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2Abstract
This Ph.D. thesis is a study of the role of the general and statesman Lucius 
Cornelius Sulla (138-78 BC) in the making of the Roman Empire.
The first chapter describes the crisis of Roman imperial strategy that became 
apparent in the age of Sulla, leading to two subsequent wars, the Social War in Italy 
and the Mithridatic War in the Greek East, then followed by a Civil War at Rome. In 
both contexts large sectors of the local elites nearly succeeded in bringing Roman 
hegemony to an end. After defeating their attempt, Rome had to redefine her 
relationship with them. Sulla played a crucial and often overlooked role in this phase.
The second chapter deals with Sulla’s contribution to the administration of the 
Empire. He brought about a fiscal reform in the province of Asia that created 
enormous difficulties for the local communities, the direct consequence of which was 
to compel them to seek the patronage or the support of members of the senatorial 
elite. In Italy, Sulla severely punished the communities that opposed his rise to power. 
In this case too they had to seek the support of members of the Roman governing 
class in order to limit the impact of Sulla’s retaliation.
The third chapter deals with the ideological aspect of the history of this 
period. Sulla made an important contribution to the ideology of Roman imperialism, 
and he made innovative use of some aspects of Roman religion. In the Greek East he 
portrayed himself and the Romans as descendants of Aphrodite/Venus, suggesting an 
interesting pattern where affinity and difference between Greeks and Romans 
coexisted and interacted. In Italy he developed this connection with Venus by 
representing himself as a new founder o f Rome, a theme that is echoed in several 
piece of evidence.
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7Introduction
Research on Sulla and his age is by no means a new undertaking. At least ten 
biographies have been published in the last century alone.1 Many accounts of the age 
of Sulla have also been written, and no reference work ignores its importance in the 
final crisis of the Roman Republic.2 Most students of the Roman Revolution have 
tried to provide an interpretation of this character, of his policies and of his aims. 
Sulla’s most prominent enemies, Gaius Marius, Cinna and Mithridates Eupator, have 
received considerable scholarly attention too.3
Biography is often a very useful form of historical enquiry. Yet, I do not 
intend to concentrate on Sulla as an individual. My aim is to focus on his role in the 
making of the Roman Mediterranean Empire. Sir Ronald Syme famously spoke of the 
‘example’ o f Sulla, which not even his constitutional reforms could prevent from 
influencing the later development of the late Republican history.4 In this thesis, I will 
try to show that Sulla’s impact was not limited to Roman internal politics. Sulla also 
played a crucial role in the reconstruction of the Empire, after a long and dangerous 
crisis that culminated with the First Mithridatic War, and in the organisation of Italy 
that followed the enfranchisement of the Allies.
Sulla’s contribution to the development of the Roman hegemony in the 
Mediterranean world was made possible by his victory against Mithridates Eupator 
and by the reconquest of Greece and Asia Minor. It is true that he did not defeat 
Mithridates completely, and that Rome’s definitive victory was only ensured by 
Pompey’s campaign in the Sixties. However, after Sulla victory the threat diminished
1 Zacharia 1834; Gerlach 1856, 25-48; Leutwein 1920; Levi 1924; Baker 1927; Berve 1931; Kahrstedt 
1931; Lanzani 1936 (cf. Lanzani 1931); Carcopino 1947; Valgiglio 1956; Volkmann 1958; Badian 1970a; 
Keaveney 1982a; Hinard 1985b; Letzner 2000; Holkeskamp 2000; Brizzi 2002; Christ 2002.
2 Cybulski 1838; Mommsen 1919, 250-377; Linden 1896; Last-Gardner 1932; Schur 1942; Sambito 
1963; Gabba 1972b; Evola Marino 1974; Santalucia 1976; Rossi 1980, 321-412; Lepore 1990; Seager 
1994. For a full survey o f  modern scholarship on this period, see Gomez-Pantoja 1990 and Gomez- 
Pantoja 1991.
3 Marius: Carney 1961a; Passerim 1971; Evans 1994. Cinna: Bennett 1923; Lovano 2002. Mithridates: 
Reinach 1890; Reinach 1895; McGing 1986a; Ballesteros Pastor 1996; Strobel 1996 (also cf. Olshausen 
1972).
4 Syme 1939a, 17; cf. Badian 1996, 401. Cf. Veil. 2.28: primus ille, et utinam ultimus, exemplum proscriptionis 
inuenit and 2.66: instauratum Sullani exempli malum, proscriptio.
beyond all recognition. After 84 BC, there was a wide awareness in the Greek East 
that Roman rule was an irreversible reality, as the refusal of the cities of Asia Minor to 
join Mithridates in the Third Mithridatic War shows most clearly. The success of Sulla 
had a fundamental consequence, the importance of which, although noted by 
economic historians, has however not been acknowledged in the standard accounts of 
the period: fiscal stability was never again to be seriously put into question down to 
end of the Republic.5
The resettlement of the province of Asia was the pivotal feature of this 
process. Resuming the revenue flow from the Greek East to Italy was the preliminary 
condition that enabled the Roman elite to restart the competition for supremacy soon 
after Sulla quit the scene. For this very reason, the age of Sulla may be viewed as the 
period that provided the essential foundation for the eventual decline of the Republic 
and the parallel consolidation of the Mediterranean Empire. As we learn from an 
important passage of Cicero, the close links between Italian and Eastern matters were 
already apparent in Sulla’s day.6 The importance of the reorganisation of the Roman 
presence in Asia Minor is indisputable, but it cannot be fully appreciated without the 
realisation that the main goal of Sulla, after defeating Mithridates, was to make his way 
back to Italy as soon as possible to fight the Civil War.
O f course, devoting a study to a character whose political agenda was strongly 
focused on internal issues does not necessarily mean adopting a Romano-centric 
outlook. This will already be implicit in the choice not to devote much attention to the 
development of Roman politics in the generation of Sulla — a topic that has been 
studied at length. A great share of Sulla’s efforts was concentrated on Italy. The choice 
was a necessary one. Central and Southern Italy were the battlefields of both the Social 
and the Civil War, and the aftermath o f the victory implied new decisions on the 
destiny of many members of the Italian elite and on the political status of numerous 
communities.
The extent o f Sulla’s interest in Italy as the centre of the Empire and as a base 
for his personal power became clear after the victory in the Civil War, with the
5 My debt to the general model o f  the economy o f  the Empire outlined in Crawford 1977a; Hopkins 
1978, 1-96; Hopkins 1980; Crawford 1985, esp. 152-218; Hopkins 1995/1996 will be apparent.
6 Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 7.19 : deinde, quod nos eadem A sia atque idem iste Mithridates initio belli Asiatici docuit, id 
quidem certe calamitate docti memoria retinere debemus. nam turn, cum in Asia res magnas permulti amiserant, scimus 
Romae solutione impedita jidem concidisse. non enim possunt una in ciuitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere ut non pluris 
secum in eandem trahant calamitatem.
9proscriptions and the setdement of his veterans. A major reorganisation of the 
governing class was brought about, not just in Rome, but also in the Italian 
communities. The ‘political death’ of hundreds of people gave way to new individuals 
to participate in the competition for power, which is pardy reflected in the 
composition of the Senate after Sulla’s reforms, although not to the extent that one 
would expect at a first glance.
At the same time, it triggered a massive redistribution of wealth and land. The 
foundation of veteran colonies was an essential part of this process, as was the 
outcome of the confiscations suffered by individuals and communities who had 
opposed Sulla. This political phenomenon can, and must, be studied as a crucial aspect 
of the social history of late Republican Italy. However, it cannot be fully understood 
without looking at its political dimension, a factor that ultimately explains the 
incomplete success of Sulla’s initiatives in some areas of Italy, especially in Etruria. As 
is the case with the study of the Greek East, dealing with the impact of Sulla on Italy 
implies understanding why some of his policies were not completely successful, and 
what Sulla decided not to do, leaving it for the following generations to deal with.
However, when Sulla decided to be a private citizen again, in 79 BC, after 
resigning from the dictatorship in 81 BC and holding his last consulship in 80 BC, he 
probably felt that he had successfully performed his essential tasks.7 The influence of 
the populares on Roman political life was at its lowest since the death of Gaius 
Gracchus. Roman rule in the East had been restored, although not extended to new 
territories. The enfranchisement of the Italian allies had been carried out without 
subverting the usual balance of Roman politics. A range of constitutional reforms left 
ground for hope that a reaction of the populares would not be successful. This is the 
established picture usually offered by handbooks of Roman history. Challenging it, or 
corroborating it is not the purpose o f this study. The assumption underlying the 
methodological approach of this thesis, in fact, is that such an approach is not enough. 
The aim is to look at what Sulla did, or failed to do, on a level that is usually 
uncritically taken for granted: that of the Empire, with its centre and its peripheries.
To do so, I will organise the discussion in three parts. In the first chapter, I 
will look at the most powerful factor of crisis that Rome had to come to terms with
7 I follow the chronology suggested by Badian 1962b, 230 and Badian 1970b, 8-14; also see Hinard 
1999 and Keaveney 2005. The slighdy later chronology (abdication from dictatorship at the beginning 
o f 79, after holding the consulship in 80) suggested in Vervaet 2004, 60-68 is unconvincing.
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between 90s and the 80s BC: the sudden and deep strain in her relations with local 
elites, both in Italy and in the Greek East.8 Between the Social and the First 
Mithridatic Wars, a considerable part of the leading groups in these two crucial regions 
became enemies of Rome. Some actively worked for the destruction of the Empire, 
especially in the East, while others engaged in a conflict whose apparent end was 
sharing some of the advantanges of the Empire — namely, Roman citizenship.9 The 
main achievement of Sulla and of his close associates is to have reversed this process, 
and to have regained the friendship, or at least the cooperation of local elites for the 
consolidation of the Roman imperial project.
To attain this result, winning both wars Rome had been compelled to fight 
was definitely not enough: a major political operation was necessary. In his study on 
Augustus and the Greek world, G. W. Bowersock pointed out that by the end of the 
first century BC the unity of the Empire was guaranteed by a powerful network of 
personal relationships among Roman and local elites.1'1 What he said of the Greek East 
is true, mutatis mutandis, of Italy too. In the first section of this thesis, I will therefore 
try to study the beginning, or rather the new beginning, of this process after the major 
traumas of the wars against the Italian allies and Mithridates, and I will try to show 
Sulla’s contribution to it.
A new balance between Rome and local elites required, especially after a phase 
of great conflict, a clear system of rewards for those who had kept their loyalty and a 
range of sanctions for those who had refused to accept the Roman hegemony. The 
discussion outlined in the first chapter must therefore be complemented by the 
analysis of the administrative development of the Empire. The second chapter of this 
study will therefore be devoted to the systems of rewards and punishment that Sulla 
brought about in Italy and in the Greek East, and to its impact on the administration 
of the Empire. In the East, distinguishing between friends and foes was quite easy: 
support for Mithridates was the basic criterion for identifying those who deserved
8 On the use o f  the category o f ‘elite’ in m odem  historiography on the Roman Empire, see Campanile 
2003b.
9 Mouritsen 1998 is a strong challenge to the idee repie that the aim o f  the Italian Allies was obtaining 
Roman citizenship; a similar approach in Pobjoy 2000. The best presentation o f  the traditional view, for 
which I still encline in many respects, is Brunt 1988, 93-130.
10 Bowersock 1965, 6-13.
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punishment.11 On the other hand, the situation in Italy was more complex, as the 
Social War had been followed by a civil war, in which what was at stake was no longer 
loyalty to Rome or to Mithridates, but loyalty to Sulla or to his enemies. The 
consequences o f Sulla’s initiatives on the making of Roman Italy were very significant, 
as the proscriptions and the colonisation both show.
Rebuilding consensus for, and even confidence in the Empire also required a 
strong emphasis on ideology. Modem scholarship has long recognised the importance 
of religious motifs in Sulla’s political discourse and propaganda. It appears, however, 
that the weight of religion in his imperial strategy has not adequately been assessed. 
The use that Sulla made of the kinship between Venus and Rome in his relations with 
the Greek East is extremely significant, and must be studied as a crucial aspect of 
Sulla’s contribution to the consolidation of the Empire. This theme also played an 
important role in the aftermath of the Mithridatic War, when Sulla tried to represent 
himself as a new founder of Rome. Its influence on other prominent figures of the late 
Republic, namely Pompey and Caesar, is indisputable.
I will approach Sulla’s contribution to the making of the Roman Empire from 
three different points of view, which may complement each other in many ways: the 
evolution of political and social relations, the administration of the Empire, and the 
religious aspects of the imperial ideology. On the one hand, I will try to assess the 
importance of Sulla on each of these levels. On the other, I will try to show their 
interconnections. Like all Empires, the Roman Empire is by definition many-fold, and 
even labyrinthine. This study is an attempt to make sense of it in a very specific phase 
of its development, by taking the remarkable contribution of an individual as a starting 
point.
11 The distinction made in Bernhardt 1985, 57 between the cities who chose to follow Mithridates and 
those who were compelled to do that was irrelevant from Sulla’s point o f  view.
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1.
Punishment and Rewards.
Sulla, the Empire and its Elites
Between the Nineties and the Eighties of the first century BC, the Roman 
Empire went through its most severe crisis between the Second Punic War and Late 
Antiquity. Two almost contemporaneous wars, the Social War in Italy and the 
Mithridatic War in the Greek East, put its very survival into question, and compelled 
the Roman governing class to an articulate reaction. The crisis triggered by these two 
conflicts had major consequences on internal political life too, and ultimately led to a 
civil war, from which the general and former consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the winner 
o f the Mithridatic War, emerged as the winner, and assumed full powers, undertaking 
a series of constitutional reforms.
The aim of this study is to identify Sulla’s role in the organisation and in the 
consolidation of the Empire after such a deep crisis. The discussion will be devoted to 
the geographical areas where Sulla operated, namely Italy and the Greek East, which, 
at that stage, were the most important regions o f the Empire. Italy was the political 
centre of the Empire already before the extension of Roman citizenship to the Allies. 
Asia Minor was the most remunerative Roman province, so important for the 
financial stability of the Empire. The stability of Greece was very significant for the 
Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean too.
The most striking aspect of the crisis Rome managed to make her way through 
is that many of the local elites became enemies of Rome, and actively plotted to 
destroy her Empire. A few decades after the victory of Sulla, however, the traces of 
this difficult phase were barely noticeable. A political process had taken place, which 
had led the Roman and the local elites to interact much more closely than in the past, 
and the Empire to derive new vigour from such cooperation.
I will try to show that Sulla’s contribution to this process was quite substantial, 
although it is usually underrated by current scholarship. As I have specified in the 
introduction, the first step to be taken in doing so is to study how the elites in Italy 
and in the Greek East took part in the crisis of the Roman Empire. I am aware o f the 
profound differences between the societies, and the elites, I am going to deal with. I 
am certain that these differences will emerge quite strongly from my discussion too.
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However, I believe that some similar patterns, both in the way the elites acted and in 
the methods that Sulla chose to deal with them, will be apparent from the discussion 
of different contexts.
I will discuss the Greek East first, and Italy immediately afterwards. This is a 
chronological order, but it is a logical one too. I believe that some of the strategies 
Sulla used in Italy may be better understood in the light of what he had done and 
learnt in the East.
1.1. A silent crisis, a noisy collapse
As handbooks often remind us, Sulla poses the same paradox common to all 
radical conservatives. Apparendy, his aim was to bring Roman politics to the balance 
of power that preceded the Gracchan crisis, but he was prepared to seize supremacy 
using the most traumatic ‘political method’, even by marching on Rome and 
organising the elimination of his opponents.1 Furthermore, many initiatives of Sulla 
are so difficult to interpret because we do not know a single line of his autobiography 
or of his speeches.
On the other hand, what we know from the literary tradition about Sulla’s 
behaviour and attitude is quite extraordinary, already from the very beginning of his 
career. As I shall try to show, his exceptional personality interestingly fits into the 
context of a general crisis of Roman imperial strategy. We know that he belonged to a 
patrician family, which had completely tarnished its political credibility five 
generations before him, and that he had to build himself a political position on his 
own efforts.2 We are told about the first important moment of his career by a famous 
section of Sallust’s Vellum lugurthinum, in which he enters the narrative as he reaches to 
Africa from Latium, probably in 106, leading a contingent of equites in support of 
Marius.3 The exceptional importance of this source prompts a detailed discussion.
1 On the concept o f ‘political method’ in late Republican history, see Meier 1965 and Meier 1966.
2 Plut. Sull. 1.1-2. About the decline o f  Sulla’s family, see Katz 1982. About the possible connections 
between the Sullae and the Sibyl, see Gabba 1975, 13-14; contra, RRC, 250. The first thirty years o f the 
life o f  Sulla are almost completely unknown: a tentative discussion in Keaveney 1980b; Keaveney 
1982a, 6-12. Shatzman 1975, 145, 152, 268-269, argues that Sulla’s career was delayed by the poor 
finances o f  his father; cf. Reams 1984, arguing, on economic grounds, that Sulla's poverty is in fact a 
myth.
3 Sail. Jug. 95.1; also cf. Val. Max. 6.9.6 and Plut. Sull. 3.1-6.
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The description provided by Sallust, who could make use of a rich tradition on 
that period, typically fits the model of the ‘paradoxical portrait’, whose importance in 
Roman historiography does not need to be restated here.4 Besides having an 
undisputable literary value, this description may be used as an interpretation o f a 
certain phase of the Roman imperial strategy and as the symptom of a broader crisis, 
which will be dealt with more fully later in this chapter. It also is an important 
assessment o f the role played by Sulla in this process, and in this respect it requires to 
be considered attentively.
Sallust says that, when he first joined the Jugurthan campaign, Sulla was an 
inexperienced commander. However, he soon managed to gain a remarkable expertise. 
Besides being extremely ambitious, he was prepared to respect his commander-in- 
chief Gaius Marius and to keep his loyalty to him. At the same time he knew how to 
obtain respect and obedience from his soldiers through using his comitas with them, 
sharing their labour and their daily efforts.5 Significantly, the portrait of Sulla emerges 
in a narrative whose central argument is the crisis of the Roman governing class, 
paralysed and blinded by its internal divisions and factional disputes. Marius, the 
commander-in-chief of the Roman army, despite being a homo novus, was already part 
of this world and shared all its limits. On the other hand, Sulla proved himself capable 
of a different approach. He was much more than Marius’ alter ego!' He knew how to 
lead his soldiers, how to motivate them and to retain their loyalty; at the same time, he 
knew how to be ruthless, if necessary. His negotiations with the local dynast Bocchus, 
leading to the treacherous capture of Jugurtha, were the clearest example of his 
qualities, which already appeared to go beyond the military field.7 However, although 
the merit of the victory was largely to be credited to him, Sulla did not hesitate in 
handing the prisoner to Marius, thus enabling him to enjoy his triumph and most of 
the political dividends of the success.
It is quite safe to argue that Marius and Sulla were still on good terms at this 
stage of their careers, and that their cooperation continued unabated until the
4 La Penna 1968, 226-227, 256; La Penna 1976, 283-285 (= La Penna 1978, 208-211); Labate 
1977/1978, 38-39.
5 Sail. Jug. 96.1-4: see Paul 1984, 238.
6 Cf. C. Kraus 1999, 221, 241-242; also see Harris 1979, 257; Paul 1984, 236-237.
7 On the negotiations between Sulla and Bocchus before the capture o f  Jugurtha, see Sail. Jug. 105-112. 
On Jugurtha’s capture, see Sail. Jug. 113; Diod. 35.39; Plut. Sull. 3; id. Mar. 10.
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campaign against the Cimbrians.8 Sallust stresses Sulla’s loyalty: neque interim, quodpraua 
ambitio solet, consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere, tantummodo neque consilio neque manu 
priorem alium pati, plerosque anteuenire. This is a very significant point, as it features in a 
work written by an author who was notoriously close to the populares and had no 
sympathy whatsoever for Sulla and his later achievements.9
In a time when the Roman governing class as a whole is proving itself 
inadequate to face the role of Rome as a world-power, and is losing cohesion in a 
fierce competition for political supremacy, Sulla stands out as a new politician, a 
special kind of homo nouus, embodying the old patrician virtues (Sulla gentis patriciae 
nobilis fu it... animo ingenti, cupidus voluptatum, sed ghriae cupidior) and, potentially, an 
innovative model of leadership too (facundus, callidus et amicitia facilis, ad simulanda negotia 
altitudo ingeni incredibilis, multarum rerum ac maximepecuniae largitor).U)
O f course, Sallust’s portrait of Sulla is not to be taken as completely reliable 
evidence. It was certainly influenced by a favourable tradition, and perhaps even more 
importandy, it had to fit the broad historiographical and literary agenda of the 
monograph. Sallust may have had a point in stressing Sulla’s new relationship with his 
soldiers: milites benigne appellare\ multis rogantibus aliisper se ipse dare benejlcia, inuitus accipere, 
sed ea properantius quam aes mutuum reddere, ipse ab nullo repetere, magis id laborare ut illi quam 
plurumi deberent; ioca atque seria cum humillumis agere. .. breui Mario militibusque carissumus 
factus. However, he was certainly inaccurate in depicting him as a figure who confined 
his ambition only to the field of military value: neque interim, quod praua ambitio solet, 
consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere\ tantummodo neque consilio neque manu priorem alium 
pati, plerosque anteuenire.
In fact, the special relationship Sulla built with Bocchus before the capture of 
Jugurtha was soon to have significant political consequences in Rome. Plutarch says 
that Sulla did not hesitate to portray the scene of Jugurtha’s capture on his seal and, 
more importandy, that Bocchus himself financed a statue of Sulla to be put on the
8 Plut. Sull. 4.1-2; uir. ill 75.3. See Cagniart 1989.
9 Sail. Jug. 95.4: atque illi felicissimo omnium ante ciuilem uictoriam numquam super industriam fortuna fuit, multique 
dubitauere, fortior an felicior esset. nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere. See Paul 
1984, 237.
10 La Penna 1968, 226-232, esp. 227-228; Labate 1977/1978, 39-40; Zecchini 2002, 46-47.
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Capitol, celebrating this military achievement.11 Its political consequences were quite 
predictable.12 Plutarch’s evidence is clearly at odds with Sallust’s narrative.
Sulla’s career ambitions, however, do not concern us. What matters to our 
purposes is that Sallust stressed the importance of a figure like Sulla, emerging in a 
critical moment for the Empire. He was more than a skilled commander: he had a 
great potential as a political leader, capable to build relationships that could turn useful 
both for himself and for Rome. It is on this aspect that I intend to concentrate my 
discussion.
As Sallust knew all too well, the war against Jugurtha, in which Sulla played 
such a decisive role, was one of the symptoms of a much wider crisis. The conflict in 
Northern Africa derived from a sudden strain in the relations between Rome and a 
local dynast who used to be on very good terms with the Romans until some time 
before. It was soon followed by the attack of the Cimbrians from the north, which 
had completely independent causes, and derived from the persisting weakness of 
Rome in Transalpine Gaul.13 However, the development of the conflict shows that 
Roman presence in Cisalpine Gaul was not strong enough either, in spite of the 
extensive colonisation brought about in the second century BC. The fragmentary 
evidence for this period suggests that the involvement of Rome in the area did 
increase after the German wars.14
The most serious threats to the consolidation and the stability of the Empire, 
however, came from the East. The creation of the province of Asia, following Attalus 
I l l’s bequest of his kingdom to Rome in 133 BC, had not stabilised the region.15 The 
most immediate danger for Roman interests came from piracy, which was remarkably 
strong in the region somewhat loosely defined as Cilicia.
11 On the seal, see Plut. Sull. 3.8-9; Plut. Mar. 10.8; Val. Max. 8.14.4; Plin. 38.9. On the statue, see Plut. 
Sull. 6.1-2 and Mar. 32.4; on the possible dating o f  the so-called ‘Bocchus’ monument’, see infra, ch. 3. 
On the connection between Sulla and Bocchus, also cf. Sen. brev. 13.6: num et hoc cuiquam curare permittee 
quod primus L. Sulla in circo leones solutos dedit, cum alioquin alligati darentur, ad conjiciendos eos missis a rege Boccho 
iaculatoribus?
12 On the deteriorating relationship between Marius and Sulla, see Epstein 1987, 50.
13 Cf. however Justin 38.3.6, mentioning talks between Mithridates Eupator, the Cimbrians and other 
Gallic populations, which probably took place in 103, soon after the beginning o f  the war.
14 The best discussion is Badian 1966, 907-910; also see Hardy 1916b, 63-68; Cary 1920; Ewins 1955, 
73-76.
15 Sherwin-White 1977a, 66 righdy stresses how remarkable and unexpected the annexation o f  the 
Kingdom was, ‘though historians generally take it for granted’.
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The military craft of the maritimi praedones had become a serious political 
problem. After being intensively exploited by Rome to supply her slave market, it had 
got out of control. Moreover, another regional power was gaining an increasingly 
important role in the Greek East. The kingdom of the Mithridatids in northeast Asia 
Minor, inaccurately called ‘Pontus’ in modem scholarship, was steadily increasing its 
power and influence under the lead of the King Mithridates VI Eupator.16 Seemingly, 
the Kingdom’s good relations with Rome were not yet in any doubt, although its 
activism certainly did not contribute to the stability of the region from a Roman point 
of view.
Mainland Greece appears to have been a less critical front, but some external 
threats were at work nearby too. There is evidence that, at the very end of the second 
century, the Thracian Chersonesus was under pressure from a barbarian population, 
the Caeni, and that the governor of Macedonia Titus Didius was assigned the task of 
dealing with them by expanding the usual boundaries of his (already fairly wide- 
ranging) prouincia.17 We owe this information to a legal document whose importance 
for the understanding of this period can hardly be underestimated: a statute voted 
probably in 100/99 BC, preserved by two inscriptions found in Delos and Cnidus, and 
known as the lex de prouinciis praetoriis.18 It was this statute that provided the basis for 
the administration in the Greek East provinces in the early years of Sulla’s career.
One of its aims was to favour the reorganisation of the Roman presence in the 
East by redefining the prouinciae of the governors deployed in the area. The clause on 
the Thracian Chersonesus is a symptom of an important aspect of the crisis that the 
statute tried to tackle. Rome had an inadequate number of magistrates with imperium in
16 See the recent survey in de Callatay 2003, 223-229. On Mithridates’ imperialistic policies in Asia 
Minor and the Black Sea region before the war against Rome, see Just. 37.1.7, with Salomone Gaggero 
1979; Shelov 1982; McGing 1986, 43-88; Boffo 1989; Avram 2005, 169-175. The concepts o f ‘Pontic 
kingdom’ and ‘Pontic ethnicity’ are anachronistic, as they derive from the name o f  the Roman province 
o f  Pontus: see Mitchell 2002.
17 Cf. Obseq. 43, recording a victory over the Thracians in 104 BC.
18 The statute is now edited, with a new commentary, by M. H. Crawford, J. M. Reynolds, J.-L. Ferrary 
and P. Moreau in RS, no. 12, 230-270; also cf. IvKnidos 31. For a discussion o f  the history o f  text, with 
special regard to the debate following the publication o f  the Cnidus copy, see RS, 231-237. The relevant 
passage o f  the statute is Cnidus copy, col. IV, 5-30; for an historical discussion, see Hassall-Crawford- 
Reynolds 1974, 213 and RS, 264. The name o f  the statute accepted here, proposed by Ferrary 1977, 
seems preferable to lex de piratis persequendis, or to lex de Cilicia et Macedonia prouinciis, suggested by Kallet- 
Marx 1995, 226 and Dmitriev 2005b, 85.
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charge of provincial administration in the East. This was a serious disadvantage in 
such a turbulent context and, indeed, it was an important factor in the outbreak of the 
First Mithridatic War.19
Even under the new statute, the governor of Macedonia had to stretch his 
field of action up to Thrace. Until the first assignment of the Cilician command, 
probably decided in 103/102, the governor of the province o f Asia had been the only 
Roman official entrusted with fighting piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome’s 
direct involvement in the Greek East was still inadequate if compared to her role in 
the Mediterranean world and to the demands of her Empire. This caused serious 
problems, which had been debated at least since Pydna and were also a matter of 
interest for Sallust’s Vellum ]ugurthinum\ to what extent Rome was prepared to get 
directly involved in the East, how her governing class should face such a challenge, 
and how the decision-making process in Roman foreign policy should work.
The lex de prouinciis praetoriis was an attempt to deal with some of these matters, 
and it marked some substantial developments. It was not just a law aiming at the 
consolidation of Roman supremacy in the Mediterranean. Its very existence implied a 
less prominent role for the Senate in the administration of the Empire. By this statute, 
the people intervened in the provincial administration and made innovative choices 
such as refusing to send senatorial legates to the Caenic Chersonese, which was an 
exception to the usual procedure that led to the inclusion of a new territory under 
Roman rule.20 Moreover, the statute was inspired by the need to defend Roman 
interests in the Mediterranean, certainly with an eye to the demands of Roman 
negotiatores and their need for security. These groups tended to be loyal to Marius and 
to the populares, although their interests were surely not in conflict with those of the 
majority o f the senators.21
Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the lex de prouinciis praetoriis is the 
evidence it provides for the emergence of a new dimension in Roman legislative texts: 
a concept which one may call, with modern terminology, ‘Roman interest’. The 
section of the statute dealing with the prouincia Cilicia specifies that its function was to
19 On the background o f  Mithridates’ strategy, see Sherwin-White 1977a, 72-73.
20 About the political significance o f  this statute, see Hassall-Crawford-Reynolds 1974, 219 and Ferrary 
1977, 654-660.
21 Mitchell 1993, 29-30. The interaction between the ordo senatorius and the ordo equester is one o f  the 
crucial problems in the study o f  the Roman Republic. Some invaluable discussions: N icolet 1966, 699- 
722; Shatzman 1975,177-212; Harris 1979, 97-104; Brunt 1988, 144-193; Andreau 2003, 236-243.
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ensure that ‘the citizens of Rome and the allies and the Latins, and those of the 
foreign nations who enjoyed the friendship with the Roman people, may sail in 
safety’.22 The explicit reference to Roman citizens and allies operating in the East is an 
aspect of the wider problem of mobility within the Empire and, specifically, of the 
mobility o f people to and from Italy, the political centre o f the Empire.
Migration from Italy had been an important aspect o f the consolidation of 
Roman presence and rule in the Greek world from the mid-second century BC. Its 
impact on the economic and social history of Italy was equally prominent. The 
experience shared by Roman and Italian negotiatores in the Greek East created the 
perception of Italian unity long before the enfranchisement o f the Allies, virtually 
eliding the status distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.23 It showed more and 
more clearly that the discrimination between the Romans and their socii was 
anachronistic in the context of the Mediterranean empire, and it ensured that the need 
for the involvement of the Allies in the administration and the full exploitation of the 
Empire would be treated as an urgent issue. In a way, this background aspect of the 
Social War may already be noticed between the lines of the lex de prouinciis praetoriis too. 
The increasing importance of the Italian presence in the Greek East had compelled 
the Roman governing class to revise its strategies accordingly.
However, there was another important aspect about this crisis, on which the 
text of this statute unsurprisingly fails to shed light. Roman mle in the Greek East was 
not building any consensus and not even any bond of trust. On the contrary, it was 
failing to reward its subjects in any way, and to ensure the protection they needed. The 
pressure of the tax-collectors on the economy of Asia Minor was unrestrained, and 
favoured by corrupt officials. Piracy was poorly contrasted by the Roman fleet, and 
kept the coasts of Asia Minor under constant threat. Ultimately, the presence of Rome 
was worsening the position of the communities, and it was causing a huge loss o f trust 
among the local elites. The conditions for Mithridates’ breakthrough were gradually 
being prepared.
22 Cnidus C opy, co l. Ill, 1. 31-37: ev  em p eX eL a i < — > , dkjTe t o u ?  | TToX'LTas*' PtopaLwv Kai 
Toug ai)(jL|j.dxous‘ A a - | t iv o u s- re  tw u  T6 eKTO? eOiAuv, oiT iues- € v  | r f |i  <f>iXtai t o o  
8 f |p o u ' Pwp.aLa)v e io iv , fier' d a -  | (fxiXeias- nAoi£eadaL SwojuraL  Tpy re  KiXt- | Kiav 8 ta  
to O to  t o  TTpayp.a k o to , t o u t o v  t o u  v o - | p o v  eT rap xeiav  aTpaTpyiKTiv TTeiroir|Keyai.
23 Gabba 1954a, 78-82 (= Gabba 1973, 239-245) is still invaluable. On the cultural integration on the 
Italians in the Greek East, see Cassola 1970/1971 (= Cassola 1993,197-212); Errington 1988, esp. 155- 
156; Sugliano 2001, 320-323; Herrmann 2002a, 36-41.
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Sulla’s career started in this critical phase of Roman imperialism, and he soon 
had to deal with difficult situations. After his praetorship, probably in 96 BC, he was 
sent to the East.24 At first glance, the literary sources are not very clear even about the 
exact denomination of his prouincia.25 Appian is quite explicit: in the famous speech he 
addresses to Mithridates during the conference of Dardanus, Sulla explicidy claims to 
‘have brought Ariobarzanes back to Cappadocia, while I was governing Cilicia’.26
As in many discussions of the making of the Roman Empire, the original 
meaning o f the word prouincia (a mission, rather than a territory, a magistrate is 
entrusted with) must be borne in mind.27 Since 103/102, Rome had begun appointing 
promagistrates to the prouincia Cilicia, also recorded in the Greek text o f the lex de 
prouinciis praetoriis as eTTCtpxeto. KiXlKia.28 As recalled above, the purpose of this 
command was to fight piracy, and explicit evidence survives for the victory obtained 
in 102 by Marcus Antonius, the famous orator, on maritimos praedones, id est piratas.2) 
Thanks to the statute, we also know that it was a military command, entrusted to a
24 Brennan 1992, 144-158; cf. Brennan 2000, 358. This view is accepted by de Callatay 1997, 209, 273; 
Ferrary 2000a, 168, 193; Letzner 2000, 100; Christ 2002, 73. There has been intense discussion about 
the date o f  Sulla's Cilician command, started by Badian 1959 (= Badian 1964, 157-168), who dated it to 
96-95 BC; a reconstruction accepted, on the whole, by Gruen 1966a, 51-52 and Keaveney 1980a, 149- 
157. Contra, cf. Sordi 1973, 374-377, who postpones the command to 91 BC, Sherwin-White 1977b and 
Sumner 1978a, who make the case, with different arguments, for a dating to 94 BC. I am not convinced 
by Amaud 1991, who uses a passage o f  Sidonius Apollinaris (Paneg. Avit. 79-82) as evidence for a 
campaign o f  Sulla against Tigranes, and dating the praetorship to 93 BC and the Cilician command to 
92 BC: see Keaveney 1995. For a full overview o f  the scholarly literature on these problems, see 
Hatscher 2001. About the spectacles Sulla organised at Rome during his praetorship, see Plin. 8.16.53 
and Sen. brev. vit. 13.6.
25 Plut. Sull. 5.6; Liv. Per. 70.6; App. b. c. 1.77.350; Mithr. 57.231; mr. ill. 75.4.
26 App. Mithr. 57.231: e? [i£y KcnnTa8oidav eyw KaTTyyayov ’ Apio(3ap£avr|v, K i\iK ia9 apxwv.
27 See Crawford 1990, 91; about the prouincia Cilicia, see Syme 1939b, 302 (= Syme 1979, 123); Sherwin- 
White 1984, 97-101; Freeman 1986. The arguments o f  Bertrand 1989, who claims that the word 
prouincia had originally a territorial connotation, are not supported by the evidence. Dmitriev 2005b, 90 
wrongly claims that, according to the lex de prouinciis praetoriis, Cilicia was a prouincia o f  the governor o f  
Asia: see RS, 262-263.
28 Cnidus Copy, col. I ll, 1. 35-37.
29 Liv. Per. 68; also see Obs. 44. Sherwin-White 1976, 4 argues that Antonius led operations in the 
mainland, but there is no evidence supporting this claim.
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praetor at the end of his mandate, with an explicit and well-identified target.30 It must 
be stressed that the statute does not ratify any territorial annexation in this area. In 
fact, there is no evidence for the establishment of the command as a permanent one, 
nor that a Roman governor was already present in Cilicia when the statute was voted 
in Rome.31
Sulla is the first known magistrate to whom the prouincia Cilicia was entrusted 
after Marcus Antonius. Plutarch gives his views about Sulla’s actual task in a passage 
with an interestingly Thucydidean flavour: he ‘was sent to Cappadocia, with the 
ostensible purpose of the expedition being to restore Ariobarzanes on his throne, but 
with the real purpose to stop Mithridates, who was restless and was about to add to 
his dominion a territory not smaller than that he had inherited’.32
Therefore, Sulla was formally ordered to restore the authority of a king who 
was a friend and an ally of the Romans and had asked for their support; in fact, 
however, the issue had a broader political relevance. Mithridates was unwilling to 
comply with the deliberations of the Senate, which had declared the freedom of 
Cappadocia and then accepted the appointment of a new king, but he was careful not 
to get directly involved in the conflict. Ariobarzanes was dethroned by Mithridates’ 
friend Gordius, but the troops of the King apparently were not in the region during 
Sulla's command, and did not fight against the Romans — unless the clash between 
Sulla and Archelaus briefly mentioned by Frontinus took place during Sulla’s Cilician
30 ’Eirapx^LOt OTpaTT)yiKf| certainly does not mean prouincia tnilitaris, as suggested by Sherwin-White 
1976, 7, but ‘praet° m n  province’: see Brennan 2000, 358, with further bibliography. Bertrand 1989, 
194-195 misses the point by stating that the province was not ‘ectoplasmique’ by 100 BC: even so, it 
still was not closely related to an identifiable territory.
31 See the commentary ad loc. in RS, 261-262. The treatment provided by Liebmann-Frankfort 1969b, 
447-457, esp. 447-450 (accepted by Merola 1996, 292-296) is misleading: see Crawford 1990, 106.
32 Plut. Sull. 5.6. This passage may derive from Sulla’s autobiography, whose fragments and testimonia are 
edited in HRK2, 1.195-204 and in Chassignet 2004, 171-184. There is a vast bibliography on Sulla’s 
memoirs: Vitelli 1898 (providing a useful survey o f  earlier literature); Leo 1914, 164-166 (= Leo 1960, 
252-254); H RR2, l.CCLXX-CCLXXX; Calabi 1950; Pascucci 1975; Valgiglio 1975; Lewis 1991b; Behr 
1993, 9-113; Suerbaum 2002; Chassignet 2004, XCIX-CIV, 240-247. O f course, the whole literary 
tradition on the Sullan age did not escape positivistic Quellenforschung. see e.g. Klebs 1876; Lely 1879, 3- 
17; Linden 1896, 5-27; Ensslin 1926.
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command.33 At any rate, Plutarch’s account implies that a war against Mithridates 
could not be formally declared.34
According to the lex de prouinciis praetoriis, Cilicia was a province for the 
policing of the Eastern Mediterranean. However, we do not have any evidence for a 
military confrontation with the pirates during Sulla’s mission.35 The victory of Marcus 
Antonius in 102/101 had not been definitive, of course. The extent of this success is 
unclear, while the incidence of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean and its survival on 
a large scale until the beginning of the Second Civil War are well-known. The lack of 
evidence does not rule out that some confrontation actually took place between the 
pirates and Sulla. The actual link between the fight against piracy and the restoration 
of Ariobarzanes, however, is usually overlooked in modem scholarship. Rather than 
postulating that Sulla had prioritised the solution o f the dynastic crisis over the fight 
against the pirates, it may be argued that they just were the two faces of the same coin. 
From Rome’s point of view, stopping Mithridates’ aggressive plans may have seemed 
a way to contrast piracy more effectively too.
The first contact he had with an envoy of the King of Parthia may also be seen 
as part of a strategy seeking to stabilise the area, which of course included the fight 
against piracy.36 It seems certain that the Senate ratified the treaty, probably after Sulla 
came back to Rome.37 It contained a clause defining the respective areas of influence:
33 Front. Strat. 1.5.18: idem aduersus A.rchelaum praefectum Mithridatis in Cappadocia, iniquitate locorum et 
multitudine hostium pressus, fecit pads mentionem interpositoque tempore etiam indutiarum et per haec auocata intentione 
aduersariorum euasit.
34 On Mithridates’ opportunism in this phase, see Glew 1977b, 381-390; Harris 1979, 273 downplays his 
role in the outrebreak o f  the war; de Callatay 2000, 355-359 argues on numismatic grounds that he did 
not start preparing an open confrontation with Rome until April 89.
35 Tac. ann. 12.62 is not relevant,/*^ Dmitriev 2005b, 92.
36 Plut. Sull. 5.8-10. There is a number o f  informed treatments o f  Rome’s early relations with the 
Parthians: see Dobias 1931, 218-221 (probably still the best discussion available); (Liebmann-)Frankfort 
1963, 183-184; Ziegler 1964, 20-24; Badian 1968a, 55-56; Liebmann-Frank fort 1969a, 172-176; Cimma 
1976, 250-252; Keaveney 1981a, 195-199; Wirth 1982, 399; Bulin 1983, 44-48; Dabrowa 1983, 21-22; 
Sonnabend 1986,159-161; Campbell 1993, 214; Frezouls 1995, 481-482; E. Winter-Dignas 2001, 26, 28.
37 See Keaveney 1981a, 198. Explicit evidence for a treaty o f  amidtia in Liv. Per. 70.7: Parthorum legati a 
rege slrsace missi uenerunt ad Syllam, ut amidtiam populi Pjomani peterent and Fest. Brev. 15.2: primum a Ludo 
Syllaproconsule Arsaces, rex Parthorum, missa legatione amidtiaspopuli Pomani rogauit ac meruit. Cf. Veil. 2.24.3. I 
do not think that the later marriage between Mithridates o f  Parthia and Tigranes’ daughter is as a 
symptom o f  a hostile attitude towards Rome, caused by Sulla’s diplomatic recklessness, as suggested by 
Debevoise 1938, 46-47. Although Mithridates’ envoy Pelopidas told the Romans that Arsaces was a
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the Euphrates was agreed to be the frontier between the area controlled by the 
Romans and their friend Ariobarzanes, and the territory in the hands of the Parthians 
and their ally Tigranes. Parthian neutrality was to prove quite significant in the near 
future, during the crisis triggered by the First Mithridatic War.
Brennan has persuasively suggested that Sulla remained in Cappadocia for 
three years, by an ordinary system of prorogation that the lack of competition for the 
prouincia Cilicia made it easy to enact.38 Marcus Antonius, who had operated in the area 
for a short time, appears not to have obtained remarkable or lasting results. His 
experience must have warned against adopting hasty solutions. The magistrates in 
charge of the province of Cilicia no doubt controlled — albeit informally -  some 
territory, which was functional to the development of military operations and to the 
policing of the hinterland. The bulk of the province was Pamphylia, although 
Lycaonia, usually a part of Asia, was occasionally included in it.39 The lex de prouinciis 
praetoriis makes it clear that Lycaonia already belonged in the prouincia Asia in 100/99 
BC, while, a few years later, Sulla and Oppius appear to have controlled it as part of 
the prouincia Cilicia, since a mission to Cappadocia required the passage of troops 
through Pamphylia and Lycaonia.40
Litde is known, however, about the scope of Sulla’s mission, and this makes an 
assessment of its impact quite difficult. Apparendy, he could not use a large Roman 
contingent: the lack of iSia Sw ains' was compensated by the contribution of a part 
o f the Cappadocian communities and of other ati|l|iaxoi npo0U|lol -  a kind of 
‘coalition o f the willing’, which certainly included Rhodes.41 An honorific inscription 
celebrating the diplomatic achievements of a Rhodian notable — unfortunately 
anonymous — includes a reference to Sulla (IG 12.1.48 = Syll? 745, 1. 1-2): [—
‘friend’ o f  the King (App. Mithr. 15.54), there is no evidence that Mithridates ever received military 
support from the Parthians.
38 See Brennan 1992, 137-144, who does not share the extreme, and untenable, view o f  Cagniart 1991, 
297-303, whereby Sulla was a marginal political figure until his successful command in the Social War in 
89.
39 Ferrary 2001a, 102-103; Ferrary 2003, 406-407. On the eiTapxeta Awcaovia in the lex de prouinciis 
praetoriis, see R3, 260-261. On the borders o f  the prouincia Asia, see Dmitriev 2005b, esp. 72-83.
4(1 See Cnidus copy, col. I ll, 1. 22-27. The problem is discussed by Ferrary 2000a, 168-170, partly 
correcting Syme 1939b, 299-300 (= Syme 1979, 120-121). About Q. Oppius, see Bertrand 1978, 798 
and Brennan 2000, 358-359.
41 Plut. Sull. 5.7. It seems however excessive to argue, with Brunt 1971, 434, that he had only a ‘personal 
escort o f  Romans’.
24
upeaPeuaavTa - ]  | Kal [mm] AeuKioy Kopyf|\toy Aeuidou [u]lo[v ZtiXXay 
| CTTpaTayoy du0UTra.Toy ' ' Pajpaltoy. This Lucius Cornelius L. fil., whose cognomen 
was engraved on a missing part of the stone, should almost certainly be identified with 
Sulla, who is the first of a list of Roman magistrates with whom the dedicatee had 
diplomatic relations. Among the others officials mentioned in the text, L. Licinius 
Murena, L. Licinius Lucullus and Murena’s legate A. Terentius Varro are identifiable 
with certainty. Each magistrate seems to be referred to with the function he had when 
he met the anonymous Greek, and the order in which they are listed is clearly 
chronological. Murena is called l|lTrr|pdTopa — a title he assumed in 83/82, before 
coming back to Rome in 81 to celebrate his triumph — while Lucullus is called 
tivTlTa|J.Lav, having been left in Asia by Sulla at the end of the war as a pro-quaestor. 
Sulla is called orpaTayov avQvirarov f Pwpoaajy, a title corresponding to the rank 
o f a propraetor with a proconsular imperiumC1 Moreover, the absence o f any reference 
to Sulla’s military achievements and to his proclamation as imperator during the First 
Mithridatic War make it very probable that the text refers to the Cilician command. 
The parallel reference to Murena's title, obtained during the same conflict, would 
otherwise be difficult to explain.43
The political context which is referred to in SylC 745 need to be discussed by 
looking at the development of the relations between the island and Rome. An 
important passage of Polybius, mainly devoted to the account of the speech delivered 
to the Senate by the Rhodian ambassador Astymedes, is evidence for the new alliance 
concluded with Rome in 164 BC, after the crisis of three years earlier.44 Rather than on 
a military basis, it was founded on a mutual declaration of friendship and on a formal 
commitment on the part of the Rhodians to comply with the requirements of Rome. 
After failing to confront piracy effectively, when it could present a danger to the
42 See Magie 1905,10, 84.
43 Ferrary 2000a, 181; contra, Wosnik 1963, 77-79 and Berthold 1984, 222, fn. 24, who date the text to 
the period o f  the First Mithridatic War. Murena is called L|lTnr|pdT(j0p in an inscription from Messene 
too (IG 5.1.1454: on the Sullan connections in the Peloponnesus, see Accame 1946, 139). Eilers 1996 
convincingly suggests, on the basis o f IvPriene 121, that Murena held a proquaestorship in Asia Minor in 
100 BC ca.; see Ferrary 2000a, 171-172. Eilers is surely right in saying, at 182, that this may have 
influenced Sulla’s decision to put Murena in charge o f  the province o f  Asia after the Mithridatic War.
44 Pol. 30.31.
25
Seleucids, Rhodes chose to take part in the fight undertaken by Rome.45 An important 
factor may be identified in the interests of the small, although rather influential Italian 
community in the island.46
A passage of the lex deprouinciispraetoriis shows that Rhodian ambassadors were 
given the right to obtain audiences extra ordinem by the Senate, in order to receive 
messages addressed to ‘the kings’.47 They played the role of intermediaries between 
Rome and the Hellenistic kingdoms that took part in the fight against pirates. 
Certainly, Rome did not ignore the issue of naval safety even when a Cilician 
command was not assigned to a magistrate. The loyalty of the island would remain 
unfailing even during the Mithridatic War, as was the case with neighbouring Caria. 
Sulla duly rewarded Rhodes’ loyalty at end of the conflict with the confirmation of 
freedom and autonomy. The Senate later endorsed it, after receiving a delegation led 
by the orator Apollonius Molon.48 Rhodes, however, remains an exception, as much as 
Caria. As mentioned above, it is in these very years that strong anti-Roman feelings 
spread throughout the Greek East. As soon as Mithridates saw the chance for a 
successful attack, he found the unreserved support of most Greek communities in 
Asia Minor, and eventually in Greece.
It is clear that, as far as the fight against piracy was concerned, Sulla’s Cilician 
command brought no discontinuity with the past. From a strategic point o f view, the 
results of the expedition were quite poor: the dynastic crisis in Cappadocia was 
temporarily solved, but it was soon to be reopened by the military activity of 
Mithridates, which caused the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War. Sulla himself was 
aware of the persisting problems in the area even after the reorganisation of Asia and,
45 About Rhodes’ non-belligerance towards the pirates as part o f  an anti-Seleucid strategy, see Wiemer 
2002, 127-130.
46 Any significant role o f  the Italian community in Rhodes in the Republican Period was denied by 
Hatzfeld 1919, 153-157 and Wilson 1966, 136, arguing that the local community limited the presence o f  
foreign negotiatores until the Empire, and viewing this as a symptom o f  Rhodian resistance to 
Romamsation; cf. however the recent discussion by Bresson 2002, 147-156, which offers a more 
complex outline o f  the interaction between Rhodians, Romans and Italians.
47 Delphi copy, block B, 1. 12-20.
48 See Cic. Brut. 90.312: eodem tempore Moloni dedimus operam; dictatore enim Sulla legatus ad senatum de 
Rhodiorum praemiis uenerat. Molon addressed the Senate in Greek: Val. Max. 2.2.3, with Wallace-Hadrill 
1998, 82-83. The embassy is likely to have taken place in 81 BC: the Senate probably confirmed the 
deliberations taken by Sulla, issuing a senatusconsultum in which the privileges o f  the Rhodian community 
were listed, as in those for Stratonicea or Tabae.
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when in power, he fostered the appointment of other promagistrates to Cilicia: Cn. 
Cornelius Dolabella in 80-79 and Servilius Isauricus in 78-74.49 The intrinsic limits of 
Sulla’s prouincia must be taken into account too. He was entrusted with a complex 
mission without receiving adequate military support, having to rely on Rome’s allies in 
the region. However, by the end of his mission, Sulla, after building his experience in 
the Roman army and in the competition for magistracies at Rome, had at least gained 
valuable first-hand knowledge of the Greek East. It is hard to say whether he 
imagined that, in a world that was changing year by year, such an experience would be 
of crucial importance to him in less than a decade’s time.50 In the light of what he 
achieved some years later, the importance of this background becomes apparent.
The increasingly precarious balance of the Roman East would collapse a few 
years after Sulla’s mission to Cilicia. Mithridates’ victorious campaign brought Rome’s 
Mediterranean hegemony to the verge of collapse. Sulla’s experience in Cilicia and — 
more importandy perhaps -  his excellent record in the Social War, to which I will 
come later, were no doubt important factors in earning him the consulship for 88 BC. 
It was no easy year to hold the supreme magistracy. The Social War was over, but the 
question of how to include the Italian allies in the citizen body and in the system of 
tribes was still open. Most alarmingly, the offensive led by Mithridates in the Greek 
East was at its highest peak. Not only was he in control o f the whole Roman province 
of Asia, where many Greek cities had greeted him as a liberator and thousands of 
Roman citizens had been killed in the so-called ‘Asiatic Vespers’.51 Greece was 
affected by Mithridates’ attack too and its cultural centre, Athens, was among the most 
enthusiastic supporters of the King. The phase in which the Empire had been under 
serious threat from various sides was over. By then, the Eastern part of the Empire 
was simply no longer in Roman hands.
49 Syme 1939b, 303 (= Syme 1979, 122); Syme 1995, 118-119. About Dolabella, see Badian 1965, 49; 
Gruen 1966b, 389-398 and Keaveney 1984, 142. About Servilius Isauricus, see Ormerod 1922; Ferrary 
1978, 781; Sherwin-White 1984,152-158; KaUet-Marx 1995, 295-296; Dmitriev 2005b, 101.
50 Badian 1958, 245 stresses Sulla’s ‘ability to learn, especially from his enemies’ — although he refers to 
those he had in Rome.
51 On Mithridates’ expansion in Asia Minor, see Bertrand 1978, 791-794; McGing 1986, 108-118; Hind 
1994, 144-149. On the massacre o f  the Italians, see Hatzfeld 1919, 44-46; Magie 1950, 216-217, 1103- 
1104; Sarikakis 1976; Amiotti 1980; Thornton 1998, esp. 271-290 (with further bibliography); Ferrary 
2001a, 106-107.
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The war against Mithridates was not one of the many diapontioi polemoi that 
Rome had sustained over the last century.52 It was a war in which the survival of the 
Empire was at stake, and the winner would obtain an extraordinary legitimisation to 
achieve prominence in Roman politics, if not complete supremacy. More importantly, 
the victorious general would be in a position to satisfy the greed o f his army by 
exploiting the booty obtained from the reconquest of the Greek East. The soldiers’ 
loyalty would be ensured for some years to come. When he decided to march on 
Rome, Sulla was surely aware of that.
The details of the controversy on the Mithridatic command do not even need 
to be recalled here.53 The task was entrusted to Sulla at the beginning of his consulate, 
but it was later revoked by a vote of the comitia and assigned to Marius. Sulla reacted 
by marching on Rome with the legions quartered in Nola.54 The prompt support of his 
soldiers — not paralleled by that of the army senior officials, save for one quaestor — 
shows their awareness of how significant the booty of the campaign could be.55
1.2. A complex strategy: Sulla between Attica and Boeotia
The level of the military threat that Mithridates posed to Rome must not be 
overrated. The victories that the so-called ‘king of Pontus’ obtained at the beginning 
of the conflict were largely owed to the limited presence of the Roman army in Asia 
Minor and Greece and to the parallel commitment in the Social War, rather than to
52 On the ‘transmarine wars’, cf. Pol. 18.35.1: ... TTpoTepov f] toI?  biaTroi'TLois- auTOii?
TToXep.oiS', eu)? eu i Ttoy lSlgjv e0wv Kai vopit'wv ep.evoy. On the exceptional 
gravity o f  the crisis opened by the First Mithridatic War, see e. g. Ferrary 1998, 825.
53 There is a number o f  good discussions: Wosnik 1963, 61-71; Luce 1970; Lintott 1971, 449-453; 
Gabba 1972b, 793-794; Glew 1977b, 398-404; Keaveney 1982a, 43-45, 58-62; Keaveney 1983b; Brunt
1988,156-157; Powell 1990, 450-459; Seager 1994, 166-170; Stone 2002, 200-206.
54 His reaction had probably better legal grounds than has often been assumed: see Levick 1982. For a
summary o f  ancient negative views on Sulla, see Dahlheim 1993, 97-98.
55 I am still inclined to believe that the quaestor who did not abandon Sulla (App. b. c. 1.57.253) was 
Lucullus, as suggested by Badian 1962a, 54-55 (= Badian 1964, 220) and, independently, by Wosnik 
1963, 52. Cf. Thonemann 2004, arguing that Lucullus was quaestor in 87 BC: also cf. Taeuber in Sayar- 
Siewert-Taeuber 1994, 118-119. The argument is based on an excessive confidence in the accuracy o f  
the official titulature used in inscriptions.
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the qualities of his forces.56 As soon as Rome decided to intervene directly, the armies 
led by Sulla, which soon included the contingent taken to Asia by Flavius Fimbria, 
quickly got control of the situation.57 According to Appian, Mithridates realised that 
defeat was close immediately after Sulla’s arrival in Greece. Hence, he ruthlessly chose 
to ravage Asia Minor, aware that he would not manage to keep it for long.58 It is the 
political strategy chosen by the King, however, that deserves to be considered more 
carefully here. His initiatives, although not supported by an adequate military force, 
were founded on an understanding of the economic aspects of Roman supremacy, 
based on the circulation of silver coinage, fiscal revenues and goods among the 
different areas of the Mediterranean. In this system, Asia Minor played a pivotal role: 
for about five years, Mithridates effectively stopped the flow of revenues from 
prouincia Asia to the Roman West (those from Greece were comparatively almost 
irrelevant), undermining the financial stability of Italy.59 Moreover, his alliance with the 
pirates, however unclear to us in its details, was making the Eastern Mediterranean 
inaccessible to Roman ships and trade.60
Although his background was Persian, Mithridates was able to talk to the 
Greeks like a Hellenistic king.61 In Athens, for instance, he accepted to be elected
56 Although widely accepted in modern literature, the definition is inaccurate, as ancient sources never 
speak o f  a ‘kingdom o f  Pontus’: Mitchell 2002, 51. Also see ibid., 39, dealing with more general 
problems o f  ethnic identity: ‘Pontikos was a term coined by outsiders’.
57 Broughton 1938, 569; cf. Sherwin-White 1977a, 73-74, stressing the exceptional skills o f  Sulla’s 
legions, which had just fought the Social War. Mithridates was already going through some difficulties 
before Sulla’s arrival: McGing 1986, 125. On Fimbria’s victories in Asia Minor, see Liv. Per. 83.1-2; 
Memn. FGrHist 434 § 24; vir. ill. 70.2-4. On the betrayal o f  his army, see Liv. Per. 83.8; vir. ill. 75.4; Veil. 
2.24.1; discussions in Badian 1962a, 57 (= Badian 1964, 225-226) and D e Michele 2005, 283-284.
58 App. Mitbr. 92.416; cf. Liv. Per. 82.5.
59 The importance o f  Asia Minor for the whole Empire is pointed out most forcefully in Cicero, Quint, 
fr. 1.1.34: simul et illud A.sia cogitet, nullam ab se neque belli extemi neque domesticarum discordiarum calamitatem 
afuturam esse, si hoc imperio non teneretur. id autem imperium cum retineri sine uectigalibus nullo modo possit, aequo 
animo parte aliqua suorum jructuum pacem sibi sempitemam redimat atque otium. On its significance for the 
financial stability o f  Italy, cf. Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 7.19.
60 See Ormerod 1924, 209-214; Maroti 1970, 481-486; Marasco 1987, 135-143; Pohl 1993, 139-140; 
Tramonti 1994, 37-41; Monaco 1996,102-103; D e Souza 1999, 116-118.
61 On the Persian background o f  the Mithridatids, see Bosworth-Wheadey 1998; Mitchell 2002, 50-59; 
Mitchell 2005b, 528-529. See Reinach 1887, 107-108 and Reinach 1888, 450 on the presence o f  Pegasus 
on Mithridates’ coinage, a typically Persian feature that the King used during the expansion o f  Asia 
Minor, and later abandoned, probably after he had to flee Pergamum. On the philhellenism of
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eponymous archon for 88/87 BC, using a traditional device of the Hellenistic dynasts 
in an explicitly anti-Roman key.62 At the same time, his whole strategy was innovative. 
He aimed at the unification of Asia Minor under his rule. No one had ever attempted, 
or attained, this goal since the day of Alexander the Great, and which was then made 
possible, at least theoretically, by the crisis of the Seleucid kingdom and by the end of 
Macedonia as an independent State. What remains of Mithridates' propaganda in the 
Greek cities of Asia Minor shows his attempt to foster a common Asiatic identity, 
involving both the Greek and the non-Greek elements.63 He carefully handled the 
matter of local and civic identities, especially when they could be used in open polemic 
against Rome. His decision not to abolish the Moukieia, the festival which the cities of 
the province of Asia organised in honour of Publius Mucius Scaevola, a governor who 
successfully limited the abuses of the publicani in the Nineties, is quite instructive in 
this respect.64
Indeed, the main question unveiled by Mithridates’ attempt was the deep crisis 
in the relationship between Rome and the local elites in the East. Mithridates had been 
actively supported by most of the cities he had to come to terms with, whose elites, 
usually without evidence of internal clashes being left on the record, were happy to 
take the newcomer’s side. Rome had to pursue a double plan: winning the war, and 
then rebuilding a constructive relationship with those she had just defeated and 
brought back under its rule. It was Sulla who was expected to carry it out successfully. 
The complexity of the situation appeared quite clearly as soon as he arrived in Greece.
Mithridates’ father, Mithridates V Euergetes, see Robert 1978; but cf. de Callatay 1997, 237-238 and de 
Callatay 2003, 221-222. On the Hellenisation o f  the Pontic governing class, see Olshausen 1974; 
Ballesteros Pastor 1994; de Callatay 2003, 220-222. Both coinage and statues show that Mithridates’ 
self-representation was heavily influenced by the iconography o f  Alexander the Great: see F. Winter 
1894 and G. Kleiner 1953.
62 Habicht 1976, 127-135 (= Habicht 1994, 216-223). IG  22.1713 reports dvapxin for that year: see 
D ow  1934, 144-146; D ow  1949, 120.
63 Mithridates’ propaganda has received considerable attention: see Matthews Sanford 1950, 33-35; 
Salomone Gaggero 1977; Glew 1977a; Rizzo 1980 (less persuasive); McGing 1986, 89-108; Desideri 
1990; Vial 1995,139-143; Muccioli 2004,151-158.
64 Cic. Verr. 2.2.51: Mithridates in Asia, cum earnprouinciam totam occupasset, Mucia non sustulit. On Scaevola’s 
outstanding record in Asia, see Diod. 37.5; Cic. Jam. 1.9.26; Cic. A tt. 5.17.5; Cic. A tt. 6.1.15; Val. Max. 
8.15.6; cf. Badian 1972, 89-92. On the date o f  his governorship, cf. Balsdon 1937; Badian 1956, 104- 
112; B. A. Marshall 1976; Sumner 1978b, 146-147; KaUet-Marx 1989; Ferrary 2000a, 163-165, 192. The 
latter’s solution, dating it between 99 and 97, is the most convincing one.
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Greece was necessarily the first step of Sulla’s campaign, both for geographical 
and strategic reasons: it was on his way to Asia Minor — the core of the conflict and of 
Mithridates’ influence — and it was a region where Rome could still rely on a number 
of allied communities, which could be of great help in starting a reaction to the attack. 
According to Plutarch, all the cities except Athens sent envoys to Sulla declaring or 
confirming their loyalty to Rome as soon as he arrived in Greece.65 According to 
Appian, however, some regions had been reached by Mithridates’ offensive. Before 
Sulla’s arrival, Archelaus had earned himself the support of Achaeans and Laconians.66 
Most Boeotian communities had joined Mithridates too. Thespiae, traditionally a pro- 
Roman city, remained loyal from the start and was besieged by the Mithridatic army. 
Only the actions of the legatuspro quaestore Bruttius Sura, sent there by the governor of 
Macedonia, Sentius, avoided a deeper penetration of Archelaus into Boeotia.67 An 
inscription celebrates Sura’s worthy actions in favour of the city.68 It was not difficult 
for Sulla, however, to regain the support of this region as soon as he passed by.67 The 
military weakness of the cities in the area certainly avoided him any serious problem.
In Attica things were more complicated. Athens had enthusiastically backed 
Mithridates early in 88 BC, as soon as the news of Roman defeat in Asia Minor 
reached the city. An embassy was sent to the King, led — it is unclear in what capacity 
— by the Aristotelian philosopher Athenion, who came back bringing Mithridates’ 
equally enthusiastic friendship and alliance.70 The Athenians welcomed him with a 
magnificent procession. The influential corporation of the artists of Dionysus joined 
this manifestation of enthusiasm, and performed sacrifices in honour of the new 
strong man of Athenian politics — or the ‘intruder’ (TTapeyypac|)O S‘) ,  as Posidonius
65 Plut. Sull. 12.1: tci? |i6v aXkas 716X619... t o i?  8’ ’ A0f|vais\
66 App. Mithr. 29.113; cf. Memn. FGrHist 434 § 22; Flor. 1.40.8. There is no evidence that Sparta 
supported Mithridates: see Cartledge-Spawforth 1989, 94-95; contra, Deininger 1971, 258.
67 Plut. Sull. 11.5; App. Mithr. 29.114.
68 Published in Plassart 1949, 830-832, no. 11. Thespiae already had a record o f  strong loyalty to Rome 
before the Mithridatic War: see the prosopographical study in C. P. Jones 1970. According to Strab. 
9.2.5 =  C 403, Thespiae was, along with Tanagra, the only reasonably wealthy city in Boeotia: see 
Wallace 1972, 71-72; Alcock 1997, 294.
69 App. Mithr. 30.117.
70 Posidonius, FGrHist 87 F 253 (= Athen. 5.211d-215b): see Desideri 1973, 249-258; Bernhardt 1985, 
45-46; Kidd 1989, 41-46; Bringmann 1997 (quite speculative); Mastrocinque 1999a, 79-86. Cf. Liv. Per. 
81, Veil. 2.23.2; Plut. Sull. 12.1; App. Mithr. 30.116-122; Flor. 1.40.10; Paus. 1.20.5-6; Oros. 6.2.5.
31
calls him.71 The allegiance of the city was confirmed by the eventual appointment of 
Athenion to the hoplite generalship and by the capture and murder of the Roman 
citizens based in Attica.72 Athens seemed eager to start a new phase of independence 
from Rome, under a democratic constitution and the benevolent patronage of a 
philhellenic dynast. Its decision to join Mithridates was certainly influenced, to some 
extent, by the King’s self-representation as a new Dionysus.73 It would be rash to 
define this revolt as a victory of democracy. Pausanias was simplifying things saying 
that only the ‘turbulent element’ of the Athenian people (to TapaxwSes* TOO 
8f||10U) supported Mithridates, while the ‘respectable’ ones ( ’ A0T|vaiOl d)P TIS* 
XoyoS') left the city and joined the Romans.74 The victory of Athenion certainly was, 
however, a defeat for the aristocracy that had been controlling Athenian politics for 
the last decades.
There are several reasons why it was simply unacceptable to Rome and her 
commander, and the immediate reconquest of the city was an absolute priority of the 
campaign. To sketch a summary list: the strategic position of Athens, its commercial 
importance, its wealth and, perhaps most importandy, its huge cultural prestige, 
unrivalled in the Greek world. Undertaking a reconquest of the Greek East without 
getting hold of its main intellectual centre was simply unthinkable.75 Plutarch makes an 
odd comment on this aspect. He dismisses Sulla’s commitment to seize the city before
71 It remains to be properly explained how Athenion managed to be entrusted with the embassy to 
Mithridates, if  Medeios was still in power: Kallet-Marx 1995, 207.
72 About this appointment o f  Athenion, see Sarikakis 1951, 44-45. The election o f  Athenion to hoplite 
general and the later developments o f  the war make it hard to agree with Kallet-Marx 1995, 211-212, 
who suggests that Athens did not commit herself to supporting Mithridates after the embassy to the 
King.
73 On the choice made by the Athenian Dionysus’ technitai in this crisis, see Breglia Pulci Doria 1983, 
240-243; Ferrary 1988, 521; Tamura 1988; Le Guen 2001, 1.336-337, summing up earlier bibliography; 
Aneziri 2003, 49-51. Cf. the different attitude towards Sulla o f the technitai o f  Ionia and Hellespont, 
whom he even rewarded them with fiscal immunity after the war. An inscription found at Cos (RDGE  
49) contains a letter to the technitai confirming their privileges and one inviting the city to respect them: 
see Segre 1938 (= Segre 1993, 16-17, E D  7); Sherk 1966; RDGE, 263-266 (no. 49); Le Guen 2001, 
1.284-288 (TE 56) and Aneziri 2003, 247-248, 394-395 (D18 a-b).
74 Paus. 1.20.7; see Bernhardt 1985, 40-42; Bultrighini 1990, 25-26. Candiloro 1965, 135-145, 158-167 is 
an unconvincing attempt to explain the choice o f  Athens as an upheaval o f  the lower classes, who were 
unhappy with the ‘agreement’ (141) between Rome and the local aristocracy.
75 See Gabba 1999, esp. 78-80.
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moving on with the campaign as a ‘fight against the shadows’ (13.1: <TXlCt|iax£LF): 
could not be more wrong. There were tangible reasons why the Greek East just could 
not be regained without Athens. Her cultural prestige was perhaps the most 
prominent one, and Sulla was perfectly aware of that.
The pro-Mithridatic revolt came at the end of a period of political tension in 
Athens. The speech given by Athenion as he returned from his talks with Mithridates, 
reported by Posidonius and included in Athenaeus’ antiquarian work Deipnosophistae, 
contains the implicit message that Mithridates’ alliance will put an end to ‘anarchy in 
which the Roman Senate has decided that we should live in until it has decided how 
we should be ruled’.76 Here ‘anarchy’ surely does not mean ‘absence of archons’ as in 
other cases of Athenian history, since the magistracy of Medeios, who was eponymous 
archon for three years in a row (91/90, 90/89, 89/88), is safely attested for 89/88. It 
probably means that an archon who has served for three consecutive years is not a 
proper archon, and that new ones were not being elected any more.77 The political 
implications o f Mithridates’ message, however, were very clear, and Athenion’s speech 
— basically, the only literary source for this period that is not openly pro-Roman — is 
immensely useful in this respect.78 Mithridates was keen to offer Athens his patronage. 
In a Greek East controlled by the King, Athens would keep its leading cultural role, 
and it would also return to a complete political autonomy, possibly even with a hint of 
democracy in its institutions. The Romans would simply disappear, both from Attica 
and — more importantly — from Delos.
Athenion’s speech is also significant because it shows that the King was 
prepared to seek the loyalty of the city by using appealing economic arguments. The 
message he addressed to the demos included a commitment to solve the problem of 
debt — a typical device of would-be tyrants throughout Greek history, and a symptom
76 Athen. 5.51.213. = FGrHist 87 F 36: t l  o w , eiTTe, au|i(3oiAei>(jo; ph avexea Qai TnS‘ avap xia?  
r\v f | ' Pa)|iata)v amyKXriTO? em axcTf)vai TTdToi'T|K6v, ew? av  aun) 8oKi|j.doTi ire pi toi) mo? 
f|p.a? TtoXiTfUfaGai Set.
77 Cf. Badian 1976, 111; Ferrary 1988, 485-486. Contra, Accame 1946, 167. About Medeios, see 
Touloumakos 1967, 85-86; Badian 1976, 106-108; Bernhardt 1985, 39-40; Habicht 1995, 301; Kallet 
Marx 1995, 207-208; Vial 1995, 116-117. MacKendrick 1969, 54-61 views Medeios’ rise as the peak o f  a 
phase o f  Athenian history dominated by the aristocracy, started in 129/128. See esp. 60-61 on the 
importance o f  aristocratic euergetism (‘The ruling class, Medeios and his circle, were creditors. The 
debtor demos could be saved only by the fall o f  Rome’); but cf. Davies 1973, 229.
78 The scepticism o f  Sherwin-White 1980, 1995 is unjustified.
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of the importance of the matter in first-century Athens. The evidence, unfortunately, 
does not reveal much about the identity o f the creditors. It would be interesting, and 
perhaps not surprising, if some Roman citizens were amongst them. The position of 
the Roman citizens resident in Attica during this period is however largely unknown, 
because evidence is lacking. Although we know a number of individuals, nothing is 
known about the political influence of their community in the city, if any.79 Not very 
much is recorded for this period about the large community of Italians who were 
based in Delos either.80 The construction of the slave market known as the ‘agora des 
Italiens’, datable to 100 BC ca., bears the traces of a considerable wealth.81 The 
Italians based on the island certainly had a crucial function in the development of the 
conflict by contributing to keep Delos on the side of the Romans.82 At any rate, the 
island refused to join Athens in her pro-Mithridatic choice, and the attack of the 
contingent sent by Athenion, led by Apellicon of Teos, was repealed.83 A new front of 
resistance to Mithridates, Archelaus and their associates was unexpectedly opened in a 
crucial position, giving Sulla some more time to refine his strategy. Despite their 
different choices, however, the destinies of Athens and Delos were inevitably linked to 
each other in this crisis.
No doubt, the reaction of Delos to Mithridates and to the attack launched by 
his Athenian associate is also to be explained by the role of the part of the Athenian 
elite, which had interests there and was interested in keeping good relations with 
Rome and the Roman business community on the island.84 The links between 
Athenian leading families and Delos are confirmed by the comparative study of 
evidence from the island and of an inscription from Athens, dating to the very end of
79 Habicht 1997.
80 The evidence for the Italians in Athens and Delos is discussed in Hatzfeld 1919, 41-44 and Wilson 
1966, 96-98, 113-119. Hatzfeld 1912 provides a full prosopography o f  the Italians attested at Delos; cf. 
the updated list in Ferrary 2002b.
81 Excavation report in Lapalus 1939. See Coarelli 1982b, 124-133; Bruneau 1975 unconvincingly denies 
that the Agora was actually a slave market. On D elos’ central function in the Mediterranean slave 
market, see Strab. 14.5.2 = C 668, with Ferrary 1978, 783-784.
82 Baslez 1982, 62-65.
83 Athen. 5.214b-215b = Posid. FGrHist 87 F 36. See Roussel 1916, 315-327; Baslez 1982, 52-58; Kallet- 
Marx 210-211.
84 Gross 1954, 116; Candiloro 1965,135-141. On the military confrontations at Delos, see Ferrary 1980, 
35-36; Baslez 1982, 52-55. On the political role o f  merchants at Delos in the Hellenistic period, see 
Reger 2003,193-195.
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the second century BC and containing the list of the contributors to seven 
celebrations of the Pythais, a procession from Athens to Delphi whose organisation 
required a financial effort on the part of Athenian leading families.85 Some members 
of the Athenian elite did business there, some others frequented the local gymnasium, 
others held priesthoods or the office of Epimeletes of the island.86
In Athens, on the other hand, the emergence of the pro-Mithndatic faction 
was sudden, and it followed the same pattern of most (JTdcjeiS': Medeios and his 
associates were compelled to leave power, without any resistance on their part being 
left on the record. Some of them were immediately killed, others were captured by 
Athenion’s men while they were trying to escape and executed. Only a part of the pro- 
Roman Athenians managed to leave the city, and there is no evidence that any of them 
reached Delos.87 On the other hand, some Athenians are known to have been with 
Sulla during the siege and to have begged him not to destroy the city after the 
conquest.88 Sulla’s decision not to ravage the city had, o f course, a strong political 
significance, which needs consideration, especially in the light of the dramatic siege 
that preceded it. It must be borne in mind, however, that a sack took place and that no 
doubt it made an impressive impact on the city.
The version of the conquest of Athens provided by the literary sources is the 
typical piece of history written by the winners; there is nothing comparable to 
Posidonius’ account for the final part of the conflict.89 The extant tradition largely 
mirrors a Roman point of view. The Athenians are depicted as undisciplined, 
opportunistic, even unable to negotiate an honourable agreement before the beginning 
of the siege. The incarnation of Athenian inconstistency is the ‘tyrant’ Aristion, who 
succeeded to Athenion at some point during the war and was killed as the Roman
85 IG 22.2336: the best edition is Tracy 1982, providing a rich epigraphic and historical commentary. 
Also see MacKendrick 1969, 59-60; Tracy 1979; Vial 1995, 114-116.
86 Tracy 1979, 217-220, 229-231.
87 See Touloumakos 1966, also providing a convincing interpretation o f  Athenaeus’ difficult text. Cf. 
Kallet-Marx 1995, 210. Badian 1976, 114-115 rightly remarks that the sources say almost nothing about 
the part o f  the Athenian elite that supported Rome.
88 Plut. Sull. 14.9. Their names were Midias and Kalliphon; it has been argued that Midias should be 
read as Medeios, and is in fact the former archon: see Ferguson 1911, 451; Habicht 1995, 305, fn. 24. 
This ‘Midias’ might also be Medeios’ son, who however became archon only in 65 BC. These 
suggestions are quite problematic, as Midias was a common name, made familiar to all educated Greeks 
by Demosthenes’ speech Against Midias. On Sulla’s ‘clemency’, see Barden Dowling 2000, esp. 336-340.
89 Candiloro 1965,145-157.
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troops stormed into the city.90 Plutarch reports the talks that preceded the siege in a 
very condensed fashion. Sulla dismissed Aristion’s envoys as soon as they started to 
celebrate the past glories of the city, claiming that his only aim was to defeat the 
rebels.91 A. Chaniotis has righdy noticed that the evocation of the past was a typical 
feature of Athenian political discourse and diplomacy, but he has gone too far in 
arguing that Sulla misinterpreted this rhetorical strategy.92 It is safer to suggest that he 
was not interested in any kind of negotiation and that he needed a pretext to stop the 
talks. In fact, as noted above, his only aim, at that stage, was to conquer Athens. That 
was the only strategy that could put an end to all hopes of Mithridatic control of 
Greece. Moreover, it was a chance to give his troops a first reward, allowing them to 
get their hands on the booty of a city that still had much to offer.
The extent of the devastations perpetrated by the Sullan army can be 
appreciated more through the archaeological record than by the literary tradition. As 
so often in Sulla’s military career, conquering Athens was largely about enforcing a 
detailed and rational plan of action, which he did with the assistance of his legatus C. 
Scribonius Curio.93 In his case, the steps to be taken were quite predictable: to 
organise an effective sack of the city and to ensure that a new political situation was 
brought about. A recent study by M. C. Hoff has shown that destructions safely 
datable to the beginning of the first century BC are attested in the Agora, especiady in 
the southwest and northwest side. The neighbouring streets also bear traces of a sack, 
involving structures like the Tholos and the Stoa Basdeos, from ad sides of the Agora. 
The Acropods and the Erechteion appear not to have escaped the devastation either, 
and the latter is, in fact, the monument that suffered the heaviest damage. To the Hst
90 There is a vast bibliography on the problem o f  the correct identification o f  Aristion and Athenion. 
The case for the separatist position was first made in Niese 1887, Ferguson 1911, 444-451 and 
Wilamowitz 1921 (= Wilamowitz 1923, 204-219); Bugh 1992 has conclusively confirmed it. Also see 
Ferrary 1988, 477-479; Dorandi 1989; Goulet 1989b; Habicht 1994, 240-241. See Bugh 1992, 111-112, 
fn. 8 for a full summary o f  the scholarly production on this problem.
91 Plut. Sull. 13.5.
92 Chaniotis 2005a, 145-146; Chaniotis 2005b, 215-216. On the incommunicability between Greeks and 
Romans, cf. Alcock 1993,178-179.
93 On Curio, see Plut. Sull. 14.11; App. Mithr. 39 and 60; Paus. 1.20.6.
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must be added the Arsenal at the Peiraeus, a magnificent building which was 
completely destroyed after the defeat of the Mithridatic troops.M
While he surveys the monumental landscape of the capital of Greek culture, 
Pausanias cannot help but detect the traces of an ancient sack, which represents, to his 
eyes, the definitive consolidation of Roman presence in its crudest form. As he 
famously puts it, ‘the behaviour of Sulla towards the majority of the Athenians was 
more cruel than that which a Roman would conceivably adopt’.95 Such a judgement 
implies a criticism of Sulla and, on the other hand, a not entirely unfavourable 
assessment of Roman policies in Greece as a whole. Sulla is portrayed as a regrettable 
exception, definitely not as the rule: other Roman officials proved capable of 
governing Greece fairly.96 As has been righdy noted, they do not deserve to be 
compared to the Macedonians, who Pausanias recurrendy blames for having vexed 
Greece and humiliated its culture.97
The awe that the sack of Athens caused was probably increased by the long 
time the reconstruction took to be accomplished. Most of the damaged buildings and 
monuments were not rebuilt or refurbished before the Augustan age, with only some 
minor interventions being brought about in the meantime.98 This is a symptom of 
economic weakness, if not of an open crisis, in post-Sullan Athens. In many ways* this 
is not surprising. The Peiraeus was heavily damaged; Delos had been ravaged by 
Archelaus and was gradually losing ground to its Italian competitor Puteoli." In 69, it 
was affected even more severely by the attack of the pirates who joined Mithridates in 
his third war against Rome. From the early Sixties on, it went through an even steadier 
commercial decline, as Rome started to fight piracy more effectively and to use
94 Plut. Sull. 14.13; App. Mithr. 41.157; Strab. 9.1.15 = C 396,14.2.9 = C 654; Front. Stmt. 1.11.20; Flor. 
1.40.10. The reference discussion is H off 1997, esp. 38-43; for the presumable chronology o f  the 
restorations, see ibid., 42. Arafat 1996, 100-102 righdy notes that Pausanias’ account is focused on 
Sulla’s actions against the Athenians, rather than on the destruction o f the monuments.
95 Paus. 1.20.7: ZuXXa 8e ecm  p iv  icai t<3 e? tous* ttoXXous1 ’ A0r|vdia)i' dypiurrepa fj to? 
avSpa e ’lKos- f|u epydaacrOai' Ptopaiov.
96 See Arafat 1996,104-105; Habicht 1998,120; Bowie 1996, 218.
97 Bearzot 1992, 17-18. Palm 1959, 64-68 is far too optimistic about Pausanias’ sympathy for the 
Romans; a much more balanced approach in Hutton 2005, 41-48.
98 H off 1997, 42.
99 Direct commercial relations between Asia Minor and Italy became more intense after the defeat o f  
Mithridates: see e.g. Rostovtzeff 1941, 959; Zalesskij 1982, 49. On Archaelaus’ sack, Baslez 1982, 57-58.
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different sources for her slave market, such as the Balkans.100 The Athenian elite that 
had weighty interests at Delos could not avoid facing serious economic difficulties.
From the political point of view, however, Athens did not lose much ground 
from the years preceding the war. Its territory appears to have kept its integrity. Sulla 
had no interest in depriving the city of its sphere of influence, traditionally reaching 
out to territories like Imbrus, Lemnus, Scyrus, and Delos of course.101 It has long been 
thought that Athens lost control of Salamis at some point soon after the Sullan 
conquest, but no evidence seriously supports this claim, as shown by C. Habicht.102 
Sulla appears to have been very mild towards Athens in this respect, and not to have 
undermined its supremacy in Attica. The adoption of this stance surely influenced the 
later development of his relationship with the city, as I will show in the third chapter.
It is worth stressing the importance of the support that a part of the Athenian 
elite decided to give to Sulla. This was not an exclusively Athenian phenomenon, as 
notables proved prepared to cooperate with Rome throughout Greece during and 
immediately after the war. The best explanation is probably that resentment against 
Rome was less intense than in Asia Minor, because the publicani had not operated 
there, and the fiscal pressure was not comparable to that imposed on the province of 
Asia. The main reason why Mithridates met a great success in Greece is surely his 
emphasis on the motif of Greek autonomy.103
The stabilisation of Athenian internal politics that took place in the aftermath 
of the war seems to have been quick and relatively smooth. Sulla’s role in this process 
should not be overrated. Appian says, somewhat misleadingly at first sight, that Sulla 
restored ‘completely similar laws to those previously decided by the Romans’.104 This
100 As pointed out by the discovery o f hoards o f  Roman denarii in the lower Danube basin: see 
Crawford 1977b, esp. 120-123; Ferrary 1978, 781; Ste. Croix 1981, 230. Bruneau 1968, 679-685, 688- 
689 argues that the destruction was less devastating than the literary sources suggest. H off 1989, 7 
suggests that, conversely, Athens’ function as a trade centre became more prominent in the late 
Republic and in the Early Empire.
101 On the role o f  Athens at Delos after the war, see Ferrary 1980, 40-41 and Baslez 1982, 65-66.
102 Habicht 1995, 311-312; Habicht 1996.
103 Significantly, in the Dardanus talks Sulla would blame Mithridates for having violated the freedom o f  
the Greeks: App. Mithr. 58.237. After 145 BC, Greece had lost the fiscal immunity, the d^opoXoyryjLa, 
but it was still largely independent from a political point o f  view (duTOVOgia-SppoKpaTia), and there 
were no Roman contingents on its soil (d(f>poupecria): see Ferrary 1988, 209.
104 App. Mithr. 39.152: T019 aXkoig (juveyvco Kai vopoug e0r|Keu dTTaaiv ayxou tw v TTpoaOev 
auTOL? u t to  ' Pojpaiwv 6pia0ev0(jjv.
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persuaded some scholars to speak of a ‘Sullan constitution’ given to Athens after the 
reconquest, for which there is no evidence whatsoever.105 Touloumakos is surely right 
in arguing that Appian is here translating the Latin expression leges imponere, meaning 
something like enforcing the peace conditions, by imposing the same context that was 
at work before the beginning of the war.106
In Greek terms, perhaps, it would not be inaccurate to say that the TToXlTCia. 
of Athens changed again with the coming of Sulla, although a constitutional reform 
was not brought about. A new political situation emerged and a more firmly pro- 
Roman section of the elite came to power. The evidence, however, is very scarce. 
There is no record of the activity of the Boule throughout more than three decades 
after the war, as the first decree we have dates to 49/48.107 We know that the 
traditional magistracies remained in vigour, and the hoplite generalship remained the 
most prominent one.108 The broader context suggests that after the conquest o f Sulla 
an oligarchic TToXiT€ia was not just the choice of the Romans or, for that matter, of 
the Athenians, but was to a large extent related to the economic and social impact of 
the reconquest on the city.109
After his victory, Sulla eliminated only the closest supporters of Aristion, 
forgiving ‘the living ones for the sake of the dead’, as he put it.110 The ‘respectable 
citizens’, as Pausanias brands the pro-Roman coalition, just came back to power as 
soon as the city was safe for them again. It was not easy, however, to come back to
105 See e. g. Accame 1946, 170-174; Geagan 1967, v, 1, 5; Rhodes 1972, 86, 222; Geagan 1979, 373; 
contra, Habicht 1995, 313-315. It may be correct to say that Sulla restored the constitution o f Athens 
only in that he defeated a monarchy: see Ferrary 1988, 217-218. Cf. Plut. Compar. Eys. Sull. 5.5: TT]V 
ttoXiu e\u)v, eXeuOepav oujjfjice tea! aimWop.oi'.
106 Touloumakos 1967, 89, fn. 3: ‘Friedensbedingungen stellen’, usefully referring to several occurrences 
in Livy; cautiously accepted by Kallet-Marx 1995, 218, fn. 105.
107IG  22.1047. See Touloumakos 1967, 87; Rhodes 1972, 257; Habicht 1995, 317.
108 See Sarikakis 1951, 17-18; Geagan 1997, 21-22.
109 Oliver 1972, 101-102 and Geagan 1979, 376-377 tried to interpret SEG  26.120 as evidence for a 
return to democracy in 70 /69  BC; cf. Geagan 1971, 101-108 and Oliver 1980 (= Oliver 1983, 52-55). 
However, the inscription is most likely to date to the age o f  Athenion: see the sound arguments in 
Badian 1976, 116-117; Ferrary 1988, 217-218; Habicht 1995, 320-321.
110 Plut. Sull. 13.9; App. Mithr. 39; Licin. 35.61 Criniti. Cf. Strab. 9.1.20 = C 398: ... Tqv tto X iv  6K 
TToXiopKias' eXwv ZuXXa?, o Ttou' PcopLatcov fiyepwv, tt) 8e noXei <juyyvu)|i.r|v ev e ip .f  K ai 
p.eXPL vvv ev  eXeuOepta ical Tip.r| Trapa t o i ? ' Pcop.aiois’. Strabo clearly minimizes the gravity o f  
Sulla’s misdeeds: see Desideri 2000, 36. However, K. Bradley 1989, 91 is no doubt wrong in claiming 
that Sulla reduced into slavery ‘the remaining population o f  Athens’.
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the status quo that preceded the war. The families that had supported the oligarchic 
regime before the emergence of Athenion were certainly weakened by the crisis Delos 
went through, and it is likely that they suffered losses during the revolt led by 
Athenion. The evidence we have for the names of the holders of the archonship is 
hard to interpret. However, at least from the Sixties, when the names of the 
magistrates recorded in the inscription include the mention of the patronymic and of 
the name of the deme, a picture is conveyed of the persisting influence of a narrow 
circle of families. Some of them belonged in the elite of the old oligarchic regime, such 
as the son of Medeios from Piraeus, who was eponymous archon in 65 BC. Others 
were exponents of families that emerged only after the crisis, like the family from 
Marathon to which the archon Pammenes in 83/82, the archon Zenon in 54/53, the 
hoplite general Pammenes (the second) after 24 BC, and probably the archon Zenon 
(the fourth) in 13/12 BC belonged.111 This family emerged in Athenian politics soon 
after the war, without having had a prominent role before. In a critical phase for the 
Athenian political establishment, its low political profile and low involvement in the 
revolt appear to have played an important role in ensuring its political success.112
At any rate, Sulla seems to have had little, or no direct role in the selection of 
the post-war new governing class. It is significant that the literary sources, after dealing 
with the siege of Athens at great length, are uninterested in the settlement of Athenian 
internal affairs after the reconquest. Such a choice probably mirrors the priorities of 
Sulla himself. After the city was conquered and the most dangerous elements were 
eliminated, there was no need for Rome to intervene directly in the affairs of the city. 
The financial burden of the reconstruction and the crisis deriving from the sack of 
Delos compelled the city magistrates to seek the support and the patronage of 
members o f the Roman governing class, developing the pattern that had already been 
inaugurated during and soon after the siege, when several senators were asked to 
persuade Sulla to avoid the destruction of the city.113
Moreover, the city was safe for wealthy Roman citizens, like the young T. 
Pomponius Atticus, and for the Athenian philosophers, like Philon from Larissa, who 
had fled the city when Athenion reached power and would be a great encouragement
111 D ow  1949, 123-124; Geagan 1992, esp. 34-35. About Pammenes, see Sarikakis 1951, 77-78.
112 Geagan 1992, 43-44.
113 Plut. Sull. 14.9. Cf. Plut. Sull. 22.1 on Sulla being joined by a axf|[ia  (3ou\f|9 during the final part o f  
the Eastern campaign.
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for the youngsters of the Roman aristocracy to spend a part of their education in 
Athens.114 The ties between Athens and Rome could only get closer. The stabilisation 
of the city, however, took several years. As I will try to show in the third chapter, it 
was probably accomplished only in 84/83, during Sulla’s second stay in the city, on his 
way back to Italy. In 86, the first aim of Sulla was to be in control of Athens and its 
port, so that he could concentrate on Boeotia, the other front of the conflict in 
mainland Greece, whose importance had increased during the siege of Athens, since a 
new contingent of Mithridatic troops had reached Greece from Thrace.
The case of Athens and her elite shows that the political history o f Greece in 
this period was more complex than some sources would lead one to believe. The war 
was a very divisive issue, which changed the profile of the Greek elites, and many 
communities paid a high price for it. As mentioned above, Plutarch plainly says that all 
the cities except Athens followed Rome as soon as Sulla arrived in Greece. He does 
not say much, however, about what led them to change their attitude, and what sort of 
debate there was within the Greek world during this period. In the biography of Sulla 
he even fails to discuss the position o f his hometown Chaeronea. In the prologue to 
the Uves of Cimon and Lucullus, however, he suggests that things were quite 
complicated there. At the outburst of the Mithridatic War a Roman garrison was 
occupying the city. A revolt led by a local young aristocrat, Damon, soon attempted to 
expel the Romans from the city.115 Only the wise intervention of Lucullus, then in 
Greece as quaestor of Sulla, avoided the destruction of the city. For this very reason, 
as he makes it clear, Plutarch decided to devote one of his Uves to the philhellenic 
commander, as a sign of lasting gratitude.116
According to his version, the reason for the revolt was the intemperance of 
the commander of the Roman garrison placed in Chaeronea, who was attracted to 
Damon and was prepared to use any means to satisfy his lust. Therefore, Damon 
organised a conspiracy with sixteen comrades, and killed the official and his escort.
114 On Philo’s escape to Rome, see Cic. Brut. 89.306, with Touloumakos 1967, 88. It is uncertain 
whether Antiochus from Ascalona fled to Rome in the same period: see Ferrary 1988, 447-448, fn. 43. 
At any rate, the Mithridatic War had a heavy impact on the Academy: see ibid., 447-448. On the other 
hand, the head o f  the Epicurean school, Zenon o f  Sidon, did not leave Athens in 88, but he was 
probably compelled to do that, if  briefly, after the Sullan reconquest: ibid., 479-482.
115 Plut. dm . 1-2.3: there is a memorable commentary o f  this passage in Ma 1994; cf. Blamire 1989, 79- 
84.
116 D u ff 1999, 59-60.
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When his fellow citizens sentenced him to death, he was already on the run. Some 
time later, Damon’s gang took another revenge, broke into Chaeronea and killed the 
city magistrates who had proposed their death sentence — again leaving unharmed 
soon after the deed. Lucullus was then resuming the command of the Roman troops 
quartered in the region by Sura. He visited the city, acknowledged the responsibilities 
of the Roman official who had caused Damon’s reaction and ordered the Roman 
garrison to join the rest of the army, which was then heading for Attica.
So far, the story may well fit the pattern of a ‘crime of passion’ with some 
serious, albeit temporary consequences. Its late developments, however, point to a 
different conclusion. Damon, after spending some time ravaging the countryside with 
his associates, was suddenly forgiven by his fellow citizens, who sent embassies to him 
and invited him to return to Chaeronea. He heeded the call and was soon elected to 
the local gymnasiarchy. Yet, some time later, he was stabbed in the public baths. 
Plutarch argues, and actually appears to believe, that Damon’s murder was the 
outcome of a sophisticated plan aiming at the elimination of a dangerous public 
enemy. This interpretation largely prevailed until some recent studies independendy 
pointed towards a different conclusion.117
A more straightforward interpretation can be suggested simply by looking at 
the development of the conflict and at the sequence of events in Chaeronea. Damon’s 
hostility was addressed, in equal measure, to the Romans and to the Chaeroneans who 
were supporting them, especially the local magistrates who convicted him. He appears 
to act as the leader of a group with a clear political agenda. Moreover, an inscription 
from Chaeronea confirms that the presence of foreign troops could be indeed a 
problem and a potential threat for the city. Amatokos, the commander of the Thracian 
auxiliary contingent which joined the Romans in the war and was deployed in 
Chaeronea in the winter of 88/87, won the gratitude of the city for having restrained 
the greed of his soldiers.118
The actions of Damon must be considered in the context of a militarily weak 
and not wealthy town, involved in a war for supremacy in the Greek East and fighting 
for survival. After the murder of the Roman official, his presence in town was
117 Ma 1994, 68; McKay 2000b; Thornton 2001.
118 Published and discussed by Holleaux 1919 (= Holleaux 1938, 143-159); cf. FD, III.3, 143, fn. 3. 
Thracian trooos took part in the Mithridatic War, both on the side o f  the Romans and o f  Mithridates: 
see Salomone Gaggero 1978 (about Amatokos, see 304-305) and Danov 1979,113-115.
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impossible until the garrison left the city for Attica. Then, the pro-Roman faction 
became weaker. It lacked any protection from the Romans, and must face the restless 
brigandage o f Damon and his associates in the countryside. The elimination of the 
magistrates made a later agreement between the pro-Roman faction and the insurgents 
quite unlikely.
Rather than postulating a Machiavellian stratagem on the part of the 
Chaeronean magistrates, it is easier to make sense of the story by arguing that in fact 
Damon was not leading a criminal gang, but a group that opposed Roman presence in 
Boeotia, and targeted the part of the local elite that sought a modus vivendi with the 
invaders. Some hints in this sense can be detected in Plutarch’s account too. We are 
told that Damon’s family enjoyed some prestige: in the second century AD, some of 
his descendants were known to live in the area of the Phokian city of Stiris. More 
importantly, Plutarch says that Damon descended directly from a soothsayer called 
Peripoltas, not otherwise known in the literary tradition, who led the mythical 
migration o f the Boeotians from Thessaly. Peripoltas’ descendants settled in 
Chaeronea after defeating the local inhabitants, who Plutarch dismissively brands as 
‘barbarians’.119 When Damon decided to lead a revolt against Rome, the weight of his 
family tradition must have been apparent to his fellow citizens. His was all but an act 
of brigandage, and more than an uprising against the conquerors. It was a military and 
political action directed by the descendant of a prominent family, whose history was 
deeply linked to the foundation myth of the city.120
The aftermath of Damon’s death too may be read as a symptom — perhaps the 
clearest one — of the political relevance of the incident. Soon after the end of the war, 
the city of Orchomenus paid a Roman informer (auKO<f>dvTT|v) to accuse the 
Chaeroneans of the murder of the Roman officer and soldiers killed by Damon. The 
case was heard by the highest authority in mainland Greece, the governor of 
Macedonia, probably Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, who held the province from 80 to 78.121
119 Cf. Ma 1994, 49-50. Plutarch is here using a local tradition, which is otherwise unknown: Piccirilli 
1990, 205-206; Blamire 1989, 79; Ma 1994, 67-68.
120 It is likely that local historiography was influenced by a tradition favourable to Damon, which still 
influenced Plutarch: cf. Cim. 1.2, for his remarks on Damon’s beauty (acop.aTOS' KaXXo?) and spiritual 
vigour (f)p6vr||i.a).
121 It is worth noting that his prouincia still extended to Greece proper even after the Mithridatic War, 
pretty much as was the case when the lex de prouinciis praetoriis was voted. Kallet-Marx 1995, 280-282
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Only a written statement by Lucullus, discharging the city from all responsibilities, 
could ensure acquittal to Chaeronea, avoiding a likely punishment, and perhaps even 
destruction. The allegations brought by Orchomenus may be explained by the 
intention to harm a neighbouring city, and by the hope of gaining some new 
territory.122 On the other hand, the prospect of creating closer relations with the elite 
of the city may have been a further reason for Lucullus’ support. Possibly, he also 
intended not to cause an irreversible crisis in a context already affected by a long war.
On the whole, Boeotia’s attitude towards Rome during the Mithridatic War 
was inconsistent. Plutarch provides a detailed narrative of the conflict, but in some 
respects he does not deserve unconditional trust. He systematically represents his 
hometown as loyal to Rome, failing to refer to any differences of approach within the 
local elite. A similar attitude applies to the rest of the region. After the Chaeronea 
battle, Sulla decided to celebrate his victory at Thebes, with a lavish session of games. 
All Greek cities were represented, and appear keen to offer their judges for the 
competition. Plutarch says that only Thebes was excluded, because o f its inconsistent 
attitude during the conflict.123 As recalled above, however, Appian says that Sulla 
decided to punish Boeotia as a whole straight after the second, decisive battle of 
Chaeronea, just before heading for Thessaly and preparing the army for the expedition 
to Asia Minor, ‘because it had lightly changed field’.124 Perhaps significantly, this phase 
of the conflict is completely ignored by Plutarch, who focuses on the talks between 
Sulla and Archelaus, preparing the Dardanus agreement.125
Pausanias recollects the resentment of Sulla towards Thebes, which he judged 
guilty of having followed Rome only after the invasion of Greece.126 According to his 
version, Sulla was eager to punish Thebes from the outset of the conflict, and finally
views the Damon affair as evidence for the little ability o f the governors o f  Macedonia to deal with 
Greek affairs, even after the First Mithridatic War.
122 Ma 1994, 64-66.
123 Plut. Sull. 19.11-12.
124 App. Mithr. 51.203: crwexw? iieTaTiOep.evpiA Also cf. ibid., 29.113 and 30.117.
125 Plut. Sull. 23.9-10. Also cf. App. Mithr. 54.215-216; Licin. 35.71-77 Criniti; Memn. FrGrHist 434 § 24. 
Cf. however Plut. Sull. 26.7, recording the destruction o f  three Boeotian cities, Anthedon, Larymna and 
Halae, after the battle o f  Orchomenus. Possibly he wanted to prevent Archelaus from using their 
harbours, but it is likely that it was also a retaliation for having supported Mithridates. There are no 
archaeological traces o f  the destruction o f  Anthedon, whose harbour came back in use in Late 
Antiquity: Schlager-Blachman-Schafer 1968, 91.
126 Paus. 9.7.4-6.
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found a pretext in his need to provide compensation to the panhellenic sanctuaries, 
Olympia, Epidaurus, and Delphi, where he had gathered most of the resources for the 
first part of the campaign. Half of the territory of the city was given to the sanctuaries 
-  unfortunately, we are not told what proportions were used. A steady and irreversible 
decline started for the city, which Pausanias describes as reduced in its dimensions and 
quite poor still in his day. However, his odd statement on Athens going through an 
uninterrupted crisis from the age of Sulla to Hadrian should invite readers to be 
cautious about his accuracy on these matters.127 Pausanias claims that, at some point, 
Rome decided to give the lost territories back to the city. Improved relations with the 
members of the Roman elite may explain this choice, although this piece of 
information is made less useful by the absence of any chronological reference.128
1.3. After a great blunder: the elites of Asia Minor
There is good evidence for the overwhelming support that Mithridates 
received from the Greek cities at the beginning of the invasion. In Athens, the 
supporters of the King could be accused of being an unrestrained and uncivilised 
crowd that unseated ‘the good ones’; in Asia Minor, such an allegation was never put 
forward, not even by the Romans. The support of the cities for the King appears to 
have been widespread at the beginning of the war. The fiscal exemption that he 
promised was an appealing message for all classes, after decades of reckless 
exploitation on the part of the Romans.129 Significantly, the richest documentary 
evidence for the Asian elites and their political choices in this period comes from cities 
that kept supporting Rome even in her most difficult hour. In fact, the highest output
127 Paus. 1.20.7: ’ A0f|vai p.eu o u t o o s - u t t 6 t o u  TToXep.ou KatcwOeiaai t o u  'Pco(iaLwv au0i9 
’ ASpiauou (3acrLAeuoi/Tos- r)i/0r|(7aiA See already Day 1942, 120-126,169-174. O f course, the opposite 
claim that Athens became ‘the city o f  culture and art’ once again immediately after the reconquest 
(Lanzani 1910, 523) is equally untenable.
128 There is no evidence supporting the claim made by Kahrstedt 1954, 93 that the land was soon given 
back to Thebes.
129 Such a measure was surely made possible by the extensive depredations that he had inflicted on the 
Roman residents at the beginning o f  the campaign: Magie 1950, 217-218; Sartre 2003, 226. Although he 
generously granted privileges and exemptions to the cities, Mithridates does not seem to have respected 
their autonomy: de Callatay 2003, 229-230.
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of sources is from Caria, the region whose loyalty to Rome was the staunchest in the 
whole of Asia Minor.
As I shall try to show in more detail in the third chapter, religion played a very 
important part indeed in the interaction between Sulla and elites in the Greek East. 
This becomes apparent in the relations between Sulla and Boeotia, which also 
involved the Panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi, and it is perhaps even clearer in his 
dealings with some cities of Caria, a region that kept a consistent loyalty towards 
Rome during the war and that was duly rewarded for it. That special relationship dated 
back to the Hellenistic age, and was largely determined by the protection from the 
influence o f Rhodes, which Rome had guaranteed to Caria from 167 BC.130
The community of Aphrodisias enjoyed an especially privileged status, which 
is powerfully demonstrated by the episode of the Delphic response received by Sulla 
at the end of the war, and in general by the magnificent epigraphic dossier published a 
couple of decades ago by J. M. Reynolds.131 Strabo still calls it a TroXlCJjlCt some 
decades after the Sullan age.132 It was only in the Augustan age, with the decisive 
intervention of the local notable Zoilus, that Aphrodisias’ impressive urban 
development took place; however, in the early Eighties the city could already afford to 
send envoys to Sulla and/or to Delphi so that the oracle mentioned its shrine of 
Venus.133 The inscriptional evidence shows that Aphrodisias was a city in its own right 
throughout the first century BC, playing a consistently important function in the local 
context o f Caria. In fact, it is a distinct possibility that the sympoliteia of Aphrodisias 
and Plarasa attested epigraphically dates back to the first half of the second century 
BC, following the liberation of the region from the influence of Rhodes.134
The loyalty of several Carian communities in the Mithridatic War is safely 
attested by a number of sources: the case of Aphrodisias, albeit very significant, was 
not isolated. There is at least one similar situation, whereby the allegiance to Rome 
involved both a city and a neighbouring sanctuary. The loyalty to Rome of Stratonicea 
in Caria was rewarded with an impressive series of privileges, acknowledged first by 
Sulla himself in 85/84 BC, before leaving Asia for Italy, and then ratified by a
130 Errington 1987,103-114.
131 App. b. c. 1.97.453; Reynolds 1982.
132 Strab. 12.8.13 =  C 576: however, the text has a lacuna.
133 On the development o f  Aphrodisias at the end o f  the first century BC, see Ratte 2002, 7-14.
134 Reynolds 1982, no. 1: see Errington 1987, revising Reynolds’ conclusions about the chronology, and 
Savalli-Lestrade 2005,16-17.
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senatusconsultum in 81 BC.135 This document is made of several parts, going backwards 
in time. It is opened by a letter of Sulla to the city, restating the merits o f the 
communities in the fight against Mithridates and the gratitude of the Romans, and 
followed by the text of the senatusconsultum, listing all the eleven clauses of privileges 
that Rome acknowledged to Stratonicea. Among them, there was the confirmation of 
the asylia o f the temple of Hecate at Lagina. The declaration occupies just one line (1. 
113), but the citizens of Stratonicea must have viewed it as a very important feature of 
their new status.
Indeed, the sanctuary was becoming a central aspect of the city’s identity, as 
much as was the case at Aphrodisias. The awareness of its importance has perhaps 
prompted unilateral and somehow schematic interpretations of the evidence. The 
northern frieze of the temple, for instance, has long been viewed as a powerful symbol 
of the renewed alliance between Stratonicea and Rome following the Mithridatic 
War.136 Its central scene, portraying a warrior and an Amazon shaking hands, has been 
seen as the most explicit symbol of the new strategic situation as the Stratoniceans saw 
it. In a recent paper, still unpublished, R. van Bremen has suggested a persuasive re­
interpretation of the frieze, largely based on a comparative discussion of its 
iconography with contemporary evidence from Asia Minor. According to her 
reconstruction, the frieze appears to be dated not earlier than the last quarter of the 
second century BC, and it must rather be explained by a development of closer 
relations among the Carian communities than by the aftermath of the Mithridatic War.
In fact, there is no need to endorse the traditional interpretation of the frieze 
to recognise the importance of the link between the Sullan declaration of asylia and the 
importance of the sanctuary of Hecate Lagina. The special status of the temple was 
certainly viewed by the local inhabitants as the clearest symptom of the city’s 
persistent importance and of the friendship between Rome and Stratonicea. Sulla’s 
decision must certainly be viewed against this background. It is significant that the text 
of the senatusconsultum was then for everyone to look at on the wall of the temple’s naos.
135 The reference edition is RDGE  18; cf. lvStrat 505. A new fragment, providing the text o f the middle 
section o f  1. 15-27, is published in §ahin 2002, 3.
136 See Schober 1933, 31-41 and Jungholter 1989,12-120 for a discussion o f  the whole frieze. About the 
possible interpretation o f  the monument, cf. Schober 1933, 72-76; Tuchelt 1979, 39-44; Jungholter 
1989, 138-157.
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The history of Stratonicea’s excellent relations with Rome is closely linked to 
the development of the religious life of the city. The cult of Hekate was not the only 
one in the Stratonicean territory. From the early third century BC a significant 
function was played by the sanctuary of Zeus Karios at Panamara, one of the most 
important among the hilltop sanctuaries that were such a conspicuous feature of the 
Carian landscape in antiquity.137 The dossier about the Stratonicean sanctuaries 
provides the background for attempting to answer some more general questions. 
Stratonicea enjoyed impressive development and wealth after the coming of Rome, 
supported by her excellent relationship with a number of magistrates and emperors, 
and not interrupted even after the devastating earthquake of AD 139.138 Connections 
with Rome were indeed a peculiar aspect of the life of the city. A citizen of 
Stratonicea, Hermias, was with Sulla during the Greek campaign, and he persuaded 
him not to sack Daulis, a city in Phocea. An honorific inscription put up for him in 
Delphi duly records his patronage of the city. From it we learn that he was also given 
proxenia, honorary citizenship, fiscal immunity and asjlia.XV) The loyalty of the city must 
have been very strong indeed, and its relationship with Rome quite exceptional, if the 
advice of a Stratonicean could be received so well by Sulla
The impact of the conflict on civic finances was nevertheless considerable, as 
is shown by Appian {Mithr. 21.82) and, indirectly, by two clauses of the 
senatusconsultum, which order Roman magistrates to support the city in recovering the 
goods which had been lost during the conflict (1. 60-63, 114-118) and in supervising 
the release and the return of the prisoners of war (1. 63-64, 118-122). Such a 
disposition was part of the range of privileges and rewards that Rome granted to the 
free cities at the end of a conflict in which they had proved their loyalty.14,1 In this 
respect, a contemporary inscription from Asia Minor, the senatusconsultum de Tahenis
137 Van Bremen 2004, 215-222. Cf. the classic discussions by Laumonier 1958, 344-425 and T. Kraus 
1960, 41-54. On the history o f  Stratonicea in the Hellenistic age, see Boffo 1985, 128-134; Boysal 1990; 
van Bremen 2000. For the cult o f  Rome at Stratonicea, see Mellor 1975, 49,177 and Fayer 1976, 74-75.
138 Aristonicus war was perhaps an exception, as some evidence suggests that the would-be King 
chose Stratonicea as his capital in the year preceding his defeat: see Coarelli 2005, 226-229, with earlier 
bibliography. On the history o f  the city in the Imperial age, see Ozgan 1999, 9-11; Mert 2002. Little 
archaeological work has been done on the site o f  Stratonicea: Mitchell 1998/1999, 157-158; Debord 
2002,158-162.
139 SEG  1.175, esp. 1. 9-12. See Daux 1936, 402-405; Accame 1946, 205; Campanile 1996,154-155.
140 For a survey o f  m odem scholarship on civic freedom in the Roman East, see Boffo 2003.
48
shows the spirit of the times quite clearly.141 The town of Tabae, after supporting 
Rome and sustaining Mithridates’ retaliation, was awarded freedom by Sulla and later 
by the Senate, following the same procedure followed for Stratonicea. This document 
is unfortunately the only surviving evidence for its political history.142
The record of another Carian city, Laodicea on the Lycus, was less consistent. 
When Mithridates first invaded the area, the city resisted briefly, as it was controlled 
by Q. Oppius, then in charge of Cilicia, but ended by delivering the Roman magistrate 
to Mithridates.143 Its status after the Sullan setdement is unknown, and it is quite likely 
that Rome decided to punish the defection by putting it under direct rule. A bilingual 
inscription found on the Quirinal, in which the people of Laodicea express their 
gratitude to Rome, was dated by Mommsen and Chapot to 83 BC. However, it is 
perhaps preferable to accept Mellor's hypothesis, viewing it as a re-inscription of a 
text, originally written in the late second century BC after the acquisition of Attalus’ 
legacy and later restored by Sulla, after the Capitolium burnt in 83 BC.144
Unlike Laodicea, Aphrodisias kept excellent relations with Oppius. An 
inscription contains a letter sent by Oppius from Cos after the end of the war, in 
which the Roman magistrate expressed his gratitude to the cities of Aphrodisias and 
Plarasa, then merged into a single political community, for their military support 
during the siege of Laodicea. Oppius also agreed to become their patron, after the 
explicit request of the two cities’ ambassadors.145 With such a distinct record of loyalty, 
and with the prominent role it played in the making of the ’ Euacj>p68lTOS‘-rnotif 
(which I will deal with in the third chapter), Aphrodisias surely had no difficulty to
141 0G1S  442 = RDGE  17; the best text is in Crawford-Reynolds 1974.
142 See Magie 1950, 1112-1113, fn. 9. For an overview o f the region and o f  the history o f  the city in 
antiquity, J. and L. Robert 1954,17-53, 72-95 is still invaluable. Also see Ma 2000, 362.
143 Ferrary 2000a, 169. On the Mithridatic attack against Laodicea, see Bernhardt 1985, 50.
144 See respectively Mommsen 1887b, 213-214 (= Mommsen 1906, 75); Chapot 1904, 37-38; Mellor 
1975, 203-206; Mellor 1978, 323-324. See also Lintott 1978, 143-144; Ramage 1991, 108; Mitchell 
2005a, 231. The low date has been proposed, with new though unpersuasive arguments, by Ameling 
1988, 20-21, also suggesting that Laodicea was already the capital o f  a conuentus in Aquillius’ organisation 
(18-19); accepted by Corsten 1997, 2.
145 This detail is conveniently stressed by Canali D e Rossi 2001, 53 and Eilers 2002, 24-25; also see 
Campanile 2001, 147-150. From the Augustan age onwards, the Roman documents systematically refer 
only to Aphrodisias: about the history o f  the joint community, see Reynolds 1985 and Reynolds 1987, 
107-108.
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obtain a declaration of freedom from Sulla at the end of the war.146 The status appears 
to have been revoked some time in the late Republic, but Augustus ultimately 
confirmed it in 39 BC.147 On the other hand, it seems quite hard to believe that 
Laodicea managed to be granted freedom in 84 BC. It must have taken the city an 
important time to regain the favour o f Rome, which certainly played an important part 
in helping.the city to become, under the Empire, one of the most important centres of 
Asia Minor.148
A comparable impression of wealth and indeed of luxury is conveyed by 
Strabo's brief account of life in Alabanda, the third important centre of Caria he deals 
with, after Mylasa, whose history in this period is almost unknown, and Stratonicea.149 
Carian epigraphy is quite abundant for the Sullan period, and there is important 
evidence from this city too. It is the honorific decree for an important citizen, 
Pyrrha[kos], who distinguished himself in several delicate diplomatic missions: two 
were addressed to Rome, the third one to an unmentioned king (1. 32), probably 
Mithridates Eupator.150 During the latter mission, the notable died, and his fellow 
citizens duly commemorated his achievements.151 Pyrrha[kos] managed to negotiate 
successfully the autonomy of the city by renewing friendship with Rome and, in a 
second mission to the Roman Senate, he also obtained fiscal immunity by effectively 
recalling the merits of Alabanda towards Rome (1. 28-32). There has been some 
disagreement about the dating of the text. The first editors thought it referred to the
146 Cf. Chaniotis 2003, 74-75.
147 Reynolds 1982, 4-5.
148 On the history o f Laodicea under the Empire, see des Gagniers 1969, 3-4 and Drager 1993, 87-89, 
198-200, 307-311.
149 Strab. 14.26 = C 660-661. Cf. however Cic. fam. 13.56.1 and 3.1, mentioning the debts contracted by 
Alabanda and Mylasa to the Roman negotiator Cluvius. IvMylasa 109 records the contacts between the 
city and the governor o f  Asia M. Iunius Silanus, called (JTpaTriyov, TTaTpwva TT|9 rroXf w? (1. 15). 
The inscription is usually dated to 76 BC ca.: Eilers 2002, 247-248; Dmitriev 2005a, 8; Dmitriev 2005b, 
104. An earlier chronology for Iunius Silanus’ governorship (about 100 BC) cannot however be 
excluded: Ferrary 2000a, 172-173,192. The history o f  Mylasa between 50 BC and the age o f  Augustus is 
better known, and symptoms o f  economic decline have been noticed: Delrieux-Ferries 2004.
150 First published by Diehl-Cousin 1886, 299-306; emended by Holleaux 1898, 258-266; see Canali D e  
Rossi 1997, 219-221 and Gauthier 2005, 85-89. The supplement o f the name is suggested in Holleaux 
1898, 260. Cf. Canali D e Rossi 1992/1993, arguing that the king mentioned here was Eumenes II.
151 Pyrrhafkos]’ death was probably due to natural causes: Habicht 2001, 12. Contra, Canali D e Rossi 
1992/1993, 39-40.
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early relations of Alabanda with Rome in the first half of the second century BC; 
Willrich later suggested that the historical development outlined in the inscription was 
compatible with a dating to the aftermath of the First Mithridatic War, and this 
interpretation seems preferable to me.152
Pyrrha[kos] was a prominent member of the Carian elite who displayed 
remarkable diplomatic skills and became a friend of Rome. He was not alone in that 
mission; other notables prepared themselves for the coming of Sulla. Chaeremon of 
Nysa even organised military support for Rome, drawing upon himself Mithridates’ 
hatred. The King wrote twice to Leonippos, the satrap he had put in charge of Caria, 
explicitly ordering his capture for having collaborated with the ‘common enemy’.153 
The letters also provide some information about Chaeremon’s moves: he helped some 
Romans to flee to Rhodes, and he apparently was very careful about the safety of his 
sons, whom he twice brought to secret refuges. He probably lost his life in the 
upheaval that took place in Nysa during Mithridates’ breakthrough. When his sons 
went back to their home town, at the end of the conflict, they recovered a prominent 
role, and chose to celebrate the deeds of their father by displaying the letters of 
Mithridates along with an honorific dedication and a letter of C. Cassius, proconsul in 
Asia in 89/88, acknowledging Chaeremon's generosity towards the Roman army.154
152 Willrich 1899, accepted by Holleaux 1899, 359-360, n. 1; Chapot 1904, 114; Marek 1988, 294-302. 
Bikerman 1937, 221, 239 (= Bickerman 1985,147,165) and Kallet-Marx 1995, 268, n. 32 still follow the 
hypothesis o f  Diehls and Cousin. Canali D e Rossi 1992/93 and Canali de Rossi 2002, no. 169, 109-113 
identifies the king with Eumenes II, and dates the inscription to 164 BC. His argument (Canali De 
Rossi 2002, 112-113) that Antiochus III, or Mithridates Eupator would have never respected an order 
o f  the Senate decreeing the freedom o f  Alabanda simply misses the point. Gruen 1984, 733-735 and 
Habicht 1999, 20, do not take a stand on this problem.
153 RC, nos. 73/74. Leonippos has the title o f ‘satrap’ (no. 73,1. 1), by which Mithridates referred to the 
officials in charge o f  the territories he conquered at the beginning o f  the first war: cf. App. Mithr. 21.81. 
On Mithridates' use o f  the expression ‘common enemies’ (no. 74, 1. 6-7), see Robert 1969, 59 and 
Erskine 1994, 81-82; on the expression ‘common benefactors’ referred to the Romans, see Wehrli 1978.
154 See M RRII, 34; Ferrary 2000a, 193. On Chaeremon’s family, see RC, 297; Campanile 1996, 172-173. 
On his wealth, Rostovtzeff 1941, 819, 821; QuaB 1993, 130. Rigsby 1988, 149-153; Rigsby 1996, 399- 
404, no. 185 attributes to Mithridates Eupator the letter acknowledging the asylia o f  the local temple o f  
Pluto and Kore, which in 1 BC the governor o f  Asia Cn. Lentulus Augur allowed to be displayed on the 
wall o f  the shrine along with an analogous message from Seleucus I. However, the argument that the 
declaration was exposed to imply that ‘even Mithridates’ had respected the inviolability o f  the temple is 
far-fetched, and it is safer to attribute the letter to a Hellenistic king, e. g. Antiochus III.
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Had he survived, Chaeremon might have been granted privileges similar to 
those awarded to Asclepiades from Clazomenae, Polystratos from Karystos and 
Meniskos from Miletus by the famous s.c. de slsclepiade sociisque, voted in 78 BC. The 
case of these three men is quite exceptional, although there surely were precedents to 
it.155 They had supported the Roman navy in the Social War, and they were rewarded 
with the grant of the rank of ‘friends of the Roman people’ and complete fiscal 
immunity, both from ordinary and extraordinary taxation.156
Their case suggests that Rome lacked any strategy of inclusion o f non-Italians 
into the citizen body at this stage. Asclepiades and his friends were not granted 
Roman citizenship, unlike Ariston from Massilia, or the mysterious Gaditani who were 
included in the citizen body for military merits by Sulla himself.157 The position of the 
three notables from Asia Minor is more similar to that of the technitai o f Dionysus 
resident in Cos, who were collectively granted fiscal immunity by the dictator, and had 
to defend it from the attempts of the polis to undo it. Apparently, in the aftermath of 
the Mithridatic War, it was unthinkable to extend Roman citizenship even to the most 
loyal individuals from Asia Minor.158
This remained true even for exceptional situations like Caria, where there is no 
evidence for tensions within the local elites about the decision to support Rome. As 
noted above, the region’s impressive record of loyalty to Rome throughout the 
Mithridatic crisis was no doubt rooted in its Hellenistic background. Not even the 
creation of the province of Asia had put its autonomy into question. After 133 BC as 
well as in the Sullan age, Rome showed no interest in controlling Caria directly, and 
relying on the loyalty of some free cities and on the power to police the area was 
enough for her purposes.159 The problem of the grant of freedom to individual cities
155 Cf. the references to oi k o t’ &v8pa KeKpipevoi kv Trji tipo?' Pa)p.aious> </>iAiai in OGIS 438 
and 439, with Ferrary 2005, 53-54.
156 The standard edition o f  the senatusconsultum is RDGE  22; also see A. J. Marshall 1968b and Raggi 
2001. On the fiscal aspects o f  this document, see Raggi 2001, 89-92.
157 Cic. Balb. 50. The text is quite tormented: quid? Cn. Pompeius pater rebus Italico bello maximis gestis P. 
Caesium, equitem Romanum, uirum bonum, qui uiuit, Rauennatem foederato ex populo none ciuitate donauit?... quid? 
Massiliensem Aristionem JL. Sulla? quid? quoniam de Gaditanis agimus, idem + erosnouem Gaditanos? Various 
readings have been suggested : seruos nouem Gaditanos (Reid), homines nouem Gaditanos (Wrampelmeyer); 
Hannonem Gaditanum (Garatoni); uiros nouem Gaditanos does not seem unlikely either. See Sherwin-White 
1973, 294.
138 Sherwin-White 1973, 306-311.
159 Marek 1988; cf. Baronowski 1996 (earlier bibliography at 241-242); Dmitriev 2005a, 8, 249-250.
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has often been treated along with that of the extension of the boundaries o f the 
province. In fact, discussion is made almost impossible by the lack of clear evidence 
on this point.
When he summoned the representatives of the Asiatic cities to Ephesus, after 
the end of the war, Sulla granted freedom to a small number of communities. For 
most of them this decision was a reward for their loyalty during the war against 
Mithridates, which was the outcome of a specific background, in which the central 
role was played by the previous relations with Rome and the development of the civic 
identity in the Roman context.160 The most reliable picture of what civic freedom 
implied in this period is the lex Antonia de Termessibus, a statute passed in 68 BC, which 
deals with the status of a city formerly included into the province of Cilicia, and 
declared free after the Third Mithridatic War.161 There is no reason to believe that the 
terms of civic freedom had changed substantially from the end of the first conflict. A 
free city was recognised friend and ally of the Roman people, and its citizens were 
allowed to live according to the laws of their community. Roman garrisons and 
soldiers may not be quartered in its territory. The local authorities were entitled to 
dispose freely of the properties of the city, and to levy taxes and customs at their own 
discretion — although at Termessus Roman publicani were exempted from any sort of 
taxation (1. 34-35).
Free cities, however, were the exception in the Roman province of Asia, 
especially after Sulla. The status of the so-called subject cities deserves special 
attention. The most significant factor of discrimination was not political, but 
economic: namely, the different fiscal treatment to which they were subjected. The 
implications of the subject status could vary even to a considerable extent from city to 
city. The great majority of the communities lost their freedom in the Sullan 
reorganisation. Moreover, even for those who managed to keep it, it was a gracious 
and always revocable concession on the part of Rome, which had to be supported by
160 O f course, civic freedom had fiscal implications, but Kienast 1967, 360-364 and Bernhardt 1980, 
196-207 have rightly warned against considering the notion o f civic freedom as a synonym o f complete 
fiscal immunity. The oscillations in the use o f  expressions like (fxXiicai XeiTOupyiai, usually viewed as 
occasional ‘contributions’ o f  an allied city to Rome, show that their meaning often shifted to that o f  
4>6poi, ‘taxes’; also see Ferrary 2001a, 103-104.
161 Edition and commentary by J.-L. Ferrary in RS, 331-340, no. 19. Ferrary 1985 remains invaluable for 
the history o f  the text and the discussion o f  various matters o f  content and chronology.
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good relations with members of the senatorial elite.162 Even so, from the First 
Mithridatic War to the end of the Civil War, most urban communities of Asia Minor 
went through very hard times.163
Even a ‘friend and ally’ of Rome like Ilium, for instance, went through hard 
times before and after the war. The price of the war against Aristonicus (133-129 BC) 
had already been heavy. Some recently excavated buildings in the southern edge of the 
Lower City show signs of destruction by fire dating back to that period, and the area 
was not reoccupied until the Augustan age.164 At the end of the Eighties, the city had 
to borrow money from the sanctuary of Athena Ilias to organise the common festival 
in honour of the goddess. The city finances were in a serious emergency, while the 
sanctuary appeared to have kept a relative stability deriving from its privileged 
relationship with the Attalids. The poor state of the city budget cannot be attributed to 
the burden of taxation imposed by Sulla, since Ilium was declared free. The 
destruction perpetrated by Fimbria surely is surely to blame.165 Whatever its reason 
may have been, however, the communities of the Troad did not recover quickly after 
Sulla’s freedom grant.166 In 77 BC, they were compelled to ask for a reduction of their 
debt: the matter was negotiated in the presence of a Roman magistrate, and the final 
solution was the cancellation of all the arrears and a substantial reduction of the 
interest rate imposed by the sanctuary.167 Such negotiations involved the temple, the 
representatives of the federated cities (at least seven: besides Ilium, Dardanus, Scepsis, 
Assus, Alexandrea, Abydus, Lampsacus) and the quaestor Lucius Julius Caesar, whose 
family had close connections in the Troad even before the Sullan period.168 O f course,
162 In general on the unequal relations between Rome and the cities, see Ferrary 1991; QuaB 1993, 179- 
195; Doukellis 1996, esp. 265-268. The best discussion o f  Roman patronage o f Greek communities is 
now Eilers 2002; also cf. Canali D e Rossi 2001. Ferrary 1997b remains an excellent introduction. The 
importance o f  patronage in the Greek East is underrated by Touloumakos 1988, 319, who views it as a 
typically Roman institution, which was never accepted, or understood, by the Greek world; see the 
sound critique in Ferrary 1997a, 210-211.
163 Kallet-Marx 1995, 275-276.
164 See Aylward 1999, esp. 161, 176 ; Mitchell 2003, 27. On the role o f  the cities o f  Asia Minor in this 
war, see the dossier collected by Brun 2004.
165 See Mitchell 1998/1999,138; Hertel 2003, 263-266.
166 Magie 1950, 239, 1119-1120; contra, Preuner 1926, 117. The sanctuary was entirely renovated only in 
the early imperial age: see the recent discussion by Rose 2002, esp. 40-41.
167 Ivllion, no. 10, esp. 11. 1-19 (block A). See Bellinger 1961,10; Tenger 1999,162.
168 Cf. the elegant ‘triangular model’ outlined in Dignas 2002, esp. 271-278.
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the gens lulia claimed descent from Venus and Aeneas, but its members could do good 
services to Athena as well. In 89, during his censorship, the homonymous father of 
the quaestor of 77 had acted in Rome to obtain a declaration of immunity for the land 
owned by the sanctuary from the activity of the publicani.169 The text of Ivllion 71 is 
very clear on this matter, also from a technical point of view: &TTOKaTacnT|- | aauTa 
ttjv  lepav | x^Pay Till ’ AGrivai | Tfji ’ I XiaSi ra i  e£e\6|j.evov | auTpv <ek 
rf\s  Sqpoai<jovia.9 (1. 5-9). The benefits obtained from the censor were so 
remarkable that a statue was dedicated to his daughter Julia too.170 The financial 
stability of the sanctuary ultimately derived from L. Caesar’s decision. Ivllion 10 makes 
it clear that the common festival was to go on through the years without any variation 
(bl. B, 1. 21-23).
The case of Ilium reflects a more general pattern. Asian sanctuaries went 
through their most difficult phase during the Second Civil War, rather than in the 
Sullan period. Despite Plutarch’s allegations of impiety, essentially based on the 
expropriations of the land of the panhellenic sanctuaries in mainland Greece, for 
which he later offered compensation, Sulla appears to have usually respected the 
inviolability of temples and sacred lands.171 That the last years of the Republic were a 
hard time for sanctuaries is implicidy confirmed by the declarations of asylia that can 
be attributed to Augustus.172
In the Sullan period, the major threat to the region was piracy, whose 
incidence seems then to have reached one of its highest peaks ever. The honorific 
inscription for Nikandros from Poemaneum, of 80 BC, shows that pirates were then 
seriously threatening the city, and also were a great cause of concern for Rome, as the
169 Ivllion, no. 71. See d’Hautcourt 1999, 256; Dignas 2002, 117; Ehrhardt 2002, 141-142, no. 4. A very 
fragmentary inscription (RDGE  53) contains the letter o f  a Roman magistrate to the city, referring to 
her freedom. It probably dates back to the first century BC: see Sherk 278-279 and Debord 1982, 448, 
fn. 113. The family background and the career o f  Lucius Caesar junior are outlined by Nicolet 1980, 115- 
122.
170 Ivllion, no. 72. Cf. Nicolet 1980, 122.
171 Dignas 2002,117-119; Dignas 2005, 208-209.
172 See Rigsby 1996, 177-178 (the sanctuary o f  Apollo at Miletus); 391-393, no. 183 (the Artemision at 
Ephesus); 426-427, no. 211, with Tac. ann. 3.62.2 (the sanctuary o f  Zeus at Panamara, near Stratonicea); 
429-430, no. 212 (Aphrodisias); 447-448 (Aezani). Also see RDGE  61, from Kyme, providing a 
practical demonstration o f  Augustus’ concerns about the respect o f  sacred ownership. Cf. res gestae 24.1: 
in templis omnium ciuitatium prou[inct\ae Asiae uictor omamenta reposui, quae spoliatis tem\plis is\, cum quo be Hum 
gesseram,priuatimpossederat. A good discussion in Dignas 2002,119-128; Dignas 2005, 209-210.
55
proconsul C. Claudius Nero’s direct interest in the solution of the crisis shows.173 The 
recently published inscription of the monument put up in 62 BC at Ilium in honour of 
Pompey, celebrating his victory against Mithridates and the pirates is further indirect 
evidence for the difficult situation which Asiatic communities experienced after the 
coming of Sulla.174
The documentation is scarce, of course, but it shows important economic 
processes at work, and it reveals the talent of the city elite in building profitable 
relations with the Roman representatives. The immediate aftermath of the First 
Mithridatic War shows that very clearly. It is usually assumed that Ilium kept its loyalty 
to Rome during the war, and that freedom was a consequence of this attitude. Yet, a 
coin issue struck by the moneyer Menephron son of Menephron bore the symbol of 
the drinking Pegasus, certainly related to Mithridates Eupator.175 Apparently, during 
the successful attack of the King, the local elite made some efforts to come to terms 
with him. However, even if the local notables had not been adamantly loyal during the 
war, declaring the freedom of the city may have appeared an almost inevitable course 
of action for Sulla, who claimed descent from Venus and Aeneas so forcefully in his 
relations with the Greek world. With such a favourable attitude on the part of the 
Romans, the civic elite surely found it easy to reassert its loyalty to them.
Caria and Ilium, however, remain exceptional cases.176 It is a safe guess that 
regaining a positive relationship with Rome was much more difficult for the Asiatic 
cities than the Greek ones. A traumatic event like the Asiatic Vespers had created too 
huge a divide between Romans and Greeks not to claim its toll in the aftermath of the 
war. Rebuilding a constructive dialogue with Rome required the initiatives of a 
number of distinguished and exceptionally skilled characters. The inscriptional 
evidence offers several significant examples.
Pergamum certainly lost its freedom in 85, when Sulla chose to punish the 
openly pro-Mithridatic stance it had taken at the beginning of the war.177 The well-
173 Ivllion, no. 73,1. 174-176.
174 SEG  46.1565: for a full discussion, see E. Winter 1996b. Cf. SEG  49.1509 from Claros, on which 
more infra.
175 The evidence is gathered and discussed in Bellinger 1961, 33-34; see Kinns 1987, 110. The 
objections o f  de Callatay 1997, 291 are not convincing.
176 On the role o f  kinship in this special relationship, see C. P. Jones 1999, 94-105; C. P. Jones 2001b.
177 This can be inferred from OGIS 433, recording that the city recovered freedom and immunity from 
Caesar: see C. P. Jones 1974, 203, fn. 130, with earlier bibliography.
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known dossier about Diodoros Pasparos, which C. P. Jones persuasively dated to the 
aftermath of the Sullan settlement, records a series of initiatives taken by a local 
notable, which closely recall those of the ambassadors of the Ilian koinon, and also fit 
the economic context outlined by the Aphrodisian text discussed above.178 In an 
embassy to Rome, Diodoros denounced the intolerably high interest rates which made 
it impossible for the cities to pay back the debts they had contracted with the 
moneylenders in order to meet the requirements of Roman taxation.179 Moreover, he 
complained about the abuses perpetrated by the Roman army in the Pergamene 
territory. His mission was certainly successful, although the extent of Roman 
concessions is unknown. The impressive honours received by Diodoros are, o f course, 
strong elements pointing to the importance of his diplomatic achievements.
Along with his political skills, Pasparos offered a part o f his considerable 
wealth to his community by sponsoring the restoration of the local gymnasium, which 
had been seriously damaged during the First Mithridatic War and still had not returned 
to use at the beginning of the Third War.180 Soon after 69 BC, the gymnasium was 
reopened, and the twenty-ninth celebration of the local feast of the Nikephoria could 
finally take place there. For this great achievement, Diodoros was rewarded with a 
new honorific decree, in which his whole career found a celebration and which is the 
ultimate, if controversial, source for the chronology of his deeds.
With good reason, such a belated recovery of an important public building is 
often cited as clear evidence for the serious financial crisis that affected the Asiatic 
cities after the conflict and the Sullan resettlement. The accomplishment of this public 
work, however, was a major step in the reconstruction of civic religious identity after 
the traumatic experience of the war, as the gymnasium was the natural scene of the
178 The inscriptions referring to Diodoros Pasparos are usefully listed by Kienast 1970, 224-225. For 
the chronology, C. P. Jones 1974; generally accepted, see e. g. Gauthier 1985, 62-63; QuaB 1993, 129- 
130; Virgiho 1994; Chankowski 1998, esp. 168-169, 195; Halfmann 2001, 12-15. The recent 
contestations by Musti 1998, 10-27, and Musti 1999 are unpersuasive: Virgilio 1999, 353-357; Canali De 
Rossi 1999a, 84-86 (to be used cautiously); C. P. Jones 2000; Muller 2003, 433-445 (providing a full 
summary o f  the debate on the Pergamene Nikephoria before Jones’s ground-breaking study at 433- 
437). Also cf. the further interventions o f  the Italian scholar, Musti 2000 and Musti 2002. The most 
recent general discussion o f  the historical context o f  Diodoros’ action is now Virgilio 1993, 77-94; C. P. 
Jones 1974,193-198 is however still invaluable.
179IGR  4.292,1. 3-6: the terms used here are eXacjjpoTOKia, 1. 4, and p.eydXous' tOkou?, 1. 6.
180 IGR  4.293, col. 1,1.13-23. See Radt 1988,143-144; QuaB 1993, 206.
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Nikephoria, the city festival created by Attalus I in the late 220s. It soon became much 
more than a celebration of the monarchy, and it acquired a prominent function in the 
identity of the city that would survive for a long time after the creation of the Roman 
province.181 It is not surprising, therefore, that the refurbishment of the gymnasium 
offered Diodoros the opportunity to receive an exceptional honour. His fellow 
citizens dedicated a statue to him and put it in the new gymnasium itself.182
The set of awards and public celebrations offered to this benefactor on his 
return from the embassy to Rome (IGR  4.292) are indeed very close to those which an 
inscription from Pergamum attributes to Attalus III, after his return from a war whose 
context and chronology are unfortunately unclear (OGIS 332): a golden crown, two 
public statues, the perpetual celebration of the day of his return to the city.183 Besides 
this parallel between Attalus III and Diodoros, the deep link of Pergamum with the 
memory of the monarchy must be stressed. The cult of the Attalid monarchs 
remained a fundamental feature of the local identity even after the Mithridatic Wars 
and the definitive consolidation of Roman rule: its revival is duly recorded among 
Diodoros’ merits. There is no evidence for Mithridates’ attitude towards it; on the 
other hand, Rome’s toleration before and after the war is well-known. The parallel cult 
of M.’ Aquillius as civic benefactor made clear that the Attalid cult was not an implicit 
attack on Roman rule.
However, questions arise about the way in which Pergamene religious identity 
reshaped itself in Diodoros’ days. After the Sullan reorganisation of the province, the 
city lost his free status, and the severe punishment and later crisis it went through 
make it hard to believe that there was no resentment against Rome. O f course, the 
clear pro-Roman stance taken by the cities of Asia Minor in the Third Mithridatic War 
shows that, after Rome’s effective reaction to Mithridates’ first attack, they were not
181 Muller 2003, 441-445.
182 IGR  4.293,1. 41-45. Two other statues o f  Diodoros are known: Radt 1986, 117. About the discovery 
o f  the complex where the cult o f  Diodoros Pasparos may have taken place, see Radt 1976, 314-316 and 
Radt 1980, 414-416. The best discussion is Radt 1986, 113-120, duly stressing the present uncertainties 
about the extent o f  cult o f  Diodoros; also cf. Radt 1988, 279-285, and the cautious approach o f  Kader 
1995, 211-212.
183 For a detailed discussion o f  this inscription, see Robert 1984, 472-489 (= Robert 1987, 460-477); on 
the honours received by Attalus III, see Robert 1985, 468-481 (= Robert 1987, 522-535). Also cf. 
Virgilio 1993, 23-27, 83-85.
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deluding themselves any more about their chances to regain complete autonomy.184 
Pergamum was no exception in this respect. The cult of M.’ Aquillius was revived: the 
magistrate who had first organised the Roman province of Asia was honoured along 
with Diodoros Pasparos, who did so much to limit the impact of Roman rule.185 
Moreover, no critical remark on the Romans or on Roman rule can be detected in the 
documents referring to Diodoros’ res gestae. At the same time, however, these texts are 
far from expressing satisfaction with the consolidation of Roman rule. In a way, their 
existence itself is a symptom of difficulty. They were put up to express gratitude to a 
local notable who contributed the make the burden of the war and the reorganisation 
of the province less intolerable for the city. At the same time, the strong emphasis put 
on the local cults and on the cult of the dynasty which had made Pergamum its capital 
suggests that the identity of the city was still something deeply un-Roman, and a 
sphere Romans were not supposed to interfere with.
A similar link between the defence of a city’s prerogatives and the identity of a 
community emerges from another epigraphic dossier, that from the sanctuary of 
Claros, near Colophon, covering from the immediate aftermath of the creation of the 
province down to the rise to power of Augustus.186 Although Sulla is not explicitly 
mentioned in any of these texts, their general importance prompts to include them in 
this discussion. While it is certain that Colophon enjoyed freedom before the First 
Mithridatic War, there is no evidence for its status in the later period.187 The decrees in 
honour of two local notables, Polemaios and Menippos, are perhaps the most explicit 
example of the efforts which even free communities had to make in order to keep 
their status.188 The two characters, already active in the last phase of the Attalid period, 
are praised for having persuaded some influential members of the Roman governing
184 None o f  the communities that supported Mithridates was Greek: see App. Mithr. 69.291-294.
185 Virgilio 1993, 70.
186 Published in J. and L. Robert 1989, with a detailed commentary. The best historical discussion o f  
the dossier is Ferrary 1991. N ew  editions o f  both texts, with commentary, have been provided by 
Lehmann 1998 and Canali De Rossi 2002, 138-149, no. 178 (Menippos) and 150-161, no. 179 
(Polemaios). N ew  texts from Claros have been recently published in Ferrary 2000b. For a survey o f  the 
archaeological context o f the sanctuary, see de la Geniere 1993; de la Geniere 1998; Ferrary-Verger 
1999.
187 Ferrary 1991, 558.
188 See Ferrary 1991, esp. 573-577; cf. Ferrary 1999. Ma 1999, 150-178 provides a useful background by 
discussing the equally complex relationship between a Hellenistic ruler and the cities o f  Western Asia 
Minor.
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class to become patrons of Colophon. Menippos also hosted the governor Quintus 
Mucius Scaevola and his staff during his stay in the area.189
This familiarity was just an aspect of a more important and complex strategy. 
Their diplomatic activity led them to visit the Roman Senate with impressive 
frequency: Menippos at least five times, Polemaios at least twice. The best-known 
embassies were carried out by Menippos. On one occasion, he asked the Senate to 
solve a controversy with the city of Metropolis, which was part of the province of 
Asia. The Roman governor must have taken a stance in the dispute, as the Senate, 
after hearing Menippos’ plea, reasserted that governors had no right to interfere with 
the organisation of free cities.190 In different moments, they successfully defended the 
jurisdictional autonomy of the city.191
The chronology of the texts cannot be fully established, and the decree in 
honour o f Polemaios is especially elusive in this respect. It is even uncertain whether 
the careers o f the two characters ever overlapped.192 At any rate, Menippos and 
Polemaios shared the same civic background and a very similar education, which the 
dedications duly emphasise. The overtone of the decrees makes it clear that, besides 
their political achievements, the fellow citizens of Menippos and Polemaios aimed at 
celebrating the model they embodied as spokesmen of the city towards Rome. Their 
typically Hellenistic paideia, rooted in the context of civic gymnasia and in the study of 
rhetoric, had given them the opportunity to influence the Roman Senate and to gain 
Roman patrons for Colophon. The most important moments of their education are 
therefore recalled in the honorific decrees, as the necessary background of their 
achievements, and a central aspect of the identity of the whole community.193
ib!) The identification o f  this Quintus Mucius is uncertain: he may be Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur, 
who was governor o f  Asia in 120/119 BC, or Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, who was in the region 
during the early Nineties. A full discussion in Eilers 2002, 127-132, who thinks that there is no decisive 
element to solve the problem.
190 I, 1. 50-54; II, 1. 1-7. See Ferrary 1991, 562-3; Eilers 2002, 131. On the controversy between 
Colophon and Metropolis, see Lehmann 2003.
191 Menippos, col. 1, 1. 27-31, 40-49; Polemaios, col. 2, 1. 51-57. Menippos obtained a ruling o f  the 
Senate decreeing that a Colophonian could not be judged at Rome for a capital offence: Mitchell 2005a, 
199-202, with a summary o f  earlier bibliography.
192 A hypothesis which was taken for granted by J. and L. Robert 1989, 104, and has recently been 
questioned by Eilers 2002, 133-137.
193 See, for Polemaios, 1 ,1. 1-46 (education in the local gymnasium, journeys to Rhodes and Smyrna); 
for Menippos, 1 ,1. 1-10 (journey to Athens). See J. and L. Robert 1989, 39-40; Gauthier 1993, 225-228;
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Later epigraphic material from Colophon also includes a series of dedications 
to the Roman patrons of the city, which are even more interesting for our purposes. 
An equestrian statue was dedicated to the proconsul Gaius Valerius Flaccus in 95 BC 
at the latest, while another one was dedicated to his brother Lucius a few years later.194 
In the late Sixties, the Valerii Flacci still had important connections in town. The 
dedication of a statue in honour of L. Valerius Flaccus, praetor in 63 and governor of 
Asia in 62/61, stresses his action of inherited (8ld upoyovtov) patronage.195 It is 
worth noting how the wording of these texts often reflects some substantial change. 
After the Sullan settlement, the emphasis is on the role of the patrons in making the 
burden of taxation less heavy. Lucullus, who enforced the Sullan setdement in a way 
that was quite favourable to the Asian cities, is called ‘benefactor and saviour of the 
city’.196 Some time later, it shifts to the defence of the city from external threats: 
Pompey is called ‘guardian of the land and the sea, benefactor and patron of the 
Ionians’.197 The emphasis on the benejicia, which strongly affected the economic life of 
the city, returns some years later, in the honorific inscription for Q. Tullius Cicero, 
proconsul of Asia between 61 and 59 BC, ‘benefactor of the Greeks and patron of the 
people’.198
As I will try to show more fully in the second chapter, the spread of Roman 
patronage of Greek communities after the Mithridatic War is perhaps the strongest 
symptom of the difficult phase the Asiatic cities went through at the beginning of the 
first century BC. In a way, it was an attempt to find a solution to the same state of 
tension and discontent that had persuaded many Asiatic cities to support the King.199 
The success of this model of political relationship in the first century BC is probably 
the clearest trace of the central role which urban communities still played in Roman
Worrle 1995b, 246-247; Lehmann 2000, 218-221. On the increasing importance o f  gymnasia for the 
construction o f  civic identity in Late Hellenism, see Gauthier 1995, with earlier bibliography.
194 Respectively SEG  49.1506 and 1507 = Ferrary 2000b, 334-338, nos. 1-2.
195 SEG  49.1510 = Ferrary 2000b, no. 5 ,1. 4: according to Eilers 2002, 79, the clearest case o f  inherited 
patronage o f  a community. Also see Coarelli 1982a, 437-440.
I% SEG  49.1508 = Ferrary 2000b, 339-340, no. 3 ,1. 3-4: €U6py6TT|i' m i atorripa | rr\g TToXew?.
197 SEG  49.1509 = Ferrary 2000b, 341-345, no. 4,1. 4-7: yi]? T€ m i  OaXacar!? | 6TTOTnT|V, Toy 
euepye- | t t |v  m i TraTpwva tw v  | ’ Icjvcov.
198 SEG  49.1511 = Ferrary 2000b, 351-353, no. 6,1. 5-8: euepyeTr)V ovto. | tw v 'EXXfjvwv m i | 
TTdTpwva to u  8f)- | p.ou.
199 Eilers 2002, 143. In this phase o f  economic crisis, patronage was often related to the construction o f  
new public buildings: E. Winter 1996a, 19.
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Asia Minor after Sulla's reorganisation. It is certainly true that the resettlement of the 
province was based on the inclusion of many previously autonomous cities under 
Roman rule. However, this is only one side of the coin. The administrative 
reorganisation carried out by Sulla was still founded on the cities. The decisions taken 
in favour o f the cities at the end of the Seventies by Sulla's closest associate, Lucullus, 
show that their crucial role did not escape the Roman governing class.2110 Weak cities 
and weak urban elites would have deprived the Empire itself of the strength it needed.
1.4. Warfare and politics: Sulla in Italy
In Italy, as well as in Asia Minor, local elites were a crucial aspect of the 
balance of the Empire. The nearly fifteen years between the end of the Social War and 
the death of Sulla presented them with numerous problems, and difficult choices. As 
pointed out above, in Italy Rome was facing a similar problem to that it had to 
confront in the East. The vast majority of the local elites had decided to manifest its 
hostility to Rome, and had managed to create a serious danger to her hegemony. The 
motives of the Italian allies, however, are not as straightforward to account for as 
those of the communities of the Greek East. It may be argued that the ultimate 
project of some of the Italian communities was to put an end to Roman rule. This is 
probably true of a part of the Samnite elites, for instance.201 Others, however, only 
intended to be allowed to share the profits of the empire, and wanted to obtain 
Roman citizenship — which Rome ultimately did grant at the end of the conflict. At 
any rate, the position of the Italian elites is by no means comparable to that of the 
Greek ones. The Roman presence and influence were much more usual for them than 
was the case with the Greeks. Their familiarity with Rome was incomparably greater, 
in all respects.
The inclusion of the Italians in Roman political life was a complex process, 
which took several decades from the enfranchisement to be accomplished. It was not 
started by Sulla, but by his enemies, and namely by Cornelius Cinna, who had a crucial 
role in carrying out the enfranchisement of the Allies. It was not accomplished in his 
day either, since the inclusion of all the potential new citizens into the citizen body
200 Plut. L m c . 20. See Broughton 1938, 537-538, 561-562. On the relationship between Sulla and 
Lucullus, see Keaveney 1992, 15-31.
201 The Social War, o f  course, was caused mainly by the initiative o f  the Italian elites, and not by the 
lower classes: Salmon 1962.
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required a censorial lustrum. Sulla’s contribution was incomplete in this respect, and it 
was related to his decision not to perform the census in 81 BC.202
This, however, does not mean that Sulla had no interest in profitable relations 
with the Italian elites. Several aspects o f his policies deserve attention: the ways he 
dealt with the communities that supported him and those that contrasted him, the 
criteria he apparently used to appoint the new senators, and the way in which the 
proscriptions were carried out. The efforts of Sulla towards the reorganisation of Italy 
were deployed after two major traumas like the Social War and the Civil War. I intend 
to show that Sulla’s skilful management of his relations with the Italian elites certainly 
played an important role in ensuring him the final victory in the conflict for 
supremacy in Rome. Like it was the case in the East, his military experience did 
contribute to ensure him the final success. His moves in the Social War are quite 
instructive.
Some time after his return from Cilicia, after escaping prosecution from his 
political foe C. Marcius Censorinus, Sulla was included among the Roman 
commanders in the Social War.203 Appian lists him among the generals who were 
entrusted with the command of a part of the army (b.c. 1.178-9): the consuls for 90 
BC, L. Julius Caesar and P. Rutilius Lupus, supervised the operations all over Italy and 
coordinated the actions of a number of senior generals, acting in local contexts and 
entrusted with the rank of legatus, probably pro praetore™ There is evidence for Sulla’s 
initiatives in an area corresponding to the territory of the Marsi and, later, to inland 
Campania. Again, we are told that he operated in close contact with C. Marius, 
possibly even under his authority. Appian mentions the important support given by 
Sulla to Marius in a crucial fight against the Marsi, although its location is unspecified 
by the numerous sources that report the episode.205
202 Until the census took place, the new citizens could therefore vote in the comitia tributa, but not in the 
centuriate assembly: Wiseman 1969, 61-62, 65-66. Also see Gabba 1956, 135-138 (= 421-424); Harris 
1971, 236; Crawford 1994, 415, 417.
203 About Censorinus, see David 1992,112, 768-769; Reams 1993.
21)4 Brennan 1992,157.
205 App. b. c. 1.46.201-202, with the provisos o f  Gabba 1956,141-142. Cf. Plut. Mar. 33.3 ; Liv. Per. 73.6; 
Oros. 5.18.15 ; Eutr. 5.3.2. Sulla in action near Aesemia, the Latin colony which the Allies had started 
to besiege from the beginning o f  the conflict: Frontin. Strat. 1.5.17.
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What we know of Sulla’s command in Campania, where he led operations in 
89 BC, is more interesting.206 The focus of his activity appears to have been Pompeii, 
where his opponent was the Campanian commander Lucius Cluentius, then in charge 
of a strong contingent. Sulla also relied on the support of Italian forces led by 
Minatius Magius, a notable from Aeclanum who was to be rewarded for his loyalty to 
Rome with an individual citizenship grant.207 We know from an isolated piece of 
information provided by Pliny the Elder that Sulla conquered and destroyed Stabiae 
on 30 April. The sack was so devastating that Stabiae could not be defined as an 
oppidum any more after the Roman reconquest, but had become something like a rural 
centre.208 Along with Norba, which was conquered in the Civil War, Stabiae is the only 
Italian city we know to have been destroyed by Sulla. Unfortunately, there is not 
further evidence for these events.
We are, of course, considerably better informed about Pompeii. The siege of 
this city must have either preceded or, more probably, followed the conquest of 
Stabiae. The development of the campaign, however, suggests that Sulla’s forces could 
not have been exiguous, as during the siege of Pompeii they had to face a sudden 
extension of the conflict. Sulla camped in the area, and soon afterwards Cluentius 
decided to camp at a very short distance from him.209 This prompted a Roman 
reaction and the beginning of hostilities. Cluentius’ soldiers were defeated and ran 
away from Pompeii, heading for the neighbouring city of Nola, which was ready to 
shelter them. Sulla chased the enemies, and killed most of them, including Cluentius. 
It was a crucial moment of the Social War. One of the strongest Italian contingents
206 See, in general, Liv. Per. 75.2 and 7.
207 Veil. 2.16.1-3: quippe multum Minatii Magii, ataui mei, A.eculanensis, tribuendum est memoriae, qui nepos Decii 
Magii, Campanorum principis, celeberrimi et fidelissimi uiri, tantam hoc bello Romanis Jidem praestitit, ut cum legione, 
quam ipse in Hirpinis conscripserat, Herculaneum simul cum T. Didio caperet, Pompeios cum L  Sulla oppugnaret 
Compsamque occuparet: cuius de uirtutibus cum alii, turn maxime dilucide Q. Hortensius in annalibus suis rettulit. .. illi 
pietati plenam populus Rjomanus gratiam rettulit ipsum uiritim ciuitate donando. See, on this passage, the valuable 
remarks in Sumner 1970, 258-261: nepos is probably to be corrected with pronepos.
208 Plin. 3.70: nunc in uillam abiit. A new smaller settlement was built on the site o f  the city (modern 
Poggio di Varano: Mimero 1988, 233), but the whole ager Stabianus appears to have been put under the 
jurisdiction o f  Nuceria (Miniero 1988, 261)
209 App. b. c. 1.50.217-221.
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was severely defeated, and had to concentrate its forces in the safe stronghold of 
Nola.210
We lack explicit evidence for the chronology of the seizure of Pompeii, which 
must be dated at some point in the spring of 89, after the victory against Cluentius. O f 
course, the siege went on even when Sulla was leading the attack near Nola. A passage 
of Orosius suggests that the legatus Postumius Albinus, uir consularis, was in charge of it 
during Sulla’s absence. However, his superbia soon alienated him the sympathy and 
support of the soldiers, who ended up by starting a revolt and stoning him. According 
to this version, which certainly derives from Livy, Sulla cleverly exploited the incident 
to encourage them to expiate their guilt by defeating the enemies, and his appeal was 
successful: in the subsequent battle, 18.000 Samnites were reportedly killed.211 Sallust’s 
remark about the talent Sulla had in dealing with his troops finds further confirmation 
here. Whatever one decides to make of Orosius’ account, the development of the 
operations shows that the army led by Sulla was quite skilled and strong, and that it 
was able to sustain a complex military effort on at least two fronts.212
The most significants details of the conquest of the city, however, remain 
mysterious. We do not know how traumatic it was, whether the choice of the city to 
oppose Rome was unanimous or not, and how many people lost their lives in the 
attack.213 Ignorance on these matters prevents from establishing which factors linked
210 It is probably at this stage o f  the war that Sulla received the coronagraminear. Plin. 22.12 (= HRR2 10 = 
Chassignet 10).
211 Oros. 5.18.22-23: cf. Liv. Per. 75.1; Plut. Sull. 6.9; Polyaen. 8.9.1. Orosius’ narrative is clearly flawed 
at least on two respects: the siege is dated to anno ah Urbe condita D C LX I  (93 BC), and Sulla is called 
consul. Amidani 1994 speculates that Sulla was so mild towards the soldiers because he already knew that 
their support would be essential for him to obtain the Mithridatic command.
2,2 Gabba 1958, 151 speculates that the legate Aulus Postumius Albinus, who was supporting Sulla with 
a fleet, may have been responsible for it.
213 There is some archaeological evidence for the Sullan siege o f  Pompeii. The northern side o f  the 
walls had to be refurbished thoroughly: Van Buren 1925; Van Buren 1932; Coarelli 2002a, 52. On the 
fortification o f  Pompeii immediately before the Social War, see Maiuri 1929, esp. 163-167, 183-184, 
223-224; Chiaramonte Trere 1986, 30-31; Guzzo 2000, 113. The so-called V/#/w-inscriptions (Ve 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28 = ST  Po 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39), no doubt the best known feature o f Oscan epigraphy in 
Pompeii, certainly deal with the organisation o f the resistance against Sulla, but their interpretation 
remains obscure on a number o f  matters: see Poccetti 1988, esp. 320-327; Coarelli 2002a, 53. Several 
Latin graffiti bear the name o f Sulla: they are on the wall o f  the tower no. 3 (CIL 4.5385 = ILLRP  346: 
L  Suld), on that o f  the tower no. 10 (CIL 12.2709 = IULRP 347), and on the grave o f  the aedilis C.
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the Sullan conquest to the decision Sulla took in 80 BC, when he founded a colony in 
the territory of the city. The parallel example of the complete destruction faced by the 
neighbouring city of Stabiae suggests that Pompeii may have had a more pragmatic 
attitude towards the Roman army. In fact, the siege had a relatively mild conclusion: 
the city was conquered, but not destroyed. No widespread bloodshed is known to 
have taken place either.214
Pompeii benefited from the extension of Roman citizenship and, for nearly a 
decade, wa^ a municipium.215 It was only in 80 BC that a colony was created and a new 
institutional system imposed upon the city.216 However, there is no evidence to believe 
that Pompeii’s conduct in the Social War was the factor that caused the foundation of 
a Sullan colony in 80 BC. The colonisation of Pompeii must have had different 
reasons, and to have been unrelated to the conquest of the city in 89 BC.217 It is surely 
significant, however, that Sulla had a direct familiarity with the area, which may have 
played a part in deciding and organising the colonial settlement.
A similar link between the Social War and the aftermath of Sulla’s victory for 
supremacy in Rome may be found in another Campanian community, Aeclanum. 
After defeating Cluentius, he moved towards the territory of the Hirpini and besieged 
the city, then in the hands of the insurgents.218 Aeclanum refused to surrender, and 
was punished with the destruction of the walls, which were still made of wood, and a 
sack. Again, as Appian makes it clear, this case was exceptional. All other cities of 
Hirpinia decided to surrender, and escaped the sack. Sulla’s attitude during the Social 
War appears to have been consistent in this respect, and it probably was an 
unavoidable strategy, in a war where time and speed were crucial factors.
Vestorius Priscus (CIL, 6.9161 = ILLRP  348: L  Sulla Cornelius). The archaeological context o f  the latter 
suggests that it may date to the age o f  Claudius: see Weber 1966.
214 Castren 1975, 50.
215 Castren 1975, 51 argued, on epigraphical grounds, that some interreges may have ruled the city in the
early phase o f  the municipiunr. the argument is convincingly refuted in Crawford 1998, 45-46.
216 On the chronology, see Weber 1975, 182-187. There is no evidence that the colony and the old
municipium coexisted for a short period, as claimed by Onorato 1951: cf. Mouritsen 1988, 71-75, 86-88.
217 Contra, Salmon 1958,168-169.
218 App. b.c. 1.222: see Gabba 1958, 152. An episode o f  the campaign against the Hirpini is perhaps 
mentioned in Gell. 20.6.3: see Keaveney 1981b, 294-296.
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In the aftermath of the war, however, Sulla apparently created some useful 
connections at Aeclanum.219 M. Magius Surus gained the supreme magistracy of the 
city. He was son of that Minatius Magius who had played such an important part in 
supporting the Romans before the conquest of Pompeii.220 An inscription found near 
the eastern gate of the walls of Aeclanum, sheds light on the aftermath o f the war in 
the town, soon after the creation of the municipium, and strikingly links Sulla’s 
involvement in the Social War to his domination Two of the quattuoruiri -  Magius 
Surus and an otherwise unknown Padacius — and the patronus municipi Quinctius Valgus 
built portas turreis moiros/ turreisque aequas qum moiro. The walls burnt by Sulla were 
replaced by an imposing stone structure, which is still the most prominent feature of 
the site of Aeclanum in contrada Grotte near modem Mirabella Eclano.222 The 
devastations of the war were therefore followed by a reasonably prompt 
reconstruction, jointly funded by the municipium and by a priuatus, who was not a local 
magistrate, and not even a citizen of Aeclanum. Quinctius Valgus was one of the 
richest landowners of post-Sullan Italy, who owed his wealth to the confiscations that
219 It cannot be ruled that there was a pro-Roman faction at Aeclanum even during the Social War. 
Salmon 1989, 232-233 attributes to the presence o f  a pro-Roman element in town the inclusion o f  the 
community into the tribe Cornelia, instead o f  the Galeria, where all other Hirpinian cities belonged. It 
has been argued that Abellinum is a Sullan colony, but the evidence is inconclusive: Colucci Pescatori 
1991,119 (earlier bibliography: ibid., I l l ,  fn. 122).
220 Again, we are well-informed about his family thanks to his descendant Velleius Paterculus (2.16.3): 
cuius \scil. o f  Minatius Magius] Hit pietati plenam populus Romanus gratiam rettulit ipsum uiritim ciuitate donando, 
duos filios eius creando praetores, cum seni adhuc crearentur. This passage implies that his sons held the 
praetorship some time between 88 and 82, before the Sullan reform o f the magistracy. It is therefore 
quite likely that they were followers o f Marius: Gabba 1954a, 101 (= Gabba 1973, 268). Surely for this 
reason Harvey 1973, 90, fn. 28 states that Marcus Magius was a third son o f  Minatius Magius. It cannot 
be ruled out, however, that he actually joined the populares, became a praetor, and was eventually 
pardoned by Sulla (see Sumner 1970, 260-261 and fn. 22). In general on Minatius’ role o f  pro-Roman 
agent, see Brunt 1988, 108-109. Taylor 1960, 310 and Harvey 1973, 90, fn. 28 are surely wrong in 
suggesting that the quattuorvir C. Marius C. f. mentioned in CIL l 2.1721 = CIL 9.1138 = ILLRP  522 is 
Marius the Younger, cos. 82. There is a stemma o f  the Velleii in Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1982, 84.
221 CIL 1.1230 = CIL 9.1140: C(aius) Quinctius C(ai) f(ilius) Valg(us) patron(usj munic(ipii) /  M(arcus) Magi (us) 
Min(ati) f(ilius) Surus A(ulus) Patlacius Q(uinti) f(ilius) /  HIIuir(i) d(e) s(enatus) s(ententia) portas turreis moiros /  
turreisque aequas qum moiro /  faciundum coirauerunt.
222 On this site, see L. Lombardo 1977; D e Caro-Greco 1981, 173-175; Colucci Pescatori 1991, 98-106. 
On the walls o f  Aeclanum, see Sgobbo 1931; Kirsten 1975, 627-628; D e Caro-Greco 1981, 173.
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followed the Civil War. Significandy, Cicero mentions his properties in agro Hirpino.223 
As we shall see in due course, Aeclanum was only one of the fronts for the activities 
of this character. Although we do not know how he reached this position, it is no 
doubt significant that Valgus became patron of a city that had fallen into Sulla’s range 
of action already during the Social War. His cooperation with Magius Surus, son of an 
Italian notable who supported Sulla in a crucial moment o f the war must be no 
coincidence either.
Already in the Social War Sulla was prepared to interact with, and even to 
reward the Italian elites that did not oppose his plans. During the Civil War, Sulla was 
keen to built good relations with the communities and the members of the local elites 
that were prepared to accept his supremacy and to support his rise to Rome. His first 
act after his return to Italy is very instructive in this respect. In the summer of 83, he 
arrived with his fleet to the former Latin colony, by then municipium, o f Brundisium. 
Appian says that he was welcomed in town, with no opposition to his arrival.224 The 
port was granted some form of fiscal immunity, which Appian calls dT£\eia, stating 
that it still existed in his own day. Since Brundisium was a community of Roman 
citizens, where the tributum was not levied, and the most important harbour of the 
Italian Adriatic coast, it is safe to assume that the immunity was granted from the
225portonum.
Sulla’s decision was a sign of benevolence and goodwill towards Italy as a 
whole.226 The exemption of 83 BC generated clear advantages to the trade to and from 
Italy, and specifically to Brundisium. Moreover, it is likely that Sulla himself or his 
associates enjoyed their own share in the economic bonanza that followed this
223 Cic. leg. agr. 3.28. The identification between this C. Quinctius Valgus and the Valgus mentioned in 
Cic. leg. agr. 3.3, the father-in-law o f  the tribune Rullus, is convincigly suggested in Dessau 1883 and in 
Harvey 1973; cf. leg. agr. 3.8, 3.13-14, with Drummond 2000, 138-139, 144-145. Also see Scuderi 1989, 
124-127.
224 App. b.c. 1.364.
225 Brundisium was included in the tribe Maeciar. on the municipalisation o f  Apulia, see Pani 1988, 21-30, 
esp. 26-27. On the harbour o f  Brundisium and its strategic importance, see Uggeri 1988, 50-55 and 60- 
64; on its relationship with the ageroi the city, see Uggeri 1998, 49-51. The archaeological evidence for 
the development o f  the city in the Republican period is summarised in Uggeri 1988, 55-59 and Carito 
1988. Portoria are known to have been abolished all over Italy in 60 BC by the lex Caecilia de uectigalibus 
(see Rotondi 1912, 386); cf. however Suet. Rhet. 1. See B. W. Henderson 1897, 254-255; D e Laet 1949, 
58, fn. 2; Gabba 1958, 213; Laudhti 1998, 36.
226 On Sulla’s agenda after the return to Italy, see the magisterial discussion in Frier 1971, 595-604.
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decision. Already before Sulla, Brundisium was an important centre for the production 
of the so-called ‘Apulian’ amphorae, actually produced on the whole Adriatic coast 
with a wide circulation in the East.227 At least two sites in the territory of Brundisium, 
contrada Apani and contrada Giancola, are known to have been important centres for 
the production of amphorae in this period.228 Amphorae stamps found in both areas 
have revealed the direct involvement in the production of amphorae of Tarula, one of 
Sulla’s closest associates. A freedman of Sulla himself, probably of Thracian origin, he 
was among those who took most profit out of Sullan confiscations and enriched 
themselves thanks to the favours they had offered to the winner of the war. He is 
mentioned in a famous passage of Sallust’s Historiae, the Oratio Repidi, where he is 
numbered among the most detestable figures of the Sullan regime: nam praetor satellites 
conmaculatos quis eadem uolt, aut quis non omnia mutata praeter uictoriam? scilicet milites quorum 
sanguine Tarulae Scirtoque, pessumis servorum, diuitiae partae sunt A stamp found at Apani 
reads T A R J/R A E  SI/7 J.AH  R, whereas another one from Giancola reads TylR R R A  
jL SV R .2M) They are explicit evidence that Tarula invested some of his patrimony in 
workshops in the territory of Brundisium.
It is unlikely that Tarula was still a slave when he owned amphorae 
workshops. Surely he had been enfranchised by then, and the stamps are to be 
supplemented with UJbertus), rather than with R(ua)2M The chronology of the 
amphorae is to be placed, on archaeological grounds, somewhere between the end of
227 In fact, they must be called ‘Lamboglia 2’: Volpe 1988, 81-87; Manacorda 1988, 94-96; Cipriano- 
Carre 1989, 68-74; Manacorda 1989, 446-447; for an attempt to define the ‘Brundisian’ amphora type, 
see Desy 1989,12-13.
228 See Manacorda 1994, 9-10 on their different characteristics and functions. Also cf. ibid., 7-9 about 
the neighbouring site o f  Masseria Marmorelle. On the Apani site, see Desy 1989, 14-15 (14: ‘sans doute 
le plus riche de tout le bassin mediterraneen en timbres amphoriques’). For a survey o f the amphorae 
types found at Apani, see Palazzo 1988 and Palazzo 1989. About Giancola, see Desy 1989, 16 and 
Manacorda 2004.
229 Sail. Hist. 1.55.21.
230 Cf. CIL  9.6079.9. Overall, there are seven exemplars o f stamps bearing Tarula’s name, six from 
Apani and one from Giancola: Desy 1989, 95, nos. 654-656; 105, no. 751. They are present mainly in 
the ager Brundisinur. see Palazzo 1996, 50, with earlier bibliography. On the function o f  these stamps, see 
Manacorda 1989, 448-450.
231 Marangio 1978; Silvestrim 1996a, 34; Palazzo 1996, 49-50; contra, arguing that Tarula was a servus cum 
peculio, Manacorda 1985, 146; Manacorda 1988, 101 and Manacorda 1989, 458; Santoro 1993, 512-3; 
Aubert 1994, 252-253; Manacorda 1994,15-16 (more cautious); Manacorda 2004,186.
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Eighties and the early Seventies, after the proscriptions. Nothing certain can really be 
said, however, about the sources of the capital used by Tarula. Sallust’s emphasis on 
Tarula’s wealth makes it quite unlikely that he was just administering his patron’s 
money at Brundisium.
Among the stamps produced in the territory of Brundisium, there are several 
bearing the name EPIC AD VS  too (cf. CIL  6079.24).232 The name is probably Illyrian, 
and another freedman of Sulla inevitably comes to mind: Cornelius Epicadus, who 
was very close to his patron and to his son Faustus Sulla, and was entrusted to 
complete the memoirs that death had prevented the great man from completing.233 
However, the idea of a direct involvement of this Epicadus in the workshops near 
Brundisium is probably far-fetched: it should be explained, first of all, why Epicadus 
would not state his relationship with Sulla, as Tarula does.
However, Tarula was not the only outsider who was involved in financial 
enterprises in the ager Brundisinus in the first century BC. Another amphora stamp 
shows the name of an ORESTE(S) LENTULO(RUAt). This Orestes is surely a 
freedman, or a slave supplied with peculium, of some members of the Lentuli family. 
His patroni must have been L. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, consul in 57 BC (RE 238) 
and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, consul in 49 BC (RE 218).234 Their political position 
was all but consistent, as they cautiously kept close both to Pompey and to Caesar, 
and it sheds little light on the reasons of their presence at Brundisium.235 Even their 
relationship with the gens Cornelia should not be viewed as an immediate reason of 
their involvement in Brundisian pottery workshops. Their involvement in the area is 
the symptom of a wider phenomenon. The exemption from the portorium decided by 
Sulla determined the economic expansion of the territory of Brundisium, and some 
members of the Roman elite took advantage of this favourable situation, replacing the 
local producers who had been operating there until the beginning of the first century 
BC.236
232 Desy 1989, 76-77, nos. 482-486 (from Apani); 109, no. 793 (from Santa Rosa); 115, no. 842 
(unknown, though certainly Brundisian workshop).
233 On the diffusion o f  the name, see Santoro 1993, 513. On Epicadus’ relationship with Faustus Sulla, 
see Suet. gramm. 12: quare numquatn non utriusque se libertum edidiP, cf. Fabre 1981, 329.
234 Manacorda 1988,101-102; Manacorda 1989, 458-459; Manacorda 1994, 15; Silvestrini 1996a, 34.
235 Syme 1939a, 44-45.
236 Cipriano-Carre 1989, 73. C. Visellius Varro, a cousin o f  Cicero, may have owned a workshop at 
Giancola: Manacorda 2004,186.
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As he moved towards Rome along the Appian Way, Sulla found no significant 
hostility from the local communities. Velleius Paterculus stresses how exceptionally 
peaceful the passage of Sulla through Calabria and Apulia was: putares Sullam uenisse in 
Italiam non belli uindicem, sed pads autorem: tanta cum quiete exerdtum per Calabriam 
Apuliamque cum singulari cura frugum, agrorum, hominum, urbium perduxit in CampaniamP1 
Velleius should be taken seriously here, rather than simply dismissed as an uncritical 
follower of the pro-Sullan tradition.238 Sulla’s most dangerous enemies were elsewhere: 
near Capua, in Latium, and in Etruria, where the decisive phase of the conflict would 
take place.239 Moreover, it is safe to assume that he had already gathered the resources 
he needed for his campaign from the extraordinary levy that he had imposed on the 
cities of Asia Minor, and could exploit the political advantages that would derive from 
a mild treatment of the Italian population. Finally, it is not unlikely that the senators 
who had left Rome and joined Sulla during his Eastern campaign, forming the oxni~La 
(3ouXfjs* mentioned by Plutarch, exploited their connections in Southern Italy for the 
sake of their friend and patron, the winner of the Mithridatic War.240
Sulla was prepared to make some substantial political concessions on various 
fronts. Between Cales and Teanum, after the victory in the battle near the Tifata 
Mount, he held talks with the consul L. Scipio Asiagenus, in which he proved himself 
prepared not to affect the rights of the Italian communities, while Scipio gave 
reassurances about his intention to respect the prerogatives of the Senate.241 Some 
time later, as he was getting closer to Rome and to the final clash with Marius, he 
negotiated directly with the Italians, and struck a deal with them, reported by the 
Epitome of Livy: Sylla cum Italids populis, ne timeretur ab his uelut erupturus duitatem et 
suffragii ius nuper datum, foeduspercussit.242 By that time, it was clear that Sulla’s power was
237 Veil. 2.25.1. On Velleius’ typical interest in Italian matters see Mazzarino 1966, 433-438.
238 Sulla’s hostility to the Samnites should not be exaggerated, and there is no good reason to believe 
that the Samnites were excluded from the enfranchisement; contra, Salmon 1964, 75-79.
239 Salmon 1967, 382.
240 See Plut. Suit. 22.1, with Angeli Bertinelli 1996,16. On the senators who may have joined Sulla in the 
East, see Keaveney 1984,126-131.
241 Cic. Phil. 12.11.27: Sulla cum Scipione inter Cales et Teanum, cum alter nobilitatis florem, alter belli socios 
adhibuisset, de auctoritate senatus, de suffragiis populi, de iure ciuitatis agentes inter se condiciones contulerunt. Non tenuit 
omnino colloquium illudfidem, a ui tamen periculoque afuit, cf. Cic. Phil. 13.1.2, and Brunt 1988, 125-126. On 
the talks between Sulla and Scipio and the position o f  Sertorius, see Strisino 2002. Some envoys o f  the 
Senate had approached Sulla immediately after the defeat o f Mithridates: Liv. Per. 83.4 and 84.1-3.
242 Liv. Per. 86.3.
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bound to replace those of his enemies. Livy reports that he was visited by litigators 
who presented their vadimonia to him. He answered them to present their claims at 
Rome, where he would deal with them in due course. He clearly felt that the final 
victory was very close. The local Italian elites must have realised it too.243
1.5. Retaliation and politics: the proscriptions
In all the narratives of the Civil War the portrait of Sulla quasi uindex libertatis, 
who gets back to Italy and reassures the Italians about his intentions, is closely 
followed by the proscriptions and the dictatorship. There is no intrinsic contradiction 
between these two moments, which are in fact different aspects of the same strategy.
After his arrival in Italy, Sulla showed his talent in building fruitful relations 
with the communities that were prepared to second his interests. The booty he had 
obtained in the East allowed him to restrain his greed, at least for the first part of the 
campaign. Overall, he kept quite consistent with this policy, as far as his relations with 
communities were concerned.244 Retaliation affected only the staunchest enemies. 
Praeneste and Norba, which had become the core of the anti-Sullan resistance and 
sheltered the most prominent Marians, were sacked.245 Norba was even abandoned, 
and the area was reoccupied only in the Middle Ages, when the city of Norma was 
founded on a neighbouring site.246 The destruction of Sulmo, the capital of the 
Paeligni, was probably only announced by Sulla, but never carried out.247 Other cities, 
as I will show in more detail in the next chapter, were punished with the settlement of 
veterans, and an unclear number of communities, which certainly included Arretium
243 The best discussion o f  this phase is Frier 1971, 601-602. On Sulla’s decision to confirm the 
enfranchisement o f  the Allies, Gabba 1954a, 102-104 (= Gabba 1973, 270-272) remains invaluable. 
Dahlheim 1993, 111-112 hastily dismisses Sulla’s pledge as a merely tactical measure; Keaveney 1987, 
187, 205-206 emphatically celebrates it as the turning-point in the making o f  Roman Italy.
244 Brunt 1971, 286-287 is probably too pessimistic.
245 Pompey conquered and sacked Sena Gallica in Picenum: App. b. c. 1.88.401.
246 See Coarelli 1982c, 265-271. The archaeological evidence shows that the city went through a 
prosperous phase between the Second Punic War and the Civil War: Quilici Gigli 2003. On Norbanus’ 
possible connection with Norba, see Linden 1896, 56, fn. 20; Miinzer 1936, 926-927. Rawson 1978, 149 
and Hinard 1985a, 385-386 are more cautious.
247 See Flor. 2.9.28: nam Sulmonem, uetus oppidum socium atque amicum — facinus indignum — non expugnat aut 
obsidet iure belli; sed quo modo morte damnati dud iubentur, sic damnatam duitatem iussit deleri. Possibly, the 
destruction was limited to the fortifications o f  the city. See Gabba 1970/1971, 462-463 (= Gabba 1973, 
363-367); Wiseman 1971, 26.
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and Volaterrae, were deprived of Roman citizenship. Other Etruscan cities, like 
Telamon, Vetulonia and Satumia, suffered heavy destructions, which may be due to a 
Sullan attack.248 It is however with the punishment of hundreds of individuals that 
Sulla earned himself the reputation of blood-thirsty tyrant which lingered on in the 
ancient tradition. His heaviest contribution to the making of the Italian elite are indeed 
the proscriptions, which were the final act of the Civil War, and the most 
extraordinary one, especially because they were unprecedented.
As soon as Sulla returned to Rome, after the destruction of Norba, Sulla 
started to settle the political affairs in the city. Appian reports a speech which he gave 
to an ‘assembly’, surely a contio, where he outlined his intentions for the immediate 
future.249 He anticipated an ambitious plan of constitutional and political reforms, and 
asked for complete obedience. Moreover, he announced that all the magistrates who 
had opposed him after his return from the East and his negotiations with Scipio 
would be severely punished. After this speech, the proscriptions started.250 The contio 
mentioned by Appian was probably held the day after a Senate assembly that took 
place in the temple of Bellona on 2 November 82 BC, in which Sulla outlined the 
project of the proscriptions.251 According to Plutarch, this meeting of the Senate 
coincided with the actual beginning of the massacres and the confiscations.
The speech reported by Appian is the most thorough and diffused justification 
of the mass slaughter that is widely known as the Sullan proscriptiones. The elimination 
of the leading exponents of the populates was, of course, an essential aspect of the 
proscriptions, but it would be wrong to view it as the only, or perhaps even the main 
one. The history of the word proscriptio reveals the complexity of such a process, and 
its political importance. The term had long belonged in part of the technical 
vocabulary of Roman law and it was commonly used to designate a procedure
248 Harris 1971, 207 (on Telamon, with earlier bibliography); ibid., 258; Pfiffig 1966, 56 (on Vetulonia); 
Rendini 2003, 333-334 (on Satumia, for which the evidence is less clear). Telamon had sheltered Marius 
in 87 BC: Plut. Mar. 41.3-4; App. b. c. 1.67.304; Licin. 35.7 Criniti.
249 App. b. c. 1.95.441-444.
250 The best modern discussion on the Sullan proscriptions is Hinard 1985a, 18-223, followed by a 
catalogue o f  the victims at 329-411. My debt to this contribution will often be apparent. For a survey o f  
the modern debate on the proscriptions, see Calore 1995, 34-40.
251 Plut. Suit. 30.3; D io 33-35, fr. 109.5. See Gabba 1958, 254; the chronology is convincingly outlined 
by Hinard 1985a, 108-110. Cf. Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 39, 147; on the Bellona temple, see ibid., 151- 
160.
73
whereby something was put up in a public place (pro-scribere), and presented to the 
whole community. A list of candidates or people deemed suitable for a magistracy 
could be the object of a proscription but the most frequent use of the word belongs in 
the area of announcement of public sales. A public sale, or an auction of the goods 
belonging to an individual was usually called proscriptio. The word had an explicidy 
negative connotation, as the sale affected the household of someone in a state of 
insolvency, and the publicity it was given was at the same time a denounciation of his 
conduct, and a sanction of his infamia.252 To a large extent, the proscriptions decided 
and enacted by Sulla were a novelty, something which had never taken place in Roman 
history, although his decision to declare hostespublici twelve leading populates, in 88 BC, 
is, to an extent, a precedent.253 At the same time, they must be described and explained 
in the light of this legal and ideological background.254
Technically, the proscriptio was the inclusion of a person in a list of the 
addressees of a range of provisions, adopted unilaterally by Sulla. We are told by the 
literary sources that the list was displayed in the Roman Forum, and periodically 
updated by the insertion o f new names.255 A reference made by Cicero in his speech in 
defence of Roscius from Ameria makes it clear that the final deadline for the inclusion 
of new names was fixed as the 1st June 81 — about seven months after Sulla’s speeches 
to the people and the Senate.256
It has often been argued that the list of proscriptions was set up to restrain the 
massacres and limit the number of victims.257 The evidence we have for many arbitrary 
and politically unjustified crimes perpetrated in the season of the proscriptions is a 
warning against accepting these arguments. It is the set of legal consequences for 
those included on the list, however, that points to a quite different conclusion. Strictly
252 The best discussion o f the legal background o f the proscriptions is Hinard 1985a, 17-29. About 
proscriptio as an aspect o f  civil law, see Kaser 1996, 388-401. On the proscriptio (public sale) o f  a debtor’s 
goods in the age o f  Sulla, see Cic. Quinct. 6.25. Also cf. ibid. 24.76: see Heinze 1960, 93-98 and Hinard 
1975 on the subtle political implications o f  this speech.
25S App. b. c. 1.60.271-272; Plut. Suit. 10.1; Cic. Brut. 168; Liv. Per. 77; Val. Max. 3.8.5; Flor. 2.9.8. See 
Pais 1916; Bauman 1973; Katz 1975, 105-115; Hinard 1985a, 108-109 (Sulla presented his aims to the 
Senate and to a contio, like he did before the proscriptions).
254 J. Henderson 1998, 15-18 is an excellent, if  brief discussion in this sense.
255 App. b. c. 1.443. See Cicero’s definition o f  the proscription in dom. 17.43 (opinor poenam in dues 
Romanos nominatim sine iudido constitutam), with Sambito 1963, 37.
256 Cic. Rose. Amer. 128.
257 Cf. Plut. Suit. 31.2-4; Flor. 2.9.25; Oros. 5.21.2-3.
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speaking, a proscription was not a sentence to death.258 Most of the people on the list 
were killed, of course, although some managed to flee Rome and Italy, and either 
spent the rest of their lives in exile, or joined the forces of Sertorius in Spain. The 
murder of the proscribed was of course the most frequent outcome, since immunity 
was granted to the executioner and those who helped the proscribed were liable to be 
killed, although not proscribed.259 However, this was not the central aspect of the 
proscriptions, which were focused on the loss of political status and on the 
confiscations. In fact, they also concerned some enemies of Sulla who had already 
died during the war, after 83, whose heirs suffered the consequences of the 
proscriptions.260
The immediate effects of a proscription were both political and financial. The 
proscribed received an interdictio, a legal provision that excluded the victim from 
citizenship, and therefore deprived him of any right, including that of personal safety, 
and meant that his patrimony was entirely confiscated by the State. Soon afterwards, 
all his properties were sold in a public auction, usually at a considerably lower price 
than the real value of the goods. It is also well known that the interdictio was extended 
to the children of the proscribed, mainly to make any legal challenge to the 
confiscation impossible.261 The punishment inflicted by Sulla on a part of the Roman, 
and Italian elites that had opposed him was not meant to be exhausted over the course 
of one generation. Moreover, the effects of the proscriptions had to be shielded from 
the likely legal challenges, or open revenge of the descendants of the victims.262
Even this cursory glance at the provisions relating to the proscriptions shows 
that the intention to limit the number of the victims was hardly the reason which led 
Sulla to reinvent the proscriptio and transform it into a political matter. Firstly, a massive
258 See Hinard 1985a, 35-36.
259 Plut. Suit. 31.7. Hinard 1985a, 35-40.
260 Hinard 1985a, 84-85. It is the clause o f  the law on the proscriptions quoted by Cicero, Rose. Amer. 
126: ut aut eorum bona ueneant qui proscripti sunt... aut eorum qui in aduersariorum praesidiis occisi sunt. Having 
died fighting with the populares was enough to receive a posthumous punishment; such a clause, o f  
course, substantially increased the number o f  the potential victims.
261 Sail. Cat. 37.9; Liv. Per. 89.4; Veil. 2.28.4; Plin. 7.117; Sen. ira 2.34.2. See Vedaldi Iasbez 1981 (with a 
tentative list at 184-207); Hinard 1985a, 87-100. Velleius’ statement that senatorum filii et onera ordinis 
sustinerent et iura perderent is probably an anachronism: see Hinard 1985a, 99-100; contra, Vedaldi Iasbez 
1981,170-176.
262 Epstein 1987, 44-45,109 at fn. 109.
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process of expropriation and reallocation of resources needed some form of legal 
recognition, which only the creation of public lists of victims made possible. Secondly, 
Sulla needed to convey the weight of the infamia that he inflicted on his enemies by 
adopting a completely new form, which was nevertheless immediately understandable 
to the Roman public. It had to be the political death of the sectors of the Roman and 
Italian elites that had opposed him. Re-using an aspect of private law in the political 
domain was, in some respects, a stroke of genius. No doubt, its close link with the 
concept o f infamia and the effectiveness of the provisions played a major part in 
bringing about the climate of terror that several sources mention in their accounts of 
life in Rome after the victory of Sulla.263
The proscription of an individual was, first of all, a legal decision, but there 
was of course a political dimension to it. It is certain that the proscriptions were 
decided by an edict and later ratified by a law. Like it is the case with other aspects of 
this problem, our information depends on the correct interpretation of a passage of 
Cicero’s speech pro Roscio Amerino.264 Cicero defended the son of a partisan of Sulla, 
who was unduly included in the proscription list and killed by two fellow citizens. 
Chrysogonus, an influential freedman of Sulla, eventually bought Roscius’ properties 
for a very low price. A global interpretation of the speech is made quite difficult by the 
constraints which Cicero had to face when he gave it: the case was heard in 80 BC, 
when Sulla was still in Rome, holding the consulship. However, the pro Roscio Amerino 
teaches us a lot about the legal aspects of the proscriptions and the way in which they 
were enforced. It is therefore quite surprising that, at some point, Cicero refers to a 
passage of the law showing some uncertainty about its name (128): quipotuerunt ista ipsa 
lege quae de proscriptione est, siue Valeria siue Cornelia — non enim noui nec scio — uerum ista ipsa 
lege bona Sex. Rosci uenire qui potuerunt? Seemingly, there should be no room for doubt 
on such a matter, especially in a plea made by a lawyer in such an important trial, and 
later revised for publication.265
263 Hinard 1985a, 135-143; cf. J. Henderson 1998, 32 (‘Sullan proscription always bleeds into the 
bloodstream o f  putting on public record — ‘noticing the terms o f  political existence’)’. Cf. the dreadful 
treatment inflicted upon the corpses o f  the victims: Hinard 1984b.
264 There are useful discussions o f  this speech in Stroh 1975, 55-79 (on which cf. Kinsey 1981); Kinsey 
1980; Diehl 1988, 43-117; Dyck 2003.
265 Diehl 1988, 46 suggests that the written version o f the speech followed closely the plea given at the 
trial; an opposite view, which I tend to favour, in Berry 2004.
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The doubt that Cicero expresses here is probably explainable as a reference to 
the legal procedure which led to the beginning of Sulla’s dictatorship.266 A law 
presented by L. Valerius Flaccus, who acted as an interrex in the months immediately 
following the end of the Civil War, provided the legal background to Sulla’s accession 
to the supreme magistracy.267 With this law, all Sulla’s acta between 88 and 82, 
including the first proscriptiones, were ratified, and the way was paved for the 
dictatorship.268 The proscriptions were then dealt with in more detail in a lex Cornelia. 
The existence of this law is confirmed by a passage of the 1Verrines (2.1.123), which 
refers to a specific clause, quae proscriptum iuuari uetaret. In the pro Roscio Amerino, 
Cicero’s intention is to de-politicise the trial by downplaying the role of Sulla in the 
rise of Chrysogonus; at any rate, his case was already forceful enough in itself.267 By 
implying that the proscriptions were not just a result of Sulla’s policy, but had 
ultimately been made possible by a law presented by a former opponent of the 
dictator, like Flaccus, Cicero did a good service to the agenda of his harangue, if not to 
the cause o f historical accuracy.270
It is therefore likely that the definitive legal framework of the proscriptions 
was provided by a lex Cornelia, voted by the comitia during the dictatorship. Although 
the full name of the law is not stated, it was probably a lex Cornelia de proscription, or de 
proscriptis, which determined the interdictio of a number of enemies of Sulla.271 It set the
266 Cf. Diehl 1988, 92-95, viewing it as an indirect reference to the unlawfulness o f  Roscius’s murder 
and o f the ensuing confiscation.
267 App. b. c. 1.98-99.459-461; cf. Plut. Suit. 33.1; Veil. 2.28.2. On Appian’s account and Valerius 
Flaccus’ role in the Civil War, see Gabba 1958, 267-271; Bellen 1975; Keaveney 1984,131-138.
268 On the ratification o f  Sulla’s acta, see Cic. leg. agr. 3.5: omnium legum iniquissimam dissimillimamque legis 
esse arbitror earn quam L. Flaccus interrex de Sulla tulit, ut omnia quaecumque ille fecisset essent rata. About the 
background and scope the lex Valeria, see Vervaet 2004; on its legitimacy, see Castello 1956. Also cf. 
Gabba 1958, 255; Wosnik 1963, 93; Hurlet 1993, 30 50; Sandberg 2002, 80.
269 Heinze 1960, 101-102.
270 Flaccus, cos. 100 was appointed princeps senatus in 86 BC: Liv. Per. 83.4. Cf. however Buchheit 1975a, 
arguing that Cicero’s negative views about Sulla are already apparent in the pro Roscio Amerino, albeit 
skillfully concealed by a clever use o f  irony; on a similar line Diehl 1988, 85-117, esp. 86-88. On the 
portrait o f Chrysogonus as a tyrant, see Buchheit 1975b. The opposite view o f  Hinard 1979, that Cicero 
deliberately politicised the case o f  Roscius by overstating Chrysogonus’ power, is unsupported by the 
evidence. The speech is probably to be dated to the beginning o f  80 BC: see Kinsey 1967. It is unlikely 
that Cicero left Rome for Athens because he feared Sulla’s anger (Plut. Cic. 3.6). It is more likely that he 
left because o f  poor health, as Cicero himself says in Brut. 314 (see Kinsey 1967, 67).
271 Hinard 1985a, 74-77 envisages a lex Cornelia de hostibus reipublicae.
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rules for the confiscation and the sale of the household of the proscribed, withdrew 
the political rights of the children of the proscribed, granted immunity to the 
murderers of those who had not died in the Civil War, fixed the temporal limit for the 
inclusion of new names on the proscription list to 1 June 81 BC, it probably contained 
the first list of the victims of the proscriptions, which was created after the Colline 
Gate and included the most prominent opponents of Sulla.272 However, such a list was 
certainly not exhaustive, as murders and expropriations were still possible after June 
81, as is shown by the case of Roscius Amerinus, who was killed three months after 
the deadline set in the law on the proscriptions.
It seems clear that Sulla himself compiled the lists, and that he had a direct 
role in organising the confiscations and the new allocations of properties. As he made 
clear in the speech reported by Appian, the first targets were the magistrates that had 
led, or followed, the populares during the last phase of the Civil War. Some of them, 
like Marius the Younger and the praetor Damasippus, had already died during the 
conflict, while other leaders of the populares, captured after the batde at the Colline 
Gate, were executed soon afterwards. Their supplice was dreadful: they were 
beheaded, and their heads were taken to Praeneste and exposed in front of the walls 
of the besieged town. The grisly spectacle was meant to persuade the citizens of 
Praeneste to surrender.273
The punishment of Praeneste is an episode of the proscriptions too, showing 
an important aspect o f the political plan which prompted Sulla’s vengeance.274 To his 
eyes, not only did the members of Roman political elite deserve to be punished for 
their infidelity, but so too the exponents of the Italian elite that had supported the 
Marians. The male population of the municipium of Praeneste was decimated. It is likely 
that a part of the local elite was put on the proscription list. The subsequent 
foundation of a colony was probably preceded by a series of individual confiscations, 
rather than by the confiscation of the whole territory of the municipium. Praeneste was 
no exception in this respect. As Appian says, the partisans of Sulla brought about 
specific and detailed investigations all over Italy, in most local contexts, constantly
272 Hinard 1985a, 84-85; Kinsey 1988.
273 App. b. c. 1.93.433. See Hinard 1985a, 127, 134; on the supplices, 107-108.
274 See Gabba 1987, 117-119: the punishment o f  entire communities decided by Sulla show that the 
political importance o f  the Italian cities had increased remarkably.
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adding names to the first list that Sulla had produced in Rome.275 Sanctions could be 
decided, without trial, if one was believed guilty of one of the charges listed by 
Appian: for having held a command or having served in the armies of the Marians, or 
even for having financed Sulla’s opponents.276
Another speech of Cicero, the pro Cluentio, shows the authors of the 
proscriptions at work in a municipium o f Central Italy, Larinum, soon after the end of 
the War. The client of Cicero was accused by his mother Sassia of having poisoned his 
stepfather Oppianicus, whom his advocate had every reason to depict as a dangerous 
thug and a profiteer of the Sullan regime. Many other people, according to the 
reconstruction he provided in his plea, may have had interest in killing him.277 His 
active role in the proscriptions is a central feature of the memorably hostile portrait of 
the victim. Oppianicus arrived suddenly in Larinum, with a group of armed thugs, 
entrusted by Sulla with a specific mission. His tasks were clear: unseating the 
quattuorviri o f the municipium, no doubt followers of Marius; becoming a member of 
the new collegium of city magistrates; ‘proscribing and killing’ four local notables 
(proscribendos interjiciendosque curaret).278 It is apparent that the proscriptions and the 
murders were two different steps in the same process, although not immediately
275 App. b.c. 1.96.446.
276 Cf. Cic. Rose. Amer. 127. Gabba 1958, 258 suggests that Appian closely followed the text o f Sulla’s 
disposition. Hinard 1983, 327 argues that copies o f  the proscription list may have been displayed in the 
municipia too.
277 Cic. Cluent. 8.25: post illam autem fugam, sceleris et conscientiae testem, numquam se iudiciis, numquam legibus, 
numquam inermum inimicis committere ausus est, sed per illam L  Sullae uim atque uictoriam Larinum in summo 
timore omnium cum armatis aduolauit. quattuoruiros, quos municipes fecerant, sustulit se a Sulla et tres praeterea factos 
esse dixit, et ab eodem sibi esse imperatum ut A . Aurium, ilium qui sibi delationem nominis et Capitis periculum 
ostentarat, et alterum A . Aurium et eius L  ftlium et Sex. Uibium, quo sequestre in illo indice corrumpendo dicebatur 
esse usus, proscribendos interficiendosque curaret. itaque illis crudelissime interfectis non mediocri ab eo ceteri proscriptionis 
et mortis metu tenebantur. About Oppianicus, see David 1992, 740. The speech is an invaluable source for 
the family alliances and rivalries within the elite o f  Larinum: Moreau 1983; Silvestrini 1996b, 269-272. 
On the economic aspects o f  the speech, see Moreau 1986.
278 M. R. Torelli 1973, 341-343 conveniently links Oppianicus’ misdeeds to an inscription from Larinum 
that mentions Sulla Felix dictator us patwnus o f  the city (A E  1975, 219); cf. Moreau 1997, 137-139 and 
Fezzi 2003, 31-33. Crawford 1998, 33 argues that Oppianicus supervised a new constitutio o f  the 
municipium, undoing the provisions taken after the enfranchisement o f the city. Two tribes are attested at 
Larinum, the Voltinia and the Clustumina; Folcando 1997, 54-55 speculates that Sulla assigned the 
inhabitants were assigned to two different tribes, as he wanted to punish the part o f  the elite that had 
supported Marius.
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related to each other. The physical elimination of the enemy may have followed his 
‘legal death’, the infamia and the confiscations, but it was not automatically implied by 
the proscription. Oppianicus claimed that he was acting on behalf of Sulla, from 
whom he had received explicit instructions: the following lines make it apparent that 
the executions had taken place, and that the threat of more was still impending. After 
Oppianicus had proved so ruthless and effective, the people at Larinum feared that 
the proscription list could be extended, should Oppianicus be attracted by the wealth 
of some other citizens: non mediocri ab eo ceteriproscriptionis et mortis metu tenebantur.
It is hard to believe that the deeds of Oppianicus were not paralleled 
elsewhere. Unfortunately, there are no other examples on the record, but this passage 
probably unveils an important aspect o f the proscriptions. It is significant that 
Oppianicus, after performing the task he had been entrusted with by Sulla, was 
entided to proscribe other individuals.279 As his case suggests, the atrocity of the 
proscriptions must not overshadow an important point: they were a political process, 
whose explicit aim was to destroy a part of Italian governing class and replace it with 
new elements that had proved their loyalty to Sulla. The first list set up by Sulla 
included only the most prominent supporters of the populares, those holding senior 
positions in Roman and Italian politics. Yet, it remained open to the inclusion of 
people whose prominence did not go beyond their local community, signalled by the 
Sullan envoys that had been sent to other cities. For the misdeeds of Oppianicus and 
the like to be perpetrated without being punished, there was time at least until 1 June 
81, as the pro Roscio Amerino makes clear.
In Appian’s account, the punishment of the individuals — the proscriptions — 
chronologically precede the retaliation that Sulla decided against some communities 
which had supported Marius. This is true for the colonies that were founded in Italy 
by Sulla himself, but not necessarily for the Italian municipia. In Larinum, for instance, 
the elected magistrates were proscribed by the envoys of Sulla. The status of the 
community did not change, but a strong interference in its political life took place. 
Indeed, the proscriptions and the political normalisation of local contexts were two 
facets of the same dossier, which took place in a close sequence, soon after the victory 
in the Civil War.
279 He may have also freed the slaves o f  his victims, like Sulla did at Rome: see the mysterious case o f  
the Martiales, a group o f  (former?) slaves Oppianicus wanted to grant freedom to (Cic. Cluent. 15.43-44, 
with Moreau 1997).
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1.6. Sulla’s infamous associates
Numerous victims of the Sullan proscriptions are known, although they 
number considerably less than the tally of victims of the triumviral proscriptions.280 
We are not equally well informed about those who claimed and obtained their 
properties. On the other hand, it is well known that the land confiscations related to 
the proscriptions affected the most diverse areas of Italy, from Beneventum to 
Casinum, from the Campanian coast to Albae.281
Besides the short, if colourful accounts provided by Appian and Plutarch, it is 
Cicero that provides the most detailed narratives of how a proscription was decided 
and enforced. The first account he gives concerns the misdeeds of Oppianicus, as we 
have seen, while the other is contained in the first chapters of the pro Roscio Amerino. In 
fact, according to Cicero, Roscius’ proscriptio was illegal. The father of Cicero’s client, a 
keen partisan of Sulla and a client of several prominent aristocratic families, was 
murdered in Rome. Cicero insinuates that two of the victim’s fellow citizens, T. 
Roscius Capito and T. Roscius Magnus, were involved in the murder. They then told 
Chrysogonus, an influential freedman of Sulla, of the value of Roscius’ patrimony, and 
suddenly the name of the victim appeared on the proscription list: nomen refertur in 
tabulas Sex. Rosci, hominis studiosissimi nobilitatis. According to Cicero, the operation 
obeyed no political rationale; its only purpose was to favour a bunch of profiteers by 
damaging an honest and unsophisticated farmer from an Umbrian municipium.282 
Moreover, it was unacceptable from a legal point of view. Q. Roscius had no 
relationship whatsoever with the populares, and he was included in the proscription list 
aliquot post menses since the final date set for the proscriptions and the sale of the
280 See the catalogue in Hinard 1985a, 327-411.
281 On Beneventum, see Cic. Verr. 2.1.38. On Casinum, see Cic. leg. agr. 3.14. On Marius’ Campanian 
villa, bought for a ridiculous price by Sulla’s daughter Cornelia, see references and discussion in Badian 
1973, esp. 121-125, 130-132. On Alba Fucens, see Plut. Sull. 31.11-12. ILLRP  146 might be evidence 
for land assignment to the veterans o f Metellus Pius in its territory after the Civil War: Gabba 1979. It is 
possible that the city took part in Lepidus’ revolt, and that this was a reaction to the confiscations: see 
Oros. 5.22.16-17, with Coarelli 1998. Plut. Crass. 6.6 is no evidence for land confiscations at Tuder, pace 
Gabba 1986, 98 (= Gabba 1994a, 205).
282 On this case, see David 1992, 233-234, 253-255; Fezzi 2003, 36-38. On the characterisation o f the 
young Roscius as a rusticus bonus, as opposed to his fraudulent city-based enemies, see Vasaly 1993, 157- 
172. On the ethical -  and moralistic — aspects o f  the speech, see May 1988, 21-31.
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confiscated properties was 1 June 81 BC. Unfortunately, the only internal evidence we 
have for a precise dating of the presumably illegitimate confiscation has no parallel 
elsewhere. When the enemies of Roscius told Chrysogonus about the potential 
operation, he was at Volaterrae, then besieged by Sulla (7.20: res ad Chrysogonum in castra 
L. Sullae Volaterras defertur). Little is known about the date of the conquest of this last 
Marian stronghold: it is beyond doubt, however, that it fell during Sulla’s 
dictatorship.283
It is because of his manifold tasks that, according to Cicero, Sulla could not 
have known about the fraudulent behaviour of his protege. The role of Chrysogonus, 
however, remains a problem, as much as his relationship with Sulla, and one certainly 
cannot be satisfied with the clever rhetorical move of Cicero, who needed to de- 
politicize the case, if he wanted to stand any chance to win it. If Cicero’s speech 
consistendy downplays the connection between the dictator and his freedman, a 
passage of Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia is much more explicit on Chrysogonus’ 
actual role and influence.284 He opens a list of freedmen who managed to enrich 
themselves thanks to the favour of their patrons, whom Pliny mentions in contrast 
with other freedmen who distinguished themselves in the literary field. Chrysogonus is 
presented as the first example of a group of influential freedmen, who acquired a 
prominent function in the late Republic. The allegation of having made illicit gains 
from the proscriptions applies to most of the freedmen mentioned by Pliny. Catulus, 
Lucullus and Pompey were all close associates of Sulla, and it is likely that they 
profited, personally and with the help of their freedmen, from the sales that followed 
the first proscription.
It is to Pliny, therefore, that we owe explicit evidence for the connection 
between Chrysogonus and Sulla. By referring to Chrysogonus as a semus, Cicero makes 
it clear that he was a freedman, but fails to uncover the real nature of his connection
283 Cf. Rase. Amer. 8.22: neque enim mirum, cum eodem tempore et ea quaepraeterita sunt reparet et ea quae uidentur 
instare praeparet, cum et pads constituendae rationem et belli gerendi potestatem solus babeat. .. On Sulla’s presence 
at Volaterrae, see Krawczuk 1960,14-21 and Harris 1971, 257-258.
284 Plin. 35.200: se quid hos referat aliquis, litterarum honore commendatos? talem in catasta uidere Chrysogonum 
Sullae, Amphionem Q. Catuli, Hectorem L. L mcuIH, Demetrium Pompd, Augenque Demetri, quamquam et ipsa 
Pompei credita est, Hipparchum M. Antoni, Menam et Menecraten Sexti Pompei aliosque deinceps, quos enumerare iam 
non est, sanguine Quiritium et proscriptionum licentia ditatos. hoc est insigne uenalidis gregibus obprobriumque insolentis 
fortunae. See Fabre 1983, 295.
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with the dictator.285 What Cicero portrays most effectively is the privileged status that 
Chrysogonus achieved after Sulla’s victory. Despite his relatively young age, he 
became one of the most influential figures in Rome, adulescens uel potentissimus hoc 
tempore nostrae ciuitatis. Over a short time he gathered an impressive wealth, which 
Cicero forcefully portrays before starting his final peroration (13.135). He lives on the 
Palatine, the most exclusive area of the Urbs, unashamedly showing off his wealth. His 
house is full o f precious objects and it is not even his only property, as he owns a 
country-house near Rome and many farms (habet animi causa rus amoenum et suburbanum, 
plura praeterea praedia neque tamen ullum nisi praeclarum et propinquum). When he walks into 
the Forum, a crowd of clients follows him; his house is often visited by artists and 
musicians, an unwelcome presence for the neighbours. After such an unsympathetic 
portrait, Cicero restates his support for Sulla and his reforms, but cannot resist a bitter 
remark: the rise of people like Chrysogonus raises some doubts about the true extent 
of the victory of the nobilitas that Sulla claimed to have ensured.286
For most of his speech, however, Cicero does not push his political critique of 
Sulla too far. His purpose was just to make the case for his client, using legal 
arguments and depicting him as a peaceful and honest farmer. He was confident that 
his still unprominent position would enable him to escape an involvement in any 
serious political controversy.287 He remained consistent with this strategy down to the 
end of the speech, with the exception of the last paragraph, dealing with the rights of 
the children of the proscribed, and possibly added just before the publication of the 
speech.288
With such a detailed reconstruction of the events, Cicero provides a crucial 
insight into the way proscriptions worked. Although the proscription of Roscius’
285 The name Chrysogonus is widely attested among freedmen and slaves: Solin 2003, 178-179. Pliny the 
Elder appears to be quite familiar with the history o f  the Sullan age: Cotta Ramosino 2004, 83-88, 303- 
310.
286 Cic. Rose. A.mer. 49.141: idcircone exspectata nobilitas armis atque ferro rentpublicam reciperauit, ut ad libidinem 
suam liberti seruolique nobulium bona, fortunas uestras atque nostras uexare possent? Chrysogonus is deliberately 
opposed to the model o f  rural virtues embodied by Roscius: see Vasaly 1993, 164-165. Also Diehl 1988, 
67-70. On the portraits o f Magnus and Capito, see Vasaly 1993, 166. Hopkins 1978, 71 views 
Chrysogonus as a powerful example o f  the importance o f  violence in the accumulation o f  wealth in the 
late Republic.
287 Vasaly 1993,170.
288 Gabba 1964,10-11 (= Gabba 1973, 399-400); Berry 2004, 84-85.
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properties was apparently illegal, the picture described can be seen as quite a typical 
one. Chrysogonus claimed he had bought the properties of Roscius from Sulla 
himself: de uiro fortissimo et clarissimo L. Sulla, quem honoris causa nomino, duobus milibus 
nummum sese dicit emisse (2.6). When the case was heard, the confiscation had already 
taken place, and Cicero claims repeatedly that his purpose is just to save Roscius from 
a conviction for murder, not to contest Chrysogonus’ right to hold his properties. 
According to his reconstruction (6.21), Chrysogonus obtained the property as soon as 
Roscius’ name appeared in the list: nomen refertur in tabulas Sex. Rosci, hominis studiosissimi 
nobilitatis; manceps jit Chrysogonus. After acquiring the properties, Chrysogonus sent T. 
Roscius Magnus as a personal envoy to his new fundi, while Roscius Capito, who had 
played an important part in identifying Roscius as a possible target, was rewarded with 
three praedia. Cicero claims that Sulla was not aware of such an operation, but 
Chrysogonus argued the contrary. It is surely significant that Cicero brings no 
evidence to support his assumption. The speech itself tells us that that Chrysogonus 
fostered the inclusion of Roscius in the list while he was taking part in the siege of 
Volaterrae, and that he could do that because he was a member of Sulla’s entourage. It 
is unlikely that he and his associates could have put their hands on a substantial 
patrimony like Roscius’ without the connivance of Sulla.289
As Cicero’s account forcefully shows, taking possession of a property after the 
proscription of the owner was not a simple operation. One had to be prepared to use 
violence, and eventually to face opposition and even resistance. Acting quickly and 
ruthlessly was therefore essential. Soon after buying Roscius’ properties for a 
shamefully low price — an aspect I will soon come back to — Chrysogonus sent his 
associate Magnus to Ameria, with the precise task of claming of the properties: Cicero 
calls him Chrysogonus’ procurator (8.23), and his arrival in Umbria as an impetus (8.21). 
Surely, he knew that he would find some resistance on the part of the city of America. 
Indeed, a delegation of the decuriones was soon sent to Volaterrae, and tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain a hearing with Sulla. Imposing the rule of the new master in 
the fundi o f Roscius, however, must not have been too difficult. Later in the speech, 
Cicero refers to the popularity which Chrysogonus had earned among the slaves 
formerly owned by Roscius. Some of them even joined his entourage and had a close 
relationship with their new master (28.77: apud eum sunt in honore et in pretio). Surely,
289 Roscius’ wealth was considerable: see Shatzman 1975, 20; Frederiksen 1981, 270; Lomas 2004, 104- 
106.
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Cicero is insinuating here that Chrysogonus’ origins made it easy for him to mingle 
with slaves.
The mission of the decuriones shows that the citizens of Ameria viewed the 
confiscation of Roscius’ properties very unfavourably, to say the least. They must have 
felt like the citizens of Larinum did after the coming of Oppianicus, fearing that their 
names would appear in the proscription list any day soon. We do not know of the 
stance taken by Ameria during the Civil War. The composition of the council of the 
decuriones, however, shows that some followers of Sulla were sitting in it.290 Roscius 
Capito was among the decuriones sent to Volaterrae. His involvement in the 
confiscation, and probably in the assassination of Roscius, was already clear, as he had 
been the first to announce the murder to his fellow citizens, and his presence in the 
delegation shows that there was no unanimity within the elite of Ameria about 
opposing the confiscation. In order to carry out the confiscation, Chrysogonus needed 
the support of some insiders to identify the property, and to make sure that the local 
community would not react too unfavourably. Capito played exactly this role, by 
misleading the fellow-members of the council about Chrysogonus’ real intentions, and 
he was rewarded with the grant of three praedia.
I have already pointed out that proscriptions were important political 
operations, which required a high level of sophistication and complexity to implement. 
Cicero’s account of the proscription of Roscius confirms this impression. The 
proscriptions were decided at a central level, in Rome, where a list of the victims was 
displayed, and the relevant law was certainly voted. However, they needed local 
knowledge and local support. In some cases caution was required too, and this is the 
best explanation for the death of many victims of the proscriptions, whom their 
depredators thought it sensible to eliminate so that they would not create problems in 
the future. Cicero’s pro Roscio Amerino is an invaluable source for the actual dynamics 
of the proscriptions, as it provides useful insight into a specific case, whilst giving 
some general views on this chain of events. Cicero’s arguments are made slighdy less 
credible by the assumption that Sulla could not be aware of the abuses of his 
associates. That something went wrong in the process, he concedes, non placet, sed 
necesse est (45.131).291 The political importance of the proscriptions, and the accounts of 
some literary sources both show that Sulla himself encouraged his associates to be
290 The evidence for land confiscations in Umbria is very episodic: G. Bradley 2000, 236.
291 Cicero states it repeatedly: see Cic. Rose. Amer. 2.6; 8.21; 9.26; 38.110, 45.130.
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ruthless and greedy.292 He even exempted some of the profiteers from paying the price 
that had agreed upon at the public auctions for the properties of the proscribed. Only 
in 72 BC was a statute passed, preceded by a senatusconsultum, which compelled them to 
pay at least the ridiculous sums of money they owed to the aerarium^ 3
However, rather than insisting on the alternative between Sulla’s alleged 
crudelitas and the greed of his associates, more relevant for our purposes is the wider 
problem of identifying the beneficiaries of the proscriptions. Some of them were 
members of the political faction that supported Sulla during the war, either benefitting 
direcdy, or using procurators to manage the properties on their behalf. This is how 
Chrysogonus achieved the wealth so bitterly criticised by Cicero. Sulla certainly trusted 
him, and used him as a political and financial agent. He was not the only freedman 
who enjoyed the dictator’s trust. The completion of his memoirs was entrusted to 
Epicadus, an educated libertus, who provided the narrative of the last days of Sulla’s 
life. Other freedmen of his, however, were entrusted with much more practical tasks, 
which earned them a place among the Sullan profiteers strongly condemned by the 
popularis tradition. However, nothing is known about him, or about the Vettius Picens 
who is mentioned after him in the same passage, and for whom one can just guess an 
Italian origin. We have better luck with Tarula: the name of this wealthy freedman 
mentioned by Sallust some lines below (21) appears on some amphorae from 
Brundisium, which I have discussed above. Sallust’s reference to his exceptional 
wealth makes all the more sense considering that his activities were diversified, and 
that some landed property coexisted with an entrepreneur-like activity. Perhaps a 
similar explanation applies to the case of the last freedman mentioned in Lepidus’ 
speech, Scirtus, but, again, nothing else is known about this character.
What is striking about these characters is not just their special relationship 
with their patron, or its political significance. It is the trust and responsibilities that 
Sulla gave to them, enabling them to take part in a crucial political process like the 
proscriptions. This would become a frequent feature in the late Republic, with all the 
leading political personalities giving important tasks to their freedmen, from Pompey 
to Cicero. Sulla, however, was the first to use the freedmen in such a way, and he
292 Cf. e.g. Sail. Cat. 11.5-7; Plut. Suit. 12.9-14.; Luc. 7.3.
293 See Cic. Herr. 2.3.81; Sail. Hist. 4.1 (= Gell. 18.4.4.). Hinard 1985a, 187-188 rightly notes that the 
statute was the final legitimisation o f  the profiteers’ rights on the bonaproscriptorum.
86
appears to have had a strategy in this respect.294 A hint at the role of freedmen in the 
devastation of the Sullan period is noticeable in a passionate passage o f Cicero’s 
Paradoxa Stoicorum (6.2.46): qui expulsiones uicanorum qui latrocinia in agris, qui cum seruis cum 
libertis cum clientibus societates, qui possessiones uacuas qui proscriptiones locupletium qui caedes 
municipiorum qui illam Sudani temporis messem recordetur, qui testamenta subiecta, tot qui sublatos 
homines. ..
O f course, this is a rhetorical overstatement, but the societates including 
slaves, freedmen and clients were certainly an important element of the Sullan 
coalition at work after the victory. After all, the three characters that expropriated and 
proscribed Roscius were a societas created by a freedman of Sulla and two obscure 
Umbrian followers. Such a pragmatic modus operandi could prompt, of course, the 
dramatic rise of some otherwise unremarkable figures, asides from the former slaves. 
This is the case, for instance, with the primipilaris (and later praetor) L. Fufidius, who is 
defined ancilla turpis in the Oratio Pepidi, and who suggested, according to some literary 
sources, that the proscriptions should be organised to eliminate the enemy more 
efficiendy.295
An important passage of Appian shows that the social promotion of 
people like Chrysogonus or Tarula was not an isolated choice involving just a handful 
of individuals.296 Being in charge of the whole proscription process, Sulla took 
possession of the slaves which formerly belonged to the proscribed. With thousands 
of slaves under his control, Sulla exploited this enormous potential for his own sake, 
and decided to enfranchise ‘the youngest and fittest’ ones, including them into the 
citizen body, and adding a powerful contingent of new clients to the already 
impressive number of his associates.297 According to Appian, more than 10.000 slaves 
were disenfranchised. Sulla was not interested in more electoral support, but rather in 
having a group of people ready to support and defend him, should the need arise.298
294 Contra, Treggiari 1969,181.
295 About Fufidius, see Sail. Hist. 1.55.22 Maurenbrecher; Plut. Sul/. 31.4; Flor. 2.9.25; Oros. 5.21.3 (who 
calls him Fursidius). It is possible that he had a role in planning the proscriptions, although it is unlikely 
that he actually expressed his views in the Senate: cf. Wiseman 1971, 232, no. 184.
296 App. b. c. 1.101.469; 104.489.
297 See Ceska 1955; Treggiari 1969, 181-184; Eder 1980, 31; Fabre 1983,198; 333, esp. fn. 40.
298 Cf. Liv. Per. 11 A, 8, with Treggiari 1969, 50-51: in 88 Sulla scrapped Sulpicius’ law distributing 
freedmen throughout all the thirty-five tribes. There is no evidence that they were given a land 
allotment too, pace Gerlach 1856, 46 and Jonkers 1963, 51.
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Rightly, Appian saw the political importance of this decision, and chose to discuss it 
along with the enlargement of the Senate and the foundation of new colonies.
We do not know of any individual liberti Comelii certainly enfranchised 
after the proscriptions. It is likely that the freedmen mentioned by the literary tradition 
among the profiteers of the Sullanum tempus were enfranchised before the end of the 
Civil War, and were already with Sulla during the conflict with Mithridates. The 
freedmen mentioned by Appian are a group that emerged later with a clear political 
agenda. When Sulla retired to Campania, his position was made safe by the presence 
of the Comelii in Rome, who ensured that no subversive initiative would take place (b. 
c. 1.104.489, K a r a  t o  d o r u ) .299
Doubts about the accuracy of Appian’s account are however prompted by an 
inscription found near the site of ancient Mintumae, in southern Latium, bearing a 
dedication to Sulla put up by a group of freedmen: JL Comelio 1L. f  /  Sullae Feleici/ 
dictatori/  leiberteini.30° The absence of any specific identification of the freedmen led 
scholars to view it as an honorific inscription offered by a collegium of former slaves of 
the proscribed.301 The hypothesis is supported by two elements. Firstly, the inscription 
was found at Mintumae, where Marius had strong clientelae and found shelter in the 
most critical phase of his political career. Marius’ slaves must have been included in 
the enfranchisement, and their presence at Mintumae may be explainable by the 
connection of their former patron with the city.302 The existence of a collegium, a formal 
organisation of the liberti Comelii is probably attested by a fragment of Cicero 
conserved by the scholiast Asconius in his commentary to the Pro Comelio. Making the 
case for his client, Cicero claims that he was not the owner of the slave Phileros: 
Cornelius is a very common name, as Phileros is among slaves. The reference to a 
collegium o f Comelii comes in this context, as part of a rhetorical question: quid ego nunc
299 After the Sullan reform, the urban plebs could not count on the frumentationes any more, or any 
public subsidy in food supply: this may have been seen as a potential danger. On the abolition o f the 
com  distributions by Sulla, see Rickman 1980, 165 and Vanderbroeck 1987, 121-123. They were 
reintroduced in 73 BC by the lex Terentia Cassia: sources in Rotondi 1912, 366.
300 CIL  10.6028 = ILS 871 = ILLRP  353.
301 Gabba 1958, 275-276; Treggiari 1969,170-171.
302 The slave o f  a C. Marius mentioned in an inscription from the so-called temple A at Mintumae is 
not relevant for the present discussion, as there is no evidence compelling to consider him a slave o f  the 
enemy o f Sulla. The text is edited in Johnson 1933, 46-47, no. 27; a sound discussion in Badian 1973, 
121-124. There is no evidence for Sullan land assignments at Mintumae, pace Chouquer 1987,174-175.
tibi argumentis respondeam posse fieri ut alius aliquis Cornelius sit qui habeat Philerotem seruum\ 
uolgare nomen esse Philerotis, Comelios vero ita multos ut iam etiam collegium constitutum sit?03 If 
we had not Asconius’ commentary, this could seem an ironic reference, a hyperbole 
used by Cicero to undermine the argument of his counterpart. Yet, the scholiast takes 
the reference seriously, and specifies that there were many collegia in Republican Rome, 
sometimes fuelling political violence. At some point, several laws and senatusconsulta 
outlawed most of them, allowing only those with a recognisable public function, such 
as professional association like those of carpenters and potters.304 This reconstruction 
usefully integrates what we know about Sulla’s aims when he chose to enfranchise the 
slaves. The collegium of the Comelii was then a tool available to the enemies of the 
populares, which could still play a role in Roman politics more than ten years after the 
death of the dictator.
The Sullan regime has evocatively been blended as ‘a reactionary regime based 
on mass consensus’, adapting the category that P. Togliatti used to define Fascism. In 
this vision, the exploitation of the freedmen is the most revealing symptom of this 
approach.305 However, the evidence is too scarce to enable to make good use of this 
generalisation. The reference made by Cicero in the Comeliana is interesting, but it is 
too fragmentary to allow any conclusion. Moreover, the value of the inscription from 
Mintumae is undermined by the absence of any clear archaeological context. Its 
historical interpretation, therefore, remains problematic; Mommsen suggested, without 
offering any supporting argument, that the leibertini mentioned here are the liberti 
Comelii, and that the stone had been carried from Rome to the Campanian shore in the 
Middle Ages.306 The latter is hard to believe, and my guess is that the freedmen of the 
proscribed, enfranchised by Sulla himself, would have probably recorded their 
gratitude to the dictator more explicidy. Appian refers to them twice, and both times 
they are called Kopuf|Xlol, which suggests that they were collectively referred to in that 
way.307 This is hard to prove anyway, as we lack further and more detailed evidence.
303 Ascon. in Cornelian, p. 75.
304 See ibid.: frequenter turn etiam coetus factiosorum hominum sinepublica autoritate malo publico fiebant propter quod 
postea collegia et S. C. et pluribus legibus sunt sub lata praeter pauca atque certa quae utilitas ciuitatis desiderasset, sicut 
fabrorum fictorumque. See B. A. Marshall 1985, 262-263, who however ignores the problem o f the liberti 
Comelii.
305 Canfora 1980,428.
306 See the commentary to CIL  6.1298.
307 App. b. c. 1.100.469; 1.104.489.
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However, an alternative suggestion could be made, accepting the possibility that the 
freedmen of the Mintumae inscription actually owed their status to Sulla. It may be 
argued that not all the Comelii were based in Rome, and that Appian’s Kcrrd TO 
d(JTU is a reference to the ager Romanus, or even to Latium. Mintumae had been a 
steadfast supporter of Marius, and keeping some loyal supporters in the area could be 
a sensible operation.
The evidence shows that the social promotion of some freedmen was part of a 
complex political operation undertaken by Sulla after his victory. The Civil War had to 
be followed by a process of political ‘normalisation’. Sulla needed to prevent the 
possibility of the emergence of a new opposition for many years to come. The 
proscriptions ensured this aim by affecting the legal status of a number of members of 
the Roman elite, and by transferring their property under the direct control of Sulla 
and his associates. This operation was not limited to the traditional Roman governing 
class and to the elite based in Rome. Italy was heavily involved in it, as much as it had 
played an important part in the development of the Civil War. Moreover, as the case 
of Roscius shows, a proscription especially when it was taking place out of Rome, needed 
some people supervising it and carrying it out. For this purpose, Sulla had some agents 
who could do the job on his behalf, were rewarded for that, and were allowed to enjoy 
part of the profits deriving from the confiscation. Hostile tradition focuses on several 
freedmen, but other free people with an apparently unprominent background, like 
Fufidius, L. Luscius, and the centurio Sullanus grandfather of the jurist Ateius Capito 
apparently had similar roles.308
Indeed, the victory of Sulla was the chance for a redistribution of wealth in 
Roman Italy, and it also led to a redistribution of political influence, and prestige. It 
did not just offer to many members of the nobility the chance of becoming even 
richer than they already were. It also rewarded a group of new men, who fought in the 
Sullan camp and had their share of power in the aftermath of the Civil War. Some of 
them, like Oppianicus, gained prominence at a municipal level. Others, like the rich 
freedmen of Sulla, unexpectedly achieved wealth and influence. It is now worth
308 Luscius is called infitians in Cicero’s lost speech in toga Candida, and briefly mentioned by Asconius, p. 
90 Stangl: notus centurio Syllanus diuesque ex uictoria factus (nam amplius centies possederat), damnatus erat non 
multo ante quam Cicero dixit, obiectae sunt ei tres caedes proscriptorum. The grandfather o f  Capito surely 
gathered a remarkable wealth, as his son managed to reach the praetorship: see Tac. ann. 3.75.1 {Capito 
Ateius, de quo memoraui, principem in ciuitate locum studiis ciuilibus adsecutus, sed auo centurione Sullano, patre 
praetorio).
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discussing how the Senate, the assembly where the Roman political elite gathered, 
went through the changes that the age of Sulla brought about.
1.7. Was there ever a ‘Sullan* Senate?
Sulla’s most evident, if not most important, contribution to the remaking of 
Roman governing class was the opening of the Senate to 300 hundred new members, 
all belonging to the equestrian order. The quality and importance of this initiative are 
undoubtedly more significant than the measures taken about the slaves of the 
proscribed, although they are not completely unrelated to it. Appian righdy saw it, and 
outlined it soon before mentioning the massive enfranchisement of the liberti Comelii. 
In his view, both decisions were steps of the ‘conservative’ revolution attempted by 
Sulla, which intended to make a new Civil War impossible. Moreover, they were both 
consequences of the proscriptions. The senators who fell victim of the proscriptions 
were replaced, and their slaves were enrolled among the citizens. The memory of their 
political role and their dignitas was erased for good — for all practical purposes, at least.
There is some reason to doubt that the liberti Comelii were actually 10.000, as 
stated by Appian: that figure is often suspect when it features in a Greek historical 
source. The parallel figure of 120.000 colonists settled by Sulla all over Italy seems 
quite doubtful too.309 On the other hand, the figure of 300 new senators is more 
credible. Appian states that Sulla had already presented a proposal for the extension of 
the Senate to 300 new members in 88, during his first consulship.310 If this 
information is not a doublet of a later decision, it may be seen as a response to the 
extension of Roman citizenship to the Italian allies. Moreover, other sources, surely 
deriving from Livy, state that almost 200 senators were killed in the Civil War.311 Even 
without a reform of the Senate, the assembly needed to be taken back to its original 
size. Involving a part of the equestrian families in the process was a necessary, and 
probably an obvious choice too. The administrative setdement that Sulla brought 
about in the East, confirming the presence of publicani and moneylenders in the 
province, shows that he was perfecdy prepared, and seriously interested, to have the 
equites on his side.
309 App. b. c. 1.104.489.
310 App. b. c. 1.59.267: see Hardy 1916a; Gabba 1958,173; Katz 1975,117-120.
3,1 Oros. 5.22.4; Eutr. 5.9.4.
91
The list of the ‘Sullan senators’, as they have often been called, has been 
compiled various times since Willems, predictably with some differences among the 
authors who dealt with the problem.312 The appendix contains a new one, whose 
guidelines I will summarise here. Until Sulla, the Senate had roughly 300 members. 
The limit was not strict, and there is evidence that it was exceeded, but it was 
consistently kept as a reference point.313 The Social War, and especially the Civil War 
caused the death of an unprecedented number of senators. The proscriptions were the 
highest and last peak of a long process. It is safe to state that, at the end of the war, 
only about 150 senators were alive, and this figure is already quite optimistic.314 Soon 
after his victory Sulla had some tools available to bring the Senate back to its usual 
size.315 The most obvious one was not the series of exceptional appointments 
mentioned by Appian, but the promotion to the senatorial rank of those who had held 
the lower magistracies after 86, when the last censorial lectio took place. No doubt, 
most o f these people had supported Cinna and the populares, and were therefore 
punished in the proscriptions. It is certain, however, that some of the people who had 
fought with the populares managed to be rehabilitated when Sulla came back.316
Sulla used a second method to increase the number of senators. He intervened 
on a structural feature of Roman magistracy system by increasing the number of the 
praetors from six to ten and that of the quaestors from eight to twenty.317 This reform
3>2 Hill 1932; Gabba 1951, 262-270 (= Gabba 1973, 159-172); Nicolet 1966, 573-591; also cf. Willems 
1878, 401-415 and Gruen 1974, 190-191. Hawtom 1962 is not very instructive. Willems 1878, 427-543 
is an attempt to list the members o f  the Senate in 55 BC, when many senators appointed by Sulla were 
o f course still alive: Gabba refers to it systematically.
3,3 See 1 Macc. 8.15 (320 senators in the mid-second century BC), with Cornell 2000, 88.
314 Cf. Evans 1983, stressing the extraordinarily high mortality rate among the consulates in this period.
3.5 Gabba 1956, 124-130 (= Gabba 1973, 407-415) is still invaluable.
3.6 Badian 1962a, 59-61 (= Badian 1964, 228-232); Hinard 1985a, 120-125.
317 About the increase o f  the number o f  praetors, see Dio 42.51 and Pompon. Dig. 1.2.2, with the 
general discussion in Brennan 2000, 389-392 and the sobering remarks in Cloud 1988. About the Sullan 
reform o f the quaestorship, see Tac. ann. 11.22.6; also c f  the fragment o f  the lex Cornelia de X X  
quaestoribus in RS, no. 14, 293-300 (edited by E. Gabba and M. H. Crawford), with Gabba 1983, 488-489 
and Purcell 2001, 650-654. Against this backrground, it is significant that a reorganisation o f the 
treasury appears to have taken place in the Sullan period: see Plut. Cat. Min. 18.8, with Crawford 1985, 
187. It is conceivable, however, that the number o f  the quaestores had already been increased before 81 
BC to meet the needs o f  provincial administration (Harris 1976; Gabba 1983, 487, with earlier 
bibliography), but there is no evidence for this: Badian 1983,167-169.
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increased the number of the people eligible to join the Senate, and it ensured a gradual 
growth of the membership. A potential input of twenty new members per year has 
been calculated.318 It inevitably had important political consequences. Provincial 
administration benefited from this decision, as governors had more staff available to 
support them in their duties. This is no doubt consistent with Sulla’s commitment to 
consolidate Roman rule in the Greek East, where he made his largest contribution to 
the development of provincial administration. On the front of internal politics, more 
people were given the chance to have access to an important magistracy, and to enter 
the Senate. Consequendy, competition was bound to become even stronger for higher 
magistracies, such as the praetorship and the consulship. It must not be overlooked, 
however, that Sulla’s reforms left the tribunate in a much less prominent position than 
ever. This magistracy is likely to have been snubbed until the counter-reform 
sponsored by Pompey, and competition was conversely stronger for the quaestorship.
According to Appian, the third strategy adopted by Sulla was the appointment 
of three-hundred new senators. Appian provides two important details: the senators 
were chosen ‘among the 18 equestrian centuries’, and their appointment was 
confirmed by a vote of the comitia tributa,319 The latter point is unproblematic. Sulla 
prepared the list, and then asked for a vote of the tribes confirming it, barely more 
than a formal endorsement of his acta. The reference to the presence of the equites is 
somewhat trickier. The possession of the equus publicus, and therefore the inclusion 
into the ordo equester, was common to all the young members of the nobilitas who had 
not held a curule magistracy and were not part of the ordo senatorius. Therefore, 
Appian’s passage just means that Sulla opened up the Senate to three-hundred 
younger members of the Roman elite, who normally would not have been eligible to 
join it yet. They were not necessarily members of what has anachronistically been 
called the ‘Roman middle class’.320 Most of them would have become senators anyway, 
and they can hardly be defined ‘Sullan senators’. Such a conclusion is well supported 
by the scarce and episodic evidence for the Senate after Sulla’s dictatorship.
318 See Hopkins 1983, 47-48; cf. Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 719. By the end o f  the second century BC, 
the membership o f  the Senate was a tangible prospect for all quaestors and most tribunes, although the 
final decision remained a prerogative o f  the censors: Cornell 2000, 89
319 Cf. Liv. Per. 89.4: senatum ex equestri ordine suppkuit.
320 See Hill 1932, 171-173; Gabba 1951, 264-267 (= Gabba 1973, 163-166); Gabba 1956, 132 (= 417- 
418); Nicolet 1966, 588-589; Shatzman 1975, 477.
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Some of the senators appointed by Sulla are likely to have held the 
quaestorship soon before 81, or even in 81 BC, when the reform came into force. At 
any rate, the evidence we have for their praetorships makes clear that they waited at 
least nine years before acceding to the next magistracy. Some of them may well have 
owed their election to the endorsement of Sulla and his associates. Others, namely 
those who held the praetorship in the late Seventies, may have earned the 
quaestorship after being admitted into the Senate by Sulla. Only the senators who 
managed to continue the cursus honorum after 81 BC have left a trace in our records, 
and they appear to have been a tiny minority of the new senators known for this 
period. Many of them were quaestors between 86, the year of the last census, and 81 
BC, who then never managed, or tried, to be elected to higher magistracies. Others 
may well have been outsiders of the Roman, or Italian, political scene who were happy 
to keep their place in the Senate without committing themselves too actively.
To create the fullest list that could conceivably be written, one has therefore to 
go beyond the close reading of the Fasti, and consider other kinds of evidence. The 
speeches of Cicero contain references to members of the Senate, who are not known 
to have held any magistracy. This is the case with the judges in Cluentius’ trial for the 
murder of Oppianicus, mentioned by Cicero in his speech, who are the bulk of the 
group of the known Sullan appointees: M. Iuventius Pedo, L. Caulius Mergus, M. 
Basilus, C. Caudinus, L. Cassius, Cn. Heius, P. Saturius.321
Cicero celebrates, with similar words, the probity and accuracy of P. Balbus 
and Q. Octavius Considius, two other members of the jury that convicted Oppianicus 
in 74. As C. Nicolet has proved, the judges mentioned here were members of the 
Senate when the case of Cluentius was heard, but their experience as judges dated 
even further back.322 They had already served in the equestrian courts, before the 
reform decided by Sulla: in iudiciis publicis Jlorente re publica floruerunt. They were almost 
certainly appointed by Sulla, who chose them from the part of the ordo equester that did 
not support Marius in the Civil War. One of them, P. Balbus, may even have taken
321 Cic. Cluent. 38.107: qualis uirM. Iuventius Pedo fuit ex uetere ilia iudicum disciplina, qualis L. Caulius Mergus, 
M. Basilus, C. Caudinus! qui omnes in iudiciis publicis iam turn jlorente re publica floruerunt. ex eodem numero L. 
Cassius, Cn. Heius, pari et integritate et prudentia; quorum nullius sententia est Oppianicus absolutus. atque in his 
omnibus natu minimus, ingenio et diligentia et religione par eis quos antea commemoraui, P. Saturius, in eadem sententia 
fuit.
322 Nicolet 1966, 581-589.
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part in the Colline Gate battle as praefectus equitum of the Sullan army.323 Considius was 
probably from Clusium, where a Q. Considius is mentioned in an inscription as a
* 2^4quattuorvtr.
The judges of the pro Cluentio, with their uetus discipline are actually the most 
considerable group of senators who owed their presence in the Senate to a Sullan 
appointment, recorded by the extant sources. Another passage of Cicero mentions 
two obscure brothers who attained the quaestorship in the Sullan period, at an 
unspecified date, from an obscure Italian background: C. E. Caepasii fratres fuerunt, qui 
multa opera, ignoti homines et repentini, quaestores celeriter facti sunt, oppidano quodam et incondito 
genere dicendi.325 The reference he makes in the de officiis to a scriba who reached the 
quaestorship in the Caesarian age, after earning a modest public role in the Sullan 
period, is much less clear.326 This character is possibly the scriba Cornelius mentioned by 
Sallust in the oratio Cepidi, unless Sallust is referring in a derogatory way to Cornelius 
Epicadus, the freedman who accomplished Sulla’s memoirs after his death.327 At any 
rate, there is no ground to argue that this Cornelius ever sat in the Senate before 
reaching the quaestorship in the Forties.
In a passage of the pro Caecina Cicero attacks the senator C. Fidiculanius 
Falcula, by implicidy comparing his peculiar name and questionable reputation with 
the glory of the ordo senatorius.328 In this context, Cicero has to be disparaging towards
323 Plut. Suit. 29.3.
324 CIL  11.7123 = ILLRP  569. Cf. CIL 11.2117, with a C. Considius quattuorvir. There is a C. 
Considius at Volsinii too (CIL 11.2757). See Wiseman 1971, 46, fn. 4. The citizens o f  Clusium put up 
an honorific inscription for Sulla during his dictatorship (CIL 11.2102 = ILLRP  356).
325 Brut. 242. Cf. a brief reference to their eloquence in Cluent. 20.57.
326 Cic. off. 2.29: nec vero umquam bellorum ciuilium semen et causa deerit, dum hominesperditi hastam illam cruentam 
et meminerint et sperabunt, quam P. Sulla cum uibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, idem sexto tricensimo anno post a 
sceleratiore hasta non recessit, alter autem, qui in ilk  dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus.
327 Sail. Hist. 1.55, 17 M. This obscure character was probably a freedman o f Sulla: see Treggiari 1969, 
154. Cf. Badian 1989, 584, no. 6 and 586-589, suggesting that Cornelius may have been a freedman o f  
L. Scipio Asiagenus and that he joined Sulla’s staff only after the Civil War.
328 Cic. Caec. 10.28: decimo uero loco testis expectatus et ad extremum reseruatus dixit, senator populi Romani, 
splendor ordinis, decus atque omamentum iudiciorum, exemplar antiquae religionis, Fidiculanius Falcula; qui cum ita 
uehemens acerque uenisset ut non modo Caecinam periurio suo laederet sed etiam mihi uideretur irasci, ita eum placidum 
mollemque reddidi, ut non auderet, sicut meministis, iterum dicere quot milia fundus suus abesset ab urbe. nam cum 
dixisset minus iccc, populus cum risu adclamauit ipsa esse, meminerant enim omnes, quantum in Hlbiano iudicio 
accepisset.
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Falcula, because he is testifying against his client. This is one of those cases in Cicero’s 
career where he had to contradict what he had said on a previous occasion. In 74 A. 
Cluentius Avitus prosecuted his stepfather Statius Albius Oppianicus for having tried 
to poison him, and Fidiculanius was among the judges who condemned him, allegedly 
obtaining a reward for his support. Some years later, however, Cluentius was put on 
trial with the charge of having corrupted the judges, and chose Cicero as his 
advocate.329 In his new role, Cicero had no difficulty in providing a complete 
reappraisal of Falcula, by stressing his unreserved acquittal at a trial de repetundis, held 
some time before.330 It seems beyond doubt that Falcula came from an equestrian 
family, and that he owed his seat in the Senate to Sulla.331
Inscriptions, both containing legal documents, record the names of two 
otherwise unknown senators of this period, who may have owed their appointment to 
Sulla. The s.c. de Asclepiade sociisque mentions among the testatores an otherwise unknown 
senator, L. Faberius L* f. Serg. (1. 4): again, it is likely that he was in the list of Sulla’s 
new appointees. A Q. Faberius who corresponded with Cicero in the late Forties 
owned properties in the area of Pompeii and Nola, where, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, the impact of the Sullan campaign was probably stronger than anywhere else 
in Italy, and Sulla’s connections dated back to the Social War.332 The s.c. de Oropiis agris 
also mentions, among the members of the consilium that ruled on the controversy
329 There are several important studies o f  the pro Cluentio: Stroh 1975, 194-242 (also see the bibliography 
at 312); Classen 1985, 15-119; Bumand 2004. The client o f Cicero was a typical member o f  the new 
Italian elite: about his family, which is attested at Larinum until the Severan age, see Buonocore 1997. 
Pietrantonio 1997, 216-217 argues that his father was that Cluentius who fought against Sulla in the 
Social War; contra, Salmon 1958, 175-176. On Cicero’s connections at Larinum, see Lomas 2004, 108- 
110.
330 Cic. Cluent. 37.103-104. See esp. 104: cuius erat ordinis? senatorii. qua lege in eo genere a senatore ratio repeti 
so let, de pecuniis repetundis, ea lege accusatus honestissime absolutus. acta est enim causa more maiorum sine ui, sine 
metu, sine periculo, dicta et exposita et demonstrata sunt omnia. See Willems 1878, 412-414 and Frier 1985, 8, 
132, 235.
331 He is probably the owner o f  the slave mentioned by the text o f a tessera nummularia from Rome 
(.ILLRP  1027): Eunus /  Fidiclani C. s(eruus) /  jp(ectauit) a.d.VI id(us)Qui(nctiles) /  D. Sil(ano), L. Mur(ena). 
See Shatzman 1975, 341; Rawson 1978, 150.
332 On his relationship with Cicero, see A tt. 13.8.
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between the sanctuary and the publicans, a certain L. Voluscius, otherwise unknown, 
who may have been enlisted among the new members appointed in 81 too (no. 90).333
A survey of the scarce evidence for the senators of the age of Sulla prompts 
some general remarks. First, the names of most of the Sullan appointees are unknown 
to us, and have left no trace either in the literary or in the inscriptional record. This 
leads to the conclusion that most of the people whom Sulla admitted to the Senate did 
not have any appreciable impact on the Roman political scene. They may have 
provided useful support for their political benefactor during the war and his 
dictatorship, but after his death they joined the rank of the senatores pedarii who never 
dared to express their views in the assembly and voted by silendy joining a group of 
colleagues.334
The presence of a considerable number of non-entities was a predictable 
corollary of the enlargement of the Senate, and it has been long recognised in all the 
modem histories of the Roman Senate.335 However, a fundamental distinction can be 
made in the crowd of the Sullan pedarii. A first group was appointed in the lectio of 300 
senators recorded by Appian, whose purpose, according to Appian, was to restore the 
Senate to an adequate number of members, and to make it a reliable tool in his 
control. Some of these senators tried to continue their career by starting their cursus 
bonorum, no doubt finding the first step easier because of the increase of the number of 
quaestors. Some others, however, did not begin such a career, either out of choice or 
because the intense competition in the Roman elite prevented them from gaining 
access to the magistracies. The second group of uninfluential senators was made of 
those who joined the Senate after 81 and the reform of quaestorship: their admission 
was, in a way, a direct consequence of the Sullan reform. In this context it is 
predictable that many of those who followed this career did not leave any trace, and 
did not manage to make their way through the bottleneck of the competition for 
higher magistracies.
335 He was probably a former aedilir. Taylor 1960, 267; RDGE, 137. The list o f  the consilium contains the 
names o f  other Sullan senators, who however are often uncertain: see Taylor 1960, 176, and the 
appendix.
334 Ancient definition o f the pedarii-. Cic. A tt. 1.19.9 and 1.20.4; Tac. ann. 3.65; Gell. 3.18; Fest. 259 L. Cf. 
Gruen 1974, 508: ‘The pedarii are those who entered the senate after Sulla’s dictatorship and did not 
rise beyond the quaestorship (so far as is known) before 49)’.
335 See Gruen 1974, 189-210, 517-520; Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 676-682; cf. Hopkins 1983, 48. Hackl 
1982, 251-253 overrates Sulla’s influence on the Senate.
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However, a great number of the senators who joined the assembly after Sulla’s 
reform were members of the Roman nobilitas who pursued a political career even after 
the dictator left the scene. Most of them belonged to well-known families of the 
Roman political establishment, and their appointment is a symptom of Sulla’s close 
relations with the Roman optimates, who were the key supporters o f his rush to power 
and the most obvious backers of his policies. Sulla let them join the Senate earlier than 
would have been the case under normal circumstances, and he may have supported 
some of them in their first campaigns, by endorsing their candidatures. It is clear, 
however, that people of such condition would have pursued a political career anyway. 
Their presence in the ordo senatorius is no surprise at all.
One would be interested in the traces of the presence in the ‘Sullan’ Senate of 
two categories: the equites who were not young members of senatorial families, and the 
notables o f the newly enfranchised Italian communities. From this point o f view, the 
results o f the enquiry are quite disappointing. Only a dozen senators belonging to 
equestrian families are safely in this period, and several of them are the members of 
the jury that tried Cluentius. Three of them are portrayed in quite unfavourable ways 
by the sources. This is the case with characters like C. Verres, Fidiculanius Falcula, and 
L. Fufidius, whom I mentioned above and whose position seems by far the most 
interesting one. His equestrian backgound seem beyond doubt: some members of his 
family are known to have been active in the business world.336 Sallust, however, 
portrays Fufidius in the most hostile way, as the typical profiteer who won a position 
of undeserved prominence by serving the new master of Roman political scene. It is 
worth summing it up, in order to find out when Fufidius paved the way to his success.
Two sources mention the active role played by Fufidius in suggesting the 
strategy of the proscriptions to Sulla. According to Plutarch, he proposed the method 
of the proscription list in a Senate meeting in 81; Orosius reports the same incident, 
but calls him primipilaris.337 Plutarch also says that in 80 Fufidius fought against 
Sertorius in Spain with the rank of tipXtoU TT\g Bai'mcns', which could be seen as a 
kind of promagistracy, probably a pro-praetorian command.338 It can be argued that he 
obtained a quaestorship in 82 or 81, and then joined the Senate, however not in time
336 Wiseman 1971, 232.
337 See respectively Plut. Suit. 31.4 and Oros. 5.21.3.
338 Plut. Sert. 12.3; cf. Sail. Hist. 1.108. See Hill 1932, 170; Wiseman 1971, 232, no. 184; Spann 1986; 
Spann 1987, 57-58; Garcia Mora 1991, 55-65.
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to take part in a debate over the proscriptions. The emphasis that sources put on 
Fufidius’ role aims to convey the impression that the Sullan regime was rooted in a 
background of violence and war. Our sources show Fufidius having an influential 
position in the entourage of Sulla, making the case for a systematic elimination of the 
enemies of the winning party. What made him memorable was not what he did or 
said, but the status and the power that he reached, which would have been simply 
unthinkable without the Civil War.
Although a discussion of Roman internal politics in this period is not among 
the purposes of this study, a few remarks must be made on this subject. A large part 
of the Roman nobility chose Sulla as its leader during the Civil War, while another part 
of it managed to coexist with the populares when Sulla was in the East, as shown by E. 
Badian.339 It is clear, however, that Sulla’s victorious campaign in Italy led to a 
progressive isolation of his opponents at Rome, who had to look for support among 
outsiders, such as the Samnite and the Etruscan elites. For this reason, a large part of 
the nobility was spared by the proscriptions, which hardly killed more than 100 out of 
300 members of the Senate.34(1 Sulla was perfectly prepared to include the youngsters 
of many aristocratic families in his lectio of new senators.
However, his power a complete novelty, built on the victory in a Civil War and 
strengthened by a dictatorship that could not be paralleled with the extraordinary and 
temporary magistracy of the traditional Republican system.341 One need not accept the 
speculative interpretation of J. Carcopino, who argued that the nobility prevented the 
dictator from fulfilling his monarchic ambitions, to be prepared to recognise that 
Sulla’s power was not easily accepted by the Roman establishment.342 Most difficult to
339 Badian 1962a, 51-54.
340 Hinard 1985a, 116-120 shows that a precise calculation is impossible: he suggests an overall figure of 
520 victims, including senators and knights (based on Plut. Suit. 31.5). Predictably, given their social 
prominence, the senators are as twice as many in the list o f the known victims as the equites, who 
however must have been affected much more heavily.
341 There are many valuable discussion o f  Sulla’s dictatorship and the constitutional problems related to 
it: Wilcken 1941, 7-12; Wosnik 1963, 96-111; Nicolet 1982; Wittman 1984; Hinard 1988; Hurlet 1993, 
29-83 (with an excellent survey o f  earlier scholarship); Sordi 1993; Hinard 1995. Mancuso 1983, 139 
unconvincingly argues that Sulla held the same imperium as the kings.
342 Carcopino 1947; see Worthington 1992. For an opposite interpretation, cf. e. g. Stockton 1966 and 
Wooliscroft 1992. Hahn 1975 is probably right in saying that the monarchic interpretations o f  Sulla are 
all indebted to App. b. c. 1.99.463, where the Sullan age is defined as the beginning o f the basileia and the 
end o f the Republic. It is unclear what the Byzantine erudite Theodosius the Deacon meant by saying
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accept were the ruthless methods used by Sulla to ensure his supremacy: the 
proscriptions, of course, and even more the social promotion and influence that he 
enabled some of his supporters to reach despite their low origins.
Sallust blames Sulla for this reason, by showing a direct link between Sulla’s 
generosity towards his associates and the greed of the urban plebs on the eve of the 
Catiline’s conspiracy. The agenda of the conspirators is likely to find a receptive 
audience for a number of reasons. Rome was filled with insolvent debtors, criminals 
and parasites, and many remembered the victory of Sulla, and the great chance it had 
offered to create a big wealth from nothing. The children of the victims of the 
proscriptions were eagerly awating the opportunity to regain their former position. 
Moreover, the Senate had many enemies, who were prepared to do anything to 
undermine its supremacy.343 Rome was getting bigger and more crowded, and 
therefore more vulnerable to moral corruption: not a new argument in ancient 
political thought. In such an unhealthy environment, Sulla’s ‘example’ was potentially 
devastating, as it prompted the need for a new revolution. The reference to senators 
chosen among the lowest ranks of the army (ex gregariis militibus. .. senatores) can be 
explained by the single case we know, that of Fufidius. The ruthless freedman 
Chrysogonus, with his domus on the Palatine, is a perfect example of the regal life-style 
criticised by Sallust.344
However, these are just prominent cases which are known to us through some 
important, although scarce, pieces of literary evidence. Surely, in Sallust’s account 
there is some propagandists: deformation, although the point it stresses cannot be 
dismissed as irrelevant. Nor it can be overlooked that there is a striking difference 
between this source and the extant list of those who entered the Senate in the age of
that Sulla was e l?  p.aTT|V 8r)p.0KpdT0)p (Acroasis, 1.255-259): diverging interpretations in Baldwin 
1983 and Canfora 2004, 9-10.
343 Sail. Cat. 37.5-10: primum omnium, qui ubique probro atque petulantia maxume praestabant, item alii per 
dedecora patrimoniis amis sis, postremo omnes, quos flagitium aut facinus domo expulerat, ii Romam sicut in sentinam 
confluxerant. deinde multi memores Sullanae uictoriae, quod ex gregariis militibus alios senatores uidebant, alios ita 
diuites, ut regio uictu atque cultu aetatem agerent, sibi quisque, si in armis foret, ex uictoria talia sperabat. quo minus 
mirandum est homines egentis, malis moribus, maxuma rei publicae iuxta ac sibi consuluisse. praeterea, quorum uictoria 
Sullae parentes proscripti, bona erepta, ius libertatis imminutum erat, baud sane alio animo belli euentum expectabant. 
ad hoc quicumque aliarum atque senatuspartium errant, conturbari rempublicam quam minus ualere ipsi malebant. Cf. 
Cic. Cat. 2.17-23, with Yavetz 1963.
344 A similar critique o f Sulla’s new senators in Dion. Hal. 5.77.5: (3ou\f)v re  yap etc twv  
fm Tuxovnov dvOparuoov auvecrrr|CTe.
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Sulla. The names of the senators of low origin have almost entirely disappeared from 
the record. This requires some explanation.
As suggested above, most of the Sullan senators may not have earned any 
mention in the literary record because their career was inconspicuous, and because 
many of them found it hard to go beyond the quaestorship. Moreover, the literary 
sources closer to the optimates, such as Livy, or more sympathetic to the populates, like 
Sallust, were probably uninterested in acknowledging their role at any rate. The loss of 
Sisenna’s work is regrettable, in this respect as well as in many others. It must be 
pointed out that Sisenna joined the Senate thanks to Sulla’s support, although his 
position cannot be compared to that of the gregarii milites mentioned by Sallust.
A second, equally important element should be taken into account. We owe to 
the Epitome of Livy an important piece of information, dealing with the lectio carried 
out by the censors of 70 BC: Cn. Uentulus et U  Gellius censores asperam censuram egerunt IIII 
et U K senatus motis. a quibus lustro condito censa sunt ciuium capita DCCCC345 The sixty-four 
senators excluded by the censors included some figures involved in the trial of 
Oppianicus, and other characters like Q. Curius (quaest. 71), P. Lentulus Sura (cos. 71) 
and C. Antonius (cos. 63), all excluded on grounds of indignity. The total figure, 
however, remains remarkably high. This may be explained by the exclusion of the 
senators appointed by Sulla who had failed to reach the quaestorship by that year, and 
therefore owed their presence in the assembly solely to the appointment of the late 
dictator. Their position was somewhat anomalous, and the censors had the power to 
sanction it. Although the evidence is not explicit, this seems the best way to make 
sense of the figure given by Livy’s Perioche. If we count that 20 quaestors per year were 
elected from 81 to 70, we reach a number of 240 senators, leaving out of the number 
approximately 60 senators of the 300 appointed by Sulla. It is true that the figure of 
the senators who never reached a magistracy, of course, may well have been even 
higher than that, as people who were not members of the Senate may have reached 
the quaestorship between 81 and 70. There is ground to believe, however, that the 
rationale followed by Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and L. Gellius Publicola was 
to exclude from the senate those who had not held the quaestorship by then.346 Their
345 Uv. Per. 98.2-3.
346 Willems 1878, 419-420; Syme 1938,11.
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close relationship with Pompey can be easily reconciled with such a policy, which 
eliminated the most obvious legacies of the Sullan regime.347
The chronological coincidence with the approval of the law that handed back 
the function of proposing bills to the tribunes, which Sulla had virtually abolished, is 
striking, and Pompey’s support for this reform of the tribunate — anti-Sullan par 
excellence -  is well-known. In 70 BC a wider reaction to the Sullan programme appears 
to have taken place. A law allowing the return of the children of the proscribed was 
voted in that year, probably along with the measures that allowed the return of the 
followers o f Lepidus and Sertorius.348 The status of the liberiproscriptorum would be left 
unchanged to 49 BC, when Caesar put forward a law that restored all their rights.349 
Until then, they were assured the incolumitas, but they were not allowed to stand for 
public offices, and were not given the opportunity to recover their properties.350 
Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, the census of 70 BC is likely to have 
undone the effects of the withdrawal of citizenship inflicted by Sulla on some 
communities after the Civil War. The expulsion of the senators appointed by Sulla 
who had not reached any magistracy would then fit quite well in the political situation 
of that year.
At the beginning of this section, I raised the question whether a Sullan Senate 
ever existed. It is in fact doubtful that the concept of ‘Sullan senators’ can be helpfully 
used. A close scrutiny of the evidence has shown that most of the senators who joined 
the assembly in the age of Sulla developed their career independently from their earlier 
political allegiance to the dictator. Scarce evidence for social and economic mobility 
may be detected in the study of the proscriptions, but Sulla had not much impact on 
the social composition of the Senate. O f course, the total membership was increased,
347 See Syme 1939a, 66; Twyman 1972, 860-862; Gruen 1974, 41, 44; on the political agenda o f their 
censorship, cf. Rossi 1965,148-149 (= Rossi 1996, 77-78).
348 Cic. Verr. 2.5.151-152; Cic. fam. 12.5.2; cf. Suet. lul. 5.2. It was probably a lex Plauticr. see Hinard 
1985a, 162-186; Hinard 1990, 569. Cicero was sceptical about the full rehabilitation o f  the liberi 
proscriptorum-. see Hinard 1980, 208-210.
349 Suet. lul. 41.3 ; Plut. Caes. 37.2; Dio 41.18.2 ; cf. Veil. 2.43.4. It was a lex A.ntonia-. see Hinard 1985a, 
217-223. Caesar’s difficult relationship with Sulla has attracted wide interest: see e. g. Macr. 2.3.9; cf. 
Canfora 1999, 3-4 and Ridley 2000.
33(1 Cic. Pis. 4 is explicit about the risk o f  giving the ius honorum to the children o f  the proscribed: 
adulescentis bonos et fortis, sed usos ea condicione fortunae, ut, si essent magistratus adepti, rei publicae statum conuulsuri 
uiderentur.
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and the criteria for admission were revised, but this did not have any serious 
consequence on the profile of the membership. No doubt, as the outcome of the 
censorship of 70 shows, a part of the Roman nobility did its best to neutralise the 
potential impact of the new men introduced by Sulla. The position of most of the 
equites appointed by Sulla remains unclear. Namely, it is hard to know how many 
members of equestrian families actually entered the Senate and started to play a 
substantial role in the Roman political elite. There is reason to believe that 
membership of the Senate was cautiously opened to some members of the Italian elite 
who had been loyal to Sulla. However, the presence of Italian senators usually remains 
to be guessed on onomastic grounds, rather than from independent evidence.351
*
The study of the structure of the Senate after Sulla’s reform has provided 
fragmentary, although not uninteresting results. There never was such thing as a 
‘Sullan Senate’. Sulla opened the assembly to new members, and made it a more 
accurate representation of the Roman elite, where even some reliable Italian domi 
nobiles were allowed. The three-hundred (or so) members he personally appointed were 
certainly loyal to him, although they had not all fought in his army. During Sulla’s 
dictatorship, the Senate did not stand in the way of the strongman. After his death, 
however, the political allegiances of its members, both old and new ones, had to be 
quickly renegotiated.
The Sullan enlargement of the Senate must now be considered in the broader 
framework of the discussion developed so far. This chapter is founded on two basic 
assumptions: that the role of the local elites was crucial in the age of Sulla, and that an 
important aspect of Sulla’s imperial policy was rebuilding constructive relations with 
the local elites that were interested in cooperating with Rome again. O f course, in 
Sulla’s case the need of serving the interest of the Empire was combined with the 
necessity of gathering support for the Civil War, and with that of providing rewards to 
his associates after the final victory. The interference and the confusion between
351 Suffixes like —enus, -ienus and —idius suggest an origin from Central Italy: cf. the names o f  Sullan 
senators like Fufidius, Staienus, Vatienus, Caepasius, Aufidius Orestes, Considius, Calidius (see the 
appendix). The best discussion remains Syme 1938, 23-24 (= Syme 1979, 111-112); also cf. Syme 1939a, 
90-91. Cf. Appendix I.
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general and personal interests are apparent especially in Italy, and they are probably 
most striking in the direct link between the proscriptions and the enlargement of the 
Senate.
I have set out to show how complex the attitude of Sulla to the local elites 
was, and how central it consistendy was to his policies. The Greek East and Italy 
could not have been more different worlds, and the strategies chosen by Sulla had to 
change accordingly. However, a similar concern can be consistendy detected 
throughout his political activities: ensuring to Rome the loyalty of as large a part of the 
local elites as possible, and concentrating repression on a limited number of enemies. 
This is what he did in the East, by sparing most of the Greek cities from destruction, 
and in Italy, where he confirmed the enfranchisement of the Allies. At the same time, 
of course, he decreed several exemplary sanctions. In Asia he reorganised the fiscal 
administration of the Roman province bringing about a draconian system that led the 
cities to the verge of economic collapse, while in Italy he confiscated the land of 
hostile communities and individuals, and used it to found new veteran colonies. At the 
same time, he did not fail to reward his most loyal supporters, even ruthlessly, and 
regardless o f their social standing, as the cases of the freedmen Chrysogonus and 
Tarula show. More than anything else, the Sullan proscriptions were a massive 
redistribution of wealth in the aftermath of a civil war.
We know little about Sulla’s political conceptions, and it is uncertain what 
place he expected the Roman nobility to have in the organisation of the State. His 
hostility to the populares does not necessarily imply that he imagined a central role of 
the Senate. At any rate, it is apparent that he viewed the role of the elites as a central 
feature of the Empire, at all levels. In this respect he was by no means revolutionising 
the practices of Roman imperialism. However, he did pursue his aims in a much more 
consistent and effective fashion than had been the case in the previous decades. In the 
next chapter I will show that a similar rationale is apparent from his contribution to 
provincial administration and to the organisation of Italy after the Civil War. Sulla’s 
interest in promoting the local elites’ loyalty to Rome was the most powerful factor 
linking the initiatives he took in the Greek East to those he took in Italy. More 
generally, it is a crucial aspect of the history of the late Republic.
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2.
Between War and Peace.
Sulla and a New Organisation for the Empire
The aim of the previous chapter was to stress the importance of the local elites 
in the age of Sulla, and to show in what respects Rome had to come to terms with 
them after going through a critical phase of her imperial project. The topic o f this 
chapter is in many ways close to that of the previous one. The discussion will be 
devoted to the provisions of Sulla for the political and administrative reorganisation of 
Italy and the Greek East, and the role of the elites, of course, will sometimes reappear 
quite prominendy. So far I have tried to show that Sulla put in place a system of 
rewards and punishment for the communities and the local notables he dealt with, 
which enabled him to serve his own purposes and to contribute to the consolidation 
of the Empire. In this chapter, I will try to show that Sulla aimed to place his decisions 
within a more stable institutional framework. The case of the settlement of Asia Minor 
shows this aspect of Sulla’s policies most clearly. This is, after all, his most important 
contribution to the organisation of the Empire, since Sulla did not reorganise the 
Roman presence in Greece, and it is indeed from this contribution that my discussion 
will start.1
2.1. Resettling the province of Asia
In the winter of 85/84 BC Sulla made important decisions about the 
organisation of the province, which he announced to the representatives of the cities
1 Sulla took decisions on the status o f  several communities and sanctuaries: see the case o f  the 
Amphiaraeum (RDGE  23) and that o f the island o f  Thasus, which had been besieged by Mithridates’ 
troops, but not conquered. The bravery o f its inhabitants was rewarded by a senatusconsultum voted in 80 
BC, in which a range o f  privileges were granted: see RDGE  21, with Dunant-Pouillox 1958, 36-55; O. 
Picard 1989; Brunet 2004, 85-86. Maronea too supported the Romans, and was apparendy destroyed by 
Mithridates’ army: see Clinton 2003, esp. 385-389. I do not think, however, that SEG  35.823 dates to 
the Sullan age, pace Canali de Rossi 1999c and Worrle 2005, 148. The presence o f  the publicani is 
attested in the province o f  Macedonia after the Mlthridatic War, and they seem to have been in charge 
o f the collection o f  the portorium: Cic. Pis. 87, with Accame 1946, 102-104 and Kallet-Marx 1995, 279. 
Syll. 748, from Gytheum, shows that the free cities o f  mainland Greece were not immune from 
extraordinary eiCT<fx)pat: Accame 1946, 131-133; Migeotte 1984, 90-96.
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who were summoned in Ephesus for that purpose. It is often assumed that Ephesus 
was the capital of the province from 129 BC. Generally speaking, there would be no 
contradiction between such a status and the award of freedom to the city included in 
Attalus’ testament.2 Several milestones, found in different areas of the province, 
mention M.’ Aquillius and show that Ephesus was their caput uiae. Hence, they have 
been interpreted as evidence that Ephesus was the administrative centre of the 
province in that time.3 The mileage of other milestones, however, has shown that 
Pergamum was in fact the starting point of the road to Side, and that the road system 
of the province had therefore two capita uiarum.4 At a close scrutiny, the evidence 
available for this period gives no reason to believe that Ephesus was the capital of the 
province in its early history. Until the Mithridatic War there is no ground to say that 
the centre of the Roman administration was moved from Pergamum, the former 
capital of the Attalids. It is quite likely that it was Sulla himself to decide the move of 
the capital to Ephesus.5
Sulla’s provisions, of course, were a contribution to an administrative system 
that had been in place for the last five decades. A senatorial commission of five
2 On Ephesus’ freedom in the earliest phase o f  the province, see Rigsby 1979; Adams 1980, esp. 311- 
314; Knibbe 1980, 750-752; Ferrary 1988, 184, n. 207, 216; Kallet-Marx 1995, 101; contra, Bernhardt 
1985, 285-294.
3 See French 1980, 707, 714. The case for Ephesus enjoying the status o f  capital from the creation o f  
the province is made by Rigsby 1979, 47 and Rigsby 1988, 137-141, oddly overlooking the evidence o f  
the milestones; contra, Knibbe 1980, 757, suggesting that it was a decision o f  Octavian. Also cf. 
Bernhardt 1999, 59-60. Haensch 1997, 312-315 states that it is impossible to determine when Ephesus 
became the provincial capital. There is evidence for intense building activities in the first century BC: 
Alzinger 1980, 813-814. Hueber 1997, 47-49 wrongly assumes that Ephesus became the capital o f Asia 
in 29 BC.
4 The milestones o f  Aquillius are listed and discussed in Mitchell 1999, 19-20. About the road from 
Pergamum to Side, see French 1988, nos. 266, 279, 294 and 295, and French 1991. A portion o f the 
road built by Aquillius to link Pamphylia with Pisidia has been located and surveyed in the Dojem e 
Bogazi: Mitchell 1998/1999, 173. Thonemann 2004, 81-82 argues that the construction o f  a road 
system was the first initiative taken by Aquillius in Asia Minor. This is quite likely, although I do not 
think that the legend cos./vt t o t o s* on the milestones means necessarily that Aquillius built them while 
he was still a consul Campanile 2003a argues that this public work was contemporaneous to the 
creation o f  the conuentus system; cf. Mitchell 1999, 21. Gray 1978 emphasises Aquillius’ contribution to 
the administration o f  the province.
5 As shown in C. P. Jones 2000,12-14, criticising Rigsby 1988, 137-141; accepted by Gordon 2003, 224 
and Dmitriev 2005b, 126-127.
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members, led by P. Scipio Nasica, was sent to Pergamum probably already in late 133, 
soon after the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, in order to ensure the creation of the 
province.6 A recently discovered inscription from Pergamum, certainly dating after 
125 BC and celebrating the merits of the local notable Menodoros, refers to the 
m issio n  of the Roman delegation by mentioning its negotiations with the 
(fouXeinrjpiOF of Pergamum, which had Menodoros among its members.7 The 
inscription significantly calls the mission of the five ambassadors a ' Pa)|iaiKT] 
i'O|i.o0€(Jta. The term indicates that its task was to create the first institutional 
structures of the province, and that it required negotiations with the communities of 
the former Attalid kingdom.8 In 132, a senatusconsultum (RDGE 11), the so-called s. c. 
Popillianum -  from the name of the consul Gaius Popillius Laenas who chaired that 
session of the Senate — ratified the decision of the committee and confirmed that all 
the dispositions of the Attalids were to remain valid under Roman rule.9 Pergamum 
was the former capital of the kingdom, and indeed it kept a prominent role in the later 
history of the Roman province. In such a context, it is therefore not surprising that 
Mithridates chose Pergamum as his residence in the short period which followed his 
conquest of Asia Minor.
The Ephesians, however, followed him quite promptly, as it is apparent from 
their prominent role in the massacre of the Italians, and the King put a satrap called
6 Contra, cf. Coarelli 2005, 215, dating the arrival o f  the Roman envoys to Pergamum to mid-132. The 
commission appears to have had both civilian and military functions: C. P. Jones 2004, 481-485. The 
debate on the exact date o f  the creation o f  the province is summarised in Dmitriev 2005a, 7.
7 SEG  50.1211; the first edition is Worrle 2000, followed by an invaluable historical commentary.
8 The inscription speaks o f  Menodoros ev Tto KCIT& t t )V ' Pw|iaiKf)v vopoOeaiav (3ou\eu “ | 
T e p io j i  yevopevo? (1. 13-14): Worrle 2000, 569 is probably right in giving a temporal meaning to 
K d T d  (cf. Worrle 1988, 96, fn. 95). Ferrary 1987/1989, 212; Crawford 1990, 112-113 and Dmitriev 
2005a, 302-303 view this passage o f  the inscription as evidence for a lex prouinciae setting rules for the 
composition o f  city councils, therefore suggesting to translate the two lines as ‘having been in the 
council created according to the Roman dispositions’. This is a perfectly acceptable translation: 
unfortunately, a solution to this problem can hardly be determined until new parallel evidence becomes 
available.
9 The text is known in three copies: see OGIS 435 and 436, and SEG  28.1208. The chronology o f this 
document has been much debated: bibliography in Kallet-Marx 1995, 353-355. See now the persuasive 
conclusions o f  Mattingly 1985, 118-119 and Worrle 2000, 567-568. The dating is confirmed by the 
context o f  the important inscription from Metropolis published in Dreyer-Engelmann 2003: see C. P. 
Jones 2004, 485.
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episkopos Ephesion in charge of the city.10 Eventually, they made a desperate attempt to 
regain the favour of the Romans when the defeat appeared inevitable, as is shown by a 
famous civic decree calling the Ephesians to the war against the King ([IvEph 8). Their 
effort was unsuccessful, and Ephesus was severely punished at the end of the conflict 
with the loss of freedom and the imposition of a fine, like most Asiatic cities.11 
However, it was with Sulla that Ephesus gained a central role in the administration of 
the province, when the victorious general summoned the representatives of the Asiatic 
cities there.
The meeting was the crucial moment of the Sullan resettlement of the Greek 
East, whose importance goes beyond the boundaries of the prouincia Asia. Immediately 
after defeating Fimbria, Sulla united his troops with those who had revolted against his 
defeated enemy, restored Nicomedes on the throne of Bithynia and Ariobarzanes in 
Cappadocia, and sent an embassy to the Senate. Then, he started to deal with the 
organisation of Asia.12 After listing the communities to whom freedom was awarded 
or confirmed (Rhodes, Chius, the Iliadic, Lycian and Carian cities, Magnesia on the 
Sipylus, and some other unspecified, presumably minor centres), as a reward to their 
loyalty to Rome and to Sulla himself, he explicitly stresses the dominant feature of the 
Sullan reorganisation: cto the other cities he sent the army, without exceptions’ (eg* be 
XoiTTa TT&VTGi CTTpcmtiv TT£pL£TT£|J.TT£). The presence of Roman troops was perhaps 
the clearest sign of the loss of freedom and of the inclusion of a community under the 
direct rule of Rome.
The economic dimension to Sulla’s decisions, however, was even more 
significant than the political one. The provisions taken in Ephesus had a huge impact
10 App. Mithr. 48.187-189.
11 See App. Mithr. 61.252. It seems hard to maintain that Ephesus was a ciuitas libera after the Sullan 
reorganisation, or that its freedom was more than formal: see Guerber 1995, esp. 390-391, 407-409; 
contra, cf. Dahlheim 1977, 233. About the history o f  the city in the late Republic, cf. Canali D e Rossi 
1999b. CIE 1.588 = 12.727, in which the Ephesians thank the Romans for having allowed them to keep 
maiorum] souom leibertatem (1. 2) probably refers only to the conservation o f the ancient democratic 
constitution o f  the city, but does not rule out its inclusion in the province: Degrassi 1951/1952, 24 (= 
Degrassi 1962, 420).
12 App. Mithr. 61.250: A utt]V  TT)V ’ Acaav Ka0iCTTa|J.evo9. He also appears to have put on trial and 
executed some o f  the keenest supporters o f  Mithridates. See Licin. 35.82 Criniti: Ephesi causis cognitis 
principes belli secure necat; ciuitates pecunia multat, oppida inpacata redigit in suam potestatem, with Hinard 1985a, 
44. Bernhardt 1985, 62 stresses that Sulla did not chose to take revenge for the massacre o f the Italians 
by ordering a mass slaughter.
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on the fiscal organisation of the province and on its economic history in the following 
decades. Plutarch mentions a collective fine of 20.000 talents imposed by Sulla on the 
Asiatic cities.13 Its devastating effect was increased by the serious losses inflicted to 
private households, and by the request made to rich families to host a Roman soldier 
indefinitely. The fine imposed on the cities deserves to be considered carefully, as it 
may reveal some interesting aspects o f the political and military agenda of Sulla, as 
well as of the fiscal reorganisation that he carried out.
Appian reports the angry and resentful speech that Sulla delivered to the city 
representatives, blaming the Asiatic communities for the stance they took in the war. 
At the end of his harangue, he declared that the just punishment for their disloyalty 
could be exacdy quantified (62): [iovovg vp iv emypaipM  1T6 PT6  ertov (popovs 
ecreveyKeiv avr'iKa Kal tt]v toD ttoX6|J.ou Saudi/riv, ocrri re yeyove pot, Kai 
ecTCXL KaGiCTTapeyto Ta {rrroXoiua. The sanction imposed on the cities consisted 
therefore of a fine, or rather an extraordinary contribution that the Roman general 
claimed as a refund in the treacherous conduct. It was also meant to be a rich booty 
for the victorious army and — quite explicitly indeed — an indispensable support for 
Sulla’s return to Italy and imminent fight for supremacy in Rome. Besides this 
extraordinary contribution, however, the cities had to pay to the Roman treasury the 
taxes they had been exempted from over the last five years, on account of their 
adherence to Mithridates' cause. Indeed, Mithridates' attack started in 89 BC, 
compelling Aquilius to flee to Pergamum and then to Rhodes. Most of the Asiatic 
cities, which had welcomed the coming of the new philhellenic master, were therefore 
compelled to put a remedy to the financial loss they had caused to Rome over the last 
five years.
This aspect of Sulla's decisions stresses two relevant issues. First, such a 
systematic and well-targeted reaction can be better explained if one bears in mind that 
the fiscal exploitation of the area was already well established before the war, and that 
resuming it was among the priorities of Sulla’s mission -  as well as Fimbria’s and 
Flaccus’.14 At the same time, the ferocity of some communities against the Italians in
13 Plut. Sull. 25.4.
14 However, Attalus’ testament declared the cities o f  the kingdom free and immune from taxation. The 
publicani operated only in the x^pa (3aaiXlKT| until 122 BC, when the lex Sempronia de uectigalibus Asiae 
was passed. This is confirmed by App. b. c. 5.4.17 (Antony addressing the representatives o f  the cities): 
bp.a? t l^Lv, to avSpe? "EXXr|ves\ vAttclXo9 o (BaaiXeus- up.tov ev  8ia0f)Kais- aiTeXiTTe, Kai 
eu0U9 ap.eivoveg up.iv qpev ’ AttoXou- ou? yap eTeXeiTe cjjopou? ’ AttcxXio, p.e0f|Kapev
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the early phase of the Mithridatic War must be explained by the hardships that the 
Asiatic communities had suffered at the hands of the Roman publicani. The Sullan 
fiscal reorganisation was not a Copemican revolution, but a reform that stabilized an 
already existing system.
Moreover, Sulla cleverly identified his personal interest — gathering resources 
in view of the final civil clash — with the public interest of Rome. The collection of the 
fine and that of the arrears were two distinct, yet closely related aspects of the same 
agenda. For this to be achieved, a reorganisation of the province had to be carried out. 
The final passages of the speech reported by Appian make this point quite clear: 
Aiaipf)aa) 8e TaOO' eK aaTois* eyw K ai K aTa TroXeis* Kai Ta£u) Trpo0ea|jXav 
Tats1 ea<£>opaTs\ The collection of such a huge sum was therefore to be undertaken 
by following a subdivision of the province into fiscal districts based on the territories 
of the cities.
As Appian points out, Sulla ‘divided the fine among the representatives and 
sent envoys to collect the money’ (emSifipei Tots' TTpea(3eai rr\v Cr||ilav Kai em 
Ta XPfiM-aTa €TT€\lTJ€v). The cities themselves were put in charge of the collection of 
the fine. The enforcement of Sulla’s orders would however be ensured by the 
garrisons o f Roman soldiers deployed in the province, which had been explicidy 
ordered by Sulla to punish the cities which would not comply with the requirements 
(Kai Tots' ou <f>uXd£a<Jiv £mOf)aa) SiKqv ws1 TToXepXois'). According to Plutarch, 
Sulla imposed the burden of the maintenance of his troops on the communities.15 
Each family was obliged to offer a daily meal to a Roman soldier and to any guest he 
might invite, to pay for his clothes and to offer him four tetradrachms a day for his 
private necessities. Plutarch notoriously likes to focus on these picturesque details, and 
his statement that this decision of Sulla was devastating for private households (TOPS' 
OLKOUS' e^erpapev) may well be exaggerated. We do not know how long this 
imposition was kept up, nor if it was systematically applied in the whole province, and 
it seems unlikely that it was part of an official provision. However, serious 
consequences on private households, along with the extraordinary financial burdens 
on communities, are hardly surprising in the aftermath of a war, and of the Sullan 
resetdement.
uglv, |iexpt SrpoKOTTtov avSpcov xai nap’ ykvo\iev<jSv eSeqae 4>6pu)v. See Gabba 1970,
14-15.
15 Plut. Sull 25.4-5.
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In this early phase of the reorganisation of the province the publicani certainly 
played no part in the collection of taxes. The reason for their temporary absence, as 
argued by P. A. Brunt, is surely the unprecedented lack of human and financial 
resources that their societates suffered after the outbreak of the Mithndatic War.16 For 
several years, until the publicani were ready to return to Asia, possibly not until the 
end of the Civil War, the Roman army was to provide the backbone of an embryonic 
form of fiscal administration, entrusted with the collection of the fine. Licinius 
Lucullus, the proquaestor whose remarkable skills had proved decisive in the early 
phases of the conflict, was entrusted with the task of coordinating it, while the legatus 
pro praetore Licinius Murena was assigned some military tasks, such as the mission 
against Moagetes, the ‘tyrant’ of Cibyra.17 Lucullus, himself a loyal partisan of Sulla, 
played no direct part in the Civil War, as the delicate task he was in charge of 
compelled him to stay in Asia. Yet, it may quite safely be argued that his efficiency in 
ensuring the revenue flow from Asia to the Sullan treasury (the aerarium was then in 
control of the enemies of Sulla) had a crucial role in the development of the conflict.18
Plutarch provides another important piece of information, the exact taxation 
imposed by Sulla: 20.000 talents, which he seems to consider part of the fine only.19 It 
is more likely, however, as mentioned above, that such a sum included the arrears too. 
Broughton, by working on the figures suggested by Bottcher, calculated that the 
annual revenues from Asia were approximately 2.400 talents, and that the arrears
16 Brunt 1956 (= Brunt 1990, 1-8, 481) ; see already Ivanov 1910, 101-102. On the role o f  the equites in 
the Sullan project, see Laffi 1967a, 188-203; Badian 1972, 94-95; Shatzman 1975, 204-205; Brunt 1988, 
159-160; Lepore 1990, 751. Wulff Alonso 2002, 97-100 is misleading. Delplace 1977, 246-247 argues 
that the publicani did not cease their activities in Asia Minor between 84 and 80, but this hypothesis 
overlooks the impact o f  the massacre o f  the Italians. There is no evidence supporting the claim o f  
Merola 2001b, 460 that Sulla aimed at excluding the publicani from levying the taxes.
17 Strab. 13.4.17 = C 631. Murena also gathered a fleet to fight piracy, sensibly financing it with the 
revenues o f  ordinary taxation (Cic. Verr. 2.1.89: decent enim nauis iussu L  Murenaepopulus Milesius expecunia 
uectigali populo Romano fecerat, sicut pro sua quaeque parte A.siae ceterae ciuitates). His deeds earned him the 
gratitude o f  Caunus (Tuchelt 1979, 153); possibly, the citizens o f  Messene called him ‘benefactor’ for 
the same reason (IG 5.1.1454, with Accame 1946, 139). See Kallet-Marx 1995, 274-275, esp. fns. 55 and 
57; de Callatay 1997, 331-335; Mastrocinque 1999a, 94-99.
18 Lucullus was also ordered to strike coinage (Plut. Luc. 4.2) and he appears to have produced a large 
amount o f  cistophori: de Callatay 1997, 356-359.
19 Plut. Sull. 25.4: tt]v ’ Acaav 8i.a|±upL0i9 TaXdvToi? e£r||±LooCTe.
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could be quantified in the sum of 12.000 talents.20 If this reconstruction is correct, the 
fine was therefore of 8.000 talents, more than triple the annual fiscal burdens usually 
imposed on the cities, and four times more than the fine imposed on Mithridates after 
the agreements of Dardanus.21 Such severity is to be explained by the intention to 
punish in an exemplary way the communities that had revolted against Roman rule, 
whose disloyalty was even less acceptable than the aggressive policy of a foreign king.22 
The figures themselves make it clear how heavy, and virtually impossible to comply 
with, the demands imposed by Sulla were.
We owe the little we know about the actual organisation of the reformed 
system to a later author, not very familiar to the students of the late Republic. A 
laconic passage in Cassiodorus’ Chronica records that, in 84 BC, siam in X U III regiones 
Sylla distribuit.23 This piece of information is almost certainly derived from Livy, who is 
the main source for the ‘Republican’ section of this work. Cassiodorus’ decision to 
refer to the reorganisation of Asia as the major event of 84 BC suggests that his source 
portrayed it as a very significant event. The other events Cassiodorus briefly refers to, 
interrupting his list o f fasti, are all crucial moments, even authentic watersheds of 
Republican history, like the death of Hannibal, the conquest of Numantia, and the 
Gracchan reform of the criminal courts. Moreover, this short note provides a new, 
although not entirely clear detail about the Sullan reorganisation. The province was 
divided into forty four districts, which are here called regiones. Quite predictably, their 
function has been much debated.24
20 Bottcher 1915, 56-62; Broughton 1938, 562. Also see Momigliano 1938, 280 (= Momigliano 1975, 
641); Magie 1950,1115-1116, fn. 16. Cf. Bertrand 1987,103.
21 2.000 talents according to Plut. Sull. 23.9; 3.000, according to Memnon, FGrHist 434 F 25.2. 
Although Badian 1968a, 33 and Cimma 1976, 202, fn. 38 call it a ‘treaty’, the so-called Peace o f  
Dardanus was never ratified by the Roman Senate; on the diplomatic consequences o f  this choice, see 
Glew 1981. Sartre 2003, 228 wrongly claims that the fine imposed by Sulla on the city was ‘about the 
same amount’ as the tax arrears.
22 Cf. Ferrary 2002a, 145-146. That Mithridates asked the Chians 2.000 for talents is not an objection 
(App. Mithr. 48.184-186): it was actually meant to bring the city to ruin, it required people to take the 
friezes o f the temples, and it was the immediate background for the mass deportation o f  the citizens.
23 Cassiodorus, Chron. p. 130 Mommsen. There is no reason to question this figure, pace Rostovzeff 
1932, 260, fn.l.
24 See Merola 2001a, 108-109,177-179, with full bibliography.
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They have often been linked to the judicial districts, the so-called conuentus or 
8tOlKT|(jeiS‘-25 They were the main unit for the administration of justice in Asia, and 
for the Roman provincial system as a whole, and an extremely important feature in the 
administration of the prouincia Asia throughout the late Republic and the Imperial 
age.26 The evidence for the district system in the early history of the province, 
however, is quite scarce. It has been suggested that there was strong continuity 
between the Attalid and the Roman administration, at least in the early phase of the 
province. Several scholars have also related the subdivision into conuentus-S>lolKT)0€lS 
to the very organisation of the Attalid kingdom: the hypothesis, originally put forward 
by Wilamowitz, has from time to time been revived with different arguments.27 Most 
recently, C. Mileta has argued that the conuentus as a direct evolution of the TOTTOl, the 
units of the Attalid administration, small districts built around an important city, most 
often a centre of a mint where cistophoric coinage was struck.28 In fact, there is no 
solid evidence for the transition between the two regimes and the date of the creation 
of the conuentus system remains unknown.
Some explicit details about the creation of the Asiatic conuentus in the late 
Republic are however provided in a passage of Strabo, dealing with the vexing 
problem of the boundaries between the regions of Asia Minor.29 According to the
25 Cf. Ramsay 1895, 265, arguing that the conuentus system was created by Sulla; Nicolet 1994a, 159 states 
that it did not exist yet in the age o f  Sulla. Full bibliography in Merola 2001a, 143, fn. 1.
26 The best discussion is Mitchell 1999, 22-29. On the terminology, see Burton 1975, 92, 94-97. The 
word iurisdictio may be used instead o f  conuentus. Habicht 1975, 67-68.
27 Wilamowitz thought that the semantic equivalence o f 8101101019 and conuentus mirrored an historical 
continuity. Apparently, he made this suggestion to his pupil A. Schulten, who accepted it, perhaps with 
some reluctance, in his dissertation: Schulten 1892, 12, fn. 2; 129. For further bibliography, see Magie 
1950,1059, fn. 41 and Merola 2001a, 172, fn. 116.
28 Mileta 1990; Dreyer-Engelmann 2003, 24-25 (with further bibliography at fn. 56). Contra, see Magie 
1950, 1059, fn. 41; Campanile 2003a, 278-282. According to Mileta’s reconstruction, the conuentus- 
capitals may have been cities like Pergamum, Ephesus, Tralles, Sardes-Synnada, Apamea. The 
fundamental introduction to the cistophoric coinage, a typical feature o f the Attalid age and a 
prominent aspect o f  its legacy, remains F. S. Kleiner-Noe 1977.
29 Strab. 13.14.12 = C 628: dkrre Kai Ta <t>piryia Kai t o  KapiKa Kai Ta Au8ia  Kai £ t i  t o  
twv Muawv 8ucr8idpKiTa etvai, TrapamTTTovTa €’19 aXXrjXa• e’19 tt|V o v y x v o iv  touttii' ov 
piKpa cruXXap(3dvei t o  T0O9 ' P(np.aiou9 [if] KaTa <f>uXa 8ieXeiu auT0U9 , aXXa erepov  
Tpouof 8iaTa£ai Ta9 8101x 1)0619, ev 0X9 Ta9 dyopaiou9 uoiouvTai Kai Ta9 8iK aio8oala9  
(‘the Phrygian and the Carian and the Lydian parts, as also those o f  the Mysians, since they merge into 
one another, are hard to distinguish. To this confusion no litde has been contributed by the fact that
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geographer, who was from Asia Minor and had a wide (though not impeccable) 
historical knowledge, the Romans were responsible for the organisation of the new 
system, which probably fitted their need for a rational organisation of the territory, but 
ignored the ethnic and cultural boundaries of the region.30 The point is made very 
clearly, and continuity between Attalid and Roman organisation seems quite hard to 
maintain in the light of this passage. If there had been any, Strabo would have surely 
specified that. Moreover, this passage cannot be used as evidence for a subdivision of 
the Attalid kingdom into (f)v\a, or for any hypothesis about the organisation of the 
kingdom.
Strabo is quite explicit about the functions of the capitals of the conuentus-. they 
were the places where local assemblies gathered, justice was dispensed, Roman 
magistrates performed their duties and, at the same time, the local elites still had a 
share of responsibilities in the management of the region.31 It is not by chance, then, 
that the earliest attestations of the conuentus system in Asia Minor are related to the 
provincial koinon, the plenary assembly of the communities included in the province. I 
will come back later to the function of this assembly in the first half of the first 
century BC.
The assize districts, at any rate, were so important for the organisation of 
Roman Asia that they are likely to have been in place from its creation. The earliest list 
of conuentus of the Roman province of Asia is known from the so-called Monumentum 
Ephesenum, the customs law {lex portorii prouinciae A.siae) discovered in 1976, published 
in 1989 and discussed ever since with relentless attention. The text was issued and 
published by Nero in 62 BC, but it was the outcome of the stratification of legal texts 
dating back to different periods.32 The earliest part of the document was issued by the
the Romans did not divide them according to tribes, but with a different method they organised their 
jurisdictions, within which they hold their popular assemblies and their courts’, transl. by H. L. Jones, 
modified). This passage is the starting point o f  the invaluable discussion o f  the Asiatic conuentus system 
in Magie 1950,171-173,1059-1063. Also cf. Strab. 14.1.38 = C 646.
30 On Strabo’s familiarity with the history of, and the historiography on, Asia Minor, see Ambaglio 
2000. The conuentus-systcm tended to dismantle the unity o f  the ancient ethne, and to give the Hellenised 
poleis a more prominent role: see Salmeri 2004, 204.
31 See, in general, A. J. Marshall 1966 and Burton 1975, esp. 102-105; also cf. Haensch 1997, 310-311. 
Governors administered justice in free cities too: Ferrary 2002a, 142.
32 SEG  39.1189 (edited by H. Pleket): first published by Engelmann-Knibbe 1989; the edition in SEG  
39 usefully distinguishes the different sections o f  the text according to their different chronology. A
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consuls of 75 BC, L. Octavius and C. Aurelius Cotta, almost certainly using 
dispositions that were contemporary to the creation of the Roman province; other 
sections were added later.33 The section drafted in Nero’s day was at the end of the 
text, on the part of the stone that is not preserved. In a part of the document added by 
the consuls of 17 BC, there is a clause involving the free cities, which cannot be fully 
interpreted because of the fragmentary state of the text.34 In order to designate clearly 
what makes a city free, it is specified that it must not be part of any of the conuentus, 
and a list is provided, valid both for 17 BC and AD 62, including the districts of 
Ephesus, Miletus, Halicarnassus, Smyrna, Pergamum, Adramyttium, Hellespontus, 
Sardis, Cibyra, Apamea, Synnada and Lycaonia.35
It is possible that Sulla compiled a list of the conuentus, but the argument is 
bound to remain speculative until new evidence emerges. If the assize districts ever 
existed in the Sullan age, however, they are likely not to have been as many as they 
were in later periods, about a dozen.36 They are definitely not to be confused, at any 
rate, with the regiones mentioned by Cassiodorus, which were related to the collection 
of the extraordinary tribute imposed in the Ephesus conference. The province of Asia 
was an intensely urbanised area, and the forty four Sullan regiones may thus have been 
quite large fiscal districts, each organised around an important city, providing the
new edition by an international research group, with a full commentary, is about to be published by 
Oxford University Press.
33 See Mitchell 2003, 24, remarking that the law clearly defines the ports o f  entry o f  the province, where 
tolls may be paid, and suggests that the boundaries o f  the province were set already in its early history; 
cf. Nicolet 1993, 757 (= Nicolet 2000, 383).
34 See the tentative discussion by Merola 2001a, 164-171.
35 rd io? <t>oijpvios\ ZeiXai'os1 i/naTOi Trpoae0r|Kav a m i'e g  TToXeiTfiai | [......... ]vr) Kai
OLTiues- 8 [t)|i]o l e la iv  8ioiKr|ae(ov ’ E<f>eata9 Kai 8ioiKT)ae(j09 MeiXr|CTid9 Kai 
8ioiK r|aea)9 ' AXiK apDaaaias- Kai e£to 8 lo lk t | - | [acoj? X |iupy|aL a9 Kai e£(o 8ioiKT|aeto9
I76p y a p r |v f)9 Kai e£oo 8 ioiK f|aea)9 ’ A 8 p a p im K f|9  Kai e£oo 8 io iK f|ceo )9 ' EXXriaTTovTiag Kai c£u) 
8LOiKf|aeo)9 Z a p 8 ia v fj9  | [Kai e£oj 8ioi]Kf|creu)9 Ki(3upaTiKfj9 Kai 8ioiKf|creu)9 ’ ATTapr|yfi9 
Kai c£o) 8io iK f|a60)9 Z u w a 8iKfj9 Kai e£u) 8ioiKf)aea>9 AuKaouiKf|9 e [ . ...] a im n  a y o p a i  e io iv  
| [— ] ...(1. 88-91, ed. Engelmann-Kmbbe). The list is opened by Ephesus: Merola 2001a, 162 argues 
that this is because Ephesus was the provincial capital.
36 It has been suggested that the forty four regions were the outcome o f the division into four districts 
of the eleven conuentus then existing: Magie 1950, 1116-1117; Gray 1978, 971-973; Mitchell 1999, 29-30. 
The number o f  the conuentus is however inferred from slightly later evidence (see Mitchell 1999, 23). 
Sources on the later developments o f  the system: RDGE  52,1. 43-47; Plin. 5.95,105, 106,109, 111, 120, 
122,123; IvDidyma 148,1. 12-21, with Robert 1949. A useful recapitulation in Campanile 2004.
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necessary framework for a well-ordered collection of the tribute. This system appears 
to have lasted for several decades, probably until the age of Caesar. Unfortunately, its 
later development remains unclear. It is likely that the fiscal regiones were abolished at 
some point in the early Imperial age, and that their function was replaced by the 
judicial conuentusLOlKTlCTeiS'. The inscription from Ephesus published by C. Habicht 
in 1975 shows beyond doubt that, by the Flavian age at the very latest, the conuentus 
were used for fiscal purposes too.37
It has often been stated that the forty four regiones should be viewed as the 
outcome of a decision made with a view to ensuring a quick and efficient levy of the 
tribute.38 Since the classic treatment of the question by F. Frolich, the assumption 
underlying some discussions is that the new system was just meant to provide a 
solution to an emergency, just before Sulla’s departure from Asia to Italy, where the 
final clash for power was about to take place.39 In fact, there are reasons to question 
that. There is no evidence for the phase in which the Sullan system was replaced by a 
new fiscal subdivision of the province. At the end of his mission to Asia Minor 
Pompey was mainly busy creating the province of Pontus-Bithynia. No substantial 
change in the fiscal administration of the province of Asia can be dated to his Eastern 
command.
Cicero says that in 62/61 BC the propraetor Lucius Valerius Flaccus, then in 
charge of Asia, raised a fleet to fight the pirates, and ordered the cities to contribute to 
the expense according to the subdivision decided by Sulla, which Pompey had slightly 
revised: discripsit. .. pecuniam ad Pompei rationem, quae fu it accomodata L. Sullae discriptioni. 40
37 IvEph 13. First published in Habicht 1975: see especially the commentary at 67-71 on the likely 
development o f  the assize system in Asia and the conclusions at 90-91. The inscription contains a list o f  
communities who were expected to pay some kind o f  tax, whose nature and destination remain unclear. 
As a matter o f  fact, however, the list was created by grouping the communities according to the 
conuentus where they belonged. Drager 1993, 53-54 dates the inscription to the age o f  Vespasian; for an 
overview o f  the evidence for the development o f  the conuentus system, see ibid., 25-26, 263-265.
38 Cic. Quint, fr. 1.1.33 suggests that each regio had to contribute the same amount o f  money, in the same 
proportion: (scil:. the Greeks o f Asia Minor) nomen autem publicani aspemari non possunt, qui pendere ipsi 
uectigal sine publicano non potuerint quod Us aequaliter Sulla discripserat, see Bertrand 1978, 803. Merola 2001a, 
54-55 ignores this problem; however, she rightly argues that the publicani mentioned in the passage 
must have been Roman, not Greek (ibid., 54, fn. 193).
39 Frohlich 1900, col. 1543-1544; Magie 1950, 1116-1118, fn. 17; Merola 2001a, 53-54, 179; Dmitriev 
2005b, 92. Contra, cf. Reinach 1890, 209-210; Broughton 1938, 518.
40 Cic. Flacc. 14.32.
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The scheme was not just useful for the purposes of ordinary taxation, but it could also 
be used to raise exceptional tributes. Flaccus’ policy too was consistent with the 
setdement of 85/84 BC: qui cum in omnis sisiae ciuitates pro portione pecuniam discripsisset 
[scil: Sulla], Mam rationem in imperando sumptu et Pompeius et Flaccus secutus est. Cicero’s 
testimony makes it clear that the Sullan reform went far beyond the scope of an 
emergency arrangement, and was based on the extensive knowledge of the territory, 
and on a preliminary assessment of the fiscal capacities of the communities. Its 
sophisticacy might also presuppose a familiarity with the administration of the 
province, which decades of Roman presence had made possible.41 If not a fair solution 
for the cities, it certainly was an efficient tool for the needs of Roman administration.
The model chosen by Sulla provided a blueprint for later administrative 
developments. The radical reform undertaken by Caesar, who entrusted the collection 
of direct taxes to the cities, thereby depriving the publicani of their role in the fiscal 
administration of the province, was based on the same principle as the Sullan 
organisation. The territory was divided in a number of districts, each one referring to a 
major urban centre and being assigned a fixed sum of money to be paid to the Roman 
administration.42 Sulla certainly ended the war without attempting a final and definitive 
victory over Mithridates, as events imposed a different agenda. However, the survival 
of his organisation of the province in the following decades does not allow us to 
consider it as a mere post-war Blit%. Sulla intended to bring about a more rational 
system for the exploitation of Asia Minor, and he managed to do so.
Curiously enough, modem scholars have rarely asked themselves in which 
kind of legal framework the deliberations taken by Sulla on the provincial organisation 
of Asia were formulated. Several senatusconsulta declaring the free status of some loyal 
communities have long been known and studied, but the position of the punished 
communities has hardly been considered as it deserves. At least since Mommsen’s day, 
it has been repeatedly argued (or rather postulated) that Sulla's main contribution to 
provincial administration was a lex Cornelia de prouinciis ordinandis, issued in the years of 
his dictatorship, as part of a broader constitutional reform.43 The key aspects of this
41 Bertrand 1978, 803-804 argues that this may explain why the subdivision was carried out so quickly. 
Crawford 1985, 160 speculates that after the creation o f the province the Romans just used the fiscal 
system o f  the Attalids.
42 On Caesar’s reform, cf. App. b. c. 2.92.385 and 5.4.19; Dio 42.6.3; Plut. Cues. 48.1. See Merola 2001a,
72-84 and Merola 2001b.
43 On the emergence o f  this theory see Giovannini 1983, 97-101.
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law, in Mommsen’s reconstruction, were the total bar on consuls and praetors from 
holding any military command during their mandate, and the abolition of any 
distinction between consular and praetorian provinces.44 After the decisive refutation 
proposed in the early 1980s by A. Giovannini, who persuasively listed and discussed 
an impressive series of exceptions to Mommsen's supposed rule, there is no need to 
reconsider this matter in any detail.45 No lex Cornelia de prouinciis was ever issued, and 
the problems posed by the references made in ancient sources to a lex Cornelia dealing 
with the administration of Asia Minor can be more satisfactorily discussed without 
viewing them as evidence for a piece of general legislation.46 Some may refer to the lex 
Cornelia de maiestatef1 others to the decisions that Sulla took at Ephesus. It is worth 
reconsidering them briefly.
One of the epigraphic documents recording the introduction of the new 
calendar in the province of Asia, in 9 BC, from Priene, fixing the beginning of the year 
to the 23 September, the date of the birth of Augustus, refers to a Kopvr|Xlc>S‘ vop.os'. 
The dispositions for the elections of the civic magistrates formulated in that Sullan law 
were not to be modified with the advent of the new system.48 This lex Cornelia may
44 Mommsen 1857, 29-36 (= Mommsen 1906, 118-124); Mommsen 1887a, 94-97, 214-219; cf. 
Marquardt 1884, 523-525. However, Mommsen developed and codified an interpretation that was 
already well established in his day: c f  e. g. Vockestaert 1816, 179-182 and Zacharia 1834, 114-116. 
There are lengthy discussions o f  this law and o f  Sulla’s contribution to provincial administration in Betti 
1982, 251-267; Cobban 1935, 72-76; Valgiglio 1956, 124-144; Hantos 1986, 89-120; also c f  Rotondi 
1912, 353 and Biscardi 1951,170.
45 See Giovannini 1983, 75-101, also providing full references to all relevant passages o f  Mommsen's 
Staatsrecht. The existence o f  a Sullan law de prouinciis ordinandis had already been questioned by several 
scholars: see Zumpt 1868, 385, 440; Balsdon 1939, 58-65; Evola Marino 1974, 115-123; c f  Pelham 
1895, 216, fn. 2; Pelham 1911, 67, fn. 4; Arnold 1914, 51, fn. 1; Badian 1986, 81-84. Giovannini’s theory 
has been widely accepted: see Girardet 1987, 292-293; Girardet 1990, 90-91, n. 4; Nicolet 1992; 
Girardet 1992, 178-179; Ferrary 2001b, 28-29; Ferrary 2001c, 103. Schulz 1997, 48-51 and Baltrusch 
2002, 248, 252 still take the lex Cornelia de prouinciis for granted; Sandberg 2002, 39-40, 157 tends to 
believe that it existed. For a better understanding o f  some historiographical matters underlying 
Giovannini’s theory, see Giovannini 1992.
46 My debt to the discussions o f Crawford 1990, 113-114 and Ferrary 2001b, 28-29 will be apparent. To 
my knowledge, a Sullan lex prouinciae for Asia was first suggested in Zumpt 1868, 362-363; also c f  
Arnold 1914, 29.
47 Cic Jam. 1.9.25; 3.6.3, 6. C f Giovannini 1983, 91, ns. 42-43; Ferrary 2001b, 29, n. 56.
48 RDGE  65.D = IvPriene 105,1. 82-84: yeiveaOai Ta icaTa Ta | d pxa iea ia  pry/i SeKaTto, to? 
Kai ev  Tto KopveXta) vopaj yeypaTTTai, evTo? | 8eKaTT|9 iaTapeuou (1. 82-84). Laffi 1967b, 70
118
well be a text dealing specifically with Asia. The reference to a provincial law is 
somewhat clearer in a fragmentary text from Thyatira, in which a 8ldrawls' ‘written 
according to the lex Comelid is mentioned (1. 5-6): ...wi ypdipOLGa. Kara t o p  
KopvTjXiov Popov 8iaTa£iP | aTTap]Ta xP^pop 6 TT£CT<J>p<ryi<jp6 P0 P TTdcnr|i Te 
06coy 61TC0L [8(01.49 The meaning of Sicrra^lS' in this context is unclear: it could be 
‘financial regulation’, or even ‘testament’. In the first case, the reference to a lex 
prouinciae would be unproblematic. If the second hypothesis is to be preferred, it is not 
unlikely that such matters were dealt with in a provincial law, reflecting the concerns 
that provided the background to the lex Cornelia de falsis issued by Sulla during his 
dictatorship.50
A third source has been used as evidence for the existence of a provincial law 
on Asia. In a letter written from Laodicea in April 50 BC to Appius Claudius Pulcher, 
his predecessor as governor of Cilicia who was then facing charges de maiestate, Cicero 
deals with the problem of limiting the expenses of the embassies sent by the cities to 
Rome.51 In an earlier letter, Appius voiced the suspicion that Cicero was preventing 
the delegates of some Cilician cities from going to Rome to witness in his favour, on 
the grounds of the excessive expenses that their mission would have required. Cicero 
replies by claiming that he has always managed the matter sensibly, and recalls a 
conversation he had with a delegation from an unspecified city of Phrygia Epictetus, 
or Minor Phrygia (Jam. 3.10.6): ad me adire quosdam memini, nimirum ex Epicteto, qui dicerent 
nimis magnos sumptus legatis decemi. quibus ergo non tarn imperaui quam censui sumptus legati 
quam maxime ad legem Comeliam decemendor, atque in eo ipso me non perseuerasse testes sunt 
rationes ciuitatum, in quibus, quantum quaeque uoluit, legatis tuis datum induxit. The lex Cornelia
viewed it as a reference to a lex Cornelia de prouinciis, similarly Worrle 1988, 92 and Muller 1995, 53, fn. 
108; Rhodes-Lewis 1997, 546 rightly speak o f  ‘a lex Cornelia o f  Sulla for the province o f Asia’. A 
treatment o f  the cult o f  Augustus in Asia is in S. Price 1984, 54-56.
49 IGR  4.1188 = TAMA. 5.2, 856. Published in Conze-Schuchhardt 1899, 234, no. 74; see Dmitriev 
2005, 303, fn. 68.
50 Contra, Worrle 1988, 92-93, fn. 77, arguing that the inscription refers to the lex Cornelia de prouinciis. 
There is a vast bibliography on the lex Cornelia de falsis: for an introduction, see Grierson 1956, 242-244; 
Santalucia 1982; Crook 1987.
51 Cic. Jam. 3.10. It was a difficult moment in the relationship between Cicero and Appius, whose 
prosecutor was Cicero’s future son-in-law P. Cornelius Dolabella: see Constans 1921, 93-102 and 
Campanile 2001, 252-259.
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Cicero refers to here was long thought to be the law on provincial administration.52 A 
clause of the Flavian lex Imitana, however, shows that the amount of money paid to 
the embassies could be decided on a local level: legatis singulis diariorum nomine Iluir 
tantum dato, quantum /  dandum esse decurion[es] conscripti{s}ue censuerint (ch. H).53 It is not 
unlikely, therefore, that a provincial law set a limit on the expenses to be met by civic 
delegations. In this case, Cicero probably decided to use in his own province, Cilicia, a 
regulation that Sulla had set for Asia. In his capacity of provincial governor, he chose 
to refer to the guidelines provided by the law of a neighbouring territory, which 
probably had already proved its effectiveness in the previous decades.54
Cicero’s letter interestingly shows how financial provision for local delegations 
was viewed by Rome as a relevant problem in the organisation of provincial life. As I 
have argued in the first chapter, a clever use of diplomacy on the part o f the cities that 
could be a fundamental strategy for the improvement of the status of the 
communities.55 As Cicero's suggestion makes clear, the contents of this lex Cornelia 
were not to be interpreted restrictively. A flexible interpretation could be of some use 
and convenience for both interested parties.
It seems therefore quite safe to conclude that Sulla reorganised the province of 
Asia by issuing a law, surely a lex data, which covered the major aspects of the 
organisation of political and institutional life. It was probably included in the lex 
Valeria of 82 BC, which legalised all the initiatives taken by Sulla during his Eastern 
command.56 It probably contained the guidelines of the new fiscal system and it
52 See Liebenam 1900, 84; contra, Crawford 1990, 114. Campanile 2001, 254-255 argues that it may be a 
clause o f the lex Cornelia de maiestater, cf. Ridley 1975, 100, suggesting the lex Cornelia de repetundis and 
Keaveney 1983c, 199-202, suggesting the lex Cornelia de prouinciis. Coudry 2004, 549 takes no stance.
53 See the brief commentary on this clause in Gonzalez 1986, 212.
54 Excellent discussion in Zumpt 1868, 362-363.
55 If  the reference is to the Sullan law, the clause can be explained by the Romans’ interest to compel 
the cities to concentrate their resources on the fulfillment o f their fiscal duties: Ferrary 2001b, 29, fn. 
57. At any rate, setting a limit to the resources available to foreign envoys was an issue already before 
the Sullan setdement: cf. the senatusconsultum voted in 94 BC, prohibiting loans to the representatives o f  
the provincial communities to Rome (Ascon. in Cornelian, p. 57C Stangl).
56 See Cic. leg. agr. 3.2.5: omnium legum iniquissimam dissimillimamque legis esse arbitror earn quam L. Flaccus 
interrex de Sulla tulit, ut omnia, quaecumque ille fecisset, essent rata, with M RR  2.66; the doubts o f  Kallet-Marx 
1995, 268-269 are excessive. On the ratification o f  leges datae, see Frederiksen 1965, 189; Hoyos 1973, 
50-53 (focusing on provincial laws); Sandberg 2002, 102-103. The doubts about the legal grounds o f
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provided a set of rules about the election of city magistrates, although apparently not 
on the membership of the city assemblies. There is no evidence that it went into 
minute details about the organisation o f civic life, like the law issued by Pompey for 
Bithynia two decades later. The former Attalid kingdom, after all, had a much stronger 
background of urbanism and local autonomy than its neighbour.57 It certainly did not 
deal with the introduction of the Sullan era, which many cities adopted without 
following any input on the part o f the Romans, at different moments and mostly 
independently from each other.58
As all provincial laws, this lex Cornelia must have been accompanied and 
complemented by the formula prouinciae, the list of the communities included into the 
province, and to which the law was actually applicable.59 When Sulla delivered his 
speech to the representatives of the cities, announcing what he had decided about the 
status of the communities, he must have presented something resembling the content 
of the formula prouinciae. The position of cities to which he confirmed or awarded 
freedom would be dealt with in a senatusconsultum after his return to Rome. The vast 
majority of the communities were punished by the deprivation of freedom and the 
downgrading to the status of subject cities, under the direct control of the provincial 
governor.60 The fact that Sulla still had to gain political supremacy in Rome, and then
Sulla’s decisions expressed in Schleussner 1978, 78-79, fn. 259 seem excessive to me. See however the 
stimulating discussion on the Sullan resettlement o f the province and its ratification at ibid., 78-81.
57 Hamon 2005, 132-135. The fullest discussion o f the lex Pompeia de prouinda Bithynia is now Femoux 
2004,129-146; Sherwin-White 1966, 525-555 (esp. 525-529, on the financial administration o f  the cities) 
and Marek 1993, 26-46 remain very useful. It is unnecessary to suggest, as Femoux does (129-130), that 
the lex Pompeia mentioned by Pliny the Younger was not a proper law, but just a series o f  decreta. On the 
rules set by Pompey about city magistracies, see A. J. Marshall 1968a; Ameling 1984; Mitchell 1984, 
121-125. Murphy 1993 does not add much to the discussion. On the impact o f  the Empire on the 
economic life o f  the province, see Salmeri 2005.
58 Leschhom 1993, 216-221; 420-423. The dossier o f  the cities using the Sullan era must now include 
Aizanoi too, as proved by Worrle 1995a, correcting Leschhorn 1993, 234-244. Pace Sartre 1995, 120, 
there was never such a thing as the era o f  the prouinda Asia, see Rigsby 1979.
59 Marquardt 1884, 500-502; Crawford 1990,115. Contra, Lintott 1981, 58-61.
60 A. H. M. Jones 1971, 62-64 is still a good discussion; also cf. Bernhardt 1985, 49-65. Bernhardt 1971, 
115, 120-132 fails to see the significance o f Sulla’s intervention in the history o f  Roman Asia Minor; 
Kallet-Marx 1995, 289-290 wrongly views the Sullan reorganisation as the moment in which many 
Asiatic communities were first included under direct Roman rule, and underrates the impact o f  Roman 
domination on Asia Minor in the early history o f  the province. A similar approach in Dmitriev 2005b, 
75-80; a sound critique in Ferrary 2002a, 133-134.
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to obtain the full legal confirmation of his acts is no obstacle to this account of the 
events.
The available evidence and the large number of cities included in the territory 
of the province of Asia make a reconstruction of the formula set up in the Sullan law 
impossible. The development of the status of many communities is unknown. The 
institutional history of a city is known in some detail only in a few cases, like that of 
Aphrodisias. However, as far as our sources tell us, the status subdivision of the 
Asiatic communities decided by Sulla was as follows:
Free cities Subject cities
before the war
Rhodes Clazomenae
the Lycian koinonA Phocea
Chius62 Synnada
Ilium Thyatira
Cyzicus Tralles65
Lampsacus 63
Magnesia on the
Sipylus64
Stratonicea
Tabae
Alabanda
Aphrodisias
Astypalaea
already Subject cities, under Sulla’s 
decisions
Ephesus
Pergamum
Miletus66
Mytilene67
Samus68
Termessus
Caunus (assigned to Rhodes)69
61 Cf. the extremely fragmentary s.c. from Cormus, in eastern Lycia (RDGE  19), where the name o f  
Sulla is legible. Friendship between the Lycian commune and Rome was confirmed by the treaty o f 46 
BC recently published in Mitchell 2005a. The relations with Rome were already very good since 167 BC, 
as is shown by the dedications o f  the Lycian koinon to Jupiter Capitolinus and the Roman people found 
on the Capitol (ILLRP 174 and 175): Behrwald 2000, 105-113; Kolb 2002, 209-210; Mitchell 2005a, 
231-232. Kolb 2002, 209, fn. 17 announces the discovery o f  another inscription containing a treaty 
between Rome and the Lycian koinon, from Tyberissus, which will soon be published.
62 On Chius’ loyalty to Rome, see App. Mithr. 46-47.180-186. This text and RDGE  70 show that some 
Roman citizens owned land in its territory. A number o f  Roman citizens started acquiring substantial
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Doubtful'.
Byzantium70
Doubtful’.
Colophon
Nysa
Doubtful:
Laodicea on the Lycus
Sardis 71
Halicarnassus 72 
Apollonis 73 
Smyrna 74
portions o f land soon after the creation o f  the province o f  Asia: see Broughton 1934, 209-212; Bussi- 
Foraboschi 2001, 450-451. The Sullan s.c. stressed that Roman citizens resident in Chius were subject to 
local laws (cf. 1. 17-18): A. J. Marshall 1969 convincingly suggests that the clause refers only to civil 
cases, especially those concerning property law.
63 Lampsacus was certainly free in 80, when Verres operated in Asia Minor: Cic. Verr. 2.1.81: circumsessus 
es. a quibus? a luzmpsacenis. barbaris hominibus, credo, aut iis qui populi Romani nomen contemnerent. immo uero ab 
hominibus et natura et consuetudine et disciplina lenissimis, porro autem populi Romani condicione sociis, fortuna seruis, 
uoluntate supplicibus. See Magie 1950,1111, fn. 5.
64 Liv. Per. 81.2: Magnesia, quae sola in Asia ciuitas in fide manserat, summa uirtute aduersus Mithridaten defensa 
est. Cf. Strab. 13.3.5 = C 621, with Mastrocinque 1999c, 189, fn. 151 and Goukowsky 2001, 149-150, fn. 
199. Dr P. Kinns kindly informs me that a silver didrachm o f  Magnesia on the Maeander, showing a 
grazing stag on the reverse, appeared for the first time in 2003. The grazing stag replaced the grazing 
Pegasus as as the reverse type o f  the tetradrachms o f  Mithradates VI in 88/87. It seems now clear that 
the city had a Mithridatic allegiance, and that the Magnesia rewarded by Sulla was that on the Sipylus. 
The moneyer o f this issue was Maiandrios son o f Artemidoros, already known from Syll? 695,1. 93.
65 Tralles took part in the massacre o f the Italians: App. Mithr. 23.90; Dio 35.101.
66 On Miletus, see Haussoulier 1921, 58 ; Robert 1937, 427-428, arguing that the city did not start its 
recovery until the late Sixties; Campanile 1996,171.
67 The Mytilenians had surrendered the legate M.’ Aquillius to Mithridates in 88: on the traditions about 
Aquillius’ death, see Amiotti 1979. Lucullus carried out the siege and the reconquest o f  Mytilene (Plut. 
L mc. 4.2-3; also see Suet. lu l. 2). He tried not to destroy the city, but was compelled to besiege and 
punish it because its inhabitants ‘were prey to a bad demon’ (KaKoSaipoi'oOv'Ta?). Cichorius 1888, 5-6 
is still fundamental.
68 In 86 BC, Lucullus organised an expedition against Samus, with the support o f  Chius and Cnidus: see 
Plut. Lmc. 3.3, with Transier 1985, 37-38.
69 See Cic. Quint. Jr. 1.1.33: non esse autem leniores in exigendis uectigalibus Graecos quam nostros publicanos hinc 
intellegi potest quod Caunii nuper omnesque ex insuds quae erant a Sulla Rhodiis attributae confugerunt ad senatum, 
nobis ut potius uectigal quam RPodiis penderent. On this adtributio, see Schmitt 1957, 182; Laffi 1966, 48-49; 
Bertrand 1992, 155. Kallet-Marx 1995, 276 uses this passage and the s.c. de Stratonicensibus to argue that 
‘as a rule’ all the free cities were given new territories, but the evidence is too sparse to allow safe 
conclusions.
70 Byzantium was an ally o f  Rome (perhaps since the Second Macedonic War: see Grzybek 1980) and 
certainly fought against Mithridates, as attested by the Byzantine ambassadors who visited the Senate in
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After summarising the political dimension to Sulla’s decisions, it is worth 
coming back to the economic consequences of the Sullan reorganisation, about which 
we are better informed. Some well-known passages of Appian and Plutarch show how 
burdensome the demands of Sullan taxation were for the cities. As argued above, Sulla 
did not aim to exclude the publicani from the collection of the taxes. In fact, his policy 
was quite favourable to that sector of the equestrian order, since it offered the Italian 
moneylenders the chance for an unprecedented intervention in Asiatic economic life 
by increasing the number of the subject cities. Moreover, as Appian makes clear, the 
cities were in desperate need for financial resources, and they would soon start 
borrowing resources from the Roman moneylenders.75
Plutarch's narrative, although not immune from a similar rhetorical undertone, 
provides some factual detail. Lucullus, serving as a proquaestor in Asia in the 
immediate aftermath of the conflict, tried not to exact from the cities more than they
AD 53 (Tac. ann. 12.62: et piratico bello adiutum Antonium memoriam, quaeque Sullae aut Eucullo aut Pompeio 
obtu/issent...); cf. Mattingly 1983, 240-241, dating the freedom grant to the aftermath o f  the Third 
Mithridatic War.
71 Some recent funerary inscriptions from Sardis (SEG  41.1027, 1029, 1030) attest the existence o f a 
ZuAAiys' tribe: such an attestation may be related to an award o f  freedom. The existence o f a 
homonymous phyle has been tentatively proposed for Saettae too: see SEG  41.1019.
72 The honours for Sulla CTTpaTTyyos- avOuTraTOS' recorded in ILS 8771 (1. 4-7: eTraivtp, XPW V I 
[a]T6(f>dvw dpiCTTeiw Kai eiKOVi | [x]aX.Kf) dpeTfis1 eveKev Kai ewoias* | [K]al euepyfeja'ia?) 
may be explained in the light o f  a freedom grant following the Mithridatic War.
73 Cic. Flacc. 71: cur ergo unus tu Apollonidensis amantissimos populi Rjtmani, jidelissimos socios, miseriores babes, 
quam aut Mithridates aut etiam pater tuus habuit umquam? The same passage records that the city was 
attacked by Mithridates, and it is likely that Sulla rewarded its loyalty with a freedom grant: see A. H. M. 
Jones 1971, 62.
74 Smyrna supported Mithridates, as its coinage shows: Kinns 1987, 109-110. However, Sulla is known 
to have acknowledged the support o f the city to the Romans in the war against Aristonicus: see Tac. 
ann. 4.56.2 and Ael. Arist. 41.766 ( ’ EmoToAf] Ttepl Zp.TjpuTis-), with Lewis 1991a; cf. Cadoux 1938, 
157 and Lintott 1976, 490-491, dating the episode to the winter o f 85/84. This led to believe that he 
granted freedom to the city. Mastrocinque 1999b, 89-93 speculates that Smyrna was one o f the cities 
that bribed Sulla in order to obtain the grant (Cic. off. 3.87 and Plut. Compar. Lys. Sull. 3.4), despite its 
disloyalty during the war. It is possible that Rutilius Rufus, a longtime resident o f the city, made the case 
for it with Sulla: ibid., 91-92. According to Dmitriev 2005a, 249-250 the evidence is inconclusive.
75 App. Mithr. 63.261: otTTopoOaai Te Kai Savei£6p.evai peyaAajv tokcov, a'i pev Ta dear pa 
roZg- 8ave,i£otX7iv, a'i 8e Ta yupvaaia  f | Teixos' f | \ 1peva9 f | et t i Sripoaiov aAAo, a w  
i)(3pei CTTpaTiooToav eueiyovTwv UTteTiOeuTo.
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could actually afford.76 However, the Asiatic cities soon contracted enormous 
obligations with the moneylenders, which interest rates soon made unsustainable. 
From the 20.000 talents of the original fine, the overall debt of the cities had grown to 
120.000 talents.77 When governor of Asia, in 70 BC, Lucullus took the sensible 
decision to cut interest rates, limit the income of the moneylenders to a quarter of the 
overall capital, and forbid them to compound the interest on the capital. Such 
measures represented a fatal blow for Lucullus's political future, but were to provide 
decisive relief for the cities, which extinguished their debts within four years, after 
paying 40.000 talents -  double the original fine, but considerably less than the debt 
which they had contracted.78
A watershed in the economic and fiscal history of the province of Asia can 
therefore be located between 66 and 65 BC. Although there is evidence that some 
communities started contracting debts soon afterwards, the cities never went through 
another crisis comparable to that following the Sullan settlement.79 The impact of the 
fine imposed on them in 84 BC took two decades to overcome. In the meantime, 
from the creation of the province of Asia, both free and subject cities had experienced 
four wars, the uninterrupted threat represented by piracy, a dramatic economic crisis, 
and the greed of the publicani. It is no wonder, therefore, that Lucullus was honoured 
in various and different contexts for his achievements and, more importantly, for his 
moderation. According to Plutarch, the Asiatic koinon honoured him with great 
manifestations of gratitude on his arrival in Ephesus. The AouKoAAeia, a new 
panasiatic celebration that closely recalls the MobKieTa, were established in his
76 Plut. Luc. 4.1: ou |iovov Ka0ap6v Kai 8'iKaiou, aAAa Kai irpaov.
77 See Migeotte 1984, 339-341; Bertrand 1987, 103-104; Kallet-Marx 1995, 276-278; Vial 1995, 160-163. 
Hatzfeld 1919, 203-212 is still an interesting discussion o f  the activities o f  the Roman faeneratores in the 
Greek East, not exclusively focused on the province o f Asia. See Plut. Luc. 20.2, mentioning the 
indebted inhabitants o f the province compelled to serve their creditors as slaves, with Bussi 2001, 111, 
121. Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.1.74 (accusator enim apponitur ciuis Komanus de creditoribus hampsaceriorum).
78 Plut. Luc. 20.3-6; see Cimma 1981, 40, fn. 147; Keaveney 1992, 95-98; Sherwin-White 1994, 244-248 ; 
de Callatay 1997, 356-359.
79 See Cic. Quint. 1.1.25, written in 59 BC (nullam aes alienum nouum contrahi civitatibus, vetere autem magno et 
gravi multas abs te esse liberatas), with Migeotte 1984, 342-343. Piracy, as well as the ruthlessness o f the 
governor L. Valerius Flaccus, had surely played a significant part. Cf. the situation Cicero found in 
Cilicia in 50 BC: Cic. Att. 6.2.4-5 {his ego duobusgeneribusfacultatem ad se aere alieno liberandas aut levandas dedi, 
uno quod omnino nullus in imperio meo sumptus factus esi).
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honour.80 A similar decision was taken some time earlier, at the beginning of the Third 
Mithridatic War, by the citizens of Cyzicus, who instituted the AouKOuXXeia in 
gratitude for having been freed from the siege of Mithndates: apparently, the festival 
was still celebrated in Appian’s day.81 Some epigraphic evidence also survives for this 
period of Lucullus’ administrative activity in Asia Minor. He was called euepyfTTiS' 
and CTO)Tf)p in an inscription from Claros, and TrdTpwv and 6uep'y£TT)S’ in a text from 
Andros. He became patron of important centres like Ephesus and Synnada.82 As W. 
Ameling has persuasively suggested, a dedication in his honour was probably put up in 
the free city of Chius too, and a relationship of patronage may be suggested in this
83case.
Lucullus is the most representative exponent of a part of the Roman governing 
class that understood the importance of a rational and sensible exploitation of Asia. 
One may wonder whether there is an open contradiction between the vision of Sulla 
and that o f Lucullus. No doubt, Sulla bore serious responsibilities for the bad state of 
civic finances, which his friend and associate had to deal with when he assumed the 
governorship of the province. However, the decisions taken by Sulla are precisely 
explainable in the light of his military needs, and can hardly be considered as the 
symptom of broader conceptions of the function of Roman rule. Indeed, Sulla made a 
serious effort towards a stable fiscal organisation, and he did not increase the yearly 
burden of taxation. What was exceptional, and actually impossible to implement, 
about his decisions are the collection of the arrears and the parallel imposition of a 
fine. There is little doubt that Sulla was uninterested in the consequences that a deep 
economic crisis could have on the cities. Such an attitude may be explained by a deep 
distrust towards most of the Asiatic communities after their warm support for 
Mithridates' cause. Such a feeling that must have been quite widespread among the 
Romans, and quite persistent too, as Cicero heavily relied on it still in 59 BC, when he
80 Plut. Lm c . 2 3 .1 .
81 ApP- Mitbr. 76.331. See Magie 1950, 327-330; 1111, fn. 4; Bernhardt 1971, 134. In general on the 
festivals organised by the Asiatic cities in honour o f  provincial governors during the late Republic, see 
Erkelenz 1999.
82 See respectively IvEph 2941 (= Eiler 2002, C89) and M A M A  4.52 (= Eilers 2002, C l34).
83 SEG  35.929: theoretically, the dedicatee could also be Murena, who is not known to have been the 
patron o f  any community. See Ameling 1989, also discussing (at 99-100) other evidence for Lucullus’ 
relations with the cities.
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delivered the pro Flacco.84 In many ways, it reflected an exceptional moment, in which 
Sulla’s priority was to show the importance of being loyal to the Empire, the 
advantages that such loyalty could bring, and Rome’s determination to punish all 
rebels. Lucullus had a different agenda, not least because at the time of his second 
service in Asia Minor the cities had already shown their lack of interest in Mithridates’ 
new attempt.85 His decisions must then be viewed as an attempt to bring life in the 
province back to a normal state, by ending a transition that had proved too long, and 
ultimately exhausting.
It should be borne in mind, however, that after the extinction of the debts the 
framework of the renewed, gradually pacified life of the province was still provided by 
the lex Cornelia issued at Ephesus in 85/84. Moreover, everything we know about 
Sulla’s contribution to the redefining of Roman rule in the province of Asia reveals a 
strong interest in placing — or rather keeping — the cities at the centre of the 
administrative life of the province. There is no evidence that the Sullan law dealt with 
the koinon of the cities of the prouincia Asia and set rules for its membership. It is 
beyond doubt, however, that Sulla informed the representatives of the cities of his 
decisions in a meeting which must have had similar composition and functions to 
those of the koinon. Although there was a heavy intervention of the army to ensure its 
enforcement, his fiscal reform was based on a network of cities and required their 
cooperation.
Many factors suggest that he still viewed communities as the backbone of the 
Roman province. Indeed, the decision to reward some cities for their loyalty to Rome 
and to punish others for having joined Mithridates is based on the assumption that the 
Roman presence itself was unconceivable without a preliminary assessment of the 
cities’ behaviour towards Rome and of the needs of the Roman presence. The core of 
the Sullan reorganisation of Asia Minor was neither a more direct intervention in the 
internal business of the cities nor a centralisation of the provincial administration. 
Sulla did not undertake anything comparable to Pompey’s organisation of Bithynia in
84 Cf. e. g. Cic. Flacc. 11.24 (tie bominibus leuitate Graecis, crudelitate barbaris ciuem ac supplicem uestrum dederetis); 
16.37 (testis ipse... leuitatem totius Asiaeprotulit, de qua nos et libenter etfacile concedimus) ; and especially 25.60- 
61 (quae quidem a me si, ut dicenda sint, dicerentur, grauius agerem, iudices, quam adhuc egi, quantam Asiaticis testibus 
jidem habere uos conueniret; reuocarem animos uestros adMithridatici belli memoriam...) and 27.64-65. See Vasaly 
1993, 198-205 and Steel 2001, 54. On Cicero’s attitude towards Greeks and Greek culture, see 
Crawford 1978,198-199.
85 On Mithridates’ forces at the beginning o f  the war, see App. Mithr. 69.292-293.
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66 BC. With its solid background of urbanism and of sophisticated political and 
constitutional organisation, the province of Asia just did not require that approach. 
On the contrary, the solution to the crisis was provided by two crucial choices: a stable 
military presence of Rome in the region, made possible by the presence of three 
legions formerly led by Fimbria and later surrendered to Sulla, and a strategy 
compelling the local elites to embark on closer relations with Rome.86
Sulla’s harsh measures did not just prove to the Greek world the scale of its 
defeat. They also compelled it to react by negotiating a new position towards Rome, 
and by accepting an active role in an Empire that was changing its shape. The fine 
decided by Sulla was a potentially deadly punishment for the cities of Asia Minor. It 
had been imposed in a phase of serious economic crisis, after a war, with piracy still in 
control of the Ionian Sea. Most of the bronze coinage struck in the province 
immediately after the war, including that produced by Lucullus, bears traces of 
overstriking and countermarking. This led to a devaluation that was a form of 
supplementary taxation itself.87 Moreover, the involvement of the Roman 
moneylenders made the prospect of emancipation from debts even less realistic.
In such a situation, the local elites had one choice left: seeking the support of 
the members o f the Roman elite who were prepared to defend the interests. The rise 
of foreign clientelae, of course, dates back to much earlier than the Sullan period, and 
cases of relations between some Asiatic cities and members of the Roman elite are 
recorded already before the Mithridatic age. However, the available evidence suggests 
that it became a more widespread tendency only after the Sullan resetdement. It was 
Sulla himself who offered a blueprint for this change, by displaying his closeness to 
some cities that had demonstrated their unstinting loyalty to Rome, such as 
Aphrodisias, Stratonicea, Delos and perhaps Ilium. Moreover, he created close ties 
with other cities whose position in the Mithridatic War was probably quite unclear, but 
which managed to build good relations with the winner, such as Smyrna and 
Halicarnassus.88
86 The decision to deploy legions in Asia Minor was unprecedented: Mitchell 1993, 29.
87 Crawford 1985,196; Kinns 1987,110; de Callatay 1997, 329-330.
88 Some cities are said to have bribed Sulla in order to be granted freedom, and his decision about their 
status was reversed in 77 BC by the initiative o f the princeps senatus L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91, cens. 
86; see Paterson 1985, 24, 40, fn. 11). See Cic. off 3.87: non igitur utilis ilia L. Philippi Q. f. sententia, quas 
ciuitates L  Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberauisset, ut eae rursus uectigales essent, neque iis pecuniam, 
quampro Ubertate dederant, redderemus. ei senatus est assensus. Also cf. Plut. Compar. JLys. Sull. 3.4.
128
The measures decided by Lucullus did not solve the crisis the province of Asia 
had been fighting for several decades with. The slow recovery of the region was 
favoured by the defeat of Mithridates and the pirates, finally brought about by 
Pompey in the Sixties, and by the political stabilisation ensured by the creation of the 
provinces of Cilicia and Bithynia as permanent commands. Most importantly perhaps, 
things started to change when the Asiatic cities realised how to deal with Rome and 
her elite. For the heirs of characters like Chaeremon of Nysa and Pyrrh[akos], who 
had kept their loyalty during the Mithridatic War, garnering favour at Rome was no 
hard task. However, the majority of the Greek world had a different record and were 
compelled to follow a different strategy. Murena, Lucullus and Pompey woud 
eventually play an even more active part in this context than Sulla did.
The list of Roman patrons of Greek cities provided by C. Eilers shows a 
pattern that cannot be explained as mere chance. Before the Mithridatic War, only a 
handful of cities honoured, and created ties with Roman magistrates operating in Asia 
Minor. Most of them have already been mentioned here: Aphrodisias of course, 
Synnada, Ephesus, Ilium. Cities like Colophon and Alabanda had already started to 
send envoys to the Roman Senate to discuss issues related to their status before the 
conflict. Samus, which later followed Mithridates, had gained the patronage of Cn. 
Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 96 BC) and C. Iulius Caesar (praet. 92 BC).89 In Greece, 
Delos, before gaining Sulla’s favour, had established ties with M. Antonius, proconsul 
in Cilicia in 102, and with C. Julius Caesar, governor of Asia in the Nineties.90 Other 
monuments were probably destroyed during the war, when the enemies of Rome 
prevailed throughout the Greek East.
From the end of the Eighties, however, the Roman patronage of Greek 
communities came into play again, and became even more widespread. The list 
provided by Eilers contains fifty-three patrons (out of 141 whose chronology is 
known) that can safely be dated between the aftermath of the First Mithridatic War 
and the battle of Actium.91 With the beginning of the principate, the patronage of
89 See respectively IGR  4.968 (= Eilers 2002, C51) and IGR  4.970 (= Eilers 2002, C53); cf. Transier 
1985, 36-37 and Ferrary 1997, 209, with further bibliography.
90 ID  1700 (M. Antonius) and 1701 (Julius Caesar): see Baslez 1982, 55-57.
91 Evidence in Eilers 2002, 269-276.
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communities starts to go through a gradual and irreversible decline, which would be 
accomplished by the age of Claudius.92
Patronage, however, was mainly a prerogative of the free cities, which had 
stronger relations with Rome, and a slightly better financial situation than the subject 
cities. For these communities a very significant function was played by the koinon of 
the province of Asia, the assembly where the cities met regularly and discussed current 
affairs. The inscriptional evidence suggests that its role of the koinon became more 
significant in the years that followed the Sullan reorganisation. The assembly of the 
cities had the function of organising the panhellenic festivals already from the 
Nineties.93 After the First Mithridatic War it became more involved in the 
administration of the province, and became the context when formal consultations 
between the cities and the Roman governor took place.
The koinon also provided the members of the Greek elites with excellent 
chances to build networks of cooperation and alliance with their peers. An important 
inscription from Aphrodisias, probably dating to the Seventies, shows that a free city 
could exploit the credit it had earned with Rome on behalf of the whole province. The 
texts shows the representatives of the Asiatic cities complaining about the difficult 
state of their finances, due to the action of the publicani and to other unfavourable, 
and unspecified, circumstances — perhaps, the unaffordable interest rates imposed by 
the moneylenders, who came into action when Asiatic cities had to gather the 
resources to pay the fine imposed by Sulla.94 The assembly decided to send two 
envoys to the Roman Senate, formally charged to ask for a remedy against the abuses 
of the publicani. Interestingly, the designated ambassadors, Dionysius and Hierocles, 
were citizens of Aphrodisias, thus a city which was not under direct Roman rule in this 
period. Aphrodisias was not a part of the province in this period, and the text makes it 
clear that the two brothers also held the citizenship of Tralles. They may have been 
chosen for their diplomatic skills, or more probably because of the excellent relations 
between their hometown and Rome.95
92 Eilers 2002, 145-146.
93 See Erkelenz 1999, 50 and Ferrary 2001b, 26-27. About the later developments o f  the tasks o f the 
koinon, see Campanile 1994,13-17.
94 Transcribed by Erim 1969, 94-95; edited by Drew-Bear 1971, 286-288; Drew-Bear 1972, 443-471; 
Reynolds 1982, 26-32, no. 5.
95 Reynolds 1982, 30; Dmitriev 2005b, 110-111. Tralles had followed Mithridates: App. Mitbr. 23; 
Varro, in Apul. mag. 42.
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The tasks of the koinon in this period are quite unclear, as there is little 
evidence available.96 Nothing, however, compels us to believe that it was direcdy 
related to the organisation of the province brought about in 129. It was surely set up 
later, perhaps under the governorship of Mucius Scaevola, and it was probably 
reorganised after the Sullan settlement.97 Some documents attest a role of the koinon in 
the organisation of games, or in the collection of money for ceremonies in honour of 
Roman magistrates.98 Its first attestation is indeed a letter of Q. Mucius Scaevola to the 
cities of the province, dealing with the organisation of games in his honour.99 In 
62/61, the League unsuccessfully tried to gather money to organise games in honour 
of the former provincial governor L. Valerius Flaccus, whose son also happened to be 
the governor in that very moment.100 The Roman governing class did not have ties 
only with the notables of the free cities, and the situation of the provincialized cities 
was not completely static, without any chance of success in influencing Roman 
attitudes. What we know about the history of the koinon of Asia shows that it played a 
crucial function in the interaction between the elites of the province and Rome.
There were therefore two different processes at work in the relations between 
Rome and the elites of the province of Asia, involving both free and subject cities, for 
which a common explanation may be suggested. It was the Sullan settlement which 
compelled the cities of the province to embark on closer relations with the Romans.
% Listed by Drew-Bear 1972, 460-463 and Dmitriev 2005b, 105-115, 129; also cf. Deininger 1965,14- 
16; Bernhardt 1985,189-191; Bowersock 1990, 412; Vial 1995, 129-130. Herrmann 2002b, 239 appears 
to believe that Ionian koinon ceased its activities in the last century o f  the Republic and that it was 
revived only in the Augustan age, but the inscription put up by the koinon at Claros in honour o f  
Pompey, ‘guardian o f  the land and the sea, benefactor and patron o f  the Ionians’ (SEG  49.1509), 
proves the contrary.
97 Ferrary 2001b, 29 suggests that the koinon was first organised by Lucullus, between 85 and 80, after he 
was left in charge o f  the organisation o f the province by Sulla.
98 The evidence is gathered and discussed by Drew-Bear 1972, 460-466. On the historical explanation 
for the panhellenic overtone o f some texts, see Ferrary 2001b, 29-35.
99 OGIS 437 = RDGE  47. On the EcoTfjpia teal M oiKieia and the role o f the cities in their 
organisation, also see OGIS 438 (from Poemaneum) and 439 (from Olympia). Rigsby 1988, 141-149 
argues that the festival in honour o f  Mucius later developed into the Euergesia, but the evidence is 
inconclusive: Ferrary 2001b, 26, fn. 43. On the significance o f ‘provincial memory’ in the history o f  
Roman Asia Minor, see C. P. Jones 2001a.
100 Cic. Flacc. 52-59, with Erkelenz 1999. The money was gathered at Tralles, and Flaccus was a patron 
o f the city (Cic. Flacc. 52).
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Some cities sought the patronage of Roman notables, others voiced their concerns 
and needs in the provincial koinon. Sulla’s demands were just not affordable, as we 
have seen. The efforts that the cities made to start paying the fine had put them in an 
even worse position, as they were compelled to borrow money from the Roman 
moneylenders. Disaster may be avoided only by obtaining the support o f members of 
the Roman elite who were prepared to defend their interests, formally or informally, 
avoiding further punishment, extending deadlines for payments, or even making the 
case for a radical change in the requirements set by Rome, like Lucullus did.
The consequences of such a process were not just political or economic. The 
main effect of the spread of patronage was to bring the Roman and the Greek elites 
closer. Their interaction became progressively more frequent and more intense, and 
mutual understanding surely improved. The language of the inscriptions recording 
relations of patronage is very interesting in this respect, with all its emphasis on 
concepts like ‘benefaction’, ‘protection’, ‘loyalty’, or gratitude, which truly conveys the 
impression of an increasingly sophisticated strategy of ‘role assignement’ between the 
Roman and the local elites.101 The network of personal and political relationships 
between members of these two elites, which G. W. Bowersock masterfully portrayed 
in Augustus and the Greek World, took shape in these decades.102 A traumatic event like 
the decisions taken by Sulla at the end of the First Mithridatic War decisively 
influenced its emergence.
The Sullan reorganisation certainly ensured that the resources necessary for the 
Civil War were gathered quickly and effectively. There were, however, two aspects of 
more general importance to it. First, it provided a substantial contribution to the 
organisation of the province, which would be used for several generations to come. 
Secondly, it generated a decisive acceleration in a political and social process that 
would be o f crucial importance for the life o f the Empire for three centuries to come. 
Sulla surely did not predict the lasting impact of his measures. But he certainly
101 This use o f  the concept o f  the ‘role assignment’ strategy is owed to Ma 1999, 211-214, who usefully 
insists on its importance in the study o f  the relationship between an Hellenistic ruler like Antiochus III 
and the cities o f  Asia Minor. Unfortunately, the documentary evidence for the early history o f  Roman 
rule in this region is incomparably less rich than that for the Seleucid presence: cf. de Callatay 2003, 
219.
102 Bowersock 1965, 6-13. Cf. Quafi 1993, 138-149. A seminal discussion o f  the interaction between 
Greek and Roman elites, both on the political and the cultural levels, in W oolf 1994.
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expected them to compel the Greek East and its elites to get closer to Rome, and to 
start building their future knowing that there would be no prospect without Rome.
In the following part of this chapter I will seek to show that some of the 
initiatives that Sulla took in Italy -  which in many respects was a completely different 
world to Asia Minor and the Greek East -  may be explained under a similar light.
2.2. Statesmanship and retaliation: between Capua and Praeneste
Italy, of course, could not be treated as a Roman province: it was the centre of 
the Empire. It is true that a considerable part of it had revolted against Rome and her 
hegemony, but after the enfranchisement of the Allies it had become clear that Italy 
would share the profits of the Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean, and that the 
Italian elites would play a more significant role in Roman politics. In this section I will 
try to show how Sulla contributed to increase the political role of the Italian elites, 
ultimately by compelling them to build closer relations with the Roman governing 
class, as was the case in the Greek East. This process would be accomplished only 
with Augustus, but it is with Sulla that it started. The punitive measures he took 
against his opponents had a decisive role in it.
The end of the Civil War prompted the redefinition of the status of several 
communities, and the foundation of a number of colonies of veterans is Sulla’s main 
contribution to the administrative history of Roman Italy. Rewarding the soldiers with 
land was an inevitable consequence of the proletarisation of the army that had become 
an established reality since the end of the second century BC. Apparently, Sulla 
planned to found twelve colonies in 87, before leaving for the East.103 Surely this was a 
clever move to ensure the loyalty of his soldiers. It was not, however, a new idea. 
Marius rewarded his soldiers with viritane assignments in Italy and in Africa, although 
he undertook the foundation of only one colony proper, the Colonia Mariana in 
Corsica.104 Widespread opposition prevented him from embarking on a series of 
colonial foundations, although his alliance with Satuminus and Glaucia strongly 
suggests that he had that aim. His followers tried to imitate him by planning a new
103 Liv. Per. 77.7: L. Sylla ciuitatis statum ordinauit, exinde colonias deduxit.
104 Plin. 3.80. Like Gaius Gracchus, Marius founded his colony overseas — unless it was actually founded 
by his followers after his death and named after him. See Gabba 1951, 221-222 (= Gabba 1973, 108); 
Salmon 1969,129,192-193; Brunt 1988, 279-280.
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settlement on the border of the ager Camp anus, at Capua, whose abortive development 
was closely related to the history of the Civil War.
The foundation of the colony was promoted in the Eighties by a certain 
Marcus Brutus, and Cicero visited the settlement soon after its creation.105 The colony 
was probably founded between the end of 84 BC and the beginning of 83 BC, by the 
tribune M. Brutus, a member of the populares, and was governed by two magistrates, 
called praetores. At least one of the two praetores mentioned by Cicero, L. Consius, 
certainly had Campanian origins.106 The function of a colonial settlement in that area is 
quite clear: that part of the ager Campanus was both fertile and strategically crucial. The 
revenue flow from the Greek East to Italy, interrupted by the Mithridatic War and by 
the victory of Sulla, had to be offset by intensifying the exploitation of that part of 
Campania.107
Brutus, however, did not have much time to develop the settlement. He may 
have assigned some land allotments, but it is unlikely that he managed to go any 
further. After the battle on the Mount Tifata, Sulla’s control of the area was unrivalled. 
The colony was certainly dismantled. Some of the land of Capua was later assigned to 
the Sullan veterans without a new colony being founded on the site.108 Another part of 
the land that had been assigned (or was bound to be assigned) to the settlers was given 
to the Diana sanctuary of the Mount Tifata. What was a reward to the temple, after 
the victory Sulla had obtained in its vicinities. This decision had a great political 
relevance, comparable to a declaration of asylia in the Greek East, and its sollemnity 
was confirmed by the means that Sulla chose to represent it. According to Velleius, he 
put up two inscriptions: a dedication to the goddess {gratae religionis memoriam), and a 
bronze table, displayed inside the temple, which probably contained a list of the
105 Cic. leg. agr. 2.34.92-93: nam et ipse qui deduxit, et qui magistratum Capuae illo creante ceperunt, et qui aliquam 
partem illius deductionis, honoris, mmeris attigerunt, omnis acerbissimas impiorum poenas pertulerunt. et quoniam M. 
Bruti atque illius temporis feci mentionem, commemorabo id quod egomet uidi, cum uenissem Capuam, colonia iam 
deducta L. Consio et Sex. Saltio, quern ad modum ipsi loquebantur, ‘praetoribus\ ut intellegatis quantam locus ipse 
adferat superbiam, quae paucis diebus quibus illo colonia deducta est perspici atque intellegi potuit. Also see ibid., 
33.89. On the reasons why Consio must be preferred to Considio or Consilio, see Harvey 1981, 299-301.
106 Harvey 1981, 302-311. Cf. Beloch 1879, 305-306; Rudolph 1935,139-141. On the history o f  the ager 
Campanus, see Beloch 1879, 360-374.
107 Harvey 1982, 156-167 is fundamental on these points; cf. Minieri 2002, 252-256. On Cicero’s 
characterisation o f  Capua in the speeches de lege agraria, see Fontanella 2005,179-183.
108 Lab. col. 232.1. The position o f  the neighbouring colony o f Urbana is uncertain, but I tend to believe 
that it was not founded in the ager Campanus (see infra).
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territories put under the control of the sanctuary.109 Augustus later carried out a proper 
reassessment of the jurisdiction of the sanctuary, and he is said to have given it a 
proper cadastral structure (forma), confirmed by Vespasian.110 The modem centre of 
Sant’Angelo in Formis, whose Basilica has annexed the foundations of the temple, 
may owe its name to this ancient administrative decision.111 Assigning new territory to 
a community, and especially to a sanctuary, was a sign of extraordinary favour.112
Such a decision was aimed to reassure all Campanian communities about 
Sulla’s intentions, and to show the rewards that loyalty to him could bring: a practical 
example of the self-penned sentence which, according to Plutarch, he wanted to be 
written on his tombstone, and whose accuracy he had so often shown in the Greek 
East.113 The sanctuary was pleased to show its gratitude adding to the list of prodigies 
in honour of Sulla. The resdess fight of two goats on the Tifata, which had occurred 
some time before Sulla’s departure from Greece, was prompdy interpreted, most 
presumably post euentum, as a premonition of the batde he fought against Norbanus.114
109 Veil. 2.25.4. See Beloch 1879, 361-362; D e Franciscis 1959, 340; Harvey 1982, 169-170. Bodei 
Giglioni 1977, 38 argues that Sulla gave land to the sanctuary after using its treasure, as he had done in 
Greece, but the evidence does not support the claim. I do not think that the land assignments to the 
sanctuary contradict Cicero’s statement that E  Sulla... agrum Campanum attingere ausus est (leg. agr. 
2.29.81), as claimed in Laffi 1966, 100: Cicero refers to viritane assignments, or to the foundation o f  
colonies o f  veterans. Franciosi 2002, 244-248 adds little to the discussion.
110 The continuity between the three moments is made very explicitly by CIE 10.3828 (= ILS 251): Imp.
Caesar Uespaslanus Aug. cos. VII jines agrorum dicatorum Dianae Tifat. a Comelio Sulla ex forma diui Aug. 
restituit. P(raedia) D(ianae) T(ifatinae). Also see A E  1971, 80. See Frederiksen 1959, 92; Frederiksen 1984, 
276, fn. 19.
111 See Beloch 1879, 15; D e Franciscis 1959, 307-308 revives the argument o f  the eighteenth-century 
erudite F. M. Pratilh that the toponym may derive from the coincidence o f  two meanings o f  the Latin 
word forma, ‘cadastral asset’ and ‘aqueduct’. About the remains o f  the sanctuary and the Basilica, see De 
Franciscis 1959, 314-343, 352-353; Kirsten 1975, 574-583.
112 See Frederiksen 1984, 265: the temple had already been in control o f some territory for a long time. 
Scheid 2006, 78-79 stresses how important it was for Sulla that the sanctuary was autonomous, or 
‘autrement dit dependant de Rome seule’. The inscription on the pavement o f  the Basilica o f  S. Angelo 
(CIE 10.3935 = A E  1996, 429 = A E  1997, 316) is not relevant to our discussion: the best text is in
Pobjoy 1997, with a full survey o f  earlier bibliography; also cf. Batino 1996.
113 Plut. Sull. 38.6: t o  8’ emypap.p.d p am v avrou inToypai|;d|j.evov KaraXiTTfit', ou Ke<J)dXaioy 
eoTiv to? ouTe T(Sv cfTXcov T19 auTov ev ttoiojv oirre tojv exOpwv KaKto? UTTepe(3dXeTo.
1,4 Plut. Sull 27.8.
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Sulla’s dismantling of the Marian colony at Capua represented a novel way to 
demonstrate his interest in, and gain control over, a strategic area. Supporting a 
sanctuary whose identity was inextricably linked to the city was no doubt a sign of 
benevolence. Assignining it territory which the Marians had allotted to Roman 
colonists was a sign of his utmost respect for its autonomy and special status. This is 
perhaps the most important example of that ‘political warfare’ which appears to have 
been the distinctive trademark of Sulla’s conduct in Italy after the Social War. Sulla’s 
strategy required a widespread use of violence, but always with a clear political agenda, 
whereby war was exploited as a chance to reshape the status of a territory and the 
balance of power within it.
The attitude shown by Sulla against the communities that had opposed him or 
sheltered his enemies was completely different. I have already touched upon the 
clearest case, that of Praeneste, whose conquest was to some extent the prologue to 
the proscriptions and the political (and often physical) annihilation of the defeated. 
Sulla’s wrath did not just target the individuals, but also led to an exemplary 
punishment for the city.
After the victory obtained by Sulla at the Colline Gate, the destiny of 
Praeneste was clear to anybody. The city surrendered, and, after a failed attempt to 
flee it, Marius the Younger, who had fled there, took his own life.115 Sulla himself 
returned to Praeneste and supervised the slaughter of those who had taken part in the 
resistance. However, the city was not destroyed, nor was its famous sanctuary, 
dedicated to Fortuna Primigenia, one of the most important religious centres of 
ancient Italy. Some time later, a colony was founded in the city, as part of the broader 
plan of the Sullan veteran settlements. Two crucial consequences of Sulla’s victory in 
Italy, the physical elimination of the adversaries and the reorganisation of the territory 
by the foundation of a colony feature very prominently in the context of Praeneste.
The history of the city is inextricably linked to that of the great sanctuary of 
Fortuna Primigenia, and the Sullan age is no exception. The systematic excavations of 
the sanctuary started in 1944, and the discoverers of the site distinguished two of its 
main elements: an ‘upper sanctuary’ and a ‘lower sanctuary’, divided by a series of 
terraces. In their view, the upper sanctuary dating back to 150 BC ca., and the lower 
one bore the traces of a Sullan intervention, which must have been part of a
1,5 Femique 1880, 53-56 is still an excellent account; on the siege, also see Gardner 1920 and Lewis 
1971.
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restoration of the whole sanctuary.116 Such a chronology was a salutary reaction to the 
widespread opinion, established long before the beginning of any serious 
archaeological research on the site, dating the whole sanctuary to the age of Sulla.
This idee regue was based on a passage of Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia, 
which mentions an intervention of Sulla on the architecture of the sanctuary. 
Referring to the different kinds of floor decorations, Pliny states: lithostrota coeptauere 
iam sub Sulla\ paruolis certe crustis exstat hodieque quod in Fortunae delubro Praeneste fecit 
(36.189). F. Zevi persuasively showed how the antiquarian tradition took this passage 
as solid evidence that Sulla undertook a major renovation of the sanctuary, and how 
deeply this ill-founded conviction has influenced scholarly discussions of this complex 
site.117 In fact, Pliny just referred to the restoration of the floor in the temple of 
Fortuna, and especially to the presence of mosaic for decoration purposes, apparently 
unprecedented in the Republican period.118
The interpretation of the archaeological evidence from the site opened further 
problems. A closer study of the two ‘sanctuaries’ revealed a set of significant 
differences between them, which suggest that the structures are actually independent 
from each other. The so-called ‘lower sanctuary’ is in fact not a religious building, 
reproducing the functions of the upper temple, but rather a public structure. This 
interpretation, forcefully put forward by Coarelli and Zevi, is now widely accepted, 
and it has two main advantages.119 First, its interpretation of the sanctuary of Praeneste 
is consistent with what we know about the other main sanctuaries of Latium: the 
duplication of a religious building within the same sanctuary is unparalleled. Moreover, 
it leads to a much more convincing reconstruction of the urban development of 
Praeneste. Since Praeneste is, along with Pompeii, the only Sullan colony for which 
there is some significant archaeological evidence, it is worth devoting some attention 
to it.
116 Fasolo-Gullini 1955, 301-323; Kahler 1958; Gullini 1991, 497-498, 511-513. For a critique o f this 
approach, see Coarelli 1987, 62-63; about the negative influence o f the ‘myth o f Sulla’ on archaeologists, 
see Coarelli 1977, 9.
117 Zevi 1979; Zevi 1989, 34-41.
118 The scholarly debate on this passage is summarised in Lavagne 1988, 238-255, also speculating that 
Sulla may have introduced the cult o f  Isis to Praeneste.
119 See Zevi 1979 (with an invaluable survey o f  modem scholarship on Praeneste, at 2-8); Coarelli 1987, 
35-61, 72-74; Coarelli 1989, 115-132; Zevi 1989, 33-41; S. Gatti-Agnoli 2001, 7. Contra, cf. Champeaux 
1982, 4-24; Champeaux 1987, 225-228; Lavagne 1988, 227-256.
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The so-called ‘upper sanctuary’ must be regarded as the actual sanctuary of 
Fortuna Primigenia, built in the second century BC, taking up the legacy of a cult that 
existed already in the third century BC. An obvious source of funding for its 
construction were the resources gathered by the affluent negotiators from Praeneste, 
whose presence is well attested in the Greek East, and who kept a significant role in 
their native community.120 Below the ‘upper sanctuary’, clearly separated by a series of 
three terraces, there was a public space, occupied by an ‘aula absidata’ that had long 
been thought to be the delubrum Fortunae whose pavement was refurbished by Sulla.121 
The complex must be seen as a whole structure, closely integrated with the area now 
occupied by Piazza Regina Margherita and the Church of S. Agapito. In this site F. 
Zevi recognised the traces of an archaic temple, unrelated to the sanctuary, which is to 
be identified with the centre of the civic cult of Iuppiter.122
Before the siege and the bloody sack that changed its history, Praeneste was 
therefore organised around two independent poles, the sanctuary and the forum.123 
The development of the city therefore proceded by a gradual diffusion from the 
hilltop. Republican Praeneste, however, was almost entirely enclosed within the city 
walls and there is evidence only for a very limited development of the setdement in 
the flat land at the foot of the hill. A drastic change occurred after the Sullan conquest 
and with the later foundation of the colony. It is in this area, rather than in the 
sanctuary, that the traces of Sulla’s presence must be looked for.124
120 Wilson 1966, 110 (Delos), 134 (Miletus), 142 (Clazomenae); Coarelli 1976, 338; Bodei Giglioni 1977,
73-76 ; Coarelli 1987, 66. On the wealth o f  the Praenestan aristocracy before Sulla, see Coarelli 1992, 
260-267 and M. Torelli 1992, 278-280.
121 Sulla’s direct interventions on the sanctuary were in fact very limited: Coarelli 1976, 339; Coarelli 
1987, 66. About the topography o f the ‘aula absidata’, see the informed discussion in Lavagne 1988, 
228-231, whose interpretation seems however untenable to me.
122 Zevi 1989, 41-46. Cf. the dedication to Iuppiter Optimus Maximus by M. Aeficius and A. Saufeius 
{A E  1989, 133): the dating and the archaeological context are unknown, but it is not unlikely that it is 
later than the foundation o f  the Sullan colony (Granino Cecere 1989, 150-151).
123 There are important discussions on the differences and the relations between the ‘world o f  Fortuna’ 
and the ‘world o f  Iuppiter’ in Brelich 1976, 17-55 and Champeaux 1982, 97-101, 437-446. On the 
analogies between the religious identities o f  Rome and Praeneste, see M. Torelli 1989.
124 For the lower city, see in general Quilici 1980, dealing with topographical problems, and Quilici 
1989, focusing on the architectural features o f  the buildings o f  the colony; a survey o f recent 
excavations in S. Gatti 2003. Cf. Quilici 1982 on the discovery o f  a mosaic with the judgment o f Paris 
in the area o f  the Sullan settlement.
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The task is made considerably harder by the recent history of modem 
settlement in modem Palestrina. After the Second World War, the town experienced 
uncontrolled building activity, involving many areas that had not been occupied for 
centuries and which probably corresponded to the site of the Sullan colony. Such a 
disaster was possible even although public authorities had duly forbidden any 
intervention in many areas, especially in that known as the Quadrilatero. Its effect was 
to make any future survey of the urban structure of ancient Praeneste much more 
difficult.125 No effective counter-measures were taken until the Seventies. Only then 
was a systematic study of the extent and of the impact of this devastation undertaken, 
and serious investigations were carried out.
L. Quilici provided a convincing picture of the urban development of 
Praeneste. In his reconstruction, the lower city is a later development of an earlier 
settlement built around the civic temple whose site is now occupied by S. Agapito, of 
course related to the Sanctuary of Fortuna, situated on the upper part of the hill. The 
lower city is an expansion of this earlier setdement, whose boundaries actually go 
beyond the area of the Quadrilatero usually identified as the site of the Sullan ‘military 
colony’. Archaeological evidence has now confirmed beyond any doubt that it was not 
an outcome of Sullan colonisation. The first bulk of the lower city was built in the 
second half of the second century, the most likely period of the construction, or rather 
monumentalisation, of the sanctuary. In this period, Praeneste was at the peak of its 
wealth, and it is not surprising that a reorganisation of the lower city was carried out 
some time before the coming of Sulla. The grid of the Sullan city clearly overlaps with 
that of an earlier setdement, pardy adapting itself to its structure, and pardy 
introducing a different orientation.126
Although the model of a strong caesura between a pre-Sullan and a post- 
Sullan Praeneste is no longer tenable, as far as the urban structure is concerned, some 
particular features of the Sullan setdement are however recognisable. The houses of 
the new setders show some innovative features. A new material, the semi-reticulated 
limestone, a technique typically used in the post-Sullan period, is clearly recognisable 
in many buildings. However, it was not used everywhere, and the houses of the 
families which survived the Sullan sack are distinguishable because they do not feature
125 Quilici 1979.
126 Quilici 1980, 209-213; Quilici 1988, 60-66.
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it. Moreover, traces of an ancient subdivision of the land, following a grid pattern, 
have recendy been detected in the southwestern area of the ager}21
Many details of the structure of the Sullan colony, however, are unknown. It 
appears that the old city forum, located in the area of the Cathedral, ceased to be in 
use after the foundation of the colony. A later forum has tentatively been located in 
the area of the church of the Madonna delTAquila, but its exact location has not been 
determined yet. Other public buildings have been excavated, but a full report is still 
pending.
Other kinds of evidence, both literary and documentary, do not reveal much 
about the structure of the Sullan colony either. Land assignments are mentioned in a 
controversial passage of Florus, along with other cities that probably were not 
colonies at the time, and by a tangential reference made by Strabo.128 Moreover, Cicero 
explicitly calls Praeneste a colonial Two inscriptions, almost identical in content, refer 
to a fountain, offered colonis incol[is hospitibus by the generosity of a local magistrate 
(CIL 14.2978 and 2979). An inscription records the refurbishment of a public bath by 
the duouiri of the colony Q. Vibuleius and L. Statius. The stone appears to have been 
found in the same area of the lower city where the public baths, dating to the Imperial 
age, have been located (CIL 14.3013). Although it does not have a clear archaeological 
context, there is reason to believe that the text does not date much later than the 
foundation of the colony.130
If his veterans were to settle there, it was certainly in Sulla’s interest to 
contribute to the recovery of a community that his conquest had so deeply affected. A 
number of inscriptions show that other interventions were carried out in the sanctuary 
soon after the foundation of the colony. Two fragments of travertine discovered on 
the site bear traces of the word reficiendum and, even more significantly, a third one 
shows the name of Var]ro Lucul[lusJ}1 It has been argued that it is a fragment of a
127 Muzzioli 1993.
128 Flor. 2.9.27: municipia Italiae splendidissima sub hasta uenierunt, Spoletium Interamnium, Praeneste, Plorentia.; 
Strab. 5.3.11 = C 239.
129 Cic. Cat. 1.4.8. Praeneste reobtained the municipal status under Tiberius (Gell. 16.13.5: Praenestinos 
autem refert maxima opere a Tiberio imperatore petisse orasseque, ut ex colonia in municipii statum redigerentur, idque 
illis Tiberium pro ferenda gratia tribuisse, quod in eorum finibus sub ipso oppido ex capitali morbo reualuissel). On 
Florus’ passage, see Gabba 1970/1971 (= Gabba 1973, 361-367), and infra.
130 See Dessau’s commentary in CIL 10.
131 Respectively, Lphemeris Epigraphica 9.779 and 9.783; CIL 12.742.
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column of a porticus built in the sanctuary by Marcus Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 
73), brother of L. Licinius Lucullus and quaestor in Greece during the Mithridatic 
campaign.132 He was a prominent figure of the Sullan camp: he was entrusted with 
striking the so-called Lucullan coins, loyally supported of Sulla during the Civil War, 
and he probably was one of the deductores of the colony of Praeneste.133
It is conceivable that other restorations took place after the sack of the city, 
and they were probably due to the initiatives of the new settlers, and of their political 
protectors. Not very much is known, however, of the history of Praeneste until the 
war between Octavianus and Antonius, or of its economic and social history in the last 
decades of the Republic. Moreover, we have a poor knowledge of local magistracies in 
the decades following the birth of the colony. This is an aspect of a more general 
problem. Little is known about the composition of the population of the colony, and 
consequently about the distribution of political power, property and wealth within the 
new community.
According to Appian, Sulla decided to spare the lives of the populares besieged 
in Praeneste, whom Appian loosely calls ' Pwpcuoi.134 As mentioned above, all the 
male citizens of the municipium, on the contrary, were exterminated, along with the 
Samnites who had come to support the resistance against Sulla.135 Only women and
132 Degrassi 1969,119 (= Degrassi 1971,11).
133 In 83 BC Varro Lucullus was apparently quaestor: see Plut. L m c . 37.1, with MacKendrick 1962, 118- 
119 and Angeli Bertinelli 1997, 380. About his support for Sulla in the Civil War, see Plut. Sull. 27.14- 
17. Thompson 1961, 437-438 argues that it was him, not L. Licinius Lucullus, who stroke the so-called 
Lucullans coins that widely circulated in Greece; cf. Alfoldi 1976, 146-148. In general on the Lucullan 
coins, see Daux 1935; Thompson 1961, 431-439; Wosnik 1963, 42-60; M. Price 1987, 96; Kroll 1997, 
140. On Rome’s choice to strike Greek coins in mainland Greece during this period, see Giovannini 
1978,34-35.
134 App. b. c. 1.94.436-438: Aoi>Kpf|Tio? 8 ’ fu e l  lTpaiveoTOV eiXe, Twy otto tt)? (3ouXf|? 
evravda  Mapitu (jTpaTr|yowTa)y tou? p£y a im ica  avripei, Toy? 8 ’ eg cf)vXaKf]v £cre(3aAAey 
ou? o ZvXXag eneXdibv avetXe.  icai tou? ev  TTpaiveaTto TTpoaeTa£e XWP'LS“ ottXcjv 
TTpocXOcLV atTavTas' eg  to  TTfSiov Kal upoeXOoimov tou? (i<?v 6 a  im p t i  xPO ^pous- 
yeyopeyou?, oXlyou? TTdpiTay, e^elXero, Tovg 8e Xoittou? eKeXevoev eg  Tpia d ir’ aXXriXwv 
8iaCTTf|tm,' Pwpatous* re  Kal ZawLTas1 Kai ripaiv£aTL0 U9 ‘ eTtei 8e 8ieCTTT|aay, to i?  pey  
Pwpaiois- £TT£Kf|pu^6v, o n  Kal o'l8e a^ ia  OayaTou 8e8paKaai, Kal CTuyyvwpriv eStoKcv 
opw?, to i)9  8 ’ eTepou? KaTTiKOVTicrfy aTTayTas-' ytjvaia 8e auTtoy Kal TtaLSla pe0f|Key 
0710061? aTTieyai. Kal Tf)y TtoXiy 8ifipira^6, TroXuxPOPc^Toy ev  to l?  paX iaTa to t£  ouaay. 
O f course, Marius the Younger was on the proscription list from the start: Hinard 1985a, 60, 375-377.
135 Sulla certainly punished a part o f  the Sammte elites, but there is no evidence that he ever envisaged, 
or carried out any retaliation on the Samnites as an ethnic group. His impact on Samnium has been
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children were spared. Strabo often exaggerates his statements about the impact of 
wars on a community or a people. However, his account cannot be entirely dismissed, 
and there is no reason to rule out that Sulla actually decided an exemplary punishment 
for a city that had strongly supported his enemies. Even if we assume that some local 
families escaped the slaughter thanks to their connections at Rome, the impact of 
Sulla’s decision on the demography of Praeneste is still hard to deny. The colonists 
arrived in a city that was depopulated, and this probably concurs to explain why we do 
not have any evidence for tensions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ citizens like it is the case, 
for instance, with Pompeii.
Confirmation of the picture given by Appian has been sought in the 
inscriptional evidence from the only necropolis of Republican Praeneste known so far, 
that of La Colombella. A. Degrassi calculated that, out of the 138 gentes attested in the 
Republican age by the inscriptions from the Colombella necropolis, only twenty are 
still attested after 82 BC.136 This led him to argue for a steady decrease in the presence 
of the names of the old gentes in the local magistracies, and to draw an analogy with 
another Sullan colony, that of Pompeii, where local families appear to have recovered 
political influence only in the Augustan age. The argument, however, is not 
convincing. The context of Praeneste is altogether different in an important respect, 
since the exclusion of the traditional families from political life argued by Degrassi 
would be an effect of the elimination of most of their members, which does not
overrated (e. g. Syme 1939a, 87: ‘desolation for ever’), usually on the basis o f Strab. 5.4.11 = C 250, 
which is not reliable evidence. Strabo says that cities Aesemia, Bovianum and Telesia went through a 
steady decline after Sulla’s victory. Cf. Strabo’s passage with Veil. 2.27.2; see Salmon 1967, 383-384; 
Brunt 1971, 355-356; Tataranni 2005, 299-300. If any, the crisis certainly did not affect Telesia, where 
several public works, such as the city walls, date back to Sullan age: Quilici 1966, 85-97; Gros 1978, 74. 
There is however no evidence for the foundation o f  a colony in this period: Chouquer 1987, 153-155; 
Compatangelo 1991, 142. There are symptoms o f a contraction o f urban life in Samnium between Sulla 
and the age o f  Caesar, but there was a similar situation in Lucania too: Crawford 1987, 415.
136 Degrassi 1969, 114-116 (= Degrassi 1971, 5-7), developing a point made by H. Dessau in CIL, XIV, 
p. 289. According to this reconstruction, the figure could be even lower, as some names may be those 
o f new families which came to Praeneste after the foundation o f the colony and happened to be 
homonymous to older ones. Degrassi’s interpretation was accepted by Harvey 1975, 41-48; Coarelli 
1976; Gros 1978, 50-51; Coarelli 1987, 62-65; Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1996, 200, 259-260. Harvey 1975, 
50-52 argues that several Praenestan families appear to have held magistracies soon after the Sullan 
conquest and in the Augustan age, but underrates the risk o f  homonimity (of which he is however 
aware: ibid., 51, fn. 49).
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appear to have taken place in Pompeii. However, there is an even stronger objection 
to this reconstruction. As M. Clauss has pointed out, the evidence used by Degrassi is 
from just one necropolis, which was used only in the third and in the second century 
BC. The necropolis (or necropoleis) in use immediately before and during the Sullan 
period has (or have) never been unearthed.137 In this context, there is no room for a 
serious statistical survey.
The epigraphic evidence being so unhelpful, one is compelled to make sense 
of the literary evidence, however unclear it may be. Even if one views Appian’s claim 
that ‘all the male citizens’ of Praeneste were killed as excessive, it remains beyond 
dispute that Praeneste is the only Sullan colony where a slaughter of the inhabitants is 
known to have taken place before the coming of the settlers. On the other hand, it 
must be considered that Sulla’s revenge may well not have affected all the members of 
prominent families. More importantly, the survival of the children allowed continuity, 
and several nomina of the old Praenestan aristocracy re-emerged some decades after 
the foundation of the Sullan colony.138 The quantitative size of the new civic elite 
represented by the colonists is hard to establish too. We are slightly better informed, 
however, about the impact of the colony on the economic and social structures of 
Praeneste.
Making the case for the repeal of the agrarian reform presented by the tribune 
Rullus, in 63 BC, Cicero warned the Roman people against the risk implied by that 
bill. He claimed that the aim of a fairer distribution of the land was not to be achieved 
by that kind of law, which only favoured a privileged number of profiteers, usually 
involved in the crucial process of assigning the land allotments. That this would be the 
outcome of Rullus’ law is confirmed by some recent examples, among which Cicero 
chose Praeneste.139 According to his account, property concentration was made 
possible in the Sullan colonies by the unfair choices of the deductores, who assigned
137 Clauss 1977, 132-133; cf. the vehement and unpersuasive critique o f Coarelli 1987, 63-65, who 
claims that the local elite o f the early first century BC stopped using the necropolis and started to use 
monumental graves. Coarelli 1992, 259 appears to consider the disappearance o f  onomastic evidence 
from private inscriptions as a symptom o f  the rise o f  evergetism and the higher number o f  public 
inscriptions.
138 Harvey 1975, 48-49: the Dindii and the Magulnii certainly did.
139 Cic. leg. agr. 2.78: nam agrum quidem Campanum quem uobis ostentant ipsi concupierunt, deducent suos, quorum 
nomine ipsi teneant et fruantur, coement praeterecr, ista dena iugera continuabunt. nam si dicent per legem id non licere, ne 
per Comeliam quidem licet, at uidemus, ut longinqua mittamus, agrum Praenestinum a paucis possideri.
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land to people who would entrust the allotments to other people to administer on 
their behalf, although the lex Cornelia that dealt with the foundation of new colonies 
explicidy forbade the settlers to sell the lots they had been assigned.140 Praeneste was 
the first example at hand, for Cicero was speaking to a Roman audience about a bill 
that would affect Campania. His words, however, make it clear that this was definitely 
not an exception.
Two decades after the Sullan foundation, Cicero stated that the territory of 
Praeneste was controlled by a small group of families, who surely had both wealth and 
political influence. O f course it may be argued that Cicero deformed reality, possibly 
for rhetorical reasons, or just because o f ignorance. It is significant that, in this part of 
the speech, he did not attack Sulla or his projects. This should encourage to see this 
piece of information as reasonably accurate. However, the actual composition of this 
group of pauci remains unclear. P. Harvey is probably right in arguing that they 
included both successful colonists who had coped well with the demands of their new 
life and members of some Praenestan families that Sulla had spared from the 
massacre, such as the Saufeii or the Samiarii, who are known from late Republican 
inscriptions, but it is impossible to go further.141
The history of post-Sullan Praeneste sums up various aspects of Sulla’s 
policies in Italy, and is strongly related to the two most important initiatives that Sulla 
took in Italy: the proscriptions and the colonisation. The conquest of Praeneste was 
the moment that triggered these two parallel processes, and that best shows how 
deeply linked they were. In the next section I will try to show this relationship in more 
detail.
2.3. Sullan colonisation in Italy: back to the basics
Cicero’s passage prompts more general questions about the economic and 
social consequences of Sullan colonisation. To discuss them in more detail, it is now 
worth dealing with the evidence we have for the colonial foundations decided by Sulla
140 See Rathbone 2003,173.
141 Harvey 1975, esp. 49-56. On the Saufeii, see Coarelli 1992, 264-267; M. Torelli 1992, 280; Cebeillac- 
Gervasoni 1996, 64; S. Gatti 1996, 255-256; Zevi 1996b, 242-243, stressing their connections with the 
Marians. On the Samiarii, see Harvey 1975, 50, fn. 48; S. Gatti-Onorati 1992, 218.
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after the Civil War. Unfortunately, it is incomparably less rich and less detailed than 
that for the triumviral or Augustan colonial programme.142
Appian says that Sulla settled 120.000 veterans throughout Italy.143 It seems 
certain that they belonged to twenty-three legions, as the same source records, and 
they were assigned ‘a large amount of land in the territories of the cities, some of it 
being still undivided, and some of it being withdrawn from the cities as a 
punishment’.144 The sources of the land used for these assignments are clearly 
identified by Appian: the ager publicus and some of the ager of the cities that Sulla 
punished for their stance during the Civil War.145 It is quite safe to argue that Sulla 
used some of land belonging to the victims of the proscription, which he could 
dispose of in his capacity of dictator.146
It is significant that Appian does not explicidy mention the foundation of 
colonies. Since we know that Sulla created at least a dozen colonies, this passage could 
seem odd, or inaccurate. In fact, it simply provides an interpretation viewing the 
foundation o f the colonies as part of a wider process, whereby Sulla assigned land to 
his soldiers in many areas of Italy, not necessarily accompanying the assignment with
142 Keppie 1983, 49-86.
143 App. b. c. 1.104.489: ap<f>l 8e Tpy ’ I TaXtav 8ua>8eKa pupid8e9 av8pu)v fjaaiA On the reliability 
o f  the figure, see Krawczuk 1960, 53-56 and Keppie 1983, 39; the scepticism o f Hirschfeld 1913 is 
probably excessive (Krawczuk 1960, 54, fn. 14). Kromayer 1914, 160 reckons that 100.000 veterans 
were settled; Brunt 1971, 305 argues that they were 80.000. Chouquer 1987, 382 suggests that the Sullan 
land division covered between 100.000 and 300.000 iugera, but see Gabba 1989 (= Gabba 1994a, 197- 
201) on the unreliability o f this kind o f  estimates.
144 App. b. c. 1.100.470: t o  8’ airro Kal Trepi tt)v ’ iTaXtav emvotov TeXeai to  19 inrep eauToii 
CTTpaTeuaaiievoig Tpiai Kal eiKoaiv eTteveipev, 009 pot Trpoelpryrai, TToXXqu ev  Tai9 
TToXeai yf|u, tt)v pev c t l  ouaav dvepr|Tov, tt|u  8e Ta? TToXei? d(j>aipoupevos\ The figure of 
twenty-three legions is certainly more reliable than that o f forty-seven given in Liv. Per. 89.12: X L V II  
legiones in agros captos deducit et eos his diuisit. This X L V II  may well be a corruption o f XXIII: Krawczuk 
1960, 54-55; Harmand 1967, 445, fn. 43; 471-472, fn. 243. It is interesting however, that Livy’s 
emphasis is on the land assignments, rather than on the foundation o f  colonies. Brunt 1971, 305 
speculates that each legion was settled in a different colony, and that the Sullan colonies may actually be 
23 in total.
145 The exploitation o f  the ager publicus is denied in Rudolph 1935, 161, fn. 1, but there is no evidence 
supporting the claim: Krawczuk 1960, 56, fn. 26. Caesar’s claim in App. b. c. 2.94.395, where he blames 
Sulla for having supported his settlement programme only with the confiscations, is surely inaccurate.
146 Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.3.81: (Sulla) tantum animi habuit ad audaciam ut dicere in contione non dubitaret, bona ciuium 
Romanorum cum uenderet, sepraedam suam uendere. See Hinard 1985a, 189-191.
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the foundation of a colony. Moreover, all the known Sullan colonies, except Urbana in 
Campania and Aleria in Corsica, were founded on the territories of already existing 
communities. It is surely significant that Cicero once referred to the Sullan colonies 
with the verb constituent normally used for the municipia, instead of deducen.147
For the sake of clarity, I will organise the list of the communities affected by 
Sulla’s colonial programme in four categories.
A. Here follows a list of the certain Sullan colonies, in alphabetical order.148 
Aleria.
Corsica...abest a Cadis Colaterranis LX II, civitates habet X X X II et colonias 
Marianam, a C. Mario deductam, Aleriam, a dictaton Sulla (Plin. 3.80.).149 Nothing else is 
known about this community, certainly founded as a response to the Colonia Mariana, 
which, however, appears not to have been dismanded after the defeat of the populares. 
Arretium.
Cicero mentions settlers of the colonies of Arretium and Faesulae among the 
followers of Catiline in Mur. 49: Catilinam interea alacnm atque laetum, stipatum choro 
iuventutis, uallatum indicibus atque sicariis, inflatum cum spe militum <tum> conlegae mei, quem 
ad modum dicebat ipse, promissis, circumfluentem colonorum Arrelinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu; 
quam turbam dissimillimo ex genere distinguebant homines perculsi Sudani temporis calamitate. 
Apparently, the communities had different names too, as Pliny distinguishes three 
groups of Arretini (3.52): Arretini Uetens, Arretini Fidentions, Arretini luliensesF0 The 
coloni Fidentions are also attested by CIL 11.6675.
Capitolum.
lege Sullana est deductum (lib. col. 232.20). The verb deducen points to a colonial 
foundation. Nothing else is known about the history of this town in this period. 
Faesulae.
Along with Cic. Mur. 49, the presence of Sullan veterans is referred to by 
Licinianus (36.36-37): Faesulani irruperunt in castella ueteranorum Sullanorum.
147 Cic. Cat. 2.20: hi sunt homines ex eis coloniis quas Sulla constituit.
148 Cf. the lists in Mommsen 1883, 164-175 (= Mommsen 1908, 205-214); Gabba 1951, 270-272 (= 
Gabba 1973, 172-174); Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62); Krawczuk 1960, 57-62; Hinrichs 1974, 
67-68.
149 Cf. Sen. Helv. 7.9.
150 It is unclear why Beloch 1880, 5, 8 used the same passage as evidence for a Sullan colony at Cortona. 
Pliny simply mentions the Cortonenses in a list o f  the Etruscan communities that is opened by Arretium.
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Pompeii.
The foundation and the political life of the colony are dealt with in Cicero’s 
Pro Sulla (21; 60-62). The full name of the colony, Colonia Veneria Cornelia Pompeianorum 
is still attested epigraphically for the age of Nero and is to be explained by a Sullan 
foundation.151
Praeneste.
As seen above, in 63 Cicero called it a colony {Cat. 1.3.9), and implicitly 
referred to the presence of Sullan settlers in its territory iagr. 2.28.78). Also see CIL 
14.2978 and 2979; cf. Flor. 2.9.27 and Strabo 5.3.11 = C 239.
Suessula.
Suessula: oppidum: lege Sullana est deducta: ager eius veteranis limitibus Sullanis in 
iugeribus est adsignatus (lib. col 237.5). The use of the verb deducere suggests that the city 
was a colony. The presence of the duoviri seems to confirm it.152
Urbana.
Falemus ager a ponte Campano laeua petentibus Urbanam coloniam Sullanam nuper 
Capuae contributam (Plin. 14.6.62). A settlement created near Capua, just beyond the 
border of the ager Campanus}^
Vibinum.
A recently published inscription shows that the city had a colonial status 
between 195 and 197 AD, when it dedicated an inscription to Caracalla.154 It is 
significant that its official name contains no reference to Caesar, or to Augustus.155 It 
is quite likely that the colony was Sullan, and that it was created to ensure a better 
control of an area traditionally controlled by the Samnites.156 Unfortunately, no 
systematic archaeological investigation of the territory has ever been undertaken.
151 Abellinum had the same epithet, but there is no evidence that it was a Sullan colony: Chouquer 1987, 
168-169.
152 See CIL  10.3764 and 3765.
153 The contributio probably dates to the age o f  Vespasian, a phase o f  apparent demographic contraction 
for Urbana: see Laffi 1966, 106-109, with earlier bibliography. Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) 
argues, against the evidence, that Urbana ‘seems to have been founded on part o f  the territory o f  
Capua’.
l54s4E  1991, 518, with the full discussion in Pani 1991.
155 Pani 1991,128.
156 Pani 1988, 28, 44; Volpe 1990, 45; Pani 1991; Gabba 1996.
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Although it has long been considered a Sullan colony, Clusium must be 
excluded from the list. Pliny the Elder mentions the existence of Clusini novi and 
Clusini veteres (3.52), and this coexistence of two separate communities has been 
compared to the situation of Arretium, where a Sullan settlement is certain. Moreover, 
the importance of the city in the Civil War and its ties with the Marians are well- 
known.157 A dedication to Sulla Felix dictator has been seen as further evidence for the 
existence of a colony.158 However, a new survey of the epigraphy from Clusium has 
shown that all the inscriptions mentioning the quattuorviri appear to date back to the 
first century BC, whereas the duoviri are safely attested only in post-Augustan texts.157 
It is much safer, therefore, to rule out a Sullan foundation, as well as the coexistence 
of a Doppelgemeinde o f municipes and Sullan colonists, with two different magistracy 
systems. The Clusini noui mentioned by Pliny are probably Augustan veterans. During 
the First Civil War, Clusium was an important front for the military operations. After 
the conflict, the local aristocracy managed to build some connections with Sulla, and 
to avoid a heavy punishment.
B. For other communities there is some evidence that they had a colonial 
status in the period between Sulla and the triumviral foundations, although there is no 
explicit record of a Sullan colonisation.
Abella.
In 73 BC, the troops of Spartacus launch an attack in colonos Abellanos 
praesidentes agros suos (Sail. Hist. 3.97).160 Since we do not know of any earlier 
foundation, they are likely to have been Sullan settlers.161 It cannot be ruled out that it
157 On the importance o f  Clusium in the war, see App. b. c. 1.89.408 and 412; 1.92.425-426.
158 CIL  11.2102. See Fell 1924, 165-166; Harris 1971, 263; contra, Pfiffig 1965, 279-280; Pfiffig 1966, 61- 
62; Pfiffig 1979, 146-147. Luchi 1981, 419 speculates that the depopulation o f  the ager Clusinus was a 
consequence o f  the colonisation.
159 Pack-Paolucci 1987, 164-173, with A E  1987, 364; Mansuelli 1993 restates that the Clusini Novi were 
Sullan colonists, completely overlooking the inscriptional evidence. The city walls were renovated in the 
first century BC, but there is no evidence that this was related to a Sullan colonisation: Borghi 2002, 87- 
88. On the local aristocracy in the Hellenistic period, see Massa-Pairault 1990.
160 Cf. CIL  11.1210; CIL  10, p. 136.
161 D e N eeve 1984, 38, fn. 39, with earlier bibliography.
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was a foundation of the populares, but, in that case, it remains obscure why Sulla did 
not overthrow, as was the case at Capua.162
Interamna Praetuttiorum.
Apparently, the city received a settlement of Sullan colonists. There is good 
epigraphical evidence for the presence of duoviri from the first century BC, and 
Florus ranks the city among the florentissima municipia punished by Sulla (2.9.27).163 The 
inscriptional references to municipes et coloni (CIL 12.1904; CIL 9.5074 and 5075) are no 
evidence for the existence of a Doppelgemeinde of natives and Sullan veterans. They just 
have an ‘antiquarian’ meaning, and convey the memory of the foundation of the 
colony following the creation of the municipium}M
Nola.
muro ducta colonia Augusta. Vespasianus Aug. deduxit. iter populo debetur ped. CXX. 
ager eius limitibus Sudanis militi fuerat adsignatus, postea intercisiuis mensuris colonis et familiae est 
adiudicatus (lib. col. 236.4).165 The official name of the city under the Empire was Felix 
Augusta Nola (CIL 10.1244). Although it is unclear when the names were adopted, the 
stance taken by the city in the Civil War makes the foundation of a Sullan colony more 
likely than a simple distribution of land.166
Spoletium.
Nothing is known about this community, which opens Florus’s list (2.9.27): 
municipia Italiae splendidissima sub hasta venierunt, Spoletium, Interamnium, Praeneste, Florentia. 
As is the case with Florentia, the foundation of a colony cannot be excluded.
162 Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) fails to do that.
163 About the duovin, see CIL 12.3296 and 1905; CIL. 9.5067, 5074 and 5075, with Buonocore 1998, 
466-467.
164 Buonocore 1998, 466; cf. Keppie 1983, 103, fn. 13, suggesting that there was ‘some uncertainty over 
nomenclature and terminology in the opening years o f  the new settlement’. Contra, Rudolph 1935, 92, 
fn. 2; Gehrke 1983, 482-485. The colonisation appears to have led to the emergence o f  a wealthy local 
elite: Guidobaldi 2001, 89.
165 See Beloch 1879, 391; Gabba 1951, 236 (= Gabba 1973, 127); Hinrichs 1974, 73; Keppie 1983, 152; 
Campbell 2000, 422-423, fn. 132. A similar titulature, [Colonia Iul\ia Felix Aug[usta Capua], was used for 
Capua-. CIL, 10.3832. There is virtually no archaeological evidence for the period following the coming 
o f the Sullan settlers to Nola: Kirsten 1975, 611.
166 Cf. Chouquer 1987, 225-226, with earlier bibliography.
149
However, the lack of epigraphic evidence makes it safer to argue that only land 
assignments took place.167
C. Other cities were affected by Sullan vintane land assignments, without a 
colony being founded on their territories. Livy and Appian stress the close relation 
between the colonisation and the viritane assignments, and it appears that they both 
were dealt with by a general law.
Capua.
muro ducto colonia lulia Felix, iussu imperatoris Caesaris a uiginti uiris est deducta. iter 
populo debetur ped. C. ager eius lege Sullana fuerat adsignatus'. postea Caesar in iugeribus militi pro 
merito diuidi iussit {lib. col. 232.1).168 The epithet Julia Felix could have been given by 
Caesar, and it may be explained by the presence of Sullan land assignments, rather 
than with the foundation of a colony.169 
Forum Comelii.
In the Passio Sancti Cassiani Forocomeliensis, Prudentius says that the city was 
founded by Sulla (Peristephanon 9.1-2): Sylla Forum statuit Cornelius; hoc Itali urbemf uocant 
ab ipso conditoris nomine. Although this piece of information is unparalleled, there is 
reason to accept it, if cautiously, as Prudentius may have used a local tradition. There 
is no ground to argue that the settlement was a Sullan colony, but the foundation of 
the forum may have been accompanied by some land assignments.170 
Tusculum.
Tusculi oppidum muro ductum. iter populo non debetur. ager eius mensura Syllana est 
adsignatus {lib. col. 238.11). The northern part of the wall dates back to the early first 
century BC, and may well be Sullan.171
167 See however ILLRP 668, listing the ioudices o f  the colony, and mentioning a P. Claudius C. f. triibunus) 
who is explicidy said not to be a local. The same character was perhaps Iluir de senatus sententia at 
Paestum (CIL 10.480), and he may have been sent to Spoletium to supervise the land assignments: 
Wiseman 1971, 46.
168 Cf. lib. col. 232.3: Calatia. oppidum. muro ducta. iter populo debetur ped. LX. coloniae Capuensi a Sulla Felice 
cum territorio suo adiudicatum olim ob hosticampugnam. See Laffi 1966,100-101; Renda 2004, 416-423.
169 Contra, Chouquer 1987, 219-220, fn. 14.
170 The most reliable discussion is Geraci 2000, 58-65; cf. Susini 1957a, 101-102, 105-106. Brunt 1971, 
573 is more cautious: the area was inhabited from the first half o f  the second century BC, although 
there are no traces o f  urbanisation before the late Republic. For further speculation about possible 
Sullan interventions between Faventia and Ravenna, see Susini 1957b, 30-33.
171 Quilici-Quilici Gigli 1993, 258.
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Venusia.
Horace (Sat. 1.6.71-75) gave a famous portrait of the pueri magnis e centurionibus 
orti who used to attend the local school with him. E. Fraenkel revived Niebuhr’s 
fascinating theory that they were the children of Sullan veterans settled in the territory 
of the city.172 Venusia had been controlled by the Marians, and was reconquered by 
Metellus.173
Volaterrae.
The city was the last stronghold of the populares, and it was conquered only in 
79 BC (Licin. 36.8 Criniti). There is evidence that Sulla deprived its inhabitants of 
Roman citi2 enship and that he planned some land distributions in its territory, but that 
they were never carried out (Cic. A tt. 1.19.4: more infra).
Florentia is one of the florentissima municipia that, according to Florus (2.9.27), 
were affected by the Sullan setdements or land assignments. We lack any positive 
information about the history of this community until the Civil War between Caesar 
and Pompey. The foundation of Faesulae makes it less likely that a colony was 
founded at such a close distance, especially if the colonies are to be seen as settlements 
with a strategic function. Florus’ statement, however, is very explicit and cannot be 
lightly dismissed. The development and the misfortunes of the colony of Faesulae may 
also be related to the foundation of another colony, that o f Florentia, in the immediate 
neighbourhood. Again, the evidence for this problem is quite elusive. Florentia is one 
of the four municipia Italiae splendidissima that, according to Florus, paid a high toll in 
the Sulla assignments.174 The foundation of a Sullan colony has often been suggested, 
as a sort of anticipation of a triumviral, or Caesarian settlement, which, on the 
contrary, is safely attested. The only support for this argument has been found in the 
archaeological evidence. The remains of some private houses show a different 
orientation from that of the later colony. The aspect of the walls is compatible with a
172 Fraenkel 1957, 2-3, with earlier bibliography. Contra, Keaveney 1982b, 516; Volpe 1990, 45; Gualtieri 
2003, 88.
173 App. b. c. 1.52-53.229-231, with Gabba 1958,157-158.
174 I am not convinced by Keppie 1983, 175-176, arguing that Florus’ passage may contain an 
anachronism and refer to assignments o f  land that later became ager Florentinus.
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dating to the Sullan age, as well as the building technique used for the Capitolium.175 
None of these elements, however, is decisive.
The first to suggest that Florentia was a Sullan colony was Mommsen.176 His 
authority, however, cannot overshadow that Florus calls it a splendidissimum municipium. 
Such a definition would be justified only if a pre-existing community had been 
enfranchised after the Social War and later colonised by Sulla; moreover, the 
archaeological evidence does not suggest a great wealth. The strongest argument 
against Sullan colonisation, however, is that Florentia never appears in the ancient 
accounts of Catiline’s conspiracy, unlike Faesulae and Arretium.177 Although we do 
not know anything about the earlier history of the city, it seems quite gratuitous to 
suggest the existence of a Sullan colony, and there is no ground to say that any land 
assignment was carried out in its territory. Hence, until new epigraphic or 
archaeological evidence emerges, Florentia may not be included in a list o f the Sullan 
colonies.
D. The correct interpretation of other passages of the Liber coloniamm, which 
Mommsen used as evidence for more possible Sullan colonies, is more doubtful. 
Seemingly, they all refer to the construction of walls around some small centres of 
Latium.
Aricia.
oppidum: lege Sullana est munita. iter populo non debetur. ager eius in praecisuris est 
adsignatus {lib. col. 230.1). It was a municipium in the age of the Second Civil War: Cic. 
Phil. 3.6.15.
Bobillae.
175 Degrassi 1949, 293-294 (— Degrassi 1962, 114). On the Capitolium, see Cagiano de Azevedo 1940, 
28-30 (the dating o f  the Capitolium o f  Faesulae is more controversial: 30).
176 See Mommsen 1883, 176 (= Mommsen 1908, 218); accepted by Degrassi 1949, 293-294, esp. fn. 103 
(= Degrassi 1962, 114); Gabba 1970/1971, 460-461 (= Gabba 1973, 362); Keaveney 1982b, 524-525. 
Beloch 1926, 511-512 argues that the veterans settled in the territory o f  Faesulae founded a colony on 
the site o f  Florentia.
177 Excellent discussion in Harris 1971, 261, 342-343. Hardie 1965 makes the case for a Caesarian 
foundation; also see Pfiffig 1966, 72.
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oppidum: lege Sullana est circum ducta. Iterpopulo non debetur. Agrum eius ex occupatione 
milites veterani tenuerunt in sorte {lib. col. 231.11). Municipium with quattuorvirate: see CIL 
6.1851 and 14.2413.178
Castrimoenium.
oppidum: lege Sullana est munitum. iter populo non debetur. ager eius ex occupatione 
tenebatur. postea Nero Caesar tribunis et militibus eum adsignauit {lib. col. 233.3). Municipium 
with quattuorvirate: CIL 14.2454.179
Gauis.
oppidum lege Sullana munitum. ager eius militi ex occupatione censitus est. iter populo non 
debetur {lib. col. 234.15). Definitely a municipium'. CIL. 14.2799; 2802; 2807.180
It is likely that the aim of this lex Sullana was not just to allow some towns to 
build fortifications. O f couse, the mention of walls is quite significant in itself, as the 
creation o f proper defensive structures fits well in the phase of extraordinary building 
activities and urbanistic renewal that took place in Italy throughout the last century of 
the Republic, and which was one of the trademarks of this period.181 In this specific 
case, the new walls may be viewed as evidence for the transformation of these 
communities into municipia, as part of the reorganisation of the administrative 
structure of the ager Komanus, which Sulla may have started and which would not to be 
accomplished until the age of Augustus.182 Suggesting viritane assignments, 
complemented by the construction of some fortifications, seems however a more 
economical hypothesis.183 Moreover, recent archaeological research has unveiled the 
traces of a centuriation that may be dated to the age of Sulla.184 At any rate, the 
evidence for the municipal status of some of these communities in the first century
178 Beloch 1926, 504.
179 Beloch 1926, 504. N ote the term occupatio, which is usually related to a military conquest: Chouquer 
1987, 94, fn. 10.
180 Beloch 1926, 501.
181 On this process, see esp. Gabba 1972a, 84-106 (= Gabba 1994a, 74-96); Gabba 1976a (= Gabba 
1994a, 105-117); Gros 1990, 831-843; Cornell 1995; Lomas 1997; Lomas 2003, 28-33.
182 See Laffi 1973, 43-44 (= Laffi 2001,121-122); Sherwin-White 1973, 166; Dahlheim 1993, 114. There 
is no ground to argue, with Hinrichs 1974, 68, 74-75, that the Sullan intervention in these communities 
was related to the proscriptions, and not to the colonisation.
183 Keaveney 1982b, 527; Campbell 2000, 414, fn. 92, stressing the use o f  deducere.
184 Chouquer 1987, 87, 92-94, 286.
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BC disqualifies these passages as further evidence for the foundation of new 
colonies.185
The safely attested setdements, on the contrary, are mosdy concentrated in 
Campania and in Etruria, and the impression that Sulla’s efforts were purposefully 
focused on these very areas is no doubt correct. The impact of Sullan colonisation on 
the two regions, however, was quite different.
2.4. Pompeii and Campania felix
On the whole, littie is known about the internal life of the colonies founded by 
Sulla. The evidence is quite sparse and often unhelpful. There is, however, the notable 
exception of Pompeii, which inevitably plays a central role in most discussions of 
Sullan colonisation. In this respect, the present one can hardly be an exception.
Sulla conquered the city during the Social War, and the role of this community 
in the Civil War is unclear. The foundation of a colony, however, suggests a Marian 
allegiance. Pompeii had a considerable Oscan cultural and linguistic background, and 
the extension of Roman citi2 enship did not revolution its identity in less than a 
decade’s time. However, not a single Oscan public inscription is known for the period 
following the colonial foundation. It is likely that the presence of the veterans 
generated tensions with the native community. This safe guess has sometimes led to 
unilateral interpretations of the archaeological evidence.
It is now widely assumed that the veterans prevalently found their home in the 
ager of Pompeii, outside the walls, in the fertile land between the city and the 
Vesuvius.186 In some cases, they settled in new farms, built after the foundation of the 
colony and the new subdivision of the territory. In some other cases, they occupied 
old Oscan properties, promoting drastic refurbishements that obliterated the traces of 
earlier architectural styles. The clearest remains of these setdements have been 
identified in the area near the Porta Ercolano and the Via dei Sepolcri, and their most 
prominent example is the famous Villa dei Misteri.187
185 Cf. however Keppie 1983, 8-12, rightly stressing that the liber is often unreliable, as far as the status 
distinction between municipium and colonia is concerned.
186 Zevi 1996a, 126-136, largely basing the argument on Mingazzini 1949; Zevi 1995, 21; Lo Cascio 
1996,120-121.
187 On the chronology o f  the Villa, see Maiuri 1967, 44-45 and Johannowsky 1976, 283; for an historical 
contextualisation, see Zevi 1996a, 134-135.
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According to this model, therefore, the veterans setded in a remunerative part 
of the city territory. It is striking that they hardly managed to make their way into the 
core of Pompeii, within the walls. Conversely, the native Pompeiani settled within the 
city walls, and reasserted their identity by imposing some clearly Sammtic features to 
their residences. Many Pompeian houses preserved Sammte features, both structural 
and decorative ones, long into the Roman period: the most prominent example of this 
is the so-called Casa del Fauno.188 These architectural choices have therefore been 
viewed as symptoms of a broader political and social process.
The case for this interpretation is not very strong. Overall, the evidence is 
quite fragmentary, and the scenario of a forced inurbation of the Pompeiani does not 
seem realistic.189 It is inaccurate, at any rate, to argue that the colonisation had an 
impact only on the ager. Even if we accept that most of the veterans settled in the 
outskirts o f Pompeii, it is undeniable that their arrival prompted some major 
interventions in the monumental aspect of the town.190 Some public buildings were 
renewed, of course in a recognisably Roman style. The temple in the Forum was 
redesigned and dedicated to Jupiter.191 The Apollo temple was partly refurbished too, 
as demonstrated by an inscription recording the names of the quattuorviri who 
supervised the work, all definitely Roman.192 A new temple was dedicated to Venus, at 
some point after the foundation of the colony, possibly on the very site of an earlier
188 Zevi 1996a, 132-134. The Casa del Fauno is probably the most prominent example o f  the 
persistence o f  Sammtic elements in the Pompeian architecture, which remained virtually intact down to 
the eruption o f  A D 79: see Zevi 1998, esp. 62-65 for its broader historical meaning (63: ‘der Wohnsitz 
eines groBen Verlierers, das Symbol einer Niederlage’) and Zevi 2000, esp. 126-127.
189 Good discussion in Savino 1998, 458-459. It is likely that some o f  the natives rented land allotments 
assigned to the veterans: ibid., 454.
190 For an overview, see Gros 1978, 74-77; Zanker 1988,18-25; Laurence 1994, 23-26.
191 Cagiano D e Azevedo 1940, 19-21.
192 CIL  10.800: M. Porcius M. f ,  L  Sextilius L  f ,  Cn. Cornelius Cn. f ,  A . Cornelius A . f ,  IIIIuir(i), d(e) 
d(ecurionum) s(ententia)f(aciundum) locar(unt). The quattuorviri also feature in CIL, 10.938: (...) Cuspius, M. 
Loreius, L  Septumius, D. Claudius. Pompeii was however ruled by the duouiri, supported by two aediles-. 
Sartori 1953, 73. The hypothesis o f  two couples o f  duouiri collectively called quattuoruiri dates back to 
Mommsen, CIL  10, p. 93; see Chiavia 2002, 101-102, slimming up earlier bibliography. Any link 
between the quattuorviral system and the pre-Roman one is convincingly ruled out by Letta 1979, 74- 
75. On the public works at Pompeii in this period, see Zevi 1996a, 126-128 (with further bibliography).
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temple of the Oscan goddess Mefitis.193 The cult of the so-called Italic Venus, the 
Venus Fisica, was of course already established at Pompeii. The coming of the veterans 
may have encouraged it even more, especially since Sulla had made such a heavy use 
of his association with Venus in the Mithridatic campaign.194 In Italy he referred to 
Venus less extensively, although the goddess is portrayed on a coin issue (RRC 359) 
that was struck at the beginning of the Civil War and widely circulated in Southern 
Italy.195
The monumental landscape of post-Sullan Pompeii inevitably poses the 
problem of the coexistence of two different communities in the aftermath of the 
foundation. The colonists asserted their presence by renewing old public spaces and 
by creating new ones, which were usually juxtaposed to the existing structures, and 
imposed themselves with their si2 e. The gemination of several public spaces is a 
curious trademark of Pompeii in this period, and it is tempting to explain it with the 
presence o f two genera ciuium. The so-called Terme Stabiane were refurbished in the 
early Sixties by magistrates whose names suggest a local origin, while new baths were 
built in the Forum soon after the foundation of the colony.196 A new, smaller theatre 
(theatrum tectum) was built by the colonists next to the great theatre that already existed 
in the area near the Porta di Stabia.197 The difference in size has been explained by 
postulating that the newcomers were less numerous than the natives. This is certainly 
true, but it reveals nothing about the actual function of the building.198 It is just
193 Coarelli 2002b, 86 suggests that the Venus cult replaced that o f  Apollo. The temple is currently 
being excavated by a mission o f  the Universita della Lucania, directed by E. Curti.
194 In the inscriptions the goddess is often called Venus Fisica. The epithet may have an Oscan origin, 
and it is surely related to the Latin fider. Sogliano 1931/1932; Coarelli 2002b, 88-89. On the relations 
between the Oscan and the Roman Venus, see Lejeune 1964.
19:5 On RRC 359, see the more detailed discussion in the next chapter. Cf. Marx 1890, 122-123; Marx 
1899, 544-545; Pais 1910 (= Pais 1918, 227-251); Lanzani 1927, 46-50, all failing , to a different extent, 
to draw a proper distinction between the Italian and the Eastern contexts o f the Venus cult. Zevi 1996a, 
128-129 is more balanced, although I do not believe that such thing like a ‘divimta ‘personale’ del 
dittatore’ ever existed.
196 On the refurbishment o f  the Terme Stabiane by the duoviri C. Vulius and P. Aninius see CIL 
10.829; on those o f  the Forum, see CIL  10.819. For a global discussion, see Zevi 1996a, 129-130.
197 About the great theatre, see Tosi 2003, 164-166; about the new theatre, improperly called Odeion, see 
Tosi 2003,166-167.
198 The figure o f  4.000/5.000 settlers suggested by Lepore 1950, 150-151 and accepted by Jongman 
1988, 144 is highly conjectural: it derives from the assumption that the 47.000 veterans settled by Sulla
156
conjectural to argue that it served as a gathering place in the early phase of the 
settlement. Moreover, even the total number of the colonists remains unknown.1})
We are on a somewhat safer ground when we turn to the institutional and 
political life of the city. The foundation of the colony was carried out by a collegium of 
three deductores, among whom there was P. Sulla, the nephew of the dictator, whose 
heavy involvement in Pompeian affairs down to the Sixties neatly emerges from the 
speech Cicero gave in his defence in 62 BC.200 Details on the institutional life of the 
city in the later period are known to us only from the epigraphic evidence, where 
Oscan disappears from all public inscriptions since the foundation of the colony. 
Information can be gleaned from the electoral programmata painted or scratched on the 
walls of the city, and the record of the interventions of city magistrates or patrons is 
even more interesting. The construction of the smaller theatre was directly supervised 
by two local magistrates with recognisably Latin names: C(aius) Quinctius C(ai) f(iliusj 
Valg(us) /  M(arcus) Porcius M(arci) f(ilius) /  duouir(i) dec(urionum) decr(eto) /  theatrum tectum /  
fac(iundum) locar(unt) eidemq(ue) prob(arunt)?(n The value of the inscriptions mentioning 
Porcius and Valgus goes beyond the record of their magistracy. It also sheds light on 
the completion of an important public work like the theatre of the colony and on the 
construction of a new roof for it.202 Along with the amphitheatre of Telesia, the little 
theatre of Pompeii is the most important monument built in Campania during the 
Sullan age.203 Its typically Roman design and the emphasis placed by the dedicatory 
inscription on the function of the building make its political significance quite explicit.
in Campania were equally divided among ten colonies. The latter figure is suggested from a 
questionable interpretation o f  Liv. Per. 89.11-12: Sulla Nolam in Samnio recepit. X L V II legiones in agros 
captos deduxit et eos his diuisit, with X L V II legiones meaning ‘47.000 legionaries’. Savino 1998, 440-453 
argues, on more solid statistic grounds, that the colonists were 1.500-2.000, and that they were assigned 
about ten iugera o f  land each; Coarelli 2000,109 suggests a slightly higher figure, 2.000-2.500.
199 On the theatrum tectum, see Zanker 1988, 19; Gros 1990, 837; Zevi 1995, 1-10; Zevi 1996a, 130-131; 
Tosi 2003, 169-171. Johannowsky 1976, 272 stresses its strong structural similarities with the Hellenistic 
bouleuteria.
200 On P. Sulla, see Miinzer 1900: his exact kinship relationship with the dictator has been proved by 
Reams 1986/1987 and Berry 1996, 320-321. On the case discussed by Cicero, see David 1992, 77-78, 
131-133, 785-786; Berry 1996,14-42.
2,11 CIL  10.844.
202 Castren 1975, 88-91; Scuderi 1989,126-127.
203 On the amphitheatre o f  Telesia, see Quilici 1966, 99-100; Tosi 2003, 303.
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Both the magistrates that promoted its construction played a prominent role in 
the early history of the Sullan Pompeii. M. Porcius, a member of the quattuorviral 
collegium in charge of the refurbishment of the Apollo temple (CIL, 10.800, see above), 
is one of the duouiri in the inscription of the new theatre.204 His colleague is no obscure 
figure either: the well-known C. Quinctius Valgus, the associate of Sulla who financed 
the reconstruction of the walls at Aeclanum and became a patron of the city.205 The 
magistracy he held in Pompeii shows that he was, or rather became, a citizen of the 
Sullan colony.206 Valgus probably served in the Sullan army during the Civil War, and 
possibly even in the East. When the war was over, he became direcdy involved in the 
political life of several Campanian communities, although there is no evidence that he 
was originally from this region.207
Valgus and Porcius also carried out the construction of the amphitheatre in 
the southwestern part of the city, capable of hosting about 20.000 people.208 It is the 
first public work that was realised for the sake of the whole body of citizens since the 
foundation o f the colony — i.e., without a ‘twin amphitheatre’ being built in town. 
Again, an inscription acknowledges Valgus and Porcius’ role in the enterprise (CIL 
10.852): C. Quinctius C. f. Valgus /  M. Porcius M. f. duouir(i) /  quinq(uennales) coloniai 
honoris /  caussa spectacula de sua /  peq(unia) fac(iunda) coer(auerunt) et coloneis /  locum in 
perpetuom deder(unt). As argued by Zevi, the mention of the coloni is not a reference to 
the Sullan veterans, but to the whole community, where any official distinction 
between old and new inhabitants is elided.209 The full name of the colony, Colonia
204 He had built his wealth on the wine trade with Gallia Narbonensis, as is shown by the discovery o f a 
series o f  amphorae with his name stamped on them: Castren 1975, 89 (summing up earlier bibliography 
at fn. 2). It is impossible to prove that he profited from the Sullan confiscations.
205 The evidence on this character is gathered and convincingly discussed in Harvey 1973, esp. 80-84; 
also cf. Wiseman 1971, 46.
206 Valgus is mentioned as duouir quinquennalis in an inscription from Frigento (/ULRP 598: it is unclear 
what community it refers to), again as the promoter o f  major public works: C. Quinctius C.f. Valgus /  L. 
Sepunius V f. quinq(ue)n(nales) /  murum, portas, forum, porticus, curia(m) /  cistema(m) /  de d(ecurionumj s(ententia) 
facie(ndum) curar(unt) /  eid(emque) prob(arunt). He probably renounced to the citizenship o f his former 
community to join the new colony o f  Pompeii.
207 Harvey 1973, 90.
208 See Tosi 2003,162-164 and 171-173.
209 Zevi 1996a, 131-132. They were the first quinquennales o f  the colony: Castren 1975, 90. It is surely 
excessive to argue that the integration did not take place before the census o f  70 BC, like Zevi 1996a,
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Cornelia Veneria Pompeianorum, known from later inscriptions, accurately represents its 
composition.210 Cornelia explicitly refers to Sulla and his gens', Veneria pays tribute to the 
cult and patronage of Venus, a goddess traditionally worshipped in the Italian world, 
supposed ancestor of the Romans, and such an important presence in Sulla’s Eastern 
campaigns; Pompeianorum does justice to the role of the indigenous Oscan community.
The situation, however, was not necessarily peaceful. Cicero’s pro Sulla sheds 
some light on the problems posed by the coexistence of the former occupiers of the 
city and the new setders into the same institutional framework. The speech was given 
in defence of Publius Sulla, a relative and associate of the dictator, who, after a 
remarkable political career, which led him to the election to the consulship for 65 BC, 
was charged of having taken part in the conspiracy of Catiline. With his outstanding 
record in its repression, Cicero took Sulla’s case and pleaded for his acquittal. P. Sulla 
had been one of deductores of the colony of Pompeii, and that this enabled him to be 
among its patrons, to whom the resolution of disputes between the colonists and the 
earlier inhabitants was entrusted.211 This was relevant to the trial, because Sulla was 
accused of having tried to summon the natives to revolt by enhancing the conflict 
with the colonists, and with the ultimate purpose of taking hold of the city and use it 
as a stronghold in the Civil War. In order to show that P. Sulla was still trusted by the 
whole city body, Cicero brought to court a delegation including both old and new 
inhabitants.212
In Cicero’s words, the conflict between the natives and the new settlers had 
become a chronic problem (inueterassei). The patrons were asked to intervene only 
‘many years’ after the dispute had started. An exact chronology is not possible, 
although it seems safe to date the intervention of the patrons to the years which 
immediately preceded the conspiracy, i.e. 65/64 BC. If Cicero is accurate, the 
controversy at Pompeii may have started immediately after the foundation of the
132. On the possible effects o f  this lectio and its relationship with the emergence o f the quinquennales, see 
Castren 1975, 90-91; Castren 1976, 359; Gehrke 1983, 488-489.
210 CIL  4.CXLIII; cf. C IL  4.CXXXVIII, CXXXIX, CXLI, CXLII, CXLIII, CXLV, CXLII, CXLVIII, 
CIL  10.787 (all mentioning a Colonia Veneria Comelid). See Weber 1975,180-181.
211 Cic. Sull. 21.60-62.
212 Cic. Sull. 21.61.
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unified colony.213 Cicero sums up the issues at stake with a formula that has long been 
discussed: de ambulatione et de suffragiis.214 The reference to the suffragia is quite 
straightforward. Dissent involved the voting procedures and, most probably, the 
electoral weight of the two genera ciuium. Even after the ‘reconciliation’ with the 
natives, the colonists must have kept a dominant position thanks to a favourable 
organisation of the electoral districts. If it is true that their settlement was 
concentrated in the ager, this area may have had more weight than the area within the 
city walls, where the Pompeians are supposed to have kept their residence. However, 
until our knowledge of Pompeian topography improves substantially, all attempts to 
give a more precise account of this supremacy are bound to remain speculative.215
The meaning of ambulatio, moreover, is still unclear. It is not unlikely that the 
text is corrupt, and that it should in fact be emended as ambitio, meaning ‘electoral 
campaign’.216 The Sullan veterans may have profited an advantageous subdivision of 
the electoral constituencies, which gave more weight to the districts where they settled 
as opposed to those inhabited by the natives. Colonists, moreover, may have enjoyed 
more favourable rules for managing the campaign, such as better spaces to advertise 
their candidates, or more resources to invest in the competition.
Cicero’s testimony is probably unreliable in an important respect, i.e. the actual 
success of the intermediation of the patrons. Since Sulla is accused of having had a 
strong bias for the Pompeiani, it is in Cicero’s interest to depict his intervention as a 
fair one, having the only aim of reconciling the whole community. The presence of 
groups of Pompeians and Sullan veterans at the trial, supporting P. Sulla’s case, can 
hardly be used as solid evidence. It is Cicero himself who refers to them, surely with 
some exaggeration.
213 See Gehrke 1983, 485-487; Lo Cascio 1996, 117-121. However, Andreau 1973, 226-231 must be 
mentioned as a salutary reaction to the interpretations that denied the existence o f political and social 
tensions in Pompeian society.
214 Bibliography in Berry 1996, 254-256 and Chiavia 2002,105-106.
215 There is some guesswork on the boundaries o f  the electoral constituencies in Coarelli 2000, 97-110.
216 See Lo Cascio 1996, 117-118, with earlier bibliography; cf. Savino 1998, 457-460. I am not 
convinced by Wiseman 1977 and Laurence 1994, 23 (cautiously accepted by Berry 1996, 255-256), who 
argue that the passage refers to some prohibition for the indigenous population to walk in certain 
designated areas, called ambulationesr. if  this is the case, why does Cicero mention it even before the 
suffragia? Coarelli 2000, 98-99 reads de ambulatione et de suffragiis as a hendiadys (‘an ambulatio that 
determines the suffragid) and relates it to the structure o f  the saepta discovered near the forum, but the 
evidence is inconclusive. For further bibliography, see Chiavia 2002,105-112.
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The actual proportions of natives and colonists in the Pompeian Fasti may 
then be figured out from the epigraphic evidence, i. e. from the inscriptions 
mentioning city magistrates, and from the electoral inscriptions, the so-called 
pmgrammata. A great amount of scholarship has been produced on this front, and a 
general conclusion has been safely drawn. The rich evidence available for the city 
magistracies until the age of Augustus shows a rapid disappearance of the natives from 
the Fasti o f the colony in favour of the new setders.217 Even if one assumes that the 
intervention of the patrons had some actual impact on the political life of the city, it 
still does not appear to have brought about a fair distribution of the suffragia.
The onomastic evidence for the city magistrates gathered by P. Castren shows 
that for at least three decades the Sullan veterans and their descendants had a clear 
supremacy. It is equally well-established that the re-emergence of the natives as an 
influential part of the populus Pompeianus, capable of making its way into the ordo of the 
city, did not start before 50-40 BC.218 The increasing influence of the natives can best 
be explained by some improvement of their financial condition, which is however 
difficult to contextualise in the aftermath of the Sullan confiscations.219 Even the 
extent o f the confiscation of private properties is unknown, as well as the number of 
the Sullan colonists who moved to Pompeii.220 It cannot be ruled out that some of the 
veterans setded on land allotments that belonged to the city, and not to private 
citizens. If this was the case, the impact of the confiscations on the local owners may 
have been less devastating than has been thought and the subordination of the natives 
mainly a political, rather than an economic problem. The possibility that the 
Pompeiani could have profited from the possession of parts of the ager publicus, or 
their involvement in the increasing fortunes of the port of Puteoli are not to be 
excluded too.
The organisation of the city territory might reveal something about the impact 
of the Sullan setdement on Pompeii. It seems likely that the town area was divided 
into four or five electoral districts, probably called viciff In a context that is uncertain
217 Castren 1975, 92. Mountsen 1988, 87-88 finds the onomastic evidence indecisive.
218 Castren 1975, 92-98.
219 Andreau 1980, 194-196, challenging the established opinion that Sullan colonisation had not any 
lasting effect on Pompeii’s social and economic structures: see e.g. Gordon 1927; Day 1932, 187-199; 
Lepore 1950,151-156.
220 A survey o f  the necropoleis, for instance, has been inconclusive: see Kockel 1987, esp. 195.
221 Cf. CIL 4.60. See Castren 1975, 79-82; Jongman 1988, 308; Lo Cascio 1996,120.
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in so many respects, it seems at least sure that the pagus Felix suburbanus, known from 
the inscriptional evidence, was related to the Sullan settlement. It was governed by a 
collegium of magistri, it had some financial autonomy, and it also contributed to the 
refurbishment of the amphitheatre.222 In the Augustan age it was renamed as pagus 
Augustus Felix suburbanus. This change of its official denomination is probably to be 
explained by the coming of more veterans.223
However, some decades after the colonisation a gradual integration between 
the community of the colonists and that of the natives took place. A number of 
developments must have contributed to making this possible. The reappearance of 
Oscan names among the local magistrates is chiefly due to wider economic and social 
change, and the impact of intermarriage cannot be completely overlooked either. The 
creation of kinship relations between families of different origin and status may well 
have been accompanied by the transferral of properties from the new landowners to 
the old ones, and may have also encouraged mobility. Descendants of the Sullan 
settlers still were in the ordo decurionum in the Augustan age.224
The wealth of Pompeii and the involvement of some of its citizens in overseas 
trade in the first half of the first century BC may perhaps be explained in the light of 
the crisis which the port of Naples seems to have gone through, along with the rest of 
the city, after the conquest of Sulla.225 In fact, however, litde is known about Pompeii’s 
strategic function in this part of Campania. It is also doubtful whether it is a 
representative example of the Sullan colonies founded in the region. A clue may be 
obtained by devoting some attention to Sulla’s choice to retire in Campania after 
resigning from dictatorship in 79 BC. He certainly enjoyed spending time in the 
region, and a passage of Cicero portrays him walking in the streets of Naples dressed
222 CIL 10.814 and 853. There is no evidence that it had an electoral function: Coarelli 2000,108.
223 They certainly setded in Pompeii by 7 BC, when the ministri pagi Augusti Felicis suburbani are attested 
(CIL 10.924): see Lo Cascio 1996, 120, fn. 39. The reconstruction proposed in Gatti 1974/1975, 174- 
178 is untenable.
224 Castren 1975, 97-98, 231, 235; Andreau 1980,196.
225 See App. b. c. 1.89.411; cf. Strab. 5.4.9 =  C 249. Appian speaks o f  a massacre o f the inhabitants, not 
o f a sack, whereas Strabo records just the loss o f  Pithecussae. The discussion o f  the impact o f  Sulla’s 
conquest on the economy o f  Naples in Lepore 1952, 317-319, 326 and Lepore undated, 279-288 is 
therefore unsupported by the evidence. Cf. Buchner 1948, 48, 63; Pugliese Carratelli 1952, 266-267. For 
a more cautious approach, see Lomas 1993, 95 and Leiwo 1995, 25-27, 166-167: the demographic 
impact o f  the Sullan attack remains unclear.
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in Greek fashion.226 His decision, however, was not determined only by the charm of 
the Campanian coastal environment, already quite popular among earlier generations 
of Roman aristocrats. The presence of a considerable number of Sullan colonies and 
land allotments possessed by the Sullan veterans in the area may suggest a different 
explanation.227
It is significant that a string of Sullan settlements can be identified between 
Urbana, Pompeii, Nola, Abella and Suessula.228 The evidence is quite unsatisfactory, 
but such a high concentration o f settlements was almost certainly unparalleled in 
Italy.229 When he chose the resort where he would spend his last years, Sulla surely 
took into account the presence of thousands of loyal soldiers. Although no one dared 
to ask him to give account of his misdeeds, after his resignation from dictatorship, the 
political situation in Rome was far from stable when Sulla left, as the attempt of 
Lepidus made clear only a year later.230 The winner of the Civil War still needed 
protection and armed support, even some years after his victory and in the declining 
phase of his life, possibly affected by a life-threatening disease, which might have been 
the crucial factor in his decision to leave power.
The exact location of the buen retiro of the former dictator is not precisely 
known. The territory of Cuma is the likeliest candidate: Appian speaks of a move €£
226 Cic. Rab. post. 10.26-27: deliciamm causa et uoluptatis non modo dues Romanos, sed et nobilis adulescentis, sed 
quosdam etiam senatores, summo loco natos, non in hortis et suburbanis suis, sed Neapoli, in celeberrimo oppido + 
maedapella saepe uideri + *** chlamydatum ilium L. Sullam imperatorem. Sulla’s presence at Neapolis is beyond 
doubt: D ’Arms 2003, 47. On the function o f  the city as a sea resort and a cultural centre in the late 
Republic, see D ’Arms 2003, 49-68 (also dealing with the immediate neighbourhood o f  the city); Leiwo 
1995, 27-30, 33-41.
227 See D ’Arms 2003, 44-47. It is inaccurate, however, to claim that ‘Sulla could scarcely have retired 
anywhere [in Central or Southern Italy] without having some o f  his former soldiers in setdements 
nearby’ (ibid., 45).
228 On the strategic function o f  Urbana, see Laffi 1966, 101-102. I see no reason to claim that 
Surrentum was a Sullan colony, as argued in Beloch 1879, 254.
229 The arguments used by Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) to downplay the importance o f Sullan 
colonisation in Campania are unconvincing. The claim that ‘most o f  the setdements were in the north, 
especially in Etruna’ (Badian 1958, 246) is even less acceptable. However, Badian is right in saying that 
Campania was not as consistendy loyal to the populares as Etruria was.
230 On Sulla’s resignation, see Plut. Sull. 34.6; App. b. c. 1.103.480-484; Oros. 5.22.1; vir. ill. 75.12. Lafon 
2001, 133 righdy remarks that the relatively short distance between Campania and Rome must have 
influenced Sulla’s decisions. On Lepidus’ initiatives after Sulla’s death, see App. b.c. 1.107; Licin. 36.33- 
45 Criniti; Flor. 2.11; Oros. 5.22.16-18.
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K6|ir|V', and an interesting passage of a letter of Cicero, sent from his estate called 
Cumanum, refers to his encounter with Faustus Sulla, the son of the dictator.231 In 55 
BC, the two Roman gentlemen, who happened to be neighbours, met on various 
occasions, and Cicero had the opportunity to browse through the magnificent 
collection of books of his friend, which no doubt owed something to Sulla’s 
depredations in the Greek East.232 The villa of Cicero was in the eastern part of the 
territory of Cuma and at a short distance from the harbour of Puteoli, in the 
immediate vicinity of the boundary between the two cities. It is likely that Sulla’s villa 
was in a similar position.233 An alternative hypothesis has been suggested, which views 
Puteoli as the place of Sulla’s exile and is supported by Valerius Maximus and the de 
uiris illustribus liber, ultimately deriving from Livy.234
Confusion on this matter was surely generated by an incident that immediately 
preceded the death of the former dictator, and shows that his political influence was 
not over even in his last days.235 The community o f Puteoli was going serious tensions: 
the princeps coloniae Granius was having a dispute with the ordo decurionum and refused to 
pay the money that the council had already offered for the refurbishment of the 
Capitolium. According to Valerius Maximus, Sulla went to Puteoli and censored 
Granius’ behaviour so furiously that anger caused him an apoplectic stroke, and led 
him to death.236 The position of Granius is made even clearer by Plutarch, who states
231 Cic. A tt. 4.10.1 {ego hiepascor bibliotheca Fausti). Cf. Flor. 2.11; Oros. 5.22.16-18.
232 On Faustus Sulla’s wealth, see Shatzman 1975, 336-337, no. 133. On his political positions, all but 
easy to define, see the interesting (although speculative at times) remarks in B. A. Marshall 1984. 
Besides being a good friend o f  Faustus Sulla, Cicero owned a villa that had belonged to the dictator 
himself, in the territory o f  Tusculum: Plin. 22.12 (= HRR2 10 = Chassignet 10).
233 The discussion in D ’Arms 2003, 42-44 (with fn. 53) is entirely convincing, except for one detail: I see 
no reason to question the accuracy o f  Cicero’s terminology here, and to keep considering Puteoli an 
option. Also cf. Lafon 2001, 191-192, comparing Sulla’s buen retiro with that o f Scipio Africanus at 
Liternum, and stressing that his choice was a model for future generations o f  the Roman nobility; a 
different view in D ’Arms 2003, 44. Granius was surely related in some way to the two Granii declared 
hostes publici in 88 BC (App. b. c. 1.60.271); two Granii are known to have been Caesarian (Plut. Caes. 
16.8; Caes. b. c. 3.71.1). However, Sulla would have hardly tolerated a ‘notoriously Marian’ city 
magistrate at Puteoli, pace Syme 1939a, 90. Also see Camodeca 1982,128.
234 Val. Max. 9.3.8; vir. ill. 75.12. See Angeli Bertinelli 1997, 414.
235 Keaveney 1982a, 204-213.
236 Val. Max. 9.3.8. Granius was related the Granius mentioned in the lex Puteolana. Cebeillac-Gervasoni 
1996,13. He certainly was a duouir. Sartori 1953, 64; Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1996, 33-34.
164
that the city magistrate did not intend to use the money already paid by his fellow 
citizens, as he knew that Sulla’s death was imminent.237 According to this version, 
Granius was summoned to the residence of Sulla and strangled by the slaves of the 
former dictator, who then had a fatal crisis soon after the murder.
In Plutarch’s account the role o f Sulla emerges as something much more 
conspicuous than that of the hysterical former-warlord who responds to the challenge 
of a local notable. Ten days before his death, according to his version, Sulla put an end 
to the stasis which was tearing apart the Puteolan community by drafting a new 
constitution, and promoting reconciliation among the citizens.238 Plutarch’s text 
should be taken litterally: Sulla intervened to stop the civil strife in the city, possibly 
using the deterrent force of the veterans settled in the area.239 Puteoli accepted Sulla’s 
proposal, which may have contained some guidelines regarding the use of public 
finances and the relations between the magistrates and the ordo decurionum.24() Then, 
new tensions arose when Granius refused to fulfil what he was required to do, and 
paid with his life.
I have repeatedly stressed the relationship between Sulla’s military 
achievements and his need to punish, or to reward, the Italian communities involved 
in the conflict. In this period there was a close relation between warfare and politics, 
between conflict and political setdement. War and peace appear to be parts of the 
same process, to some extent influencing each other. The initiatives of Sulla in 
Campania show this very effectively. Sulla fought a part of the Social War in this
237 Plut. Sull. 37.5-6.
238 Rotondi 1912, 492: lex Puteolauis data. Sartori 1953, 61-62 speculates that the Sullan law may have 
merged the Roman colony o f  Puteoli and the praefectura mentioned by Fest. 262 L. Keaveney 1982b, 
520-522 suggests, with no evidence, that Puteoli was a Sullan colony. Bispham 2000, 58-59 rightly links 
the Sullan provisions to the status o f  autonomy o f  the city referred to in Cic. leg. agr. 2.86: Puteolanos uero 
qui nunc in sua potestate sunt, suo iure libertateque utuntur, cf. Steuemagel 2004, 41. There is no reason to 
believe, with Angeli Bertinelli 1996, 35, that Sulla just ‘advised’ the Puteolani on their constitution, since 
he did not hold the imperium to impose a law.
239 There is no ground to assume that Puteoli was affected by Sullan colonisation: Gabba 1954b, 286- 
287 (= Gabba 1973, 603-605).
240 See Val. Max. 9.3.8: Puteolis enim ardens indignatione, quod Granius princeps eius coloniae pecuniam a 
decurionibus ad refectionem Capitolii promissam cunctantius darel, cf. Plut. Sull. 37.5. M. H. Crawford, however, 
argues that the money gathered by the decuriones was supposed to finance the reconstruction o f the 
Capitolium at Rome, and not at Puteoli: see Bispham 2000, 59, fn. 91.
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region, came back some years later at the beginning of the Civil War, founded some 
colonies, and even decided to spend the final years of his life there.
Arguments e silentio are always quite risky, but the choice of Sulla to retire in 
Campania may be seen as a symptom of the success of his veteran setdements in the 
region. The emphasis that the hostile tradition puts on Sulla’s dissolute lifestyle and 
questionable company in his last years must not overshadow the political importance 
of his actions in that period. In Campania he created a network of colonies and rural 
settlements, which made possible a control of the region from the centre, with 
Urbana, founded on the border of the ager Camp anus, down to the coast, through the 
land assigned in the territory of Nola and the colony of Pompeii. Puteoli’s harbour 
was bound to become even more important after the destruction that Sulla brought 
about at Naples, and direct control was kept on the political life of this community.
Leisure, o f course, may have been among the reasons that prompted Sulla’s 
interest in the area, but even that was, to some extent, a politically, and socially 
oriented choice. The popularity of Campania with the Roman elite had been 
consolidated since the second century BC, and it was inevitable that some of 
properties confiscated in the proscriptions were in that area. However, the case of the 
villa owned by C. Marius at Misenum, eventually bought for a ridiculous price by 
Cornelia, the daughter of Sulla, and later by Sulla’s associates Scribonius Curio and 
Licinius Lucullus, is as well-known as it is unparalleled in our scarce evidence.241 
Campania was, at any rate, the most important area of Roman Italy Sulla had to come 
to terms with in the aftermath of the conflict, both for strategic and economic 
reasons. In many ways, Campania was a special place for the Romans, and an 
important pole in the making of Roman Italy. This must be bome in mind when one 
sets out to study the impact of Sullan colonisation on Etruria, its second major front.
As I will try to show in the next section, the success of the Sullan settlement 
was much less conspicuous in Etruria, where there is evidence for much stauncher 
opposition. Campania was a rich and attractive region, with strong ties with Rome. 
The anti-Sullan resistance was effectively defeated and dismantled there. The 
development of Sulla’s campaign in 83 suggests that it had already been less strong 
and widespread than in Central Italy.
241 Badian 1973, esp. 121-125,130-132, criticising D ’Arms 1968 (same position in D ’Arms 2003, 37-42). 
Badian’s point was later accepted in D ’Arms 1977, 349 (= D ’Arms 2003, 333).
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2.5. Etruria: a contrasting picture
The successful development of Sulla’s campaign, with major efforts being 
concentrated on two fronts — Campania and Praeneste — was made possible only by 
the contemporaneous parallel successes of the Sullan generals on other fronts. In 
northern Etruria and in Aemilia Metellus faced the attacks of Carbo, while Pompey 
and Crassus obtained crucial victories against Carbo himself and the propraetor 
Carrinas. Sulla’s direct involvement on this front appears to be limited to a single 
military confrontation with Carbo, near Clusium.242
This city was certainly loyal to the Marians, who used it as a pivotal point for 
the movements of their troops. The allegiance of the Etruscan cities to the anti-Sullan 
coalition is widely accepted, and confirmed by the available evidence, which however 
fails to be satisfactory in many respects. It is safe to say that the connections of the 
populares in Etruria were very strong from the age of Marius. It has been argued that 
Cinna managed to obtain the support of the elites, while the lower classes 
wholeheartedly supported Marius, perhaps attracted by the prospect of serving in his 
army.243 The evidence, however, is almost non-existing, and we also lack any 
information about the dissensions that may have arisen within the Etruscan elites 
about their attitude towards Sulla. It is beyond dispute, however, that some groups of 
the aristocracy managed to reach an agreement with the winner as soon as the 
outcome of the war became clear.
After the Colline Gate battle, what was left o f the army of the populares was 
disbanded in Etruria. The war, however, continued on several fronts, as the literary 
sources on one hand, and the archaeological evidence from a number of sites on the 
other show. From the literary accounts of the war, it is apparent that Clusium and 
Arretium had an important role in the development of the operations. Populonia was 
besieged and sacked, almost certainly by Sulla. The Acropolis, which had gone 
through an impressive renovation in the last decades of the second century BC, was 
abandoned since then.244 The site still looked almost depopulated in the early fifth
242 Liv. Per. 88.1; App. b.c. 1.89.412; cf. Veil. 2.28.1.
243 Piotrowicz 1930; Gabba 1954a, 49-50 (= Gabba 1973, 204-205); Krawczuk 1960, 23-24. Contra, see 
Harris 1971, 218-224 and Brunt 1988,106. A balanced discussion in Rawson 1978,133-134.
244 Strab. 5.2.6 =  C 223: TTottXcjviov... TToXioptdav Kai airrb SeSeypevov, with Pasquinucci 1988, 
49-54 and Giua 1996, 37-39. On recent excavations, see Zanini 2002, 76-78; Mascione 2003, 34-35, 44- 
49; Mascione 2004, 36-44.
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century.245 Telamon, which however was not a municipium, was ravaged, and traces of a 
sack, followed by a prompt reconstruction, have been recently discovered at 
Satumia.246 The extent of violence and human losses finds further confirmation in the 
four coin hoards datable to the late Eighties that have been discovered in Etruna.247
Volaterrae came into play at a late stage of the war, as the last stronghold of 
the diehard enemies of Sulla, both Etruscans and Roman victims of the proscriptions. 
It was, along with Nola, one of the last fronts Sulla had to deal with, before 
concentrating all his energies on his programme of reforms. From a passage of the pro 
Roscio Amerino, we know that he was still besieging the city in the first months of 81 
BC, soon after the beginning of the proscriptions.248 A passage of Licinianus, whose 
importance was rightly stressed by A. Krawczuk, dates the final conquest to 79 BC, 
during the consulship of Appius Claudius and Servilius Vatia.247 A number of 
proscribed were still in the city, and left just before the besiegers arrived. However, 
they were promptly caught, and eliminated. The siege of Volaterrae is therefore a 
significant exception in Italy, which was altogether pacified after 82 BC. For three 
years, possibly until Sulla’s abdication from dictatorship, an important Etruscan city 
was still held by a contigent of rebels. There is no reason to disbelieve Licinianus in 
this respect.250 That the situation at Volaterrae was unparalleled in Italy is apparent 
from several pieces of evidence. Nola, the other main anti-Sullan city, was conquered 
about two years before, in 81, and its ager was prompdy assigned to the Sullan
245 See Rutil. Nam. 1.401-414, with Krawczuk 1960,13-21; Doblhofer 1977, 189-190.
246 Rendim 1998, esp. 113-116; Rendini 2003, 333-339. There is no evidence, however, for a settlement 
o f  v e t e r a n s , R e n d i n i  2003, 337.
247 Such a concentration o f  hoards in a specific area is unparalleled in this period: see Crawford 1967 
and Crawford 1969a, nos. 258 (Capalbio), 260 (Carrara), 262 (San Miniato al Tedesco), 266 (Montiano, 
near Telamon); cf. Harris 1971, 258. On the relation between coin hoards and violence in the late 
Republic, see Crawford 1969b.
248 Cic. Rose. A.mer. 7.20.
249 Licin. 36.8 Crimti: see Krawczuk 1960, 16-17. It is likely that the siege was not followed by a sack, as 
there are no archaeological traces o f  destruction on the Acropolis: Bonamici 2003, 83-84.
250 See Massa-Pairault 1985, 222-223 on speculation on some indirect (and indeed doubtful) references 
to the Sullan siege in the Volaterran art o f  the first century BC. In general on the impact o f  Roman art 
in northern Etruria, see M. Torelli 1976 and Cristofani 1976.
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veterans.251 On the contrary Volaterrae attracted all sorts of anti-Sullan partisans 
because of its strategically invaluable position, and it remained a critical front for a 
longer period.
What we know about the countermeasures taken by Sulla also shows that the 
situation was exceptional. While there is no direct evidence for a project to found a 
colony after the conquest of the city, we know that Sulla decided, or at least tried to 
enforce, an exemplary punishment: the withdrawal of Roman citizenship of the 
municipium. The information derives from a passage of Cicero’s de domo sua, where Sulla 
is said to have deprived some communities — it is unclear how many — of citizenship, 
along with part of their territories. This decision was included in a law voted by the 
comitia centuriata.252 Cicero argues that the land confiscations were legitimate, since it 
was in the people’s power to decide about that matter. Citizenship, however, could 
not be affected under any circumstances, and hence Sulla’s measure was illegal. For 
this reason, according to Cicero, that part of Sulla’s provisions was not enforced even 
when Sulla was alive, and the Volaterrani soon regained their rights.253
Cicero is rarely a neutral or innocent source; he certainly is not here.254 The 
primary reason why he recalled this particular Sullan initiative in this case was to 
support his personal position in a difficult moment of his political career. He gave this 
speech after the end of his exile, with the aim to reassert his claim on his house 
confiscated by Clodius. His point was a general one, and it addressed the nature of 
Roman citizenship.255 There was, however, a specific reason why the position of
251 On the conquest o f  Nola, see Liv. Per. 89.11-12 and Licin. 36.9 Criniti, with Keaveney-Strachan 
1981. There is no reason to argue that the resistance o f  the city was a response to Sulla’s decision to 
found a colony: contra, Harris 1971, 258.
252 There is no evidence to agree with Dahlheim 1993, 114 that the measure affected communities in 
‘Samnium, Lucania or Etruria’.
233 Cic. dom. 30.79: populus Romanus L. Sulla dictatore ferente comitiis centuriatis municipiis ciuitatem ademit; ademit 
eisdem agros; de agris ratum est, fu it enim populi potestas; de ciuitate ne tam diu quidem ualuit, quam diu ilia Sullani 
temporis arma ualuerunt; an uero Volaterranis, cum etiam turn essent in armis, L. Sulla uictor re publica reciperata 
comitiis centuriatis ciuitatem eripere non potuit, hodieque Volaterrani non modo dues, sed etiam optimi dues fruuntur 
nobiscum simul hac duitate.
254 Other sources on Volaterrae in this period: Liv. Per. 89.13 and Licin. 36.8 Criniti.
255 Wirszubski 1950, 30. Cicero, however, knew well that citizenship had been wihtrdrawn in the past: 
cf. the case o f  Hostilius Mancinus in 137, mentioned in Cic. orat. 1.181 (P. Rutilius, M. filius, tribunus 
plebis, de senatu iussit edud, quod eum duem negaret esse; quia memoria sic esset proditum, quern pater suus, aut populus 
uendidisset, aut paterpatratus dedidisset, ei nullum esse postliminium).
169
Volaterrae was so familiar to him: he was a patron of that community.256 Soon after 
the death of Sulla, the Volaterrani challenged the legitimity of the law, and Cicero 
played an important part in supporting them.
The most important source for these problems is the final section of Cicero’s 
pro Caecina, which raises the issue of citizenship and that of the status of the Etruscan 
communities punished by Sulla. This case is the clearest proof that the issue of the 
rights of the communites punished by Sulla was definitely not solved soon after the 
former dictator’s death. The client of Cicero, Aulus Caecina, from Volaterrae, was a 
member o f one of the most distinguished Etruscan families.257 In 69 BC he was 
involved in a complex civil litigation over the ownership of a fundus. The key argument 
of his opponent was that the Volaterrani were not entitled to accept legacies from 
Roman citizens, like Caecina had done, because Sulla had deprived them of the right 
of citizenship.258 Cicero challenged the argument on two grounds.259
First, citizenship could never be withdrawn, unless one renounced to it by 
becoming citizen of a Latin colony. This was, according to Cicero’s interpretation, an 
established principle, closely linked to the correlation between ciuitas and libertasf)0 
Secondly, there was already a precedent that made Sulla’s measure legally 
unacceptable. Cicero claims to have taken a tough stance against these measures 
already in the early phases of his career, when he discussed a case whereby the issue of
256 Cf. Cic. Jam. 13.4.1, written to Q. Valerius Orca between 46 and 45: cum municipibus Volaterraneis mihi 
summa necessitudo est. magno enim meo beneficio adfecti cumulatissime mihi gratiam rettuleruntr, nam nec in honoribus 
meis nec laboribus umquam defuerunt. Cf. ibid.'. summo studio p. R  a me in consulatu meo defensi sunt. Also cf. Cic. 
Jam. 13.5.2, written to the same addressee soon afterwards. See Brunt 1988, 397; Deniaux 1991; 
Deniaux 1993, 340-343, 354-360, 374. Cic. Jam. 11.20.3, written in June 43 by D. Iunius Brutus Albinus, 
cos. des. 42, suggests that even in the Forties there were plans to use the land which Sulla had not 
managed to assign: quattuor legionibus iis, quibus agros dandos censuistis, uideo facultatem fore ex agris Sudanis et 
agro Campano. The text, however, is not certain.
257 Hohti 1975; Frier 1985, 18-19; 35; Deniaux 1993, 471-473; Lomas 2004, 106-108. On Caecina’s 
bilingualism and interest in Etruscan antiquities, see Hadas-Lebel 2004, 38; on the emergence o f  
bilingualism in Etruna after Sulla, see Crawford 1987, 414-415. Several members o f  Caecina’s gens 
eventually joined the Senate from very the end o f  the first century BC onwards: see M. Torelli 1969, 
295-298 and M. Torelli 1982b, 281-282, 290.
258 The background o f  the case is summarised in Frier 1985, 20-27. Also see Gelzer 1962, 305-311; 
Stroh 1975, 80-103; Fotheringham 2004.
259 Cic. Caec. 33-35.95-102.
260 On the close link between ciuitas and libertas, see Dessertaux 1907; Wirszubski 1950, 3-4; Ste. Croix 
1981, 366-368; Brunt 1988, 296-297, 518-519.
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citizenship played a decisive role. The case dealt with the libertas of a mulier Arretina 
who had been somehow reduced into slavery. It was heard Sulla uiuo, and Cicero’s 
opponent, C. Cotta, supported the claim that Arretium had been deprived of the 
citizenship by Sulla, like Volaterrae, and that the woman, lacking the ciuitas, was not 
entitled to the acknowledgement of her freedom.261 Cicero overthrew the argument 
and, according to his own reconstruction, he persuaded the jury of the inalienability of 
citizenship.262
The case of the woman from Arretium is mentioned first in the list of the 
precedents, no doubt because of Cicero’s interest in celebrating his merits, and it is the 
only one derived from the discussion of a judicial case. Although it is presented as a 
very straightforward one, the issue was admittedly often discussed in the law courts 
(98: quaeri hoc solere nonpraeterii). Although no evidence remains for it, a debate certainly 
took place among Roman lawyers and politicians since the Sullan law on the 
withdrawal of the political rights was voted. As Cicero’s digression proves, the 
controversy continued through the following years, when new attempts to enforce the 
law were carried out. We do not know whether the law on citizenship involved other 
communities. If this was the case, however, it would not be surprising at all. 
Significantly, the case for Caecina’s opponent, Sex. Aebutius, was made by a former 
associate o f Sulla, C. Calpumius Piso, who certainly supported the Sullan law from a 
political point of view too.263
According to Cicero, the case against his client was obviously flawed, even if 
one left aside doubts about the legitimacy of the law. Sulla, by changing the status of 
Volaterrae, did not affect some rights of its citizens: quod Sulla ipse ita tulit de ciuitate ut 
non sustulerit horum nexa atque hereditates. The right to sell goods and to inherit was still 
acknowledged, since Sulla decided to change the status of the punished communities 
from citizenship optimo iure into the so-called ius X II coloniarum, or ius Ariminensium: 
iubet enim eodem iure esse quo fuerint Ariminenses; quos quis ignorat duodecim coloniarum et a 
ciuibus Knmanis hereditatespotuisse? The origin and implications of this juridical status are 
far from clear, but they do not concern us here.264 Cicero does not spend many words
261 Cic. Caec. 34.97. With good arguments, Frier 1985,100 suggests that in Caec. 95-102 Cicero exploited 
the same arguments he had used in the plea for the woman from A rretium ,
262 A false claim, according to Brunt 1988, 518-519, fn. 1.
263 Frier 1985,102-103, with earlier bibliography.
264 It is unclear whether the ius X II coloniarum was more or less advantageous than the status o f  the Latin 
colonies. A number o f  (mosdy unsuccessful) attempts to reach safer conclusions have been made: see
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on this matter because he is interested in stressing his decisive objection, which is 
focussed on the inalienability of citizenship. However, even if someone still wanted to 
second a restrictive interpretation of the law, and consider the withdrawal of the 
citizenship sufficient to prevent the Volaterrani from inheriting and doing business 
with Roman citizens, Caecina would still deserve special consideration, because he is a 
worthy and decent man, and a friend of Rome.265 Behind this skillful discussion, the 
tension and the conflicting interpretations of a complex legal issue are recognisable.266
Cicero’s own position in the affair deserves to be stressed again. The two cases 
that he accepted to take, in which the issue of citizenship played such a prominent 
role, show that he had good connections in at least two strongly anti-Sullan cities of 
northern Etruria. It is very significant that the cities heavily punished by Sulla were 
interested in obtaining the support of members of the Roman elite and in trying to 
make their position more advantageous. The plea for Roscius Amerinus made Cicero 
a credible candidate for the defense of the individuals, and potentially of the 
communities, that had been affected by Sulla’s retaliation.
The law on citizenship was just an aspect of what Sulla intended to achieve in 
Etruria. It was accompanied and complemented by a plan of land assigments that was 
carried out only in part. Significandy, it is again a passage of Cicero’s correspondence 
which sheds light on what happened to the land of Volaterrae and Arretium. In a 
letter to Atticus written on 15 March 60, Cicero summarises the main episodes of 
current political life, and mentions his efforts towards the introduction of some 
changes to an agrarian bill presented by the tribune Flavius and supported by 
Pompey.267 Cicero sought consensus to prevent the enforcement of the law on the ager 
publicus (according to the boundaries of 133, before the first Gracchan reform), to 
confirm the rights of the ‘Sullan men’ (Sullani homines, the veterans) on the land
Bemardi 1948; Krawczuk 1960, 33-44; Sherwin-White 1973, 102-104, 109-110; Harris 1971, 280-281; 
Galsterer 1977, 90-92; Pfiffig 1979,148-151; Mouritsen 1998, 105-106.
265 Cic. Caec. 35.102: ... omnes boni quaereremus, quem ad modum spectatissimum pudentissimumque hominem, 
summo consilio, summa uirtute, summa auctoritate domestica praeditum, leuatum iniuria ciuem retinere possemus. The 
argument is put forward in other Ciceronian speeches too, such as the pro Archia and the pro Balbo: Steel 
2001,78.
266 Frier 1985 is an admirable discussion o f  the importance o f  this case in the development o f  Roman 
civil law and in the emergence o f  Roman jurisprudence. On the specific issue o f Roman citizenship, see 
97-104.
267 Cic. A lt. 1.19. See See Gruen 1974, 396-397.
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allotments they had been assigned, and to exempt Volaterrae and Arretium from the 
implementation of the law.268 Sulla had singled out the territories of these communities 
as possible targets of new assignments. For some reason, however, after Sulla had 
already planned them, they did not take place, although the threat remained 
incumbent on the communities for some time.269 The former owners kept occupying 
the land formally confiscated as possessores. Cicero, as a Roman patron of these 
Etruscan communities, made sure that they were not affected by any land distribution. 
The aim was achieved, rather than by Cicero and his talent in gathering the consensus 
of the boni, mainly because of the opposition of a large portion of the Senate, which 
feared the possible implications of an agrarian law whose enforcement was left in 
Pompey’s hands. The rights of the possessores from Arretium and Volaterrae were later 
confirmed by the lex lulia agraria of 59 BC too.270
Cicero’s reference to the agri of the Etruscan cities, however, is interesting for 
several reasons. First, it is evidence for an incomplete side of the Sullan colonial plan. 
An important project of the dictator, certainly conceived in the aftermath of the Civil 
War and aimed against two strongholds of the resistance, could not be fully 
implemented.271 We do not know if it was the only one, as Cicero shows an exclusive 
interest in the cities which he protected.
Cicero’s letter bears some the traces of the tense political atmosphere of the 
decades that followed Sulla’s hegemony, in which the agrarian problem resurfaced
268 Cic. A tt. 1.19.4: agraria lex a Flauio tribuno pi. uehementer agitabatur auctore Pompeio, quae nihil populare 
habebat praeter auctorem. ex hac ego lege secunda contionis uoluntate omnia ilia tollebam quae ad priuatorum 
incommodum pertinebant; liberabam agptm eum qui P. Mucio L. Calpumio consulibus publicus fuisset; Sullanorum 
hominum possessiones confirmabam; Volaterranos et Arretinos, quorum agrum Sulla publicarat neque diuiserat, in sua 
possessione retinebam; unam rationem non reiciebam, ut ager hac aduenticia pecunia emeretur quae ex nouis uectigalibus 
per quinquennium reciperetur. Cicero never intended to affect the interests o f the Sullan veterans, and the 
attacks on the Sullan possessores in the third speech de lege agraria are no evidence for a hostile attitude to 
them: see Drummond 2000, esp. 144-146.
269 Zambianchi 1978,124 argues that Sulla decided not to affect the interests o f the Etruscan aristocracy 
and refused to carry out his earlier plan; in fact, there is no evidence explaining why the assignments 
were not brought about.
270 Cic .Jam. 13.4.2: cum tribuni plebi legem iniquissimam de eorum agris promulgauissent, facile senatui populoque R  
persuasi ut eos ciuis quibus fortuna pepercisset saluos esse uellent. hanc actionem meam C. Caesar primo suo consulatu 
lege agraria comprobauit agrumque Volaterranum et oppidum omni periculo in perpetuum liberauit. See Drummond 
2000,151-152.
271 Cf. Harris 1971, 262-263.
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now and again, never to find a proper solution. Thanks to his speeches de lege agraria, 
we are much better informed about Rullus’ bill than we are about Flavius’, although 
the information Cicero gives is definitely misleading in various respects.272 The 
argument put forward by Cicero is identical in both cases. Although the sponsors of 
the bill claim that it was popularis, it did not serve the interests of the people. Leaving 
propaganda aside, however, an important difference can be noticed. Rullus planned 
some interventions in the ager Camp anus, which no one had ever dared touch ever 
since — although the accuracy of this statement is far from certain.273 The bill 
presented in 60 BC was more wide-ranging, and it probably concentrated the 
assignments in central Italy, which had been invested both by Sullan colonisation and 
by the recruitment carried out by Catiline.
There is ground to believe that the land assignment in Etruria was not always 
as unsuccessful as it appears to have been in the territories of Volaterrae and 
Arretium. Moreover, there probably was a significant difference between these two 
cities. We have no evidence that a colony was founded at Volaterrae, while Pliny’s 
reference to the Arretini Fidentiores (‘the more loyal ones’) is safe evidence for a Sullan 
settlement.274 No doubt, besides being included in the community, these colonists 
were given some land. However, Cicero’s mention of some land of Arretium’ and 
Volaterrae having been divisa, but not publicata implies that the project of settlement 
was not fully implemented.275 The colony had definitely been founded, but probably
272 See Drummmond 2000, with special reference to the third speech de lege agraria.
273 Cic. leg. agr. 1.7.21: praetermitto... eum... nos agrum... concessisse, qui ager ipse per sese et Sullanae dominationi et 
Gracchorum largitioni restitisset, cf. leg. agr. 2.29.81. Jonkers 1963, 50-51 accepts Cicero’s testimony. 
Chouquer 1987, 217, fn. 8 is more sceptical and refers to Licin. 28.35-37 Criniti: (P. Lentulus) agrum 
Campanum inter priuatos diuisum publicauit et eum indicto pretio locauit. multo plures agros. .. recognitioni praepositus 
reciperauit formamque agrorum in aes incisam ad Ubertatis fixam  reliquit, quam postea Sulla corrupit. Also see 
Scardigli 1983, 43; Fezzi 2003, 33-36. Sulla, however, founded Urbana on the very border the ager 
Campanus-. see Beloch 1879, 17; Laffi 1966, 101-102; Chouquer 1987, 187-188, fn. 342; Minieri 2002, 
256 (earlier bibliography at fn. 22).
274 Cf. Cic. Mur. 49: drcumfluentem colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu. About Arretium, see 
Pfiffig 1966, 66; Harris 1971, 261-263.
275 Cic. A tt. 1.19.4: Volaterranos et Arretinos, quorum agrum Sulla publicarat neque diuiserat, in sua possessione 
retinebam. See Harris 1971, 261-262, 264; Deniaux 1991, 221-223. Novaro 1975 makes the case for the 
reading Arteminos (given by many manuscripts) instead o f  Arretinos. In her view, sporadic finds near 
modem Artimino points to the existence o f  an ancient community in the area. Moreover, Arretium had
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too much land had been confiscated, and there were not enough setders available to 
get hold of it.276 In the meantime, the earlier possessores kept occupying it. Later they 
managed to find the support of some members of the Roman elite, who opposed the 
completion of the programme and the coming of more setders..
The situation is quite different, although by no means less interesting, further 
north. The foundation of a Sullan colony at Faesulae is certain, as it is the violent 
opposition to the new settiement. Licinianus records a revolt of the inhabitants of 
Faesulae against the colonists, which apparendy took place in 78 BC and aimed to 
restore the situation that preceded the coming of Sulla. According to Licinianus, 
Faesulani irruperunt in castella ueteranorum Sullanorum et compluribus occisis agros sms receperunt. 
et in senatu defendebant, quod uulgus agreste domoque extorre eo coactum esset. et consules dato 
exercitu in Htruriam profecti sunt, ut scitum < ... >277 These few fragmentary lines contain 
several important pieces of information. First, they tell something about the form of 
the setdement, which apparendy was organised around fortified sites.278 The word 
castellum makes it unlikely that the veterans lived within the city walls. They settied in 
the ager, forming a separate community and following a pattern similar to that 
suggested by some archaeologists for Pompeii, with the natives living in the oppidum 
and the colonists controlling their land in the outskirts, protected by some kind of 
fortifications (the castella). After a few years, the local population managed to launch a 
successful attack on the newcomers, which led to a bloodshed, and to the (probably 
temporary) recovery of the confiscated properties.
Moreover, the Faesulani were bold enough to defend their actions in the 
Senate, and to openly make the case against the legitimity of the Sullan assignments.279 
Licinianus does not say how the Senate dealt with the envoys of the city, but if they 
could afford to be so confrontational they probably had some support within that
not quite the same position as Volaterrae, as it certainly was a colony. The reconstruction is ingenious, 
but it cannot be accepted unless solid evidence about the would-be ancient site o f Arteminum emerges.
276 Harris 1971,262.
277 Licin. 36.36-37 Criniti. The text is quite tormented: I accept the reading o f the Bonn edition 
receperunt, instead o f  reddiderunt, which is given by the manuscript and accepted by Criniti. On this 
passage, see Scardigli 1983,129-131.
278 Cf. App. b. c. 1.96.448; see Brunt 1971, 308-309 and D e Neeve 1984,131.
279 I do not agree with Scardigli 1983, 129, arguing that the veterans were compelled to explain their 
defeat to the Senate; Mazzarino 1957, 120 is certainly wrong in saying that they forgave the rebels and 
defended them in the Senate.
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assembly. Significantly, both consuls were sent to put an end to the revolt, but one of 
them, M. Aemilius Lepidus would soon join the insurgency himself.280
2.6. The Sullan veterans and Catiline’s conspiracy
Unfortunately, there is no literary evidence for what happened in Etruna 
between the revolt of 78 and Catiline’s conspiracy. It remains unclear, first of all, what 
happened at Faesulae after Lepidus and the rebels were defeated.281 No doubt, a 
considerable group of Sullan setders did not leave the area, as Cicero refers twice to 
the presence of colonists from Faesulae in Catiline’s army.282 Probably their position 
remained difficult, and was further complicated by the losses suffered in the attack. It 
would be useful to know what measures, if any, were taken by Rome to protect the 
colonists and avoid further attacks, or even to restore some of them on the allotments 
re-occupied by the Faesulani.
The incidents at Faesulae suggest that something about the Sullan setdement 
plans in Etruria was flawed. Soon after the arrival of the veterans, the local population 
managed to react successfully.283 This was, to our knowledge, unparalleled in the rest 
of Italy. It is impossible to establish what triggered the offensive, or rather what led 
the inhabitants to believe that an attack could be successful. The riots were possibly 
related to contemporary events in other areas of Etruria. As we have seen, the land 
assignments at Volaterrae and Arretium were stopped after the death of Sulla. 
However, the strongest element suggesting that Sullan colonisation in Etruria was not 
a success is the participation of a contingent of veterans in the conspiracy of Catiline. 
This may be explained both by local factors, and by the impact of wider processes that 
involved Italy as a whole.
It is significant that the bulk of the Sullan colonists who followed Catiline was 
from Arretium and Faesulae, where the setdement programme knew some significant
280 See Licin. 36.38 Criniti and Sail. 1.66 M, with Labruna 1975, 46-51, 156-158.
281 Harris 1971, 268 argues that the land given up by the veterans was a ‘temporary concession’, and that 
it was recovered after Lepidus’ revolt.
282 See Cic. Cat. 3.6.14; Mur. 24.49.
283 Harris 1971, 267-271 is too optimistic about the success o f the Sullan settlement in the area.
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drawbacks. They had endured hostility, open attacks, and isolation. They were 
prevented from increasing the size of their properties by adding unoccupied land (like 
that which had been publicata, but not diuisa) to the allotments they already had. There 
is reason to believe that these scattered groups of veterans posted to a hostile territory 
still communicated with each other. Figures like Gaius Manlius and Publius Furius, 
both mentioned in Cicero’s Catilinarian speeches promoted the adhesion to the 
conspiracy.284 Cicero’s metaphorical reference to a colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum 
exerdtus cannot be lighdy dismissed.285 The typical accusation launched against the 
supporters of Catiline is to have tried to revive the licentia of the early Sullan period 
after squandering the fortunes earned by the proscriptions and the mass murders.286 
This may be true of Catiline and of other leading figures of the conspiracy.
The main reason why Catiline was so successful among the Sullan veterans, 
however, is that many of them became considerably poorer less than two decades 
after the Sullan colonisation. A satisfactory explanation for this development is still to 
be provided, and it probably is not within reach. It would be far-fetched, for instance, 
to view it as a consequence of the scarce talent of the Sullan veterans for agriculture, 
as has often been claimed. There is no reason to believe that they were less skilled 
than the average Italian peasant. Most of them certainly had a rural background before 
joining the army, and it is conceivable that they were prepared to return to their earlier 
condition after Sulla’s victory.287 It is true that many Sullan veterans tried to sell their 
properties soon after the land was assigned, and not just in Etruria, as Cicero says.288 
However, this may be better explained by the economic conditions of Italy at the end 
of the Eighties than by their inability to cope with rural life.
It is hard to establish whether the difficulties met by the Sullan veterans in 
Etruna had more to do with local dynamics or with wider economic processes. From
284 Cic. Cat. 3.6.14: in P. Furium, qui est ex eis colonis quos Faesulas L. Sulla deduxit; Cic. Cat. 2.6.14: Manlius 
iste centurio, qui in agro Faesulano castraposuit, bellum populo Romano suo nomine indixit and 2.9.20: quo exgenere 
iste est Manlius, cui nunc Catilina succedit. hi sunt homines ex eis coloniis quas Sulla constituit.
285 Cic. Mur. 49: Catilinam interea alacrem atque laetum, stipatum choro iuuentutis, uallatum indicibus atque sicariis, 
injlatum cum spe militum <tum> conlegae mei, quern ad modum dicebat ipse, promissis, circumfluentem colonorum 
Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu.
286 Cf. Sail. Cat. 16.4 {plerique Sullani milites, largius suo usi, rapinarum et uictoriae ueteris memores ciuile bellum 
exoptabanfy, Cat. 28.4.
287 Brunt 1971, 309-310.
288 Cic. leg. agr. 2.78.
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the outbreak of the Mithridatic War Italy went through a serious financial crisis, 
triggered by the interruption of the revenue flow from the province of Asia. The 
bankruptcy of the bank of Fulcinius, which took place at Volaterrae between the 
Mithridatic and the Civil Wars and is mentioned in Cicero’s pro Caecina, fits well this 
scenario, and was certainly not unparalleled.289 In 86 BC the consul Valerius Flaccus 
put forward a law reducing debts by three-fourths, which received significantly wide 
support.290 At the same time, circulation of false and debased coinage was a serious 
issue. The edict of the praetor Marius Gratidianus of 85 BC and the lex Cornelia de falsis 
of 81 BC show similar concerns on the part of the government, regardless of factional 
politics.291
Moreover, the losses of the Social and the Civil Wars had considerable 
economic impact.292 Evidence like the coin hoards from Etruria that were buried in 
the Eighties and never recovered afterwards suggests that money supply diminished 
considerably in the aftermath of the Civil War. The outcome was more widespread 
indebtedness.293 Huge military expenses had exhausted the Roman aerarium, and they 
were bound to grow in the future, as the enfranchisement of the Allies exempted them 
from any contribution to the financing of the army.294 Besides, despite Sulla’s 
reorganisation of the province of Asia, the public budget was definitely not stabilised, 
and it would not be until Pompey’s Eastern campaign in the Sixties. In 82, the Senate 
was compelled to use resources taken from the temples to pay the troops; the
289 Cic. Caec. 11, with Frier 1985, 9-11. Cf. Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 7.19: haec fides atque haec ratio pecuniarum 
quae Romae, quae in foro uersatur, implicata est cum illis pecuniis A.siaticis et cohaeret; mere ilia non possunt, ut haec 
non eodem labefacta motu coincidant.
290 See Sail. Cat. 33.2 (ac nouissume memoria nostra propter magnitudinem aeris alieni uolentibus omnibus bonis, 
argentum aere solutum est)\ Veil. 2.23. 2 (Ualerius Flaccus, turpissimae legis auctor, qua creditoribus quadrantem solui 
iusseral). See Frank 1933, 56-57; Bulst 1964, 330-337; Nicolet 1971, 1220-1221; Lo Cascio 1979, 234- 
235; Barlow 1980, 215-217.
291 On Gratidianus’ measures, see Cic. off 3.80 and Plin. 33.132. Cf. Crawford 1968 (= Crawford 1985, 
187-193); Lo Cascio 1979; Verboven 1994.
292 Brunt 1971,285-287.
293 Cf. Catilina’s pledge for tabulae nouae-. Sail. Cat. 21.2 {turn Catilina polliceri tabulas nouas, proscriptionem 
locupletium, magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas, alia omnia, quae bellum atque lubido uictomm fed).
294 Nicolet 1978 (= Nicolet 2000, 93-103, 397-398); Barlow 1980, 203-212; Crawford 1985,187.
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reconstruction of the Capitol was accomplished only in 69 BC.295 Things were soon 
made more difficult by the war against Sertorius, which stopped the revenue flow 
from an important province like Spain for several years,
It is conceivable that these critical factors influenced the situation of the Sullan 
foundations in Etruria, but it is unclear to what extent. Colonisation in Campania was 
an overall success: there is no evidence that the veterans became poorer, all the 
confiscated land appears to have been assigned, and the opposition to the new 
foundations is not known to have been violent. Such a contrast is a warning against 
attempting to identify the economic difficulties of Italy as the main explanation for the 
situation o f Etruria. On balance, it is preferable to put more emphasis on local factors.
Colonisation in Etruria started later than in Campania. As we have seen, 
although a lex Cornelia on the colonial foundations may have covered all the new 
settlements at once, military activities were not over before 79 BC, with the conquest 
of Volaterrae. Sulla may have played a role, if indirect, in the foundation of a colony 
like Pompeii. He certainly did not in the land assignments near Volaterrae and 
Arretium. There is ground to argue that the settlement of the veterans in this region 
was not accurately organised. Unfamiliarity with the territory, and perhaps haste might 
have led some of the newcomers to settle in not very productive land. The hostility of 
the local population and the subsequent campaign of Lepidus made it even harder for 
them to cope with their new situation. There is also evidence that the colonists spent 
huge resources in building activities, and that this further compromised their financial 
position.296 Some of the veterans became impoverished, and joined Catiline’s attempt. 
It should be noted, however, that not all the Sullan settlers made that choice. The 
colonies o f Faesulae and Arretium survived even after that crisis.
Although many crucial aspects remain unclear, the background of the 
Catilinarian crisis sheds light on the importance of some crucial aspects of the policies 
that Sulla adopted in Italy, and the impact which they had on Italian economy and 
society. They need to be briefly summarised at the end of this discussion on Sulla and 
Etruria. As seen above, the proscriptions and the foundation of veteran colonies were
295 Val. Max. 7.6.4: C. autem Mario Cn. Carbone consulibus ciuili bello cum Sulla dissidentibus. .. senatus consulto 
aurea atque argentea templorum omamenta, ne militibus stipendia deessent, conflata sunt. See Frederiksen 1966, 133; 
Barlow 1980, 213-219; Bumett 1982, 135.
296 Cic. Cat. 2.20: hi dum aedijicant tamquam beati, dumpraediis lectis, familiis magnis, conuiuiis apparatis 
delectantur, in tantum aes alienum inciderunt, ut, si salui esse uelint, Sulla sit iis ab inferis excitandus. See Gabba 
1976a, 323 (= Gabba 1994a, 114).
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the main features of Sulla’s policy in Italy. Their background was provided by the 
needs of the power struggle and of internal politics, but the consequences were much 
deeper. Although they were part of the same project, they largely appear to have 
operated on two different levels.
The proscriptions affected parts of the ordo senatorius and of the ordo equester,; 
and they were a major chance for other sectors of the same ordines to increase their 
wealth. Some close associates of Sulla built huge fortunes out of the proscriptions, 
which in some cases would enable them to pursue a successful political career.297 M. 
Licinius Crassus was so eager to accumulate the goods of the proscribed in Bruttium 
that he irritated even Sulla, who isolated him from the political scene.298 The list of the 
beneficiaries includes as diverse characters as L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Catiline and 
C. Verres.299 Concentration of properties must have been the rule, rather than the 
exception, if even Quinctius Valgus, who apparendy was not a senator, got control of 
vast estates in the territory of Casinum and in Hirpinia.300 The list of the known 
profiteers is not very long: a couple of dozen people in total. From the available 
evidence, the first proscription appears to have been advantageous only for those who 
had, in various capacities, a close relationship with Sulla. The great fortunes 
accumulated by freedmen like Chrysogonus and Tarula, which enraged* the 
traditionalists, are to be explained as the outcome of personal affiliations. Local 
associates of Sulla, like Oppianicus at Larinum or Capito at Ameria, who had an 
important function in carrying out some confiscations, had their share of the booty.
The proscriptions generated new great estates, more absentee ownership, and 
more unoccupied or underexploited land. At the same time, however, Sulla setded his 
veterans in areas of Italy that were fertile and strategically significant. Colonisation 
responded to two basic needs: rewarding the soldiers that had won two wars, and
297 Jaczynowska 1962, 487-489; Brunt 1971, 303-304; Shatzman 1975, 39-40; Hinard 1985a, 200-203.
298 Plut. Crass. 6.7-8.
299 On Domitius, see D io 41.11.1, with Hinard 1985a, 201, fn. 200; on Catiline, see Sail. Cat. 5.2; Q. Cic. 
Comm. Pet. 9-10; Ascon. 84, 91 C; Plut. Sull. 32.3; Plut. Cic. 10.3. Verres’ properties were concentrated in 
the territory o f  Beneventum: Cic. Verr. 2.1.38.
300 Cic. leg. agr. 3.14: denique eos fundos quos in agro Casinati optimos fructuosissimosque continuauit, cum usque eo 
uicinos proscriberet quoad angulos conformando ex multis praediis unam fundi regionem normamque petfecerit, quos nunc 
cum aliquo metu tenet, sine ulla curapossidebit. On Valgus’ estates in Hirpinia, see Cic. leg. agr. 3.8, and supra. 
He was therefore a great landowner whose properties were scattered in different regions: Gabba 1994b, 
438-439 (= Gabba 1994a, 226-227).
180
punishing the communities which had opposed Sulla’s rise to power.301 In Campania 
there is no evidence that the setdements of the Sullan veterans ever went through a 
critical phase, or that their survival was ever threatened. The situation in Etruna was 
not equally straightforward. In some communities like Volaterrae and perhaps 
Florentia, there were just land assignments to the Sullan veterans, without a colony 
being founded. At Faesulae, the local population attacked the veterans, and they 
managed to regain their land, although it is unclear to what extent and how long. At 
Arretium, the Sullan deductores made some mistakes: part of the land that had originally 
been destined to the assignments was never used for that purpose, because enough 
setders could not be found.
The ancient accounts of the Catilinarian conspiracy are not immune from 
propaganda and from rhetorical bias, but they cannot be dismissed when they portray 
the Sullan veterans fighting next to the descendants of the victims of the proscription. 
These two groups may have fought each other in the past, but they apparendy shared 
the same problem at the end of the Sixties: they were impoverished and in search of 
new sources of wealth. The reason why the proscribed may have been in that position 
is apparent. The poverty of the veterans is harder to account for, as I have tried to 
show above.
*  *  *
The veterans of the Etruscan colonies were the weakest link of the large 
constituency of the supporters of Sulla who were rewarded after his victory. The 
political importance of their presence in the region, however, must not be overlooked. 
Although their setdement may not have been organised very competendy, it played a 
significant part in the history of Etruria during the late Republic. The coming of the 
veterans was not just a price that had to be paid to the victorious army, but it was the 
clearest signal of an epoch-making defeat. It followed a series of impressive 
destructions, and it was accompanied by a law that withdrew Roman citizenship of 
several anti-Sullan communities.
301 Chouquer 1987, 245-247 speculates that in some areas centuriatio was first carried out in the Sullan 
age: the territory immediately south-est o f  Rome, around Castrimoenium, Bovillae and Gabii, a part of 
the ager Campanus, and the ager Nolanus.
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The response of some sectors of the Etruscan elite to this situation is 
extremely interesting: they started seeking the patronage of the part of the Roman elite 
that was prepared to support their agenda, and to defend the interests of their 
communities. As I have argued above, the Faesulani who went to the Senate to defend 
their attack on the veterans would not have spoken as boldly as reported by Licinianus 
if they had lacked any support in that assembly. The Arretim and the Volaterrani, 
downgraded to the mysterious ius X II coloniarum, would have hardly regained their 
rights if they had not found support among the Roman notables that were interested 
in exploiting their loyalty.
Finding informal ways to interact with the Roman elite was a problem that was 
common to all the Italian Allies in the period between the enfranchisement and the 
actual inclusion into the citizen body. For some Etruscan communities this may have 
been even harder, as they had been deprived of full citizenship. Fortunately, we are 
quite well informed about their position because they chose such a vocal patron as 
Cicero.302 The status problem of the Volaterrani was probably solved not long after 
Caecina’s case and Cicero’s successful plea in his favour. It is likely, in fact, that the 
census that started in 70 BC put this anomaly to an end and included the Volaterrani 
and the other communities back into the citizen body.303 That was the success of 
Caecina and of the members of the Etruscan elite who, like him, had proved prepared 
to accept the victory of Rome without reservations, and negotiate a new role for 
themselves.304 About ten years before, that very elite had taken part in a war against 
Sulla and a large part of the Roman political establishment. Sulla’s great victory was 
probably to have found the most direct way to compel the Etruscan to become, 
politically speaking, Roman.305 As soon as the well-to-do Volaterrani lost full 
citizenship, it became clear to them that they could not afford isolation, or sterile 
opposition anymore. They had to look for Roman patrons, and it is significant that 
they found one in Cicero, who was by no means a popularis. Sulla’s retaliation had 
compelled them to renegotiate their relations with the Roman elite.
302 T h e  best discussion o f  this relationship is Deniaux 1991.
303 Harris 1971, 275-276. Cf. Bruun 1975, 466-468.
304 The talent o f  the Volaterran elite in building profitable relations at Rome and the central role o f the 
Caecinae are stressed by Terrenato 1998, 107-109; Terrenato 2001, 61. Cf. however Berrendonner 2003, 
59 remarking that the case o f  a prominent family like the Caecinae must not necessarily be considered 
the rule.
305 Cf. Piotrowicz 1930, 337-338.
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The attempt to change the status of Volaterrae and Arretium is of great 
significance for an assessment of Sulla’s policies on the Empire. It reflects more 
general patterns of his contribution to the making and the consolidation of the 
Empire, and it suggests analogies with other events that I have discussed in this 
chapter. The land confiscations and the withdrawal of Roman citizenship that Sulla 
inflicted on some hostile communities were an extraordinarily harsh punishment, 
which may be compared to the fine he imposed on the cities of the province of Asia at 
the end of the Mithridatic War. The effects of these two measures are remarkably 
similar to each other. In both cases retaliation enabled Sulla to gather a significant 
amount of wealth, either in cash, as was the case in Asia Minor, or in land, as 
happened in Italy. This was of course crucial in the development of the Civil War, as it 
enabled Sulla to finance his Italian campaign, and to reward some of his veterans after 
the victory. However, it also had a considerable effect in the longer term, as it 
significantly affected the administrative organisation of some crucial regions of the 
Empire, and compelled the local elites to redefine their position towards Rome.
At the end of both wars he fought in the Eighties, Sulla put in place a clear 
system of rewards and sanctions, whose scope went beyond his personal interest, and 
which reveals his interest in contributing to the organisation of the Empire. As I have 
shown in the first part of this chapter, the fine decided by Sulla in Asia Minor was part 
of a wider programme, whereby the whole administration of the province was 
reorganised, probably by a lex provinciae. In Italy Sulla has a similar approach: he 
confirmed the enfranchisement of most allied communities, and took revenge only on 
a handful of cities whose resistance had been particularly staunch during the Civil War. 
Some of them were punished with the substitution of the local magistrates with pro- 
Sullan ones, as happened at Larinum; others had part of their territory confiscated and 
assigned to the Sullan veterans, like Praeneste and Pompeii; others suffered the 
confiscations and the downgrading from the ciuitas optimo iure to the ius X II coloniarum.
The response of the local elites too was strikingly similar in the Greek East 
and in Italy. Some chose to join and support Sulla from the beginning, and had their 
loyalty rewarded. Those who did not, and were consequently punished, embarked on a 
process that gradually enabled them to find support, and sometimes patronage, among 
members of the Roman governing class. For the cities of Asia Minor it was crucial to 
limit the impact of the financial impositions decided by Sulla, and to ensure that a limit 
was set to the greed of the Roman moneylenders. As I have shown above, two
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strategies were adopted: the search of Roman patrons, which was prevalently used by 
the free cities, and active participation in the assembly of the cities of the province of 
Asia, the koinon, which dealt with Roman governors on a regular basis. In both cases, 
the outcome was a progressively closer cooperation between Greek and Roman elites, 
whose importance for the development and the stabilisation of the Empire in the 
longer term was crucial. In Italy, the local elites that managed to survive Sulla’s 
revenge soon committed themselves to a similar process, and sought the support of 
members of the Roman elite. It is quite fortunate for the student of this period that 
Volaterrae and Arretium found such a vocal patron and supporter in Cicero, who 
often recorded his special relationship with the Etruscan cities. As I have remarked 
above, it is even more significant that the descendants of the Volaterran aristocrat 
Aulus Caecina defended by Cicero managed to enter the Senate in a couple of 
generations’ time, providing us with an impressive example of the ultimate 
consequences of the strategy that Sulla’s punishment had compelled their ancestors to 
adopt.
At the end of an analysis of Sulla’s contribution to the administration of Italy 
and Asia Minor, his strong interest in the role of the elites, which emerged already in 
the first chapter, finds full confirmation. At the same time, the widely held stereotype 
portraying Sulla as a bloodthirsty and greedy general, exclusively interested in 
eliminating his enemies and building personal power, is decisively undermined. O f 
course he was driven to create a personal supremacy in Rome, but this is a reductive 
way to consider his role in the history of the late Republic. The age of Sulla cannot be 
fully understood without considering his efforts towards the consolidation of the 
Empire, and his considerable achievements in this respect.
In the following chapter I will try to discuss the ideological aspects of this 
operation by studying the use Sulla made of some religious motifs in various moments 
of his imperial strategy. Some similarities between the initiatives he took on the two 
sides of the Empire are recognisable on this level too. Again, both in the East and in 
Italy, Sulla’s emphasis on the ideology of the Empire was part of a broader effort to 
involve the local elites in the new phase. Although his use of religion was on various 
fronts, his first interlocutors were the domi nobiles, the local elites. Sulla realised that his 
efforts to strengthen the Empire, both in Italy and in the East, were likely to turn into 
failure without a complex ideological operation supporting them. It is now time to 
consider it in detail.
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3.
Sulla, Religion, and the Empire
In the previous chapters the focus has been kept on the consequences that the 
initiatives o f Sulla had on the administration of the Empire, and on its economic and 
social history. There is a third level, however, that deserves to be taken into 
consideration, as it complements the other two: religion. Sulla did not just substantially 
contribute to the development of the Empire in the Greek East and to the 
development of Roman Italy by winning wars and compelling the local elites to 
redefine their attitude and position towards Rome. He also made a very significant 
contribution to the development of Roman imperial ideology: to the way in which the 
Romans made sense of their global power, and to the way in which the Greek world 
viewed the role of the Romans. Sulla’s operation was rooted in the context of the 
Mithridatic War and in the developments of the Greek campaign and, as I shall show 
in more detail, it was based on restating the kinship and the special relationship 
between Venus and Rome. Sulla managed to exploit this old theme, which had been 
circulating in the East for several generations, for the sake of his own political agenda, 
and to transform it into a ‘political theology of victory’.1 Back in Italy, he aimed to 
represent himself as a new founder of Rome, who came to rescue the Republic from a 
deadly crisis. The theme of the mythical kinship with Venus would be of great 
importance for this strategy of self-representation, and would represent an ideal bridge 
between Sulla’s agenda in the East and in the West. The aim of this chapter is 
therefore to explore the two sides of Sulla’s approach to religion, and to show the 
importance that religion had in both the contexts where he operated.
3.1. Why ‘Sulla Epaphroditos*?
A good starting point for the discussion is provided by the events that took 
place in Boeotia during and immediately after the Mithridatic War. The literary sources 
indeed offer many interesting, if isolated elements, which may be viewed as symptoms 
of more widespread patterns. What matters most to this discussion, however, is that 
the history of the region in this period is closely linked to the panhellenic sanctuaries,
1 The definition is derived from Gallim 1970, 127, whose discussion o f  Sulla’s attitude to religion (127, 
140-141) is however misleading.
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a front of the Sullan campaign in Greece, which turned out to be decisive in his 
relations with the Greek world as a whole.
Sulla’s depredation of the Greek sanctuaries is reported by Plutarch, who links 
the siege of Athens directly with Sulla’s need for fresh resources.2 He interestingly 
stresses an aspect of Sulla’s conduct before and after the conquest of Athens: his 
striking, even appalling indifference towards Greek religious institutions and 
sanctuaries. According to Plutarch, when Sulla sent Caphis of Titheora, a Greek 
member of his entourage, to collect the treasure of the Delphic Amphictyony, his 
envoy was extremely wary and ended by bursting into tears in front of the priests of 
Apollo, fearing the possible consequences of such an impious act. When he wrote to 
Sulla claiming that he had witnessed some unfortunate presages, he received a 
mocking reply and was ordered to withdraw the treasure at any rate.3 Plutarch makes it 
clear that only political convenience — largely determined by the need to keep the 
favour o f his army — mattered to Sulla at that stage.4 Piety could happily be left aside 
and rediscovered after the victory. Allegations of impiousness, however, could turn 
out to be a political problem in the meantime.
The negotiations between Caphis and the Amphictyones show how important 
a factor religion could be in the relations between Sulla and the Greek world since the 
beginning of the Mithridatic War. The record of the Roman general was both 
inconsistent and controversial in this respect. No doubt, some episodes did not help 
him to earn a good reputation. In Athens, he was blamed for hunting Aristion down 
to the temple of Athena, where the former tyrant had fled after the Romans had 
stormed in the city.5 According to Pausanias, who has a consistently negative bias
2 Plut. Sull. 12.5.
3 Plut. Sull. 12.6-8. The chronology o f  the episode cannot be determined: Daux 1936, 399. About 
Caphis, see Plut. Sull. 15.5, with Robert 1960, 82-84; C. P. Jones 1971, 41-42 argues that Plutarch was 
told about Caphis’ deeds by his friend Soclarus, who was from Titheora himself.
4 D u ff 1999,165-168,193-200 is an excellent discussion o f  Sulla’s portrait in Plutarch.
5 The crime committed by the victorious general was so awful that Pausanias viewed it (1.20.7) as the 
cause o f  his horrible death, caused by the same disease which had caused the death o f  the philosopher 
Pherecydes o f  Syrus: Ellinger 2005, 203-204. Different accounts o f Aristion’s death in App. Mithr. 
39.151 and Plut. Sull. 14.11-12. A list o f  other famous characters killed by the same illness as Sulla is 
provided by Plutarch too {Sull. 36.5). Some attempts to establish the cause o f the death o f Sulla and to 
relate it with his abdication from the dictatorship have been made by modem scholarship: see Carney 
1961b; Africa 1982; Schamp 1991; Jenkins 1994; Cilliers-Retief 2000. According to Keaveney-Madden 
1982, 94-95 both Pherecydes and Sulla suffered from scabies, although o f course their deaths were
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against Sulla, but whom there is no reason to disbelieve on this matter, he was also 
responsible for the sack of at least two Greek temples.6
At Orchomenus, he stole from the Myniae sanctuary a standing statue of 
Dionysus, made by Myron, which he later dedicated again on Helicon, where many 
other statues of the gods and the muses were on display. Pausanias bitterly remarks 
that Sulla’s behaviour is the most vivid illustration of a Greek proverb, ‘to worship 
gods with other people’s incense’ (GupidpacJLy dXXoTpioiS’ t o  06iov a,£(3€O'0C(.i) — a 
judgement combining heartfelt contempt of the Roman commander with an implicit, 
yet quite proud reassertion of the peculiarity of Greek religious identity.7 Pausanias is 
the only source mentioning hostile actions of Sulla against Orchomenus. A 
destruction of the city can safely be ruled out, as the story of Damon shows the local 
elite actively plotting against Chaeronea in the immediate aftermath of the war. In fact, 
the eventual attempt of the Orchomenians to damage Chaeronea by questioning its 
loyalty to Rome is probably to be explained in the light of a crisis they suffered at 
Sulla’s hands. According to another passage of the Periegesis, Sulla’s misdeeds caused a 
severe crisis for the city, comparable to that which other Greek associates of 
Mithridates experienced: ‘Sulla’s treatment of the Athenians was fierce and alien to the 
character o f the Romans, but it was consistent with his treatment of the Thebans and 
the Orchomenians’.8
In Pausanias’ view, however, this misdeed was not Sulla’s greatest fault. The 
Boeotian village of Alalcomenae had in its territory an important sanctuary of Athena, 
which Sulla profaned by stealing the image of the goddess. The shrine was soon 
abandoned, because the goddess was widely believed ‘not to live there any more’.9 
Sulla, however, was cursed by the gods, his fortune started to decline and he died of
caused by other diseases. In Sulla’s case, the likeliest cause o f  death was liver failure; also see Bondeson 
1997, 52-55.
6 On the booty that Sulla gathered in the Greek East, see Pape 1975, 21-22; Waurick 1975, 44, 46. The 
shipwreck discovered near Mahdia, in m odem  Tunisia, has been viewed as a that o f  the ship carrying 
part o f  the booty that Sulla gathered at Athens (on which see Luc. Zeux. 3). There is, in fact, no way to 
prove that, and a dating to 100 BC ca. is most likely: Hellenkemper-Salies 1994.
7 Paus. 9.30.1: cf. Arafat 1996,103-104; Schomer 2003, 85, fn. 611.
8 Paus. 9.33.6: ZvXka 8e ecru (ieu m l  Tti eg ’ AOrjvdious' avf|p.epa tea! fiOoD? aXXoTpia tou  
Ptop.alwt', eoucoTa 8e totjtols- m l  Ta eg ©riPatous’ re  m l ’ Opxo(ievious\ As we have seen in 
the first chapter, Sulla deprived Thebes o f  a considerable part o f  its territory, which he gave to the 
Panhellenic sanctuaries as compensation: Paus. 9.7.4-6.
9 However, the village was not destroyed: Strab. 9.2.36 = C 413. Cf. Kahrstedt 1954, 87-88.
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scabies — the just punishment for such a misdeed. With his explanation of Sulla’s 
death Pausanias confirms that a strong tradition, overtly hostile to Sulla, had 
developed in the Greek world, which still found a place in the historical debate in the 
second century AD. There is some ground to believe, however, that Sulla tried to 
counter this vision, and to give credit to a different representation of his in the Greek 
world, especially when the defeat of Mithridates seemed at hand. I intend to suggest 
that this was a crucial part of his political agenda.
In fact, the portrait of an impious Sulla is challenged by several interesting 
episodes. Back in the Nineties, during his propraetorship in Cilicia, he had confirmed 
the asylia of the sanctuary of Isis and Serapis at Mopsuhestia, which had already been 
acknowledged by the Seleucid kings. The grant was later renewed by Lucullus in the 
late Eighties, and endorsed by Sulla during his dictatorship, as is shown by the 
inscription that records it.10 As Sulla arrived in Greece, the oracle of Trophonius, near 
Lebadea, predicted that he would obtain great victories in Greece and in Asia Minor.11 
In the tenth book of his Memoirs, he recalled that a Roman businessman based in 
Greece, Q. Titius, came to him immediately after the first victory of Chaeronaea, 
announcing that the oracle had predicted another one in the near future, and a soldier 
called Salvienus reported another oracle foreseeing the victory in the Civil War.12
At some point during the war, Sulla granted the sanctuary of Amphiaraus near 
Oropus, on the border between Boeotia and Attica, complete fiscal immunity, and 
even gave it new land -  a remarkable sign of favour in itself. Later, in 80 BC, a 
senatusconsultum confirmed the decision. The circumstance is recorded by a controversy 
which arose some years later and required the arbitration of the Roman Senate. In
10 SEG  44.1227. First published in Sayar-Siewert-Taeuber 1994; also see Rigsby 1996, 465-472, no. 217. 
Lucullus explicidy refers to the asylia decreed by other Roman magistrates before him (1. 15-6). The 
reference is to the magistrates who, since 102, had been in charge o f the prouincia Cilicia. The extant 
fragment o f  1. 2, where Sulla’s accompanying letter was, reads ]crews' Tf|s,[, which the editors 
supplement as d vavew jaew s' Tfjs‘[: it is possible that Sulla is here referring to the renewal o f a privilege 
awarded by himself (Rigsby 1996, 469). Buraselis 2003, 156-157 speculates that the grants o f  Sulla and 
Lucullus extended the asylia o f  the sanctuary to the city, implying that Rome would protect it from the 
pirates. On the history o f  Mopsuhestia and its sanctuary under the Seleucids, see Boffo 1985, 60-63.
11 Plut. Sull. 17.1.
12 Plut. Sull. 17.2-3. It is significant that both responses were reported to Sulla by Roman citizens. The 
Trophonius oracle already had a record o f  responses consistently favourable to the Romans: Radke 
1939, 684. Cf. Arafat 1996, 98-99; Bonnechere 2003, 31-32. It is significant that the local festival o f the 
Basileia was resumed straight after the Mithridatic War: Gossage 1975,123-124.
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74/73 BC, Sulla’s decision was challenged by the publicani, who tried to levy taxes 
from the sanctuary. Somewhat curiously, their argument was a religious one: 
Amphiaraus was a hero, not a god, and his sanctuary did not deserve immunity. A new 
senatusconsultum, however, was voted (RDGE  23) confirming the decisions of Sulla, and 
the asylia o f the sanctuary was respected down to the age of Augustus, when the 
publicani left Greece.13 In that very period, the Amphiaraeum returned under Athens’ 
sphere of influence, where it used to belong before the intervention of Sulla. The 
intention to harm Athenian interests may have had a role in the decision to reassert 
the autonomy of the sanctuary. At any rate, the episode casts doubt on the stereotype 
of an impious Sulla, holding Greek religious tradition in low regard, and encourages us 
to adopt a more nuanced perspective.14 But there is much more. The strategy adopted 
by Sulla to present himself in the aftermath of his victory against Mithridates and 
Archelaus offers very interesting evidence to the discussion.
Plutarch provides important information about the way in which Sulla 
celebrated his crucial victory at Chaeronea.15 He erected two trophies in the territory 
of the city, both bearing dedications ‘to Ares, Nike and Aphrodite’.16 Plutarch could 
certainly see them in his own day. At first sight, the choice of the three gods seems 
quite transparent, for once: Nike-Victoria is a goddess one would expect to see 
mentioned in such a context, Ares-Mars was the god to whom the patronage of 
Roman warfare was entrusted, and Aphrodite-Venus a goddess with whom both the 
Romans and Sulla as an individual claimed a special relationship. The language in 
which the dedications of the trophies were written is a less straightforward problem. 
Plutarch remarks that the monument built on the top of a hill called Thurium bore the 
names of Omolochos and Anaxidamos, two Chaereonean notables who led the
13 On the immunity o f  the Amphiaraeum, cf. Cic. nat. deor. 3.49. On the economic history o f the area, 
see Kahrstedt 1954, 59. The inscriptional evidence suggests that the local festival in honour o f  
Amphiaraus, the Amphiaraia, kept flourishing after 80 BC: Gossage 1975, 117-121. Also see Dignas 
2002, 118-119.
14 The decision on the status o f  the Amphiaraeum is viewed in an anti-Athenian light by Cosmopoulos 
2001, 79, who supports the argument by stressing the emergence o f  local pottery in the first century 
BC.
15 On the development o f  the battle, Hammond 1938,188-201 is still fundamental; cf. Keaveney 1982a, 
92-95; Brizzi 2002,110-113,125-128.
16 Plut. Sull. 19.9 ; cf. Plut. mor. 318d; Paus. 9.40.7.
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contingent of fellow citizens which took part in the battle, written ‘in Greek letters’.17 
The mention of the two notables and the monument itself was confirmed some time 
ago by the lucky discovery in the neighbourhood of Chaeronea of an inscription 
bearing their names, which appears to be, in all likelihood, part of the trophy erected 
after the batde.18 Unfortunately, the archaeological context of the find does not enable 
us to determine how this Greek inscription related to the rest of the monument and 
its overall structure. Plutarch’s specifying that the inscription was in Greek alphabet 
suggests that the first monument and possibly a part of the second monument were 
inscribed in Latin.19 At any rate, in another passage of the biography Plutarch says that 
Sulla’s name also appeared in Greek, and that it was followed by a Greek epithet, 
’ ETra<f>p6SiTos‘: auTog Se Toig "EXXriai ypd<f>a)v m l  x P 6M’a T t£ a)V'» eairrov 
’ E ttck ^ p o S ito v  duTiyopeue, m l  Trap’ pply  ev Toig Tpcrnmoig oirrwg 
dvayeypaTTTai • AeuKiog Koppf|\iog ZuXXag ’ ETTa<f)p68iTog {Sull. 34.4: "When he 
wrote to the Greeks or had political relations with them, he called himself 
’ ETra<J>p68lT0g, and in our region one can read this on the trophies: ‘Lucius Cornelius 
Sulla’ EuCK/jpodlTOg”).
It is beyond doubt that Plutarch is here referring to the Chaeronean trophies, 
but the importance of his remark goes way beyond the boundaries of Boeotia and 
concerns Sulla’s relations with the Greek world as a whole. Very early on during his 
campaign of reconquest, certainly soon after the first decisive victory against
17 Plut. Sull. 19.10: ypdpiiaCTiy' EXXriviKOts'.
18 Published and discussed in Camp 1992; cf. the sceptical, though unconvincing arguments o f  McKay 
2000a. The international press has reported that the other trophy erected by Sulla, in the spot where 
Archelaus’ troops started withdrawing towards the Molum (Plut. Sull. 19.10), has recently been 
discovered near Orchomenus by a local peasant, and its first edition is currently being prepared by the 
Ephor o f  Classical Antiquities for Boeotia, Vassili Aravantinos.
19 N o  surviving document from Asia Minor shows us Sulla using Latin; all the messages addressed by 
him or by the Roman Senate are in Greek, though often translated from Latin original versions. There 
is a handful o f  Latin inscriptions o f  the Sullan period from Greece: two from Delos, ID  1850 (= IULRP 
349): L  Cornelius L  f. Sulla pro co(n)s(ule) and ID  1852 (= IULRP 350): L  Cornelius L  f. Sulla pro co{n)s{ule) 
/  de pequnia quam conlegia /  in commune conlatanr, also see CIC 12.2507; and, more interestingly, from the 
Peloponnesian city o f  Sicyon, where he dedicated a statue to Mars, on the southern side o f the Artemis 
temple. The dedication, probably dating to the aftermath o f  the victory over Archelaus, reads L(ucius) 
C(omelius) L(ucii) f(ilius) Sulla imper(ator) Marter. A E  1939, 43 =  IULRP 224; briefly discussed by Accame 
1946, 158 and Griffin 1982, 89. Sicyon was definitely a free city in 60 BC: Cic. A tt. 1.19.9, with Peppe 
1988, 47-49, 55-56. Schorner 2003, 172 stresses that dedications to Ares are rarely attested in Greece in 
this period. On the connection between Mars and Venus Victrix, see Galinsky 1969, 233-234.
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Archelaus (if not earlier, as we shall see), Sulla decided to deal with the Greek world 
using an epithet, ’ ETTa<j>p68lTOS*, that suggested a close relationship between him and 
Aphrodite, and soon became part of his name. The numismatic evidence confirms the 
importance of this process, and prompts further interest in the background of the 
epithet.
At the end of his campaign to the East, Sulla struck his own coinage, which he 
used to finance his army and had a wide circulation in the Italian regions where his 
conquest was easiest, like Apulia, Campania and Southern Latium.2'1 The mint travelled 
with him, and resources had been gathered on the way. In Greece, they derived from 
the conquest of Athens and, even more, from the depredation of the panhellenic 
sanctuaries. In 84/83 BC, at the end of the Mithridatic War, on his way back to Italy, 
Sulla struck a coin issue, produced both in aurei and denarii, that looks like a perfect 
epitome of the ideological agenda of his imperialistic effort. RE.C 359 has, on the 
recto, a head of Venus and the name of Sulla and, on the verso, the legend 
IM PER(ATOR) ITERV(M ), accompanied by a jug and a lituus, two symbols that are 
related to the augurate and to the concept of imperium, and surrounded by two trophies 
which have long been identified with those he erected at Chaeronea.21
Discussion has involved various aspects of this coin, such as the meaning of 
the symbols referring to the augurate and the mention of the double proclamation of 
the tide of imperator, which almost certainly refers to the victories in Cilicia and at
20 The hoards containing Sullan coins from the years o f  the Civil War have been found in Southern 
Italy, where the penetration o f  the Sullan army found no opposition: see Crawford 1964,150.
21 On the emphasis on the title o f imperator., see Cesano 1945/1946, 188; Deininger 1972, 985-986. On 
the jug and the lituus, see RRC, 373-374 and Keaveney 1982c, 154-161, linking Sulla’s ‘claim to imperium’ 
to the /w/A-declaration pronounced by his enemies while he was in the East. This coin issue has often 
been discussed in modem studies on the priesthoods that Sulla held, or may have held. On this, see the 
polemic between B. Frier, arguing that Sulla was an augur from 88 BC and claimed back the priesthood 
in 84/83 BC (Frier 1967, Frier 1969; cf. Cesano 1945/1946, 204; Luce 1968, 27), and E. Badian, 
claiming that he was a pontiff instead (Badian 1968b, Badian 1969); cf. Alfoldi 1976, 156 and Martin 
1989, 43. RRC, 374 argues that Sulla reached the augurate only in 82, replacing L. Scipio Asiagenus; 
same position in Riipke 2005, 926-927. Fears 1977, 104-105, 109-110 speculatively argues that the lituus 
is a symptom o f  exceptional divine favour and personal charisma, both in the Sullan coinage and in late 
Republican issues as a whole; also see Fears 1981, 785 and Wistrand 1987, 29. The discussion in G.-C. 
Picard 1957,174-181 is entirely misleading.
191
Chaeronea.22 It is indisputable that the two trophies are a reference to the victory on 
Mithridates. Their importance was so great that Sulla referred to them on the first coin 
issue he ever produced, on his way back from the Greek East. They were the visual 
celebration of his crucial victory in the campaign for the reconquest of Greece.
The stress on the battle at Chaeronea is hardly surprising, if one considers the 
actual development of the campaign. It was, in fact, the most important military 
confrontation that Sulla had with the army of Mithridates. When he won it, he 
probably knew already that he would seek an appeasement of Mithridates ensuring the 
status quo ante and enabling him to leave for Italy in the near future. The victory had to 
be celebrated for what it actually was: the most important moment of the war, the 
event that threw Mithridates’ army out of Greece for good and prepared its final 
defeat. In this light, it is not surprising that the trophies also feature, in small size, on 
several coin issues struck in Athens after the reconquest.23 The theme of the double 
victory may also occur in the so-called Bocchus’ monument, found at Rome near the 
church of Sant’Omobono, where two trophies feature, and the palm branch in the 
eagle’s beak clearly has two wreaths.24 It is possible that the monument was built in 91 
BC, as a base for the statue portraying the capture of Jugurtha by Sulla, and
22 See the commentary in RRC, nos. 359-360, with earlier bibliography; also cf. RRC, 732. It is possible, 
however, that the first proclamation took place in 89 BC, after the victory on the Samnites near Nola, 
when Sulla received the corona graminear. Plin. 22.12 (= HRR2 10 = Chassignet 10). Wosnik 1963, 14-31 
and Martin 1989 argue that RRC 359 was actually struck at the end o f  the Civil War, and that Sulla was 
hailed as imperator for the second time after the victory o f  the Colline Gate: I find it unlikely, since that 
was the final act o f  the Civil War (cf Val. Max. 2.8.7). Zehnacker 1973, 573-575 and Pera 1977, 244 
wrongly claim that Venus was a ‘personal’ goddess o f  Sulla.
23 Thompson 1961, 430-431, nos. 1341-1345.
24 On Bocchus’ monument, see Bertoldi 1968; Giuliani 1968 (both dating it to the second century BC); 
Holscher 1980, 357-371 (= Holscher 1994, 60-74, 228-233); Holscher 1984, 17-18, 78 (= Holscher 
1994, 149-151, 255); Schafer 1989, 74-83; Sehlmeyer 1999, 192-197. Cf. Hafner 1989, suggesting an 
unconvincing dating to the age o f  Scipio Africanus; Behr 1993, 126-127 takes no stance on the 
problem. Iconography suggests that the monument celebrates Sulla and Rome at the same time: 
Holscher 1980, 365 (= Holscher 1994, 67). The presence o f  two trophies may be explained by the need 
for symmetry rather than by a dating after the victory on Mithridates: Schafer 1989, 78. If this is the 
case, it is however harder to explain why the palm branch in the eagle’s beak has two wreaths: RRC, 
373; Holscher 1980, 366, fn. 106 = Holscher 1994, 67-68, 231, fn. 106. Ramage 1991, 112-113 argues 
that the relief is part o f  monument built after the Eastern campaign and located next to the statue 
offered by Bocchus. The arguments o f  Schafer 1989, 78 are unsatisfactory, as they give too much 
importance to the corona graminea that Sulla received in the Social War.
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demolished by Marius in 87 BC. Sulla may have rebuilt it after he returned from the 
East, bringing about some significant iconographic changes.25
At any rate, in Sulla’s intentions Chaeronea was to be remembered as the 
beginning of the new phase of the history of Roman Greece, and the moment in 
which the threat posed by Mithridates was defeated. The powerful message of RRC 
359 is complemented by the presence of Venus, next to Sulla’s name.26 The reference 
to the goddess is extremely significant, especially in the aftermath of the first victory 
against Mithridates. The importance of Sulla’s allusion to his special relationship with 
Venus in the definition of his imperial strategy has probably not been stressed 
adequately so far. Scholars have often tended to view it as a feature of his personal 
propaganda and as a claim to be used mainly in the Roman political arena. I believe, 
on the contrary, that the claim to Venus’ favour played a very prominent role in Sulla’s 
relations with the Greek world, whereas it was less intensively exploited on the Italian 
front. It is significant that the fourth name that Sulla adopted in Italy was not 
’ ETTa4>po8 iTOS*, but Felix, which has nothing to do with Venus.27 The evidence of RRC 
359, if very precious, is not conclusive. Luckily, it can be usefully supplemented by a 
literary source.
A passage of Appian’s Civil Wars, which conveniendy, although not always 
clearly, deals with the meanings of Sulla’s ‘fourth names’, records the time when 
Venus appears to have become part of Sulla’s Selbstdarstellung in the Greek East. At 
some point during the Greek campaign, Sulla consulted an oracle, no doubt that of 
Delphi (1.97.453-455).28 Despite the strong criticism he attracted in the Greek world 
for having deprived the panhellenic sanctuaries of their treasures, Sulla was very 
interested in acknowledging the function of religious institutions, pardy because of his 
personal beliefs, and pardy because he was aware of their political value. The oracle
25 Holscher 1980, 368-369 = Holscher 1994, 70-71. According to Schafer 1989, 74-75, 78, the material 
the monument is made o f is definitely from Numidia: this suggests an earlier dating. The importance of 
Jugurtha’s capture for Sulla’s propaganda is confirmed by the coin issue struck by his son Faustus Sulla 
in 56 BC: see RRC  no. 426.1 and Holscher 1994, 56-60, 227-229 (with bibliography).
26 On the portraits o f  Sulla known from coins and statues, see Strocka 2003 and Ganschow 2003.
27 Contra, Zieske 1972, 45-46. Passerim 1935 very usefully stresses the differences between the two 
epithets; a similar approach in Castagnetti 1996. Also see Ericsson 1943, 82: Felix does not mean 
‘favoured o f  Fortuna’, but ‘favoured o f  the gods’.
28 Gabba 1958, 265-267. Also see Marinoni 1987, 193-209 (an excellent contribution); Scardigli 2003, 
586-587. The episode is surprisingly overlooked by Daux 1936.
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gave him a very interesting response, based on three points, which it is worth quoting 
here.
TTei0eo p o i , 'P u p a t e .  KpdTos* p e y a  Kim pis' eScoicev 
A iv e io i; yeyri pepeXripevT|. aXXa a h  Tra/ny 
dOavaTois- eT ieT eia T t0ei. pf] Xf|0eo Ttovbe •
AeX^ois' Swpa KopiCe. Kal ecm  t i s  dp(3atvouCTi 
Taupou tlTTO VKfjOeVTOS*, OTTOU TT6pipf|K6TOy a<7TU 
Kaptoy, di, yaloixjiy eircoyupoy ’ Ac|>po8iTT|S“
■f) TTeXeKw © epeyo? X f|4n KpdTos' dp ^ iX a^ es- a o i .
‘Believe me, Roman. Cypris gave great power
to the offspring of Aeneas, which she protects. But offer
yearly gifts to all the immortals. Do not forget that!
Bring gifts to Delphi. And there is a god, for those who climb 
under the snowy Taurus, where there is a high city inhabited 
by the Carians, which they name after Aphrodite; 
dedicate an axe to her and you will obtain enormous power.’
The oracle ackowledged that, as a Roman, Sulla was a descendant and a 
protege of Aphrodite: this was in itself a great strength, and implied precise religious 
duties. For this very reason, the oracle ordered him to send gifts to Delphi and to 
honour the shrine of Aphrodite in the Carian city of Aphrodisias by offering an axe. 
These pious actions would ensure him a great power. Sulla was happy to comply with 
the order and sent the axe and a golden crown to the sanctuary, accompanied with an 
epigram in which he remembered having dreamed of the goddess leading the Roman 
army with the signs o f Mars.29 There is no evidence to say whether Sulla himself went 
to Aphrodisias at some point during his stay in Asia Minor; however, this is issue has a 
relative importance.
What matters to the present discussion is the apparent political agenda of the 
oracle’s response. A descendant of Venus was asked to put a remedy to his guilt 
towards the most important Greek sanctuary, and to pay tribute to a sanctuary of 
Aphrodite, situated in the region of Asia Minor that had been most loyal to Rome. No
29 App. b. c. 1.98.455: TovSe ao i airroKpaTtop ZuXXa? dveOriK’, ’ Ac^poSirri /  to a ’ elSov kcit’ 
oveipov ava crTpaTif)v SieTroucrav /  Teuxecn to! 9 ”Ape09 p.apvap.evry' ewrrXov.
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doubt that was the outcome of some ‘discreet diplomacy’ involving at least three 
parties: Sulla, Delphi, and Aphrodisias -  then the sanctuary of a not-so-prominent 
community in a region of Asia Minor that resisted Mithridates’ attack most staunchly. 
Sulla’s reference to his dreaming of Aphrodite suggests that the vision dated back to 
the night before a battle fought in the Greek campaign. It is striking, and no doubt 
significant, that Sulla’s dream referred both to Aphrodite and to Ares, who are 
mentioned in the inscription of the Chaeronea trophy.
His visit to the Delphic oracle probably dates to the aftermath of the victory.30 
Surely, it was the most appropriate occasion to compensate the sanctuary for the 
expropriation of its treasury at the beginning of the campaign. The gift to the 
Aphrodisias sanctuary must date to the aftermath of the batde of Chaeronea at the 
very earliest, when Sulla had already reconquered mainland Greece and was preparing 
the final stage of the war in Asia Minor. The order to make gifts to Delphi would be 
quite easily explainable in this context. There had been a crisis in the relations between 
the Roman commander and the sanctuary, which needed to be solved by reasserting 
full respect on the part of the Romans. Therefore, Sulla decided to offer the territorial 
compensation to Delphi, Epidaurus and Olympia. The second part of the response, 
suggesting Sulla to honour to the shrine of Aphrodisias, is certainly engrained in the 
context o f his Eastern campaign. As Mithridates’ success shows, Greece and Asia 
Minor had closer ties than is usually assumed. The descendants of Aphrodite were 
ordered to pay their respect to a temple of the goddess in the Greek East, which 
deserved gratitude and recognition for the firmly pro-Roman stance taken in the 
Mithridatic War, and shared by other Carian communities.31
As far as Sulla’s special relationship with Aphrodite is concerned, the phrasing 
of the oracle shows that it was rooted in the way in which the Greek world was used
30 Appian is not explicit about the chronology o f  the episode. Although it cannot be ruled out that Sulla 
visited the oracle on his way back to Italy, the prominence o f  the Epaphroditos-motif in his relationship 
with the East makes it quite unlikely. Scholars have tended to date the visit to 87 or 86 BC, and usually 
before the Chaeronea battle: a summary o f  the most significant positions in Marinoni 1987, 223-226. I 
am inclined to think that the oracle was consulted in 86 BC, after the victory at Chaeronea and soon 
before the m ove to Asia. There is no reason to believe, with Lanzani 1927, 32-33, that the appeasement 
between Sulla and Delphi must have taken place ‘non breve tempo’ after the victory at Chaeronea and 
the restitution o f  the sanctuary’s land properties.
31 See Marinoni 1987, 232-235. About the iconography o f  the Carian Aphrodite, which had some 
influence on Roman art, see Fredrich 1897 and Galinsky 1969, 217 (with further bibliography at fn. 90).
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to view and to represent the Romans. He was the military commander of a people 
whose mythical kinship with the goddess was universally acknowledged by the end of 
the first century BC (‘the offspring of Aeneas’, Alveiou yevefi, as the oracle calls the 
Romans).32 This was not controversial for any of the parties involved: the Greeks were 
prepared to acknowledge it, and Sulla was ready to exploit its political significance.33
The actual genesis of the epithet ’ E'ua(f)p6SlT0S', however, is less 
straightforward. It certainly is a development of the kinship theme developed by the 
oracle. It is hard to go beyond the conclusions reached, more than fifty years ago, by 
E. Frankel and J. P. V. D. Balsdon, showing that it is etymologically connected with 
Aphrodite and it relates to her qualities, but it cannot be interpreted simply as the 
‘favoured of Venus’, as has repeatedly been suggested.34 Sulla, or even one of his 
associates must have found the name (or rather the word) still in use in the first 
century BC Greek, they were attracted by it, and they decided to use it in order to 
stress the connection with the goddess. ’ ETTa^poSlTOST had been used, as an adjective, 
since Herodotus, and may be translated as ‘fascinating, charming’: a charm deriving, of 
course, from the most charming goddess, Aphrodite. In his memoirs Sulla made it 
clear how much he liked to think of himself as a person with extraordinary, almost 
charismatic qualities since the beginning of his career. The charm he emanated was the
32 Breglia Pulci Doria 1983, 265-279 has suggested that the Trojan liberator, the Tpu)<r mentioned in 
the Sybilline oracle recorded by Phlegon o f  Tralles (FGrHist 257 F 36.X) is Sulla, and that this is a 
development o f  the theme o f the kinship between Aphrodite and Rome that he reasserted during the 
Mithridatic War. It must be noted, however, that the Comelii were not among the familiae Troianae 
(Galinsky 1969,165, fn. 66): this may be an obstacle to Breglia’s argument.
33 Norden 1901, 255-258; Balsdon 1951, 8-10; Schilling 1954, 281-282; Weinstock 1955, 187-188; 
Galinsky 1969, 217-219; Keaveney 1983a, 60-61; C. P. Jones 1999, 97-98; Erskine 2001, 237-245; de 
Chaisemartin 2001,194-195; de Chaisemartin 2002, 233-235; Ver Eecke 2005,178-180. Cf. Liv. 37.37.3, 
dealing with the visit o f  the Comelii Scipiones to Ilium, in 190 BC: et Iliensibus in omni rerum uerborumque 
honore ab se oriundos Romanos praeferentibus et Romanis laetis origine sua. Fimbria was much less receptive: 
during his siege o f  Troy he justified his order to the Ilians to capitulate by evoking the kinship between 
the two cities in an ironic way. This no doubt played a part in Sulla’s decision to grant freedom the city: 
App. Mithr. 53.211 (cf. D io 35.104.7). See Norden 1901, 256 and Erskine 2001, 243.
34 Balsdon 1951, 8, esp. fn. 91; contra Ericsson 1943, 84; Volkmann 1958, 41; D e Martino 1973, 91; 
Keaveney 1983a, 64-65; Behr 1993,160; Fadinger 2002 (a misleading discussion, trying to discuss Sulla’s 
use o f  religion in the light o f  some Near Eastern parallels). Erkell 1952, 83 and Wistrand 1987, 27-28 go 
too far in arguing that ’ Euac^poSlTO? corresponds exactly to uenustus (perhaps following Facciolati- 
Forcellini-Bailey 1828, 2.828, s. u): see Weinstock 1955, 187 and RRC, 373. Alfoldi 1976, 144-149 
appears to confuse the role o f  Venus with that o ffelicitas. Also cf. Classen 1963, 329-331.
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alleged source of his famous fortune, and it became widely known and highly rated in 
Rome at the end of his life.35
It was only after contact with the Greek world, however, that Sulla found the 
way to develop this aspect and to exploit it within the framework and the needs of the 
Roman imperial project. It was only during the Mithridatic War that the theme of his 
special relationship with the gods could be best exploited if it was combined with the 
evocation of a kinship between Rome and an individual goddess, of course Venus. 
The official correspondence between ’ ETTacfjpoSlTOS' and Felix was ratified by a 
senatusconsultum voted in 82 BC, and Felix was added to Sulla’s tria nominal Appian 
claims, perhaps stretching the imagination, that the epithet was used by the many 
adulators of the new strong man and later passed into official use. He goes on to say 
that in Rome Sulla was also called Faustus and ‘the name can be very similar to a.iaios' 
or to €Tra<f>p68iT0S’’ (1.97.452: SupaTai 8e tou  aiaiou Kal 6TTa<£po8LTOu 
dyx0TC*TW M-dXiaTa elvai t o  ovopa). Appian is making at least one mistake: Sulla 
never adopted the cognomen Faustus, but rather introduced it among Roman 
praenomina by giving it to his children.37 The confusion may derive from a linguistic 
matter: in Appian’s day, ’ Eua4)p68iTOS‘ apparendy meant ‘propitious’ too, as he 
somewhat misleadingly related it to the Latin name Faustus. Moreover, there is no 
etymological connection between Faustus or Felix, and ’ ETra(f>p68lTOS>, which is of 
course explicidy linked to Aphrodite. They may well have been used by, and referred 
to, the same person, but their origin was clearly different.
35 Cf. Plut. Sull. 35.5-11: a woman, passing by his seat while he was sitting in a theatre, touched his toga, 
justifying her deed with the intention to get some o f  Sulla’s fortune by that quick contact: on this 
episode, see Wagenvoort 1954, 321-322 (= Wagenvoort 1980, 81-83). Front. Strat. 1.11.11 remarked 
that claiming a special relationship with the gods could be very useful for a general: L  Sulla, quo 
paratiorem militem ad pugnandum haberet, praedici sibi a dlls futura simulauit.
36 On the chronology, see Veil. 2.27.5: occiso. .. demum eo [the younger Marius] Fellcts nomen adsumpsit and 
vir. ill. 75.9. Appian tries to convey the impression o f  the great power which Sulla enjoyed in Rome by 
mentioning a statue o f  his erected in the Forum, bearing a dedication which probably read, in Latin, as 
Comedo Sullae Felia imperatori (1.97.451). On this statue, also see Cic. Phil 9.13; Veil. 2.61.3; Suet. Caes. 
75.4; D io 42.18; cf. RRC 381. See Gabba 1958, 263; Wosnik 1963, 32-37; Ramage 1991, 104-105; 
Sehlmeyer 1999, 204-209, 231-232.
37 Plutarch loosely states that both his children were given the names o f  Faustus and Fausta, as a further 
honour o f  the leading force o f  the goddess Fortuna {Sull. 34.5). The twins were probably bom  in 87-86: 
see Angeli Bertinelli 1997, 403-404.
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The decision was unprecedented in Roman Republican history, and it certainly 
involved the systematic use of the Greek name too, which is consistently used in the 
Greek documents. If one looks at the meanings of the two adjectives, their analogy is 
not ill-founded: they both refer to a range of meanings involving personal fascination, 
good luck, divine favour, and exceptional ability to influence people and situations. As 
Plutarch says, Sulla used to acknowledge a fundamental role to TUXfi — ‘fate’, ‘destiny’, 
‘fortune’.38 He saw it as a prominent force — although not as a goddess — integrating 
and completing his virtues. To his mind, none of his victories would have been 
possible without his exceptional value, and without the support and the protection 
afforded by fate.39 Any direct relationship between the cult of Fortuna and that of 
Aphrodite must however be ruled out. In fact Sulla never aimed to depict himself as a 
protege of Fortuna.40 The origins of Felix and ’ ETTCt(f)p68lT09 are independent from 
each other, and must be explained by different contexts and political agendas. 
However striking the similarities between the outcomes of these two processes may 
be, they should not conceal the profound differences.
The epithet’ETTa4>po8lTOS‘ is used in several official acts that Sulla produced 
in the Greek East, both in Greece and in Asia Minor.41 The senatusconsultum about the 
Amphiaraeum at Oropus, for instance, refers to Aeuiaos* Kopvf|\ios* ’ ETra(j)p68iT09 
(I. 52). This document, however, does not contain a message issued by Sulla himself, 
as it is a confirmation of decisions taken by Sulla when he was in Greece: the name 
’ Eud-t^poSt'TOS’ is used only once, while Sulla is mentioned five more times. The 
senatusconsultum confirming freedom for the city of Tabae, in Caria, calls Sulla AeuKLOS' 
Kopuf|Xio9 ZuXA.as’ auTOKparajp (1. 9-10), while the much lengthier s.c. de 
Stratonicensibus speaks of [AeuKios> Kopvf|\ios> A]euidou [mbs'] ZuXXas* 
’ E'rca4>p68iTOS‘ | 8iKT0tT(ji)p (1. 1-2). The difference must be explained by the
38 Plut. ffior. 318c-d.
39 Weinstock 1971, 231 on the relationship between Fortuna and Virtus in Sulla’s approach; the 
comparison between Sulla’s Fortuna and Marius’ Virtus in Wistrand 1987, 27-34 is interesting, though 
somewhat schematic. Also cf. Champeaux 1987, 218-220, 230-236.
40 Plut. mor. 318c-d must be interpreted in this light. See Marx 1890, 121-122; Marx 1899, 543-545; 
Ericsson 1943, 77-82; Erkell 1952, 72-79; Weinstock 1961, 208-209 (criticising Latte 1960, 279-280); 
Zieske 1972, 43-44; Champeaux 1987, 216-236; Wistrand 1987, 27-28; Ver Eecke 2005, 182-184. There 
are some entirely misleading discussions too: Poplawski 1927, 317-328; Lanzani 1927, 50-55; Levi 1980.
41 RDGE  18,1. 74,103, 125 (x c. de Stratonicensibus)', RDGE  20, col. lid , 1. 7 and He, 1. 4-5 (x c. de Thasiis); 
RDGE  23,1. 52 (x c. de Oropiis); RDGE  49,1. 2-3 (the letter to the artists o f  Dionysus).
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different contexts in which Sulla is mentioned. In the text addressed to Tabae, the 
Senate r a n  firm s the privileges granted by Sulla in his capacity of victorious 
commander, at the end of the conflict, when ’ ETra(f)p68lTOS‘ was not part of his full 
name. In that for Stratonicea, the dictator Sulla ’ ETrac^ poSiTOS* is addressing a letter to 
the assembly and the people of the Carian city introducing them to the context and 
the negotiations which led to the approval of the s. c., whose text follows immediately 
afterwards. However, only the first lines of the s. c. de Tabenis, not visible on the stone, 
would enable us to reach safer conclusions.
The background and the use of the epithet chosen by Sulla for his relations 
with the Greek world are not mere technicalities. On the contrary, they can help to 
understand some aspects of Sulla’s self-representation as an epoch-making leading 
figure in Roman history, who even found it acceptable to expand his name.42 Most 
importantly for our purposes, they reveal how communicating with the Greek world 
in a personal and innovative way was important to his global strategy, and how 
interested he was in exploiting the opportunities offered by the religious dimension of 
Greek culture.43
Sulla’s main aim in the Greek East was to resume its exploitation compelling 
at the same time, the local elites to get closer to Rome and to resume full cooperation 
with it. To do so, he did not limit himself to confront them with excessive demands, 
which left the Asian cities with no choice but to look for Roman patrons. He also 
tried to persuade the Greeks that, to an extent, they shared the same legacy as the 
Romans. The Romans descended from the daughter o f Zeus, the goddess who 
presided over love and social coexistence. At the same time, they were the 
descendants of the Trojans, who fought against the Greeks, but had long been widely 
regarded as very similar to them.44 The potential of such an ambiguous identity were 
obvious. Rome was somehow part of the Greek world, and still irremediably different 
to it. She had a right to interfere in Greek affairs, and at the same time could present
42 See Ericsson 1943, 78; Balsdon 1951, 1: ‘a far advance from such specific cognomina as ‘Numidicus’ 
or ‘Africanus”; Ramage 1991,101; Behr 1993,150-152.
43 Galinsky 1969, 187-188, helpfully remarks that the legend o f  the Trojan ancestry o f  Rome was used 
by the Roman elite, and that it never became a ‘living popular tradition’. Cf. ibid., 188-190, showing how 
the legend was used by Rome to mobilise the Sicilian Greeks against Carthage. The foundation o f  
Rome, and Aeneas’ role in it, started to intrigue Greek scholars by the end o f  the fourth century: see 
Cornell 1975, 23-27, with earlier bibliography.
44 On the ‘Grecization’ o f  the Trojans from the fourth century BC, see Galinsky 1969,161-162.
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herself as an independent power, and an external force.45 These themes had been 
lingering in the Roman religious discourse for nearly two centuries, but it is with Sulla 
that they were first used for an explicit political purpose, on the wider scene of the 
Empire.
3.2. A new founder for Rome
By exploiting the theme of the kinship between Rome and Venus in the 
aftermath of the Mithridatic War, Sulla also managed to make it part of his own 
political discourse, which was a global one, and went beyond the boundaries of the 
Greek East. There is not much direct evidence for Sulla’s use of religion after his 
return to Italy. It seems quite clear, however, that he gave to several of his actions the 
trademark of those of the ‘new founder’ of Rome after more than decade of turmoil 
and civil war. The theme was of course related to the kinship with Venus, although it 
had a largely independent development.
That the theme of the ‘refoundation’ of Rome was so prominent in Sulla’s 
agenda must have been known to some quarters of the Greek world too, as the 
behaviour o f the Athenian elite seems to suggest. Sulla came back to Athens on his 
way back to Italy, in 84 BC. He took several important initiatives during his stay in the 
city, and he received considerable honours too. Athens had betrayed Rome, of course, 
and Sulla showed his generosity by sparing it from destruction. His attitude towards 
the city could not be as positive as that he adopted towards the cities that he had 
declared free. However, he showed he was prepared to deal with the pro-Roman elites 
in a relatively amicable way. That is what he did in Athens, by spending some time in 
the city and accepting pledges of loyalty from the local elite. O f course, he could 
afford to behave as if he was in perfect control of the situation, with a victorious army 
protecting him during his stay and plenty of time to rest from the hardship of war. No 
doubt Sulla ‘had fun’ during his second stay in Athens — but he acted with a political 
agenda too. Even after the Mithridatic War and the complete submission of the Greek 
world to Rome, Athens was not, and could not be a city like all others.
First and foremost, Athens was still a major cultural centre. Even Sulla 
intended to exploit the opportunities it offered. According to Plutarch, during his stay 
in town he put his hands on the library of Apellicon of Teos, a former supporter of
45 Galinsky 1969, 187-190; Gabba 1976b, 94-101. Cf. the curious theory o f  the first century BC erudite 
Aristodemus o f  Nysa, who claimed that Homer was in fact Roman: Heath 1998.
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Athenion, who owned many works of Aristotle and Theophrastus.46 Moreover, in 
Plutarch’s words, he was ‘initiated’ ((11^061?) • Although K. Clinton has tighdy noticed 
that Plutarch is not explicit here about the initiation received by Sulla, it is likely that 
he actually refers to the most prominent Athenian mysteries, those of Eleusis.47 Sulla’s 
interest in or respect for Athenian culture, however, still went hand in hand with more 
ruthless attitudes. Pliny the Elder records that he used some columns from the temple 
o f Olympian Zeus in the reconstruction on the Capitol.48 It is unlikely that the 
columns o f the Olympieion that were already in place were dismantled. Moreover, the 
temple had been left unfinished after Antiochus IV’s death in 164 BC, and it was 
accomplished only under Hadrian. Pliny probably means that Sulla took to Rome 
some columns that were meant to be used in the construction of the temple.49
Some inscriptional evidence shows that the Athenians paid tribute to Sulla 
with a statue (IG 22.4103) and, more importantly, by creating new civic games in his 
honour, called Sylleia. The chronology of these games is far from certain: it is safe to 
assume, however, that they were discontinued some time after his death, although they 
were almost certainly still held in 79/78 BC, under the archonship of Apollodorus, 
who is mentioned in an inscription praising the ephebes who served in the games.50 A. 
Raubitschek has demonstrated that the holding of the Sylleia was not an entirely 
original event in the Athenian liturgical calendar. In fact, they bear striking similarities 
with the Theseia, the games in honour o f the mythical founder of the city, which 
required the participation of the ephebes as in the Sylleia, consisting of a torch race. It
46 Plut. Sull. 26.1-2. About Apellicon, see Goulet 1989a; about the role o f  his library in the spread o f  
Aristotelism at Rome, cf. Barnes 1997, esp. 8-17, and Sedley 1997,112.
47 Clinton 1989,1503: moreover, I see no serious reason to suggest that the text is corrupt.
48 Plin. 36.45: columnis demum utebantur in templis, nec lautitiae causa —  nondum enim ista intellegebantur — sed quia 
firmiores aliter statui non poterant. sic est inchoatum A.thenis templum Iouis Ojympii, ex quo Sulla Capitolinis aedibus 
aduexerai columnas.
49 Cf. Boethius 1962, 31; Gjerstad 1962, 39-40; Abramson 1974a, 8-23; Abramson 1974b. I find no 
reason to doubt that the columns were used in Rome: contra, Heilmeyer 1970, 34 and Gros 1990, 844. 
On the history o f  the Olympieion, see Travlos 1971,402-403. Cf. Wycherley 1964,170-171 (with earlier 
bibliography), speculating that Sulla did not carry columns, but smaller decorative elements, such as 
capitals.
50 IG  22.1039, with SEG  22.110. Cf. the dedication to a winner o f  the Sylleia, SEG  13.279. Kallet-Marx 
1995, 214-215 righdy argues that the Sylleia cannot have been abolished too quickly: C. Scribonius 
Curio, who played such an important part o f  the reconquest o f  Athens, was consul in 76 BC and 
proconsul o f  Macedonia between 75 and 72.
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is reasonable to believe that the short-lived games established in honour of Sulla were 
probably celebrated along with the Theseia, pretty much reproducing the same ritual.
This is not the only festival that we know to have been organised in the 
honour o f Sulla: there is a parallel at Rome. The similarity between the Theseia and the 
ludi uictoriae, which Sulla annually organised by Sulla at Rome from 1st November 81 
BC, is quite striking.51 The festival he created in Rome were part of a strategy of self­
celebration that aimed to portray him as a saviour and second founder of Rome. The 
dictatorship, and decisions like the enlargement of the Senate were surely justified with 
a parallel with Romulus, which appears to have influenced the antiquarian tradition on 
early Rome too.52 The motif was to be used polemically by Sulla’s political foes too: in 
his speech recorded by Sallust, Lepidus significantly called him scaeuos iste Ts&mulusT' By 
renaming the Theseia after Sulla, the Athenians showed that they were aware o f the 
image Sulla was trying to portray, and they chose a parallel strategy to that he adopted 
at Rome. There is no need to insist on the meaning of the analogy between Theseus 
and Romulus, which must have been apparent to everyone.54 The Athenians were
51 Veil. 2.27.6; Ascon. ad. Verr. 1.10.31 (p. 217 Stangl). On these ludi, see Keaveney 1983c, 189-191; 
Behr 1993,136-143; on Sulla’s use o f  the cult o f  Victoria, see Holscher 1967,142-147. Weinstock 1971, 
102 rightly notes that the adjective Sullanae was added only later, probably to distinguish the Victoria 
celebrated by Sulla from the Victoria Caesaris. Cf. RRC 445-446, no. 421, with the monetalis Sufenas 
celebrating his ancestor S. Nonius, pi\aetor\ l[udos\ l/[ictoriae] p\rimus\ J[ecit\. Apparently, Nonius was the 
first magistrate to preside over the celebration o f  the ludi. Mattingly 1956 argues that p i\  must be 
supplemented with Pr[aeneste, and that the Sullan ludi celebrated Fortuna Primigenia. This is surely far­
fetched, but it appears, however, that some ludi were organised at Praeneste by the Roman quaestors: 
Cic. Plane. 63 and A tt.  12.2.2, with Veyne 1975 (who does not refer to Mattingly).
52 On the analogy between Sulla and Romulus, cf. Dion. Hal. 2.7-29 and 5.77, with Gabba 1960 (=  
Gabba 2000, 69-108), esp. 206-225 (= Gabba 2000, 87-108); Evola Marino 1974, 26-30; 162-166. On 
Sulla’s self-representation as parens et seruator,, see Alfoldi 1952, 225 and Alfoldi 1953, 104. Marius had 
probably received the title o f  seruator r. p . from the Senate in 101 BC, after the battle o f  the Campi 
Raudii: Liv. Per. 68.8. Plut. Mar. 27.9 (oi ttoXXo'l ktlcttt|v Te ' P(up.T|S‘ TpiTOV eicetvov dvriyopeuov) 
is no firm evidence that he was hailed as ‘third founder’ o f  Rome: Muccioli 1994, 194-197; Ver Eecke 
2005,187-190.
53 Sail. Hist. 1.55, M 5: quae cuncta scaeuos iste Romulus quasi ab extemis rapta tenet, non tot exercituum clade neque 
consulum et aHorum principum, quos fortuna belli consumpserat, satiatus, sed turn crudelior, cum plerosque secundae res 
in miserationem ex ira uortunt. Scaeuos probably means ‘sinister’, ‘unfortunate’, as opposed to felix. Reggiani 
1994, 211-221. A useful discussion in Ver Eecke 2005, 223-233.
54 A theme unfortunately overlooked in a recent collective book on the relations between the myths o f  
Theseus and Romulus: Greco 2005. The parallel drawn by Behr 1993, 141 between the ludi uictoriae
202
capable o f using it in the most straightforward way, exploiting this equivalence and 
restoring the traditional calendar after Sulla had left the scene and his legacy had 
become controversial in Rome.
It is in the light of this analogy between Theseus, Romulus, and Sulla that the 
transfer o f the columns from the Athenian Olympieion to Rome must be seen. Back 
in Rome, Sulla had to deal with the reconstruction of a central sanctuary of Roman 
public religion and, indeed, o f the city’s very identity. Therefore, he decided to use 
some material from a temple he was certainly very familiar with, after the long period 
spent in Athens, and which was dedicated to the same god. In this process, which 
redefined the identity of Rome as centre of the Empire and of Sulla as maker of the 
Empire itself, both the cult o f Zeus Olympius and the foundation myth of Athens 
play an important function in their own right.
Sulla’s propagandists: genius extended itself to the Olympic games, the 
panhellenic competition organised in honour of Zeus himself. According to Appian, 
during the 175th Olympics, i.e. in 80 BC, Sulla summoned ‘the athletes and the other 
attractions’ of the Olympic games to Rome. For this reason, no one took part in the 
competitions at Olympia, and only the chariot races were held in the stadium where 
the Games usually took place.55 As V. J. Matthews has shown, Sulla’s decision was not 
about giving a new home to the Olympic Games, but rather about offering the Roman 
people a major celebration of his victory.56 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 
best athletes o f the Greek world were involved in the celebration of the ludi uictoriae 
Sullanae, probably on 1st November 80. They may have found it impossible to take part 
both in the Olympics and in the Sullan celebrations at Rome, and for this reason the
Sullanae and the dyove? and Oixj'iai organised at Oropus imep Tfi? Tiyepovta? tou 8f|pou to i) 
' PoopaLtov (I .  48-49) is therefore misleading. The ludi uictoriae and the Sylleia were much more than the 
celebration o f  a military success. Their parallel must be explained in the light o f  the analogy between the 
two city founders. Ver Eecke 2005, 114-129 has interesting thoughts about Mithridates Eupator’s anti- 
Romulism, which was an important aspect o f  his anti-Roman propaganda in the Greek world.
55 App. b. c. 1.99.463-464: ' PtopaToi... ai>0ig eueipwvTo f3aaiXetas\ oXupmdSwu ouacov ev  
"EXXtictiv eKdTbv e(38opf|KovTa irevTe Kai ouSevo? ev  ’OXupma to t? dyajvtapaTO? ttXt]^
CTTa8Cou 8 p 6 p o u  y iy u o p e v o ir  t o u ?  y a p  d 0Xr|Tdg Kai Ta aXXa O edpaT a u d v T a  o  'ZvXkag 
e g ' Pgl>[it|v peTeK^KXrpro eTtl 86£t| tw v  M t0pi8aT£iojv epyw v fj tu jv ' I TaXucwv. Trp6c|>a(7i9 8 ’ 
V  dvaT tvetxja i Kai i/w x a y c o y f |a a i t 5  T r X ^ ?  €K KapaTwv. Cf. Eus. Chron. I, p. 211: " A ^ p e ?  
y d p  ouk fiyajvtaavT O , EuXXa u d vT as' e l ? ' Paipriv peTaTTepifiapei^ou.
56 Matthews 1979; accepted by Newby 2005, 26; cf. Behr 1993, 141-142. Contra, Crowther 1983, 270- 
271, 273; Ferrary 1988, 519, fh. 52; Stirpe 2002,181-182.
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Olympic races were a complete fiasco. Only the chariot races were unaffected by 
Sulla’s competition, because they were deeply linked to the stadium of Olympia and to 
the religious dimension of the Games: the winner was usually granted the privilege of 
lighting the fire at the altar of Zeus.
Appian claims that Sulla organised these lavish games at Rome with the sole 
aim to please the people and make them forget the distress caused by decades of wars 
and instability. The parallel evidence we have for the dismantling of the Athenian 
Olympieion and for the creation of the Sylleia at Athens suggests that things were 
more complex than that. The temporary importation of the Olympic races to Rome 
was a feature o f a broader process, which aimed at representing Rome as the centre of 
an Empire that irreversibly included the Greek world. The response of the Delphic 
oracle had been important in acknowledging Rome’s kinship with Venus and pointing 
to the special relationship with Aphrodisias. Carrying parts of the shrine of Olympian 
Zeus was much more than a contribution to Roman architecture: it was a step in the 
process o f re-thinking Rome as the centre of the Greco-Roman world. O f course, this 
new image o f Rome could not be conceived without renegotiating the role of Athens 
itself. The city whose reconquest had made possible the victory against Mithridates 
and the return o f Rome into the Hellenistic world was then to contribute to the 
reconstruction of a crucial part of Rome itself — a symbolically much more demanding 
and complex task, after years of civil strife and open warfare throughout Italy.
Sulla never became a patron o f Athens or, at least, there is no evidence 
suggesting an explicit relationship of patronage with the city. However, the Athenians 
had some reasons to be grateful to Sulla and the ties he created with the city were 
certainly unusual. Sulla’s attitude after the war was no doubt an example to the Greek 
world that cooperating with Rome and her representatives could only be profitable. A 
story like that o f the Sylleia is a clear indication of the ultimate success of Sulla’s 
strategy in the Greek East. After Sulla had won the war and demonstrated the strength 
o f Rome and the potential virulence of her revenge, the Greek elites were compelled 
to accept Roman rule and to take active part in the reorganisation of the Empire. It 
was Sulla, with the systematic repression of anti-Roman dissent and the promotion of 
civic autonomy within the framework of Roman rule, who paved the way for the 
emergence o f a consistendy pro-Roman Greek elite, which quickly learned how to 
interact with the Romans and to put its weight in the diplomatic relations with the 
only super-power left in the Mediterranean world.
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Back in Italy, Sulla did not need to exploit the myth of the kinship with Venus 
as intensively as he did in the East. In fact, only the colony of Pompei is safely known 
to have received the name V'eneria, which may have something to do with the cult of 
earlier Italic cults.57 Significandy, the Venus-motif disappeared from the coin issues he 
struck in Italy during the Civil War, probably in 82 BC (RRC 367 and 368), to be 
replaced by the helmeted head of Rome on the recto of one issue and by the 
customary laureate head of Janus on the recto of the other assis.58 The echo of the use 
that Sulla had made of the kinship between Rome and Venus reached Italy thanks to 
the circulation o f RRC 359, and it contributed to this aspect of Sulla’s self­
representation.59
O n the other hand, Sulla recovered some of the religious eclectism that he had 
shown before putting Venus at the core of his self-representation strategy, and which 
is evidence o f a continuous interest in religion.60 At Tarentum, he performed a 
sacrifice, whereby the liver o f the victim turned out to have the shape of a crown: 
interestingly, the sacrifice was performed by Aulus Postumius, the same haruspex who 
had celebrated another sacrifice for him during the siege of Nola, in the Social War.61 
Soon afterwards, at Silvium, he was visited by the slave of a certain Lucius Pontius, 
who appeared to be in a mystical frenzy and declared to be a messenger from Bellona, 
charged to announce his victory.62 Sulla manifested his devotion to this goddess on 
other occasions too. Just before the march on Rome of 88 BC, he claimed that that 
the goddess had appeared in his dreams, put a thunder in his hand and made him 
smite all his enemies, who of course had all fallen and vanished.63 It is perhaps 
significant the Senate meeting in which he presented the project of the proscriptions
57 Cf. Lambrechts 1952 about the discovery o f  two statues o f  Venus at Alba Fucens, in an area that may 
be dated to the Sullan age: see however D e Ruyt 1982, 79-83, dating the statue to the end o f  the first 
century BC at the earliest. The territory o f  the city is known to have been affected by the proscriptions: 
Plut. Sull. 31.11.
58 See Luce 1968, 26-28; Zehnacker 2006, 56-57.
59 See Wosnik 1963, 80; Ramage 1991,106.
60 Cf. the evidence for Sulla’s devotion to Apollo, which never gained the public prominence o f  that to 
Venus: Front. Strat. 1.11.11; Val. Max. 1.2.3; Stat. Silv. 4.6; Plut. Sull. 29.11-13, with Gage 1955, 434-436.
61 Aug. civ. Dei 2.24; cf. Plut. Sull. 27.7. On Sulla and the haruspices, see Keaveney 1983a, 51-54.
62 Plut. Sull. 27.12-13.
63 Plut. Sull. 9.7-8.
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took place in the temple of Bellona.64 Sulla’s generous grant of land and privileges to 
the Diana sanctuary of the Mount Tifata has already been discussed in the previous 
chapter. Back in Rome, he showed a great attachment to Hercules. He paid tribute to 
the hero before celebrating the triumph over Mithridates, by devolving one tenth of 
his patrimony to him. He also appears to have supported the cult of Hercules by 
financing the refurbishment of the shrine of Hercules Custos near the Circus 
Flaminius.65
Sulla’s main aim at the time was to portray himself as the legitimate 
representative of Rome and the only true defender of the res publica, who came to Italy 
to bring order after reconquering the East. The verso of RRC 367 bears an image of 
the goddess Victoria in a quadriga, with a caduceus in her hand, accompanied by a 
reference to L. S V L L A  IMPE{rator) (or IMP): a celebration of the past victory and an 
anticipation o f the imminent one, both reported in the name of Rome.66 At the end of 
the Civil War, the cause of the Republic was in the forefront. Sulla was by then 
interested in representing himself as a victorious refounder of Rome.
His role in the reconstruction of the Capitol, which was however 
accomplished only a decade after his death, was of course part of such a programme.67 
His veneration for Hercules is probably to be seen as a claim to a special relationship 
with Iuppiter too. However, the extension of the pomerium was the most significant 
element o f this strategy.68 It is self-explanatory that, after the foundation, it was 
decided only by him and by Augustus. Sulla had several reasons to consider himself a
64 Plut. Sull. 30.3; D io  33-35, fr. 109.5; cf. RRC 480.1. However, the role o f  Bellona in Sulla’s religious 
discourse has sometimes been overrated: Alfoldi 1956, 82-83; Palmer 1975; Alfoldi 1976,149-158.
65 See Plut. Sull. 35.1 and Ov.fast. 6.209-212, with Coarelli 1996. On Sulla’s surplus o f  wealth after the 
Civil War, see Shatzman 1975, 272.
66 For a full analysis o f  these coin issues, see Frier 1971, 602-603 (the whole article is very important); 
RRC, 1.386-387 and 2.732. Cf. RRC 1.369-371. Also see Zehnacker 1973, 574 (earlier bibliography at 
fh. 4). Victoria is not an equivalent o f  Concordia here, pace Richard 1963, 312-313.
67 Val. Max. 9.3.8; Plin. 7.138; Tac. hist. 3.72.3; Plut. Publ. 15.1. N ot much is known about the works 
that Sulla earned out in the Forum, although some changes certainly took place in this period: see Van 
Deman 1922 and Coarelli 1985,134-135,190-209.
68 On the Sullan extension o f  the pomerium, Sen. brev. 13.8; Tac. anti. 12.23; Gell. 13.4.4; D io 43.50.1 and 
44.49.1; cf. D ion. Hal. 4.13.3. See Alfoldi 1951, 205; Badian 1968a, 34; Gros 1978, 60; Sordi 1987; Gros 
1990, 843-844; Ramage 1991, 119-120; Giardina 1995, 135-136 ( = Giardina 1997,126); Giardina 2000, 
30-31.
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new founder o f Rome, like Romulus and Servius Tullius.69 He had regained control on 
the Empire, and he had put an end to more than a decade of civil strife and war in 
Italy. Italy was now pacified, and the body of citizens had been considerably extended. 
It is perhaps in this light that the extension of the pomerium, the sacred boundary of the 
city, must be explained.
Sulla surely knew very well that the age of Rome as a city-state with a 
hegemonic function in the Mediterranean was over for good. An Empire was taking 
shape, and Roman religion had to contribute to the definition of a new strategy, by 
going back to the very origin o f Rome. The use of the cult of Venus of the East was a 
first contribution to the confrontation with the Greek culture. In Rome, the same 
theme could be exploited as far as it involved the theme of foundation, and to the 
extent in which Venus was seen as the daughter of Iuppiter, whose most sacred 
temple had been destroyed during the Civil War. Sulla’s interest in Hercules may be 
explained in a similar way, as part of an upsurge of devotion for Iuppiter, father o f the 
hero.
Sulla’s religious legacy was soon taken up by Pompey, who had Venus and 
Hercules as his favoured gods, and appeared to view them mainly as divinities 
presiding over victory.70 Sulla’s son-in-law C. Memmius, the dedicatee of Lucretius’s de 
rerum natura, showed a similar devotion for Venus, as the prologue of the poem 
strongly suggests. Moreover, his was one of the familiae TroianaeJx With Caesar, of 
course, Venus gained an even more central role at the intersection between religion 
and politics, and the Trojan myth would be revived and further developed throughout 
the Augustan age.72
Sulla’s contribution was inevitably overshadowed, and the dictator was 
remembered by the authors o f the Imperial age more for his felicitas than for his
69 The importance o f  the model o f  Servius Tullius is stressed by Ver Eecke 2005,187-200.
70 A brief, but very accurate discussion o f  Pompey’s approach to religion in RRC, 450-451.
71 Lucr. 1.1-2. About C. Memmius, see Marx 1890, 116-117; Miinzer 1931; de Chaisemartin 2001, 195- 
196. See Serv. ad^Aen. 5.117, with RRC no. 313 (106 BC, struck by a L. Memmius); RRC no. 349 (87 
BC, struck by another L. Memmius, probably son o f  the former). See Galinsky 1969, 220-221 and Pera 
1977, 241-243.
72 The reference discussion remains Weinstock 1971, 80-132.
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relationship with Venus.73 The importance of his role in the development of the cult 
o f his goddess, however, can hardly be denied. It was he who first managed to unite 
the theme o f the kinship between Venus and Rome with the theme of a new 
foundation o f Rome and her Empire. That was perhaps the most fascinating 
achievement o f a political life that had been restlessly engaged on two fronts of the 
Empire, Italy and the Greek East.
Sulla’s experience showed that the similarities between these two worlds could 
be as striking as the differences. In the next, concluding section I will try to summarise 
the main aspects o f Sulla’s imperial policies. It will be apparent that Sulla often used 
similar methods, and had similar aims in the diverse contexts where he operated. 
Narrative histories usually overlook this aspect. It is one of the aims of this study to 
bring it to light and to stress its importance.
73 On Cicero’s views on Sulla’s felicitas, see Diehl 1988, 111-115; on Seneca’s representation o f  Sulla, see 
Mazzoli 1977; on Sulla in Lucan, see Bagnani 1955. In general on Sulla’s literary portraits from Sallust to 
Augustine, see Laffi 1967a, 274-277; Lanciotti 1978,195-210; Barden Dowling 2000, 313-336.
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Concluding remarks
So far, I have discussed the contexts in which Sulla deployed his initiatives in 
parallel. I have mainly used a contrastive approach to deal with Sulla’s attitude to the 
local elites, his contribution to the development of Roman administration, and his 
development of several ideological motifs. During the late Republic, Italy and the 
Greek East were in several respects completely different worlds, and it was important 
to do justice to their differences.
It is undeniable, however, that at the beginning of the first century BC there 
was an increasing extent of interdependence within the Empire. This was especially 
the case with Italy, the centre of the Empire, and the East, its richest part. Cicero 
posed this problem most forcefully in a memorable passage of the de itnperio Cn. Pompei 
which I have already referred to in the introduction: if taxes are not regularly levied in 
Asia Minor, the financial stability of Italy is bound to collapse in a short time.1 The 
years preceding the Mithridatic War showed this economic relationship most 
impressively, and Cicero made the case for Pompey’s extraordinary command in 66 
BC precisely by claiming that Rome could not afford such a crisis to occur again.
In concluding my discussion, I will set out to stress the relations between the 
initiatives that Sulla took in the East and those that he took in the West. There are two 
possible approaches to this problem. The first is the biographical one, which I have 
intentionally avoided in this study, even if some narrative sections have inevitably been 
included at various stages. The most obvious factor that links the impact of Sulla on 
the Greek East to the impact he had in Italy is of course the relation between the 
Mithridatic War and the Civil War. Had he not been compelled to head back to Italy 
to face the final fight for supremacy, Sulla may well have chosen to defeat Mithridates 
completely, and possibly conquer his kingdom. Instead, he offered him a peace deal 
that left the geo-political situation in Asia Minor as it was before the war. Moreover,
1 Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 7.19 : detnde, quod nos eadem Asia atque idem iste Mithridates initio belli Asiatici docuit, id 
quidem eerie calamitate docti memoria retinere debemus. nam turn, cum in Asia res magnas permulti amiserant, scimus 
Romae solutione impedita fidem concidisse. non enim possunt una in ciuitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere ut non pluris 
secum in eandem trahant calamitatem.
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when he was back in Italy, Sulla certainly took advantage of the experience he had 
gained in the East, especially in his relations with the local communities.
There are, however, several substantial factors linking the destinies of these 
two areas of the Mediterranean world even more strongly than the chronological and 
biographical ones. It is on these aspects that I would like to focus here. The central 
element is the economic and financial relationship between Italy and Asia Minor, 
which became very close after the creation of the province of Asia in 129 BC. Its 
development can shed light on many crucial developments that took place before and 
after Sulla. When Asia came under the control of Rome, the senatorial elite soon 
realised the importance of the event. N ot only was it an advantageous source of 
revenue, but it represented a formidable chance for the Roman elite too. The nobility 
used it to finance its internal competition by ruthlessly exploiting the new province, 
while the members of the ordo equester who were involved in the revenue collection 
took advantage of their public contracts to increase their wealth and influence. As I 
have argued at the beginning of the first chapter, it was this very model of exploitation 
that alienated much of the support for Rome in the Greek East by the end of the 
second century BC, and ultimately determined the overwhelming support of the 
Asiatic cities to Mithridates.
When he was sent to fight Mithridates, Sulla had the crucial task to restore the 
revenue flow from the East to Italy, and he brilliantly achieved that. For this reason 
some attention has been here devoted to the reorganisation of the province of Asia 
Minor, which implied a range of fiscal measures. The effects of this reorganisation, 
however, were not the solution to all problems. The increasing economic ties between 
Italy and the East started to pose a new range of complications. The extension of 
Roman citizenship to the Italian allies, for instance, implied a different distribution of 
costs for the maintenance of the Roman army. As soon as the former socii, then 
citizens, were not expected to finance their contingents any more, the Roman army 
had to be paid for with new resources.
This enhanced the need for further Roman expansion in Asia Minor. 
Moreover, piracy had not been defeated yet, and apparendy the Roman governing 
class did not intend to consider her relations with Mithridates as a setded issue. The 
Senate’s decision not to ratify the Dardanus agreement was a clear hint that more 
Eastern campaigns were not being ruled out already in the Eighties. It was in fact with 
Pompey’s victory in the Third Mithridatic War and the creation of the province of
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Pontus-Bithynia that this phase of the Roman expansion in Asia Minor was 
accomplished. The role of Sulla in this process of increasing integration and 
exploitation is o f course significant, as it reversed a phase of crisis for the Roman 
imperial strategy, and also because it led to the emergence of a new compromise 
between Rome and the Greek elites.
The attention I have devoted to the local elites may be explained by recalling 
Rome’s well-known attitude to a close relationship with the domi nobiles. Sulla is no 
exception in this respect, although I have tried to show that his position is quite 
remarkable, as he lived in a period when many local elites became openly hostile to 
Rome. He was extraordinarily ruthless in punishing the enemies of Rome, and in 
punishing his personal enemies too. The same pattern occurs in the Greek East, as 
well as in Italy. In both contexts, retaliation involved both individuals and 
communities, as two binary strategies. One of the central arguments of this study is 
that the punishment he chose was part o f a precise political plan, as much as the 
rewards he offered to those who supported him.
In Asia Minor he sentenced the Greek leaders of the revolt to death, and he 
severely punished the formerly pro-Mithridatic cities by imposing a fine and by 
claiming back the tax arrears o f the previous five years. The result of this measure was 
to consolidate and spread the interest o f the Greek communities in acquiring the 
patronage o f Roman magistrates and notables. The evidence offered by the 
inscriptions shows that the first cases of Roman patronage to Greek cities of Asia 
Minor are recorded in the Nineties, and that nearly fifty of cases of patronage are 
recorded between the victory of Sulla and Actium. There is no steady increase, but this 
model o f relationship definitely becomes more widespread and common after the 
Sullan settlement. This can hardly be mere chance, as I have argued above. The 
increasing importance o f the koinon o f the province of Asia after Sulla is further 
confirmation of how important the interaction between Rome and the local elites 
became in this period.
In Italy Sulla punished the hostile communities with land confiscations and, in 
some cases, with the withdrawal of Roman citizenship. The land assignments were 
usually earned out as planned, although there is evidence that they were not 
accomplished in the territories o f some cities, such as Volaterrae and Arretium. The 
impact o f the law on citizenship was predictably more devastating, and the 
communities affected — Volaterrae, Arretium, and probably others — were compelled
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to seek support and patronage from members of the Roman elite. The effects of such 
measures, which were certainly no longer enforced after 69 BC, were therefore 
comparable to those taken in Asia. The local elites who had fought Sulla and 
supported his foes were compelled to change their attitude towards Rome and to seek 
new allegiances. Sulla may have wanted them to stay out of the game for a while, but 
his retaliation had the ultimate effect of persuading them to play an active part in 
Roman Italy.
As his relations with the elites show, Sulla’s career was often played on the 
double front o f personal ambitions and the promotion of Rome’s interest. The 
political use o f religious motifs that he made at various stages of his life has often been 
regarded as part o f his personal propaganda. In the third chapter, I have tried to view 
Sulla’s attitude to religion, and especially to a goddess like Venus, in the context of his 
imperial strategy and of his relations with the local elites. In the Greek East he 
developed the theme of the kinship between Venus and Rome, while in Italy he 
tended to represent himself as a new founder o f Rome. In this respect, his link with 
Venus was largely functional to support his claim to be an ideal successor of Romulus, 
and possibly o f Servius Tullius too. On both sides of the Empire, Sulla’s aim was to 
convey the idea of a new beginning, a new era of order and stability, in which the 
extension o f Roman citizenship to Italy coexisted with a new relationship, based both 
on affinity and difference, between Rome and the Greek world.
The central aim of this study was to show that the attempt to stabilise the 
Empire was central in Sulla’s agenda. To some extent, his effort was successful. He 
reached a stabilisation of the Mediterranean Empire and he brought about the political 
integration o f Italy. His constitutional reforms, which I have deliberately not discussed 
in this study, show a similar concern as that underlying his imperial strategy. They 
were an impressive attempt to stabilise the internal situation in Rome, also by 
enforcing traumatic, and in some cases unprecedented measures.
The stabilisation that Sulla appears to have envisaged, however, was not bound 
to last long. The financial costs of integrating new citizens, the growing Roman 
presence in the East, and the increasing competition within the senatorial elite made a 
further expansion o f the Empire an absolute necessity. After Lucullus and Pompey’s 
victories, it became clear that the stakes were much higher than before — and than 
previously expected. The consequence was a new ferocious competition for the
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political supremacy, leading to a new civil war, in which local elites would play a 
considerable role.
The outcome of decades of conflict was not just a new political settlement. It 
is only after Actium that the Empire started to go through a phase o f economic 
stability and growth. In this respect too the situation of Italy was quite similar to that 
o f the Greek East already in Sulla’s day. Both regions paid the price of a lasting 
economic crisis, which had causes as diverse as endemic warfare, the cost of the 
enfranchisement o f the Allies, or piracy. From the early first century BC until the age 
o f Augustus, their economic history is scattered with moments of crisis, and there is 
evidence for shortage of resources in the cities’ budgets, indebtedness, and devaluation 
o f currency, which I have discussed in the second chapter. If this is more apparent in 
Asia Minor and Greece, it is a distinctive feature of several periods of Italian history 
too, from the years preceding Catiline’s conspiracy to the debt crisis of 49 BC. Sulla 
was too busy fighting his many enemies to attempt a definitive solution to this critical 
phase. However, he managed to achieve stability on a number of crucial fronts, and to 
create some preliminary conditions that made the solution of the crisis somewhat 
more feasible. His greatest achievement in this respect, as I have tried to show in the 
second chapter, was the reorganisation o f the province of Asia — the greatest beneficium 
that the Italian elites could possibly hope for at the end of the Eighties.
With the proscriptions and the constitutional reforms Sulla unsuccessfully 
tried to make a new civil war impossible. In fact, the background of the wars fought in 
the Forties and in the Thirties is closely related to the legacy of his imperial strategy. It 
is certainly true that the ‘example’ of Sulla had crucial consequences in Roman political 
history. To a great extent it triggered the final dissolution of the Roman Republic, and 
it certainly inspired all the protagonists of this process. I hope to have shown, 
however, that the ways in which Sulla took part in the consolidation and the 
development o f Rome’s hegemony over Italy and the Mediterranean world was an 
even more substantial contribution to the painstaking process of re-definition and re­
generation o f the Roman Empire that we have been taught to call the Roman 
revolution.
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Appendix I 
The ‘Sullan Senators’
a) A new list
The list provided by Gabba includes 102 possible new members of the Senate 
in the Sullan age.1 It carefully distinguishes those whose presence in the Senate can be 
safely argued from those whose cursus honorum is less certain. This list, even after the 
corrections proposed by Nicolet, remains the starting point for any discussion, as well 
as the conclusions that Gabba derives from his prosopographical enquiry. The 
method chosen in its compilation is interesting in itself, as it is a warning against using 
the concept o f ‘Sullan senators’ loosely. The list includes all those who are known to 
have held the aedileship, the praetorship, or the consulship after 81, after holding the 
quaestorship before 81, and entering the Senate after the Sulla’s decision to open its 
membership to all the former quaestors. The terminus ante quern used for this list is 
derived from the new lex annalis voted under Sulla, which determined a fixed order for 
the tenure o f the most important magistracies (quaestorship — praetorship — 
consulship), forbiding their iteration before an interval of ten years and determining 
minimum ages for the accession to the magistracies (probably 30 for the quaestorship, 
40 for the praetorship and 42 for the consulship).2 Therefore, one must therefore 
include in the list the praetors up to 70 BC, and the consuls up to 66 BC, allowing 
about ten years from the death of Sulla. O f course, not all the former magistrates who 
ran for a higher office may have won their election in the first possible year. I have not 
included the senators who were persecuted by Cinna, joined Sulla and lost their seat 
for all practical purposes during the Civil War.3
1 Gabba 1951, 262-270 (= Gabba 1973,159-172). On the Sullan lectio senatus, see Willems 1878, 403-415; 
Hill 1932; Shatzman 1975, 475-477.
2 The main points o f  the law are outlined by App. b. c. 1.100.466: vopou? T6 e£eXve Kai eTepovs' 
6TL06TO' Kai aTpaTri'yeiv aTreiTre, TTplv T a p ie iia a i, Kai inraTeuetv, rrplv CTTpaTryyfjaai, Kai 
n )v  dpxpv tt)v  avT qv avOi^ dpxeiv eKwXuae, TTplv err| Sera 8 ta y ev ea 0 a i. On the limits to 
the iteration o f  magistracies, cf. Cic. leg. 3.3.9: eundem magistratum, ni interfuerint decem anni, ne quis capito; 
aeuitatem annali lege seruanto. The law was not famously not enforced when Pompey stood for the 
consulship in 71 BC without having hold neither the quaestorship nor the praetorship and being only 
thirty-four-years old: see App. b. c. 1.121.560 and Cic. imp. Cn. Pomp. 62. There are invaluable 
discussions o f  the Sullan law, o f  its contents and its aims in Fraccaro 1934, esp. 493-503 (= Fraccaro 
1957, 224-234) and Gabba 1958, 342-343; cf. Hantos 1986, 33-45.
3 On this group, see Hill 1932,174.
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If one is to provide a complete list of the known Sullan senators, a first group 
must be identified, including those who owed their appointment to the Sullan reform 
that allowed the former quaestors to join the Senate even if they had not held other 
magistracies before 81 BC.4 These are the people that can safely be numbered among 
them:
1. C. Claudius Marcellus (quaest. 87; praet. 80) ;
2. L. Licinius Lucullus (quaest. 87; aed. 79 ; praet. 78; cos. 74) ;
3. C. Scribonius Curio (trib. pi. 90; leg. Sullae in the Greek campaign; praet. 
80; cos. 76);5
4. Hirtuleius (quaest. 86): uncertain;6
5. M. Terentius Varro (quaest. 85);7
6. M. Fonteius (quaest. urb. 84, praet. 75);
7. M. Iunius Silanus (quaest. 84, praet. 76) ;
8. C. Verres (quaest. 84, praet. 74) ;8
9. M. Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus (quaest. 83; praet. 72; cos. 61);J
10. P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura (quaest. 81 ; praet. 75, cons. 71) ;10
11. C. Tarquitius Priscus (quaest. 81; leg. Sertorii 76-72);11
12. L. Valerius Triarius (quaest. urb. 81);
13. C. Caepasius (quaest. by 81 ?);12
14. L. Caepasius (quaest. by 81?).
4 See Gabba 1951, 262-263 (=  Gabba 1973, 160-161). The Sullan lex de X X  quaestoribus is published in 
Gabba-Crawford 1996. Also see Tac. ann. 11.22.6: post lege Sullae uiginti creati supplendo senatui, cui iudicia 
tradiderat. E t quamquam equites iudicia recuperauissent, quaestura tamen ex dignitate candidatorum aut facilitate 
tribuentium gratuito concedebatur.
5 Paterson 1985, 23; David 1992, 750-751.
6 H e might be either Lucius or Quintus Hirtuleius, who eventually were proscribed and joined Sertorius: 
Hinard 1985a, 358, nos. 30-31. However, two more Hirtulei are attested, both operating at the 
beginning o f  the first century BC.
7 Hill 1932,175.
8 Nicolet 1966, 585.
9 Paterson 1985, 24.
10 Hill 1932,174; David 1992, 761.
11 Wiseman 1971, 264; cf. W ulff Alonso 2002,185-186.
12 David 1992, 782.
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There is firm evidence that these people held the quaestorship by 81 BC, 
joined the Senate thanks to Sulla’s reform, and later pursued a political career. As the 
exiguity of the list shows, these straightforward cases are a tiny minority.
A second group, considerably more numerous, includes the senators whose 
whose cursus honorum suggests, but does not explicidy record, that they were quaestorii 
by 81. It is therefore based on indirect, although sometimes very clear evidence. 
According to the reconstruction of the lex Cornelia annalis outlined above, the list 
includes two groups of individuals: those who reached the quaestorship between 91 
and 81, and those who became praetors by 71 BC. I also include, very doubtfully, 
some characters who reached the praetorship between 71 and 68 BC, as they may 
have owed their election to the quaestorship to Sulla’s support, back in the early 
Seventies:13
15. P. ? Burrienus (praet. urb. 83)
16. A. Terentius Varro (leg. 82; praet. 78?);
17. L. Fufidius (praet. 81 ?);14
18. C. Claudius Nero (praet. 81 ; procos. 80-79) ;
19. Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (praet. 81 ; procos. 80-79) ;
20. Sex. Nonius Sufenas (praet. 81) ;
21. A. Gabinius (trib. mil. 86 ; leg. 81);
22. M. Domitius Calvinus (praet. 80) ;15
23. M. Fannius (praet. 80);
24. C. Cosconius (praet. 79 ; procos. 78-76) ;
25. L. Manlius (praet. 79 ?; procos. 78) ;
26. Cn. Octavius (praet. 79?; cos. 76)
27. M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (aed. 79 ; praet. 76; cos. 73);
28. Cn. Aufidius Orestes (aed. 79; praet. 77; cos. 71) ;
29. C. Aurelius Cotta (praet. 78 ; cos. 75) ;
30. L. Cornelius Sisenna (praet. 78) ;16
13 When an individual position is uncontroversial, I implicitly refer to M RR  for the primary evidence; 
further references are provided for the uncertain cases.
14 Nicolet 1966, 584.
15 Hill 1932,175.
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31. L. Octavius (praet. 78 ?; cos. 75) ;
32. C. Valerius Triarius (praet. 78 ?);
33. Aquinus (leg. 78): very uncertain;17
34. M. Aurelius Cotta (praet. by 77, cos. 74)
35. Sex. Peducaeus (praet. 77?);
36. C. Staienus (quaest. 77) ;
37. C. Cassius Longinus (praet. 76 ?; cos. 73) ;
38. M. Iuncus (praet. 16?) ;
39. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus (praet. 75 ? ; cos. 72) ;18
40. M. Caesius (praet. 75) ;19
41. L. Furius (praet. 75 ?) ;
42. L. Turius (praet. 75 ?) ;20
43. C. Licinius C. f. Sacerdos (praet. urb. 75) ;21
44. C. Iunius (aedil. 75) ;
45. M. Antonius (Creticus) (praet. 74) f2
46. Q. Caecilius Metellus (Creticus) (praet. 74 ; cos. 69) ;23
47. L. Calpumius Piso Frugi (praet. 74) ;24
48. P. Coelius (praet. 74) ;
49. Q. Arrius (praet. 73) ;25
50. C. Claudius Glaber (praet. 73) ;
51. L. Cossinius (praet. 73 ?) ;
52. M. Licinius Crassus Dives (praet. 73 ?; cos. 70, 55) ;26
16 Hill 1932, 175; Rawson 1978, 150; David 1992, 761-762. On the personality o f  Sisenna and his 
historical work, see Candiloro 1963; Perutelli 2004, 10-49. The fragments and testimonia o f  Sisenna’s 
work are edited in HRR2, 1.276-297 and Chassignet 2004, 49-88.
17 A senator for Hill 1932,176; contra, Nicolet 1966, 582, as his son appears to be a homo novus.
18 Hill 1932, 174; David 1992, 760-761.
19 Probably o f  equestrian origin: Nicolet 1966, 584; cf. W ulff Alonso 2002, 195-196. The doubts o f  Hill 
1932, 177 are unjustified.
20 Wiseman 1971, 267-268; W ulff Alonso 2002,197-198; cf. David 1992, 775.
21 Hill 1932,175-176.
22 Shatzman 1975, 296-297, no. 90.
23 Hill 1932,174.
24 David 1992, 759-760.
25 Shatzman 1975, 305, no. 92; David 1992, 265-266, 780-781; Wulff Alonso 2002, 194-195. Excluded 
by Nicolet 1966, 582; also cf. N icolet 1974, 786 (no. 33, Q. Arrius).
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53. P. Valerius (praet. 73??);
54. P. Varinius Glaber (praet. 73);
55. Cassius Barba (leg. Luculli 73);27
56. M. Cassius (praet. by 73);
57. L. Lardus (aedil. by 73);28
58. T. Maenius (quaest. by 73);29
59. Q. Hortensius Hortalus (aed. 75, praet. 72, cos. 69) ;
60. Cn. Manlius (praet. 72);
61. L. Afranius (praet. 71 ; cos. 60) : uncertain30
62. L. Caecilius Metellus (praet. 71 ; cos. 68);
63. Q. Marcius Rex (praet. 71?; cos. 68) ;
64. M.’ Acilius Glabrio (praet. 70; cos. 67);31
65. C. Antistius Vetus (praet. 70): uncertain;32
66. L. Aurelius Cotta (praet. 70 ; cos. 65) ;
67. C. Calpumius Piso (praet. 70; cos. 67);33
68. A. Manlius Torquatus (praet. 70?);34
69. M. Mummius (praet. 70);
70. P. Sulpicius (quaest. 69);35
71. M.’ Aemilius Lepidus (proquaest. by 78 ; praet. 69 ; cos. 66);
72. Q. Manlius (trib. pleb. 69);
73. L. Volcatius Tullus (praet by 69; cos. 66);
74. P. Cornelius Sulla (praet. by 68; cos. design. 65);36
75. T. Aufidius (praet. 67 ca);37
26 Hill 1932,174.
27 Hill 1932,176.
28 Rawson 1978, 150.
29 Taylor 1960, 228.
30 Hill 1932, 176; excluded by Nicolet 1966, 582; cf. Nicolet 1974, 767-768 (no. 13) and Wulff Alonso 
2002, 194.
31 David 1992, 757.
32 A Sullan senator for Nicolet 1966, 582.
33 David 1992, 782-783.
34 David 1992, 789-790.
35 He was still a simple senator in 70 BC, but he was elected quaestor for the year following the lectio and 
had to resign from the jury o f  Verres’ trial: see Cic. Verr. 1.30 and Nicolet 1966, 585.
36 David 1992, 785-786.
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76. M. Petreius (held magistracies and public offices from 92 to 63).38
For some others the date of the first magistracy is unclear, but there is literary or 
inscriptional evidence that they joined the Senate in the late Eighties or in the early 
Seventies, either by Sulla’s appointment of after holding a magistracy:
77. L. Procilius (senator by 80): uncertain
78. L. Faberius (senator by 78);39
79. Q. Petillius (senator by 78);
80. T. Manlius Torquatus (senator by 78);40
81. C. Velleius (senator before 77): uncertain
82. C. Luscius Ocrea (senator by 76) ;41
83. L. (Octavius) Ligus (senator by 75);
84. M. Octavius Ligus (senator by 75);
85. P. Popillius (senator before 74);42
86. C. Fidiculanius Falcula (senator by 74);
87. Ti. Gutta (senator by 74);43
88. M. Iuventius Pedo (senator by 74);44
89. L. Caulius Mergus (senator by 74) ;45
37 Doubtful. See Cic. Brut. 175; Val. Max. 6.9.7; cf. Shatzman 1975, 306-307, no. 95.
38 Sail. Cat. 59.6: C. A.ntonius.. . M. Petreio legato exercitum permittit... homo militaris, quod amplius annos triginta 
tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus aut praetor cum magna gloria in exercitu fuerat. See Hill 1932, 176; Nicolet 
1974, 976-977 (no. 267).
39 The name is unparalleled in the ordo senatoriur. Nicolet 1966, 584.
40 David 1992, 790.
41 Syme 1964, 119 (= Syme 1979, 597); Wiseman 1971, 239. Perhaps related to the Sullan centurion 
Luscius, who gathered a huge wealth in the proscriptions, but was convicted in 64 BC (Ascon. tog. cand. 
81).
42 Expelled in 70 BC. See Cic. Cluent. 47.132: uerum esto: condemnat Popilium Gellius, iudicat accepisse a Cluentio 
pecuniam. Negat hoc Centulus. nam Popilium, quod erat libertini filius, in senatum non legit, locum quidem senatorium 
ludis et cetera omamenta relinquit, et eum omni ignominia liberat; quod cum facit, iudicat eius sententia gratis esse 
Oppianicum condemnatum. et eundem Popilium postea Centulus in ambitus iudicio pro testimonio diligentissime laudat. 
Cf. Hill 1932, 177.
43 Nicolet 1966, 586 doubts that he was a Sullan senator.
44 Nicolet 1966, 587; N icolet 1974, 919 (no. 190).
45 N icolet 1966, 587; N icolet 1974, 833 (no. 89).
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90. M. Basilus (senator by 74);^
91. C. Caudinus (senator by 74);
92. L. Cassius (senator by 74) ;47
93. Cn. Heius (senator by 74);48
94. P. Saturius (senator by 74);49
95. P. Octavius Balbus (senator by 74);5()
96. Q. Octavius Considius (senator by 74);51
97. M. Atdlius Bulbus (senator by 74);52
98. M.’ Aquilius (senator by 74);53
99. Cn. Egnatius (senator by 74);54
100. M. Seius (aed. cur. 74);55
101. P. Septimius Scaevola (senator by 74);
102. L. Voluscius (aedilis by 73);56
103. C. Octavius (quaest. ca. 73);57
104. L. Claudius (senator by 73) ;58
105. C. Annaeus Brocchus (senator by 73) ;59
106. Q. Axius (senator by 73);60
107. Q. Pompeius Rufus (senator by 73);61
46 A former equestrian judge, then included in the Sullan lectio-. Nicolet 1966, 585.
47 Nicolet 1966, 587; Nicolet 1974, 828-829 (no. 84).
48 Perhaps not appointed by Sulla: Nicolet 1966, 586; Nicolet 1974, 909 (no. 176).
49 Nicolet 1966, 588; N icolet 1974,1012 (no. 312); David 1992, 773-774.
50 Possibly, he is the same Balbus who served as praejectus equitum in the Collina Gate battle (Plut. Sull. 
20.3): no. 43 in PIP, no. 49 o f  Gabba’s list; Hill 1932,176.
51 A former equestrian judge appointed to the Senate by Sulla: Hill 1932,177; Nicolet 1966, 583-584.
32 Hill 1932, 175; Nicolet 1966, 583.
55 Cic. Cluent. 47.130.
54 Cic. Cluent. 48.135.
55 N icolet 1966, 586; Nicolet 1974, 1015-1016 (no. 316); Deniaux 2002, esp. 30-31. His family, 
apparently o f  Paelignian origin, had strong interests at Delos. His descendants never managed to join 
the ordo senatorius until the end o f  the Augustan age {ibid., 38).
56 N icolet 1966, 586: ‘homo novus. Rien de sur’ ; Rawson 1978,150.
57 Wiseman 1971, 246.
58 Known from the s. c. de Oropiir, Taylor 1960, 203.
59 Shatzman 1975, 293, no. 85.
60 Friend o f  Varro and Cicero: see RE, no. 4; Wiseman 1971, 61; Shatzman 1975, 308, no. 100.
61 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis, 1. 12-13; Taylor 1960, 197.
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108. Aulus Cascellius (senator by 73);62
109. Q. Minucius Thermus (senator by 73);63
110. M. Publicius Scaeva (senator by 73);64
111. L. Claudius (senator by 73) ;65
112. Q. Rancius (senator by 73);66
113. Calidius (senator by 73-71);67
114. C. Verres (senator by 72) ;68
115. C. Popilius (senator by 70);69
116. Q. Titinius (senator by 70);70
117. C. Antonius Hybrida (senator by 70);71
118. C. Aquillius Gallus (senator by 70);72
119. Statius (senator after 87).73
62 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis, 1. 13. Rawson 1978, 150; David 1992, 784.
63 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis, 1. 14; Taylor 1960, 236.
64 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis, 1. 14-15.
65 Known from the s. c. de Oropiis, 1. 15-16.
66 Nicolet 1966, 586. He was expelled from the Senate in 70 BC, for unknown reasons: Cic. Cluent. 135.
67 Hill 1932, 177.
68 Father o f  the corrupt governor: Cic. Verr. 1.8.23. See Wiseman 1971, 272, no. 479; Nicolet 1966, 585; 
Nicolet 1974, 1068-1069, no. 382. There is no ground to argue whether he became a senator before or 
after the Civil War.
69 See Cic. Verr. 1.39.
70 Shatzman 1975, 402-403, no. 208. On this character and the involvement o f  his family in the 
proscriptions, see Nicolet 1974, 1039-1040 (no. 345); Hinard 1985a, 402; cf. David 1992, 754-755. 
Nicolet 1966, 586 ranks him among the victims o f  the proscriptions on the basis o f  Comtn. Pet. 2.9 {turn 
Titiniorum ac Nanneiorum ac Tanusiorum capita demetabanl), which is however no solid evidence. ‘DoubfuT 
for Hill 1932, 177.
71 Expelled by the censors: comm. pet. 2.8; Ascon. 75 p. 84C. He was the youngest son o f  the orator M. 
Antonius, and he had served in Greece under Sulla: multos in A.chaia spoliauerat nactus de exercitu Sullano 
equitum turmas (Ascon. 75 p. 84C). Also cf. Plut. Caes. 4.2-3. See Shatzman 1975, 295-296, no. 89; B. A. 
Marshall 1985, 282, 293-294.
72 Doubtful, o f  equestrian origin: David 1992, 779-780.
73 It is unclear when this Samnite notable, TToXXti ZauviTaiS‘ ev  tco ai>[i(iaxLKa) TToXe(i.tp 
KaT6ipya<J|JL6VOS' (App. b. c. 4.25.102) joined the Senate: with Sulla, or even earlier, in 88 or 86. Cf. 
Gabba 1954a, 101 (= Gabba 1973, 268); Wiseman 1971, 263; Hinard 1985a; Magnino 1998, 175. He 
may be gn. staatis I. klar., the meddix tuticus mentioned in an Oscan inscription from the temple o f  
Pietrabbondante (ST  Sal 3): La Regina 1975; La Regina 1976, 244-245; Torelli 1982a, 182. According to 
Crawford 1983, 50 he may well be Campanian, and not Pentrian.
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For some other characters who supported Sulla in his military campaigns the 
appointment to the Senate may cautiously be suggested, although there is litde, or no 
evidence for their later cursus honorum\
120. L. Minucius Basilus (leg. L. Sullae 88, tr. mil. 86);74
121. Q. Bruttius Sura (leg. in Macedonia in 87) ;75
122. Munatius (Plancus?) (leg. L. Sullae 87);
123. L. Hortensius (propraet. in 87);76
124. A. Gabinius (trib. mil. 87) ;77
125. Erucius (official with Sulla at Chaeronea);78
126. (Sulpicius) Galba (a legatus of Sulla at Chaeronea);79
127. Cn. Manlius Agrippa (probably a legatus in the Greek campaign);80
128. (Vibius) Pacia(e)cus (leg. L. Sullae 81);81
129. C. Visellius Varro (trib. mil. 80-79; quaest. by 73);
130. L. Marcilius (leg. Luculli 74-72);82
131. Somatius (leg. Luculli 74-68).
Finally, there are several individuals who reached the quaestorship by the end of the 
Seventies, and who might have been appointed to the Senate by Sulla some years 
earlier. It is therefore worth including them in the list, although their position remains 
quite unclear:
74 Hill 1932, 176; Keaveney 1984, 123. Nicolet 1966, 585 doubts that he ever joined the Senate, but cf. 
Nicolet 1974, 955-956, no. 236.
75 Plut. Sull 11.6-7,
76 Plut. Sull. 15.4-6; 17.7; 19.1-3. See Keaveney 1984,122.
77 Plut. Sull 16.14-15; 17.12; 18.1; App. Mithr. 66.
78 Plut. Sull 16.15; 18.1: Sulla put him in charge o f  a contingent o f  Chaeroneans. Perhaps he must be 
identified with the prosecutor o f  Q. Roscius Amerinus: Nicolet 1974, 870, fn. 3; Shatzman 1975, 272- 
273; David 1992, 264, 762-763. It remains to be explained, however, why Cicero does not refer to his 
senatorial rank.
79 Plut. Sull 17.13; App. Mithr. 43.166. Perhaps he also took part in the Social War: Liv. Per. 72 and 76.
80 One o f  the dedicatees o f  three honorific inscriptions put up in the Agora o f  Messene, along with 
Sulla and Murena: Dohnicht-H eil 2004.
81 Plut. Sert. 9.2; Plut. Crass. 4.2, 32.2.
82 Wiseman 1971, 240.
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132. L. Critonius (aed. 83);
133. L. Papius (monetalis ca. 78);
134. Vatienus (senator after 76?);83
135. L. Plaetorius (quaest. 74-66);84
136. Q. Caecilius Niger (quaest. Sicily 72);85
137. P. Caesetius (quaest. Sicily 72);86
138. Cervius (leg. Verres in Sicily);87
139. Cossutius Sabula (monetalis 72);88
140. M. Plaetorius Cestianus (quaest. by 70?) ;89
141. At(t)idius (senator by 67 BC).90
A fragment of Varro’s Saturae Menippeae (453 Bucheler-Heraus = 455 Cebe) 
has been used as evidence for the existence of another Sullan senator: noster Atticus 
rivalis, homo item lectus in curiam cum macescehat. In fact, there are no elements to discuss 
the identity o f this character, whom we only know to have a rural background and 
never to have got used to his new position. There is certainly no reason to claim that 
he is T. Pomponius Atticus, whom appears never to have become a senator.91
b) The geographical provenance
The origin of most of the Sullan senators is hard to establish. Here follows a list of 
those whose provenance may be guessed:
M.’ Acilius Glabrio Ostia?92
83 There is no direct evidence, but his wife was a Cornelia L. Scipionis f., perhaps daughter o f  Scipio 
Asiagenus (which would make a Sullan allegiance unlikely): CZL 12.821, with Syme 1956, 208 (= Syme 
1979, 320); Wiseman 1971, 270.
84 Wiseman 1971, 251, no. 319.
85 Badian 1958, 302-303; Wiseman 1971, 218; David 1992, 781-782.
86 Wiseman 1971, 219.
87 Wiseman 1971, 223.
88 Wiseman 1971, 227: from a wealthy equestrian family.
89 Syme 1964,114 (= Syme 1979, 592); Wiseman 1971, 251, no. 320; David 1992, 794-795.
90 App. Mithr. 90.410, with Wiseman 1971, 216.
91 See Cebe 1996, 1841-1842, with earlier bibliography. Cf. Wiseman 1971, 279, no. 522.
92 Taylor 1960, 325; Syme 1964, 110-111 (= Syme 1979, 587-588); Shatzman 1975, 293. Licordari 1982, 
35 is more cautious.
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L. Afranius Cupra Maritima93
C. Annaeus Brocchus Forum Novum? 94
C. Antistius Vetus Gabii?95
Q. Arrius Formiae? Capua? 96
At(t)idius Central Apennines?
Axius tribulis o f Varro; Reate
M. Basilus Cupra Maritima?
Q. Caecilius Niger Sicily
C. Caepasius Clusium?
L. Caepasius Clusium?
M. Caesius Praeneste, Pompeii, Arpinum?
Cn. Egnatius Capena?97
L. Faberius Etruria
M. Fonteius Tusculum 98
Fufidius Arpinum?99
A. Gabinius Campania?100
T. Gutta Campania?101
Cn. Heius Cumae102
Hirtuleius Cures? Trebula Mutuesca? 103
M. Iuventius Pedo Tusculum?104
L. Lartius Castrum Novum
Luscius Ocrea Lanuvium105
93 Taylor 1960, 188; Gasperini-Paci 1982, 226-227.
94 Taylor 1960, 190.
95 Taylor 1960, 192; Licordari 1982, 28-29.
96 Shatzman 1975, 305; Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1982, 79. According to Licordari 1982, 34, he is from 
Minturnae.
97 Taylor 1960, 211. Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1982, 85 stresses that there is no ground to relate this Egnatius 
with the Egnatii attested in Campania.
98 Taylor 1960,214-215.
99 Licordari 1982, 20.
100 Taylor 1960, 217. N ot listed in Cebeillac-Gervasoni 1982.
101 Cf. the Marian Gutta, who was from Campania: App. b.c. 1.90.416, with Badian 1958, 247.
102 Lomas 1993, 158-159, listing the relevant evidence.
103 Cf. Taylor 1960, 221.
104 Licordari 1982, 49.
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L. Marcilius Aesemia106
L. Minucius Basilus Cupra Maritima107
Munatius (Plancus?) Tibur108
Sex. Nonius Sufenas Trebula Suffenas?109
C. Octavius Velitrae110
L. (Octavius) Ligus Liguria?
M. Octavius Ligus Liguria?
Paciaecus Spain??
L. Papius Lanuvium?111
M. Petreius Aricia?112
L. Plaetorius Tusculum (or Praeneste)
Plaetorius Cestianus Tusculum (or Praeneste)
L. Procilius Lanuvium114
M. Pupius Piso Frugi Velitrae?115
Rancius Umbria
M. Seius Paeligni116
Somatius Picenum117
Statius Samnium
Tarquitius Priscus Tarquinii? Caere?118
A. Terentius Varro Reate
M. Terentius Varro Reate
Q. Titinius Mintumae119
CIL  14.2119; Eph. Epigr. 7.1237; Syme 1964,119 (= Syme 1979, 597); Licordari 1982, 31.
A Q. Marcilius L. f. was duovir av Aesemia: ILERP  526.
Taylor 1960, 235; Gasperini-Paci 1982, 227-228.
Licordari 1982, 43.
Licordari 1982, 45.
Licordari 1982, 51.
Licordari 1982, 32.
CIE  14.4197, with Taylor 1960, 242; Licordari 1982,19.
Licordari 1982, 49-50.
Taylor 1960, 248-249.
Cf. Taylor 1960, 249.
N ot listed in Torelli 1982a.
Gasperini-Paci 1982, 240-241.
Torelli 1982b, 296 assigns him to Caere, against Wiseman 1971, 264.
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L. Valerius Triarius 
C. Valerius Triarius 
Vatienus 
C. Velleius 
C. Verres 
C. Visellius Varro 
L. Volcatius Tullus 
L. Voluscius
Fundi120 
Fundi ? 
Reate? 
Lanuvium121 
Sora122 
Reate?123 
Etruria124 
V olsci125
Appendix II 
Sulla in the Epigraphical Evidence
Here follows a list of the known inscriptions in which the name of Sulla is
recorded. The titulature is mentioned for all the cases where it is attested.
SEG  44.1227 Mopsuhestia: asylia grant to the temple of Serapis,
accompanied by a letter of Sulla dictator.
Syll? 745 Rhodes: honorific dedication to a local notable, who
met a number o f Roman magistrates, including Lucius 
Sulla GTpaTaybu avOuTTaTov ' Pa)(iaitov.
Plut. Sull. 19.9-10; 34.4 Chaeronaea: inscriptions on two trophies put up after
the battle of 86 BC; at least one mentioned AeuKLOS' 
Kopi/f|\ios* ZuAAas' ’ Etkk^poSitos*.
RD G E  17 Tabae: s.c de Tabenis, passed in 81-80 BC, mentioning
AeuKtos* Kopvr)Xios* ZuXXas* auTOKpaTajp (but 
voted during the dictatorship).
119 Licordari 1982, 35.
120 Licordari 1982, 28.
121 Licordari 1982, 33.
122 Taylor 1960, 264.
123 Taylor 1960, 266.
124 Cf. the haruspex Vulcatius (or Vulcanius) in Serv. ad Eel. 9.46, with Rawson 1978,146, 150.
125 Taylor 1960, 267.
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RDGE 18
RD G E  19 
RDGE  20
RDGE  21
RDGE 49
RDGE 70
IL S  8771
ILLKP  349 
ILLRP  350 
.4E  1971,448
ILLRP  224 
7G22.410
RDGE 49
ILLR P  346 
ILLRP  M l  
ILLRP  348 
ILLRP  351 
^4E 1975, 219 
ILLRP  352
Lagina Sanctuary, Stratonicea: r.c <7<? Stratonicensibus, 
passed in 81 BC, mentioning Acuklos" KoptTiAios 
AJeuKiou [1/1 0 9 ] XtiXXag ’ ETrac|>p6 8 iT0 9  |
SlKTClTlOp.
Cormus : r.c'. Cormis, mentioning ZuXXa9 (very 
fragmentary).
Thasus : r.c. ^  Thasiis, passed in 80 BC, mentioning 
A€ukio9 KoptT|Xio9 ZuXXa9 ’ETra(|>p6 8 iT0 9  
UTTCLT0 9 .
Thasus : letter o f the proconsul Cn. Cornelius
Dolabella to the city, mentioning an earlier decision of 
Sulla.
Cos: two letters of Sulla’ ElTa(|)p68etT09 8lKTdTU)p to 
the city, dealing with he status of the artists of 
Dionysus.
Chius: letter of a proconsul to the city, mentioning an 
earlier decision of Sulla SfUTfpot' i/naT0 9 . 
Halicarnassus: dedication to Sulla aTpaTT)Y0 9
avQvTTOLTOS.
Delos: dedication to Sulla proconsul.
Delos: dedication of the collegia to Sulla proconsul. 
Akraiphia: dedication to Sulla i|lTTepdT(op, CTtOTTjp, 
eU6pY6TT)9
Sicyon: dedication of Sulla imperator to Mars.
Athens: dedication of a statue to Sulla (very 
fragmentary)
Cos: Sulla’s epistle on the status of the artists of 
Dionysus.
Pompeii: graffito (L  Sul/a)
Pompeii: graffito (L  C(omelius) Sulla)
Pompeii: graffito (L  Cornelius Sulla).
Suessa: dedication to Sulla imperator.
Larinum: dedication to Sulla dictator, patronus of the city. 
Vicus Laci Fundani, Rome: dedication to Sulla Felix 
dictator.
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IULRP  353 Mintumae: dedication to Sulla Felix dictator from a
group of freedmen.
ILLRP  355 Alba Fucens: dedication to Sulla Felix dictator.
ILLRP  356 Clusium: dedication to Sulla Felix dictator.
RDGE  23 Oropus: s.c. de Oropiis, passed in 73 BC, referring to
earlier decisions of AetiKLOS* KoptT|XlOS' ZuXXas*.
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